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On 29 January 1996, the Security Council expressed its support for the efforts
of the Secretary-General to facilitate a comprehensive political dialogue in
Burundi with the objective to, ia, promote the rule of law.1 From this date
onward, the Council has invoked the rule of law in 281 resolutions and 163
presidential statements.2 The rule of law figured most prominently in Council
resolutions reacting to situations in conflict- and post-conflict states where the
Council furnished several UN peace operations with rule of law mandates
aimed at establishing or strengthening rule of law related institutions and
procedures.3 In this context, the Council developed a vocabulary intimately
related to the rule of law, invoking guarantees such as due process, separation
of powers or judicial independence. Another field in which the Council actively
employed the rule of law is the prevention and fight against crimes of a cross-
border dimension or with cross-border effects such as terrorism, piracy or
sexual violence in conflict. Additionally, in 2003 the Council started holding
open thematic debates on the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in
the maintenance of international peace and security, allowing UN member states
to deliberate on the elements and implications of the rule of law.4
1 UNSC Res 1040 (29 January 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1040 [2].
2 Full-text search with symbols ‘S/RES/’ & ‘S/PRST’ with UN Official Document System
search mask ‹https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/xpSearchResultsE.xsp› accessed
14 July 2017. The present thesis has included resolutions issued until and including
24 June 2017. The first resolution invoking the rule of law was issued in 1961 in
response to the situation in the Congo. See, UNSC Res 161 (21 February 1961) UN Doc
S/4741 [section B, preamble, indent 2]. It was, however, only in the late 1990 s that the
Council started to repeatedly invoke the rule of law in its resolutions.
3 Security Council Report, ‘Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law’ (28October 2011) 2;
Richard Sannerholm, Rule of Law after War and Crisis (Intersentia 2012) 51, 56; Hilary
Charlesworth and Jeremy Farrall, ‘Regulating the Rule of Law through the Security
Council’ in Jeremy Farrall, Hilary Charlesworth (eds), Strengthening the Rule of Law
through the UN Security Council (Routledge 2016) 1, 3.
4 See, 4833rd Council Meeting on Justice and the Rule of Law: the United Nations role,
UN Doc S/PV.4833 (24 September 2003) and the related UNSC Presidential Statement
15 (2003) UN Doc S/PRST/2003/15 and 4835th Council Meeting on Justice and the
Rule of Law: the United Nations role, UN Doc S/PV.4835 (30 September 2003); 5052nd
Council Meeting on Justice and the Rule of Law: the United Nations role, UN Doc S/
PV.5052 (6October 2004) and the related UNSC Presidential Statement 34 (2004) UN
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The prominent emergence of the rule of law on the Council’s agenda in the
1990s must be contextualised with a view to the general developments in world
politics and the international legal order of the time. The post 1989-phase was
characterised by an awakening of international cooperation, an increased use of
international law to manage international relations, the creation of a variety of
multilateral institutions and an increased focus on the legal protection of the
individual through international law.5 The end of the Cold War also put an end
to those bipolar political dynamics that had made it impossible for an organ such
as the UN Security Council to agree on a model of domestic governance
for states – an important corollary of its later engagement in rule of law
promotion.6 Quite generally, the Council had been inhibited during the Cold
War era to elaborate on the meaning and scope of those Charter articles that
pertain to the maintenance of international peace and security and thus on
the tools to fulfil its mandate – such as, eg, the rule of law.7 The prominent
Doc S/PRST/2004/34; 5474th Council Meeting on Strengthening international law: rule
of law and maintenance of international peace and security, UN Doc S/PV.5474 (22 June
2006) and the related UNSC Presidential Statement 28 (2006) UN Doc S/PRST/2006/28;
6347th Council Meeting on The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the
maintenance of international peace and security, UN Doc S/PV.6347 (29 June 2010) and
the related UNSC Presidential Statement 11 (2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11; 6705th
Council Meeting on The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the
maintenance of international peace and security, UN Doc S/PV.6705 (19 January 2012)
and the related UNSC Presidential Statement 1 (2012) UN Doc S/PRST/2012/1; 6849th
Council Meeting on The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the
maintenance of international peace and security, UN Doc S/PV.6849 (17October 2012);
6913th Council Meeting on The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the
maintenance of international peace and security, UN Doc S/PV.6913 (30 January 2013);
7115th Council Meeting on The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the
maintenance of international peace and security, UN Doc S/PV.7115 (21 February 2014)
and the related UNSC Presidential Statement 5 (2014) UN Doc S/PRST/2014/5.
5 André Nollkaemper, ‘The Process of Legalisation After 1989 and its Contribution to the
International Rule of Law’ (2010) 3 Select Proceedings of the European Society of
International Law 89, 92f; Heike Krieger, ‘Trumping International Law? Implications of
the 2016 US Presidential Election for the International Legal Order’, EJIL: Talk!
(3 January 2017) ‹https://www.ejiltalk.org/trumping-international-law-the-implications-
of-the-2016-us-presidential-election-for-the-international-legal-order/› accessed 14 July
2017.
6 Roland Paris, At War’s End (CUP 2004) 15.
7 José Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers (OUP 2005) 184f; Brian
Frederking, The United States and the Security Council (Routledge 2007) 31; Jonathan
Graubart, ‘NGOs and the Security Council: Authority All Around But for Whose
Benefit?’ in Bruce Cronin, Ian Hurd (eds), The UN Security Council and the Politics of
International Authority (Routledge 2008) 154, 157; Simon Chesterman, Ian Johnstone
and David Malone, Law and Practice of the United Nations (OUP 2016) 33 f.
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emergence of the rule of law in Council documents during the past twenty years
must, thus, be related to the Council’s newly gained ability to achieve consensus
on previously contentious issues.8 The increasing involvement of the Council
with matters pertaining to the internal governance structure of states, however,
also related to another development of the post-Cold War world order.
Increasingly, the Council had to deal with internal conflicts as opposed to inter-
state conflicts that had traditionally characterised its agenda.9 Correspondingly,
the Council’s engagement with the rule of law must be understood as an attempt
to create strong state structures in order to address security threats or to prevent
threats arising from deficient state institutions.10
Another post-Cold War phenomenon relevant for the subject of the present
thesis was the rise of human rights in national, regional and international law.
Accordingly, human rights also figured more prominently on the Council’s
agenda.11 Since Russia and China, however, generally considered human rights
an issue outside the ambit of the Council’s mandate, the rule of law was
a convenient compromise vehicle for Council members to initiate similar
activities in the name of a different concept.12 In academia, the transition from
a human rights- to a rule of law discourse has been criticised as a deliberate
decision to evade the transformative and emancipatory potential for social
change of human rights in favour of the more conservative and normatively less
ambitious rule of law agenda.13 If, however, Council resolutions that invoke
the rule of law indeed serve the concealed promotion of human rights as
suggested by the not-for-profit organisation Security Council Report, then the
substitution of a human rights- by a rule of law discourse would not have a
substantial bearing on a level of implementation.14 The concomitant differences
in discourse, however, most likely affect the associated ideation on the rule of
8 Martin Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law after the Short Twentieth Century: Launching a Global
Career’ in Richard Nobles and David Schiff (eds), Law, Society and Community: Essays
in Honour of Roger Cotterrell (Ashgate 2014) 327–346.
9 Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law (n 3) 2.
10 Nico Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of
the United Nations: A Commentary, vol II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) n 36.
11 See, eg, Katarina Månsson, ‘UN Peace Operations and Security Council Resolutions: A
Tool for Measuring the Status of International Human Rights Law?’ (2008) 26 Neth.
Q. Hum. Rts. 79-107.
12 Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law (n 3) 14.
13 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Rebuilding: A
Critical Examination’ (2008) 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1345, 1359 f.
14 Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law (n 3) 14 (‘Incorporating the rule of law into its
vocabulary has allowed for the Council to promote the protection of human rights without
labelling its actions as such, thus avoiding tensions and criticism by those who view the
link between international peace and security and human rights as tenuous.’).
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law among Council members and those agents interacting with the Council or
affected by its decisions and recommendations.
It is in this field of research that the present thesis situates itself by trying to
assess the potential of Council documents to affect the emergence of a global
understanding of the rule of law. It therefore assumes that the practice of the
Council, an organ providing a platform for international legal and political
discourse, may be reflective of an emerging consensus among states with
regard to certain rule of law elements or result in it as a consequence of the
organ’s far reaching powers to issue decisions binding upon UN member and
non-member states or its potential ability to affect an ideation related to the
concept of the rule of law due to its political authority. The fact that binding
rule of law measures often interfere deeply with the internal governance
structure of affected states and sometimes even with individual rights of
their inhabitants, constitutes another reason why it is essential to establish a
clearer understanding of the concrete contours of the Council’s rule of law
understanding and the circumstances of its use.
II. Research Questions and their Relevance
The first research question of the present thesis is whether repeated references to
the rule of law in Council documents may indicate the emergence or even
existence of a global consensus on the meaning of the concept of the rule of
law. The follow-up and second research question then inquires whether the
Council itself may be said to have developed an understanding of the rule of
law and under what circumstances its practice may contribute to a diffusion
of its understanding among states and the wider international society. The
research questions’ relevance relates to the lack of detailed research with regard
to the Council’s engagement with the rule of law and to the assumed impact of
the Council on the governance structure of states affected by binding rule of law
measures as well as on an international ideation process related to the meaning
of the rule of law due to its singular function and powers in the international
society.
The first reason of the thesis’ research relevance pertains to a lack of
profound research regarding the scope and implications of the Council’s rule of
law understanding. Despite the increased engagement of the Council with the
rule of law, only few scholars have dedicated their research to an analysis of the
UN organ’s understanding of the principle. Many authors have written about
UN peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities and the Council’s role in this
field and several publications have focused on rule of law components of UN
peace operations without, however, delving into the Council’s rule of law
II. Research Questions and their Relevance
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understanding in this context.15 While several authors have focused on the
question to what extent the Council itself is bound by or shall respect the rule
of law in the exercise of its powers, very few have attempted to analyse the
Council’s approach to and understanding of the rule of law.16
15 On UN peace operations see, eg, John T O’Neill and Nicholas Rees, United Nations
Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (Routledge 2005); Julia Leininger, ‘Democracy
and UN Peace-keeping’ (2006) 10 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 465–530; Michael Doyle
and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Peacekeeping Operations’ and Roland Paris, ‘Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding’ in Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the
United Nations (OUP 2007) 323–348, 404–426; Månsson (n 11) 79-107; Susanne
Alldén and Ramses Amer, ‘The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned
from Cambodia and East Timor’ in Per Bergling, Jenny Ederlöf and Veronica Taylor
(eds), Rule of Law Promotion: Global Perspectives, Local Applications (Iustus Förlag
2009) 111–128; Eric de Brabandere, ‘UN Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Activities’ (2014)
18 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 188–216; Jennifer Easterday, ‘The Rule of Law at the
National and International Levels in Post-Conflict Peace Agreements’ in Machiko
Kanetake and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the National and
International Levels: Contestations and Deference (Hart Publishing 2016) 383–408. On
rule of law components of UN peace operations see, eg, David Tolbert and Andrew
Solomon, ‘United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict
Societies’ (2006) 19 Harv. Hum Rts. J. 29–62; Carolyn Bull, No Entry without Strategy:
Building the Rule of Law under UN Transitional Administration (UN University Press
2008); Stéphanie Vig, ‘The Conflictual Promises of the United Nations’ Rule of Law
Agenda: Challenges for Post-Conflict Societies’ (2009) 13 Journal of International
Peacekeeping 131–258.
16 For literature on the application of rule of law principles to the Council see, eg, Andreas
Stein, Der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und die Rule of Law (Nomos 1999);
Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘A Machiavellian Moment? The UN Security Council and the Rule of
Law’ (2006) 3 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 189–224; Kenneth Manusama, The United Nations
Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: Applying the Principle of Legality (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 2006); Jeremy Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law
(CUP 2007); Final Report and Recommendations from the Austrian Initiative
2004–2008, The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law: The Role of the Security
Council in Strengthening a Rules-based International System; Simon Chesterman, ‘I’ll
Take Manhattan: The International Rule of Law and the United Nations Security
Council’ (2009) 1 HJRL 67–73; Hitoshi Nasu, ‘Who Guards the Guardian? Towards
Regulation of the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII Powers through Dialogue’ in
Jeremy Farrall and Kim Rubenstein (eds), Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in
a Globalised World (CUP 2009) 123–142; Pavel Šturma, ‘Does the Rule of Law also
Apply to the Security Council?’ (2012) 32 Polish Y.B. Int’l L. 299–305; Devika Hovell,
The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process in Security Council Sanctions Decision-
Making (OUP 2016); Matthew Happold, ‘United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law’
in Clemens Feinäugle (ed), The Rule of Law and its Application to the United Nations
(Nomos 2016) 75–97; Erika de Wet, ‘Human Rights and the Rule of Law as Applicable
to the UNSC: Implications for the Right to a Fair Hearing’ in Clemens Feinäugle (ed),
The Rule of Law and its Application to the United Nations (Nomos 2016) 181–200;
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Various authors who did focus on the implications of Council documents
invoking the rule of law have been sceptical of whether they indicate a Council
understanding of the principle’s meaning.17 In general, the concept of the rule of
law is often described as vague and abstract and as lending itself to the
introduction and justification of all kinds of goals, purposes and interests.18
Nonetheless, several authors have attempted to shed light on the Council’s
approach to the rule of law by proposing categories that describe the various
contexts of its use.19
No study, however, has yet attempted to look at the Council’s rule of law
language in more detail, ie focused on particular guarantees identified as
sub-elements of the rule of law in Council documents and examined the
circumstances that have triggered their reference. Such a detailed analysis,
however, is an indispensable requirement of a legitimate claim that the Council
indeed did not develop an understanding of the meaning of the rule of law. To
assess the accuracy of the very generalised assumption in legal literature that
the Council has not yet developed a coherent understanding of the rule of law,
the present thesis examines the purposes the Council claims to be pursuing
when invoking the rule of law in order to contextualise its rule of law
references and the rule of law requirements identified by the Council for the
judiciary as an institution of central importance to the guarantee of the rule of
law.
Sherif Elgebeily, The Rule of Law in the United Nations Security Council Decision-
making Process: Turning the Focus Inwards (Routledge 2017).
17 Helmut P Aust and Georg Nolte, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law at the National
Level’ in Michael Zürn, André Nollkaemper and Randall Peerenboom (eds), Rule of Law
Dynamics in an Era of International and Transnational Governance (CUP 2012) 48, 55;
Farrall, United Nations Sanctions (n 16) 24.
18 Joel Ngugi, ‘Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling and
Restrictive Discourse’ (2005) 26 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 513, 515f; Simon Chesterman ‘An
International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 Am. J.Comp. L. 331, 332; Ian Hurd, ‘The
International Rule of Law: Law and the Limit of Politics’ (2014) 28 Ethics &
International Affairs 39–51; Martin Krygier, ‘The Security Council and the Rule of
Law’ in Jeremy Farrall and Hilary Charlesworth (eds), Strengthening the Rule of Law
through the UN Security Council (Routledge 2016) 13, 14.
19 Sannerholm (n 3) 55–62 (who categorises the Council’s rule of law language into ‘broad
narratives’ and references related to the ‘notion of impunity’, ‘security and law and order’,
‘judicial and other institutional reforms’); Jeremy Farrall, ‘Rule of Accountability or Rule
of Law? Regulating the UN Security Council’s Accountability Deficits’ (2014) 19
J. Conflict & Sec. L. 389, 395–397, 401–403 (the categories associated with the phrase
‘rule of law’ in Council decisions according to Farrall are ‘law and order’, ‘ending
impunity for crimes’, ‘resolving conflict through law’, ‘protecting and promoting human
rights and international humanitarian law’, ‘countering corruption’, ‘promoting principled
government’).
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The second reason of the thesis’ research relevance relates to the assumption
that references to the rule of law in Council documents may reflect or contribute
to the emergence of a global concept of the rule of law. Documents of the Council,
an organ of an international organisation of almost universal membership, may
indicate an already existing or emerging international consensus with regard to
certain rule of law elements or the function of the rule of law.
If this assumption cannot be maintained, Council documents may still
contribute to the emergence of such a consensus. Due to the Council’s
important function to maintain international peace and security and its far
reaching powers to fulfil this mandate, its actions matter greatly to all UN
member states and agencies and to the international society as a whole.20
Binding rule of law measures that are enforced by UN peace operations or
demand implementation by the addressed states may affect those countries’
future rule of law understanding via institutional transplantation.21 If such
measures change the governance structure of states based on the Council’s
enforcement powers, they may constitute interferences with the principles of
state sovereignty and self-determination and indirectly affect the rights of
individuals subject to the reformed government system.22 It is, thus, of pivotal
interest to determine the legitimacy of the Council’s rule of law understanding
based on which it interferes with or reforms the governance structure of states
as the original ‘consent of the Members of the United Nations to submit
themselves to the authority of the Security Council on matters of international
peace and security through membership of the organization does not absolve
the Council from an obligation to provide sufficient justification for the actual
exercise of political authority in a particular case’.23
Independent of the consequences that legally binding rule of law measures
may have on an affected country’s rule of law understanding, the Council may
20 Cora True-Frost, ‘The Security Council and Norm Consumption’ (2007) 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’l
L. & Pol. 115, 116.
21 On the complex conditions of successful institutional transplantation, however, see,
Martin de Jong and Suzan Stoter, ‘Institutional Transplantation and the Rule of Law:
How this Interdisciplinary Method can Enhance the Legitimacy of International
Organisations’ (2009) Erasmus L. Rev. 311–330.
22 Jochen Frowein, ‘Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions – AThreat to
Collective Security?’ in Volkmar Götz, Peter Selmer and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Liber
Amicorum Günther Jaenicke – Zum 85.Geburtstag (Springer 1998) 97, 112; Krisch,
‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 69 (referring, however, to the most invasive type
of rule of law measures by the Council undertaken in the wake of the establishment of
territorial administrations).
23 Steven Wheatley, ‘The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in
Iraq’ (2006) 17 EJIL 531, 544.
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also contribute to the emergence of a global concept of the rule of law simply by
providing a platform for an international political and legal discourse that
enables the evolution of shared understandings and intersubjective meanings of
certain concepts and terms.24 By issuing a substantial amount of documents that
amplify the meaning of the constitutional law principle of the rule of law, the
Council may further be considered as an agent of a global ‘(putative) process of
constitutionalization’.25
It remains an unanswered question at the present time, whether the Council
will further entrench its engagement with the rule of law and continue to
contribute to an international discourse on the principle’s meaning. Several
events of the 21st century suggest an end of the post-Cold War era of
legalisation, international human rights and increased international cooperation
to which the Council’s promotion of the rule of law can be counted.26 The
election of the latest US President is symptomatic of a general shift in
world politics towards an increased scepticism against law that transcends the
national realm. The British decision to leave the European Union, the
withdrawal of Russia, South Africa, Burundi and Gambia from the ICC and a
growth in popularity of protectionist and nationalist politics in Western liberal
democracies are just a few additional examples of this trend.27 In the wake of
these developments, it has also been suggested that Russia and China may
replace the US as an international norm shaper.28
24 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change’ (1998) 52 IO 887, 899f; Ian Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The
Power of the Better Argument’ (2003) 14 EJIL 437, 439, 452, 456, 460 f.
25 Anne Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism’ in Michael Gibbons and others (eds), The
Encyclopedia of Political Thought, vol III (3rd edn, Wiley Blackwell 2015) 1484, 1485.
26 See, eg, Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the
Turn of the Century (Hart Publishing 2000); Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian
Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law (CUP 2003);
Ingrid Wuerth, ‘International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era’ (2017) 96 Texas
L. Rev. (forthcoming) (on the implications for international law of the decline of human
rights).
27 Krieger (n 5).
28 Anne Peters, ‘After Trump: China and Russia move from Norm-Takers to Shapers of the
International Legal Order’, EJIL: Talk! (10 November 2016) ‹https://www.ejiltalk.org/
after-trump-china-and-russia-move-from-norm-takers-to-shapers-of-the-international-
legal-order/› accessed 14 July 2017. It is no coincidence that the American Society of
International Law has launched a live online briefing series for the first 100 days of the
Trump presidency under the heading ‘International Law and the Trump Administration’
scrutinising how the newly elected government treats its existing international law
obligations and its future policy choices with regard to international law. ‹https://www.
asil.org/100days› accessed 14 July 2017.
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The role and evolution of an international rule of law discourse in this
allegedly new era is uncertain. If it is indeed considered a convenient substitute
for the more transformative potential of the human rights discourse and – as
Rajagopal suggests – ‘much more empty of content and capable of being
interpreted in many diverse, sometimes contradictory, ways’, it might still fare
well in times characterised by waning international consensus.29 At the present
time at least, the rule of law still figures prominently in Council decisions and
informs the mandates of UN peace operations. Accordingly, on 13April 2017
the Council established the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
(MINUJUSTH), which is expected to start its work on 16October 2017 with
the mandate ‘to assist the Government of Haiti to strengthen rule of law
institutions in Haiti’.30 The author of the present thesis, thus, hopes that her
analysis will remain relevant in the coming years and inform future research on
the implications of the Council’s engagement with the rule of law.
III. Methodology
The present thesis applies, ia, insights gained by a social-constructivist analysis
about the motivation behind and implications of actions by states, international
organisations, their organs and other agents of the international society.31 Social
constructivism is a meta-level social theory, which – as opposed to neoliberal
and neorealist theories – focuses on ‘the social fabric of world politics’.32 It
purports that meaning and knowledge are socially construed and assumes the
mutual constitution of agents and the structures they inhabit and that ideas,
values and norms determine the identity and interests of agents.33 Applied to
international politics, the agents are traditionally states but may also be other
29 Rajagopal (n 13) 1359.
30 UNSC Res 2350 (13April 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2350 [6].
31 Thomas Risse, ‘Social Constructivism Meets Globalization’ in David Held and Anthony
McGrew (eds), Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies (Polity Press 2007)
126, 132.
32 Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’ (1997) 3
Eur. J. Int. Rel. 319, 323; Jeffrey Checkel, ‘International Norms and Domestic Politics:
Bridging the Rationalist—Constructivist Divide’ (1997) 3 Eur. J. Int. Rel. 473-95;
Jeffrey Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’ (1998) 50
World Politics 324-48.
33 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Penguin Press
1966); Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations’
(2000) 6 Eur. J. Int. Rel. 147, 149; Thomas Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative
Action in World Politics’ (2000) 54 International Organization 1, 5; Alexander Wendt,
Social Theory of International Politics (CUP 1999) 171.
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international actors such as international or regional organisations or non-state
actors such as NGOs, multinational enterprises, individuals, or professional
communities.34 The structure they inhabit is the international society.35 Social
constructivism considers this structure and the identities and interests of its
agents as socially construed.36 In the field of international relations, social
constructivism thus provides explanations for the behaviour of states (and other
international agents) that differ from materialist or rational choice theories,
which assume that states are primarily rationally motivated by goals such as
their survival, power or wealth.37 A strong motivational factor for agents
according to a social-constructivist account is rather their identity and
perceptions of what counts as appropriate behaviour for an agent of such an
identity.38 To explain state behaviour, one must thus examine ‘a complex and
specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs’ that motivates these agents.39
A social constructivist perspective does not deny the existence and relevance
of material resources and power in international politics but maintains that
their meaning is determined ‘through the structure of shared knowledge in
which they are embedded’.40 Social constructivism thus assumes that material
causes are ‘constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts’ and that
social realities are equally powerful in determining behaviour, as are material
realities.41
34 Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change in International
Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System’ (1994) 48 IO 215,
222 (‘Instead of conceiving the international system in terms of distribution of tangible
resources and of “invisible” structures working behind the backs of the actors,
constructivism views this system as an artifice of man-made institutions, such as, but not
limited to states’). See also Tilmann Altwicker and Oliver Diggelmann, ‘How is Progress
Constructed in International Legal Scholarship?’ (2014) 25 EJIL 425, 427 (conceiving, eg
international lawyers as actors in an international legal discourse contributing to the
construction and reconstruction of social reality in the international sphere).
35 Constructivism conceptualises international politics as an international society, not an
international system. See, Michael Barnett, ‘Social Constructivism’ in John Baylis, Steve
Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to
International Relations (7th edn, OUP 2017) 144, 145.
36 Social constructivism was introduced to the discipline of international relations by
Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making (first published 1989, Routledge 2013).
37 Anne-Marie Slaughter and Thomas Hale, ‘International Relations, Principal Theories’
(MPEPIL 2013) para 21.
38 Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’ (n 33) 4 f.
39 Slaughter and Hale (n 37) para 20.
40 Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’ (1995) 20 Int. Security 71, 73.
41 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (n 33) 97. See also Martha Finnemore,
National Interests in International Society (Cornell University Press 1996) 128.
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A social-constructivist approach, thus, provides an analytical tool, which
allows focusing on the evolution of ideas, which, in the present case, may be
initiated in international society by means of Council documents endorsing a
particular understanding of the rule of law.42 Social constructivism assumes that
‘knowledgeable agents’ construe social reality by relying on social facts whose
meaning – and often their related existence – depends on inter-agency
agreement.43 The rule of law is a classical social fact whose existence depends
on human agreement as opposed to brute facts such as stones or flowers that
exist independent of human perception.44 Based on the Council’s particular
function and the implementation of its mandate by recommending or requiring
a course of action it considers conducive to the maintenance of international
peace and security, it may contribute to the construction of an intersubjective,
collective understanding among the members of the international society as to
what the rule of law implies and why conformity with it might be valuable.45
For the present analysis, relevant ‘knowledgeable agents’ are the Council itself,
states that are addressees of its resolutions or involved in Council deliberations,
other international or supranational organisations and non-state actors such as
NGOs etc, ie essentially all actors of the international society which participate
in an idea generation process with regard to the function and content of the rule
of law for the maintenance of international peace and security.46 The evolution
of this idea generation process determines, whether an originally domestic
norm – the rule of law – becomes an international norm in the sense that
it establishes what counts as appropriate state behaviour and consequently
shapes state identities and interests.47 A social constructivist analysis thereby
pays attention to motivational mechanisms behind changes in state behaviour
beyond coercion, cost-benefit calculations or material incentives that relate to
42 Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’ (n 33) 5 (‘constructivism points to the constitutive role of
ideational factors’).
43 Emanuel Adler, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and
Debates’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds), Handbook of
International Relations (Sage 2013) 112, 113 f.
44 John Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social
Constructivist Challenge’ (1998) 52 IO 855, 856.
45 Adler, ‘Constructivism in International Relations’ (n 43) 125.
46 True-Frost (n 20) 181.
47 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 24) 893 (‘Many international norms began as domestic norms
and become international through the efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds.’). Most
probably, the rule of law could also be theorised as an institution understood as
a ‘habitualized practice of which every member of the social community knows’
with habitualised practice taking the form of rules, norms and concepts of world-
understanding. See, Oliver Diggelmann and Tilmann Altwicker, ‘Is There Something
Like a Constitution of International Law? (2008) 68 ZaöRV 623, 643 f.
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socialisation processes such as, eg, persuasion, discourse or acculturation.48
Accordingly, it allows to take into account the potential impact of Council
documents that do not contain legally-binding decisions on the behaviour of
agents (states primarily) and is thus sensitive to the question of how the
Council may affect the evolution of a global rule of law understanding only by
means of disseminating an idea of the concept’s meaning and value.
Another factor making a social-constructivist perspective valuable for the
present study – which analyses Council documents and thus Council language –
is its interest in the role of communicative and discursive practice and its
contribution to the construction of social reality.49 Social communication
depends on language as its vehicle to create, diffuse and institutionalise
knowledge, meaning and ideas.50 It allows agents – in this case the members of
the Security Council – to assign meaning to practices, rules and institutions and
relate them to the concept of the rule of law. The present thesis assumes ‘the
political relevance of language beyond the concept of rhetoric as a means to
political ends’ and that language is a source of change.51 Following this analysis,
Council documents may be considered acts of social communication with the
potential to affect the evolution of a collective understanding among agents of
the international society about the function, value and content of the rule of law.
The social-constructivist focus on language is helpful for the present study to the
extent that the Council acts ‘through’ language only.52 A social-constructivist
analysis accounts for the particular impact of language and is thus particularly
valuable for this study which tries to determine whether Council documents –
and in particular resolutions – are capable of affecting the emergence of a global
understanding of the rule of law independently of their legal bindingness or
ensuing implementing measures.53
48 See, eg, Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’
(2001) 55 IO 553-88; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law’ (2004) 54 Duke L.J. 621–703;
Nicole Deitelhoff, ‘The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of
Persuasion in the ICC Case’ (2009) 63 IO 33–65.
49 Risse, ‘Social Constructivism Meets Globalization’ (n 31) 131.
50 Adler, ‘Constructivism in International Relations’ (n 43) 125.
51 Thomas Diez, ‘Speaking ‘Europe’: The Politics of Integration’ (1999) 6 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y
598, 603; Adler, ‘Constructivism in International Relations’ (n 43) 125.
52 See, eg, Altwicker and Diggelmann (n 34) 442 (basing one of their strategic assumptions
on the construction of progress of international law on ‘the belief that language is a key
means to shape and pre-structure “reality”’).
53 Albert Yee, ‘The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies’ (1996) 50 IO 69, 94 (observing that
‘the ideational capacities or mechanisms that enable ideas and beliefs to affect policies




A further reason why a social constructivist analysis is valuable for the
present thesis is its interest in norms and their potential to define identities or
prescribe appropriate behaviour.54 Unlike ideas, which can be private and
subjective, norms are always intersubjective, ie shared and social.55 According
to a social-constructivist analysis, norms are ‘collective expectations for the
proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’.56 The present thesis proceeds
from the assumption that the Council could act as a norm entrepreneur in
international society capable of persuading a critical mass of states and other
international agents to endorse the rule of law as an international norm that
redefines ‘appropriate behaviour for the identity called “state” or some relevant
subset of states’.57
The necessary follow-up question then is, what requirements need to be
fulfilled for the Council to contribute to the emergence of the rule of law as an
international norm. A pertinent study by Finnemore and Sikkink proposes that
norm influence follows a three-stage process, ranging from norm emergence to
norm cascade, to norm internalisation.58 The present thesis focuses on the role
of the Council with regard to the first stage, norm emergence, and confines
itself to an analysis of the criteria that need to be fulfilled if Council documents
shall contribute to the emergence of the rule of law as an international norm. In
this vein, the thesis analyses Council resolutions referring to the rule of law
in order to determine whether specific criteria that determine the potential
emergence of norms are fulfilled.
IV. Thesis Structure
A conclusive examination of the Council’s approach to the rule of law would
exceed the scope of this thesis. It thus restrains itself to an analysis of the
circumstances and purposes that have triggered rule of law references in
Council resolutions and focuses on particular sub-elements of the rule of law,
ie rule of law requirements for national judiciaries. For reasons of feasibility,
the present thesis rests its analysis only on those cases in which the Council
54 Peter Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’ in Peter
Katzenstein (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics
(Columbia University Press 1996) 5.
55 Finnemore (n 41) 22.
56 Katzenstein (n 54) 5; Finnemore (n 41) 22 (who defines norms as ‘shared expectations
about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors’).
57 One relevant subset of states would be, eg, ‘liberal’ states. See, Finnemore and Sikkink
(n 24) 902.
58 For this purpose, the thesis draws on insights gained by ibid 895.
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became active and does not take into account the possible implications of a
‘negative analysis’, ie an examination of those cases in reaction to which the
Council did not invoke the rule of law or its sub-elements even though similar
circumstances prevailed like in cases where it did so.
Based on the many and varied references to the rule of law in Council
documents, future research could also examine Council identifications of actors
and institutions linked to the rule of law, the consequences of rule of law
deficiencies or rule of law vacuums, challenges to the establishment and
guarantee of the rule of law, the relationship of the rule of law to other
guarantees and goals (such as human rights, transitional justice or democratic
governance), the requirements that rule of law institutions must fulfil to be rule
of law compliant or the circumstances triggering references to other sub-
elements of the rule of law such as the guarantee of due process, the principle
of separation of powers or the civilian oversight of military forces etc.
The thesis is structured as follows: Part I contains the theory chapter on the
concept of the rule of law. This chapter shall facilitate an analytical reading of
Council decisions with a view to the guarantees, institutions and procedures
commonly associated with the rule of law. A subsequent chapter portrays the
rule of law understanding of the five permanent members of the Council (UK,
USA, France, Russia and China).59 This comparative analysis shall enable
conclusions regarding the room for consensus among Council members on the
meaning of specific rule of law elements as referred to in Council decisions. The
focus on the five permanent Council members results from their particular
impact on the decision-making process within the UN organ but shall also
serve as an illustration of how differently rule of law elements may be
understood in different states.60
Part II of the thesis is dedicated to a portrayal of the Security Council. It
depicts the Council’s functions and powers as indicators of the legal and
political implications of its rule of law language. Its composition and working
methods are discussed to determine the representativeness of the body of the
wider UN membership. This chapter serves the purpose of assessing how
Council resolutions invoking the rule of law may affect the emergence of a
global understanding of the principle’s content from a legal and political
perspective. It further inquires whether the UN body is sufficiently
representative so that its documents may indicate an emerging or already
existing international consensus. The chapter also applies a social-constructivist
59 See art 23 (1) Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force
24October 1945) 145 BSP 805 (UN Charter) for the enumeration of the permanent SC
members.
60 art 27 (3) UN Charter.
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perspective to the question of how the Council may affect the evolution of a
global understanding of the rule of law.
Part III of the thesis contains a qualitative analysis of Council resolutions
invoking the rule of law and determines under which circumstances and for
what purposes the Council refers to the principle. It, thus, contextualises
Council references to the rule of law and provides an overview in which
contexts the Council develops its notion of the principle. As the central part of
the present thesis, part III then examines rule of law requirements developed by
the Council for national judiciaries. For this purpose, the thesis analyses all
Council resolutions containing language of rule of law reform targeting the
judicial branch of government and attempts to assess to what extent it reflects a
rule of law understanding of the Council and its potential to affect the
emergence of a rule of law understanding among UN member states and the
international society as a whole.
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Part 1 – Defining the Rule of Law – The Rule of Law
as a Contested Concept?
I. Introduction
Discussions about the meaning and function of the rule of law have not been
settled to the present day. While some have qualified the rule of law as just one
of the many virtues of a legal system, others claimed it to be a sine qua non for
its very existence.61 Neither did the discourse on what the principle entails ever
come to an end.62 In the words of John Finnis, the rule of law may be described
as the ‘state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape’.63 This,
of course, does not yet tell us anything about what it means for a legal system to
be ‘legally in good shape’ since we first need to know what law we are
envisioning in order to critically assess this statement. Rule of law concepts are
necessarily contingent on what is understood by the concept of law but do not
stop there (the concept of law forms one part of a rule of law concept but there
are more elements to it that are related to institutions, procedures etc).64 The
concept of law, in turn, is intimately linked to the historical, socio-cultural and
political understanding of the individual and its relationship to the community
and position in society.65 These concepts tend to diverge between different
political and legal cultures. What unites most political communities no matter
how well organised and orderly constituted they are, however, is the need for
coercive government to ensure the sustainability of whatever form of social
cooperation they have chosen for themselves.66 The rule of law serves the
61 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (2nd ed, OUP 2009) 211, 219; Lon Fuller, The
Morality of Law (rev edn, YUP 1969) 39.
62 Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework’ (1997) PL 467.
63 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (first published 1980, 2nd edn, OUP 2011)
270.
64 Rainer Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ in Christian Starck (ed),
Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis (Nomos
1999) 269, 271, 304; Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43
Ga. L. Rev 1, 44 ff.
65 Philippe Mastronardi, ‘Recht und Kultur: Kulturelle Bedingtheit und Universaler
Anspruch des Juristischen Denkens’ 61 (2001) ZaöRV 61–83; Gerhard Casper, ‘Rule of
Law? Whose Law?’ in Stephan Lorenz and others (eds), Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich
(CH Beck 2005) 1109, 1112.
66 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev edn, OUP 1999) 211.
Part 1 – Defining the Rule of Law – The Rule of Law as a Contested Concept?
18
purpose of preventing this form of coercion from taking on a life of its
own which is no longer related to the facilitation of social cooperation or
the guarantee of the rights and liberties of the members of the political
community.67 Common to all rule of law concepts is thus the aspiration to
restrain the exercise of public authority in a manner that inhibits arbitrary rule.68
It is the array of possible answers to the question of what exactly the rule of
law presupposes to fulfil this task, however, that illustrates the complexity of the
concept and why it has been qualified as ‘essentially contested’. The term
‘essentially contested concept’ was coined by William Gallie and employed
by several scholars in order to approach the analysis of the rule of law.69 It has
been proposed that ‘essential contestability’ refers to a situation where the
participants of an argument about the content of a concept agree on the value of
its realisation but disagree on how it shall be realised.70 This accurately captures
the circumstance that the rule of law enjoys great popularity among state and
non-state actors as well as within academia, while states with distinct historical
experiences follow diverging rule of law models and a great variety of different
rule of law conceptions are discussed in legal theory.71 One reason for its
popularity might relate to Jeremy Waldron’s observation that the rule of law is
‘one of a cluster of ideals constitutive of modern political morality’.72 Another
reason might be exactly the concept’s openness to different interpretations and
definitions.73 Elements commonly associated with the rule of law are
transparency of governmental action, the separation of powers or checks and
balances, equality before the law, due process, minimal guarantees of fairness,
fundamental rights protection and judicial review of governmental action.74
67 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 304.
68 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 342.
69 Richard Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested
Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137-64.
70 Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (n 69) 150 f.
71 Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, ‘The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications for the
European Union and the United States’ (2010) 72 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 229, 259.
72 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 64) 3 (mentioning the rule of law in the
same breath with human rights, democracy and perhaps the principles of free market
economy).
73 Brian Tamanaha, ‘The History and Elements of the Rule of Law’ (2012) Sing. J. Legal
Stud. 232; Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 332.
74 Anne Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’ in Janne Nijman and André
Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International
Law (OUP 2007) 251, 271. See also Simon Chesterman, ‘Rule of Law’ (MPEPIL 2007)
para 2.
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However, not all rule of law conceptions contain all of these elements, nor do all
rule of law models interpret and implement them equally.
It is in international fora such as the UN Security Council that contestations
about the rule of law may be particularly pronounced but also where bridges can
be built to close gaps between diverging understandings.75 International actors
uniting different states to deliberate and decide on questions of politics and
international law may provide a platform and procedures that could contribute
to the identification of certain elements of the rule of law that enjoy global
approval.76 Beyond the mere identification of such elements, global actors
might even figure as platforms that enable an approximation between different
understandings of the concrete meaning of certain rule of law elements.
In order to introduce the working concept of the present thesis, the following
chapter will discuss different conceptualisations of the rule of law and their
implications. This exercise shall allow for an analytical reading of Security
Council resolutions that invoke the rule of law and identify sub-elements of the
principle. To illustrate the room for consensus among Council members when
agreeing on a rule of law vocabulary, the rule of law models observed by the
five permanent members of the Security Council are further portrayed by way
of example and due to the P5’s considerable impact on the content of the
Council’s deliberations and decisions. Whether the Council’s rule of law
vocabulary also forms part of an already existing Council understanding of the
rule of law, is a separate question that will be addressed at a later stage of this
thesis.
II. Contestations about the Rule of Law in Legal Discourse
Paul Craig is given credit in legal literature for coining the widely popularised
categories of formal and substantive rule of law concepts in order to enable a
structured discussion about different ways to conceptualise the principle. The
differentiation is based on the observation that formal theories focus on the way
laws are promulgated, on the ability of norms to guide people’s behaviour and
the question whether laws have been enacted prospectively or retrospectively.77
Substantive theories build upon these formal requirements but derive
substantive rights from the rule of law whose realisation by the law serves as a
point of reference to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ law.78 They often
75 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 439.
76 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 24) 899 f.
77 Craig (n 62) 467.
78 ibid 467.
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include the protection of human rights or a specific (eg democratic) form of
government in their conception of the rule of law. Since the theoretical
distinctions between various rule of law models are manifold and often more
complex than captured by the dichotomy of formal and substantive concepts,
the categories mainly serve as a tool to simplify a structural analysis and
discussion about different rule of law theories. Along these lines, the ensuing
chapters will illustrate in more detail, what formal and substantive theories of
the rule of law imply and discuss related concepts such as procedural and
functional understandings of the rule of law.
A. Formal Rule of Law
Proceeding from the assumption that law consists of rules, formal theories of the
rule of law require that sovereign power be exercised in accordance with rules
that satisfy certain formal standards and have been enacted in line with
particular procedures.79 Formal theories are thus characterised by their focus on
the intrinsic qualities of rules and the process of their creation and application.
According to a formal understanding, the rule of law may also be described as
the ‘law of rules’ to the extent that the whole concept of the rule of law may be
reduced to a theory about the ideal qualities of rules and their implementation.80
One of the first proponents of a formal understanding of the rule of law was the
19th century constitutional theorist Albert VennDicey. For Dicey, the constitutional
principle of the rule of law consisted of three elements, which for him were only
existent in English law: First, the law should be supreme in order to rule out all
forms of arbitrary (at that time royal) power.81 By subordinating the royal
prerogative to the law – and favouring general rules over delegated discretion – the
criteria amounted to an endorsement of parliamentary sovereignty.82 Second, no
one should be above the law and the law should apply equally to all, private
79 Margaret Radin, ‘Reconsidering the Rule of Law’ (1989) 69 B.U. L. Rev. 781, 787;
Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 64) 7.
80 Antonin Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 U. Chi.L. Rev. 1175-88;
Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (CUP 2004) 97
(‘Philosophical and sociological analyses of rules and rule-following highlight the same
considerations and elements as the formal version of the rule of law. In the end there is
nothing distinctive about the formal rule of law as a separate ideal. It is about (legal)
rules.’).
81 Albert Venn Dicey, ‘Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution’ in
J.W.F. Allison (ed), Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, vol
I (OUP 2013) 97.
82 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 275; Martin Loughlin,
‘Grossbritannien’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Peter Huber (eds), Handbuch Ius
Publicum Europaeum, vol I (CF Müller Verlag 2007) § 4, para 81.
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individuals and government officials alike.83 This required that there should not be
any special laws for state officials, ie at the time public law did not exist and private
law applied equally to citizens and members of the government. Third, the general
principles of the constitution should be discovered in judicial decisions that
determine the rights of individuals in particular cases.84 Thus, the ‘law of the
constitution’ was not regarded as ‘the source but the consequence of the rights of
individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts’.85 This was meant to reflect the
fact that the English constitution grounded in the ordinary law of the land and on
remedies provided for by the ordinary courts rather than on individual rights
established by a written constitutional document.86 All three elements focus on
formal or procedural features of the law rather than on its content: The law shall be
supreme, apply equally to all and if general constitutional principles for the
protection of individual rights are to be established, they should be the result of a
particular law-making procedure.
The elements of supremacy of the law, equality before the law and
compliance with specific procedures for the recognition of rules or rights are
also found in more recent formal theories. In their essence, formal theories
expect the rule of law to allow people to plan their affairs and to do so by means
of rules that guarantee the predictable exercise of public authority.87 Achieving a
degree of legal certainty that allows people to plan their affairs facilitates
individual freedom as it enables the individual to exercise its autonomy.88 The
aspiration that law be capable of guiding human conduct, however, establishes a
demanding standard. Various scholars have provided different accounts of what
qualities the law needs to fulfil in order to provide such guidance.89
Friedrich Hayek, eg, proposed a minimalist understanding of the qualities
law needs to fulfil in order to allow people to plan their affairs. He required that
83 Dicey (n 81) 100.
84 ibid 115.
85 ibid 119.
86 Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System (Routledge 2013) 25.
87 The idea was famously advanced by F.A. Hayek who described the rule of law ideal as
follows: ‘stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its actions is
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge’.
Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London 1944) 54.
88 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of
Law?’ (2011) 22 EJIL 315, 338.
89 Margaret Radin condensed Lon Fuller’s eight rule of law elements to two principles: that
there are rules and that they are capable of being followed. This illustrates the extent to
which the idea of law’s capacity to guide human conduct informs this formal theory of
the rule of law. Radin (n 79) 785.
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the rules of a rule of law-abiding legal system be general, equal, certain as well
as enacted and published before their application to a particular case.90
Compliance of rules with these virtues is associated with the concept of ‘formal
legality’, which from a positivist perspective already comprises all that shall be
expected from the rule of law.91
One of the most popular ‘laundry lists’ of qualities to be satisfied by rules in
order for them to guide human conduct was proposed by Lon Fuller.92 Fuller
discussed eight principles of legality as part of an ‘inner morality of law’ that
need to be satisfied in order for a system of rules to attain perfection.93 The rule
of law is accomplished if the rules of a legal system satisfy these principles. As
the most basic requirement, Fuller claimed that in order for a legal system to
guide human conduct, there need to be rules in the first place that apply to a
general set of situations and people. He discussed this element under the heading
of ‘generality’.94 He further called for laws to be adequately published,
prospective, intelligible and non-contradictory; they should neither require the
impossible, nor be subject to frequent change and be administered in accordance
with their announcement by those entrusted with the exercise of public
authority.95 It is important to note that Fuller proposed these elements as a
standard to measure excellence in legality. He did not claim that all requirements
needed to be perfectly fulfilled in order for the rule of law to be satisfied. The
elements would rather serve as a yardstick to measure the performance of a legal
system between two extremes: The non-existence of a legal system and an
‘utopia of legality’.96 Fuller’s theory resonates with the insight that the
compliance of a legal system with the rule of law is always a matter of degree.
Legal systems never fully comply with all desiderata of a given rule of law
concept. Nevertheless, legal systems will be considered as systems governed by
the rule of law as long as deviations from the ideal are not too extreme.97
90 Friedrich August von Hayek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law (National Bank of
Egypt 1955) 34.
91 Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80) 94.
92 Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (n 69) 155.
93 Fuller (n 61) 41.
94 ibid 46–47.
95 ibid 39. Under the congruence element, Fuller elaborates on the difficulty of
interpretation of unclear statutes by judges as one of the central problems of the
cooperative task of maintaining legality.
96 ibid 41–42.
97 Nigel Simmonds, ‘Law as a Moral Idea’ (2005) 55 U. Toronto L.J. 61, 63; Waldron, ‘The
Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 64) 44 f. The same idea was addressed by Raz and
Rawls. See, Raz (n 61) 215 and Rawls (n 66) 207 f.
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The idea that law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects
also informed Joseph Raz’s conception of the rule of law.98 It was clear to Raz
that in order for the rule of law to achieve this goal, it had to be conceptualised
following a formal understanding.99 In order to guide human conduct, laws thus
needed to be prospective, open, adequately publicised, clear and relatively
stable.100 Raz’s rule of law concept did not generally disapprove of specific
legal orders but required that they be enacted according to general, open, stable
and clear rules that confer the authority to issue such orders and define the scope
of this authority.101 To this extent, Raz seemed to derive very similar
requirements from the concept of the rule of law as did Fuller.
Raz further included procedural and institutional elements in his rule of law
conception, which resonate with Fuller’s requirement of congruence between
official action and the announced law. He called for an easily accessible,
independent judiciary, authorised to ensure the application of the law to
particular cases and to review the conformity of legislative and administrative
action with the rule of law.102 In order to ensure the correct application of the
law, the principles of natural justice should to be satisfied, guaranteeing open
and fair hearings and the absence of bias.103 Additionally, Raz required that
crime-preventing agencies be prevented from the arbitrary application of the
law.104 The latter elements are meant to institutionalise the efficacy of rules and
to ensure that their particular qualities are realised in their administration and
application.105
Other authors have drawn up similar rule of law narratives, also deriving
their normative aspiration from the idea that law should be capable of guiding
peoples’ behaviour. John Finnis, eg, characterised the rule of law as the specific
virtue of legal systems and proposed a set of rule-qualities that clearly take their
inspiration from Fuller’s and Raz’s doctrines. He required rules to be
prospective, capable of being performed, promulgated, clear, coherent with one
another and sufficiently stable.106 If specific decrees and orders were to be
enacted, their enactment should follow rules satisfying these qualities.107 In
addition, he postulated that those in charge of making, administering and
98 Raz (n 61) 214, 218.
99 ibid 214.
100 ibid 214–215.





106 Finnis (n 63) 270.
107 ibid.
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applying the rules, should be accountable for their compliance with the rules
regulating their authority and should administer the law consistently and in line
with its content.108 These latter requirements resonate with Raz’s procedural and
institutional elements in that they also acknowledge that ideal rules depend on
their adequate enforcement in order to benefit the individual and satisfy the rule
of law.109
Legal theorists following so-called thin rule of law conceptions such as Raz
or Fuller consider the fulfilment of formal and procedural requirements as
encompassing all that is needed for the law to rule and to guide human actions.
It is further argued that formal legality, taken alone, already guarantees ideals
such as self-directed action and a distinct form of justice.110 Nothing more shall
be expected from the rule of law in order to avoid it being overcharged with
contentious decisions about social values and rendering it meaningless as a
distinctive concept.111 Its political neutrality is expected to garner more consent
in pluralist societies than substantive concepts, this argument being particularly
relevant for an international notion of the rule of law.112
However, even though it is true that the idea that law be capable of guiding
human conduct captures a particular conception of human dignity, rule of law
narratives only informed by this rationale are theoretically compatible with
laws of the most egregious content.113 This circumstance has motivated some
108 ibid 270 f.
109 ibid 271.
110 Fuller (n 61) 210; Finnis (n 63) 273. John Rawls maintained that ‘(. . .) we can say that,
other things equal, one legal order is more justly administered than another if it more
perfectly fulfills the precepts of the rule of law. It will provide a more secure basis for
liberty and a more effective means for organizing cooperative schemes. Yet because
these precepts guarantee only the impartial and regular administration of rules, whatever
these are, they are compatible with injustice. They impose rather weak constraints on the
basic structure, but ones that are not by any means negligible’. Rawls (n 66) 208. Formal
requirements, eg, are part of Ronald Dworkin’s concept of justice: Ronald Dworkin, A
Matter of Principle (reprinted 1992, OUP 1986) 12 (‘Any political community is better,
all else equal, if its courts take no action other than is specified in rules published in
advance, and also better, all else equal, if its legal institutions enforce whatever rights
individual citizens have’).
111 Martin Krygier, ‘Rule of Law’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), Comparative
Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 233, 239; Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History,
Politics, Theory (n 80) 113.
112 Robert Summers, ‘A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law’ (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 127, 136.
113 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 64) 28 (stating that ‘the action-guiding
character of law with its emphasis on self-application and its reliance on agency and
voluntary self-control’ is reflective of the dignity of the people). On the position that a
formal understanding of the rule of law does not prevent abusive laws, see Richard
Epstein, ‘Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure’ (1987) 56
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legal theorists to propose rule of law concepts that establish more demanding
standards.
B. Substantive Rule of Law
Substantive theories concur with formal understandings of the rule of law to the
extent that they also require the law to fulfil certain formal qualities and that
the enactment as well as the administration and application of law follow a
predetermined set of procedures. In addition, however, substantive theories
expect the law and legal systems to satisfy certain standards regarding their
content.114 Substantive conceptions of the rule of law require that the law
and legal systems incorporate and enforce ideals such as democracy and
human rights or more abstract concepts such as justice, dignity or individual
freedom.115 Substantive rule of law concepts are thus not only concerned with
how laws are enacted or whether they satisfy certain formal criteria but have a
vision of what an ideal legal system shall guarantee to its subjects in terms of
content such as, eg, the promotion of the rights of disadvantaged members of a
society.116
Like all rule of law conceptions, substantive approaches depend on a
particular vision of what legitimately qualifies as law. They are informed by the
idea that law and morals must not be separated and that rules only qualify as law
if they comply with certain qualified moral ideals and principles.117 A prominent
advocate of a substantive understanding of the rule of law and a fierce opponent
of a positivist theory of law was Ronald Dworkin. For Dworkin, the rule of law
represented a distinctly substantive ideal, ‘the ideal of rule by an accurate public
conception of individual rights’.118 He distinguished between ‘rule-book’ and
‘rights-conceptions’ of the rule of law. The rule-book conception, which
resembles formal understandings of the rule of law, requires that state power be
Geo. Wash.L. Rev. 149, 153 (‘The hard questions of social organization involve more than
generality and clarity. (. . .) A rule that says “all persons over eighteen may marry” has no
greater generality than one that says “no persons over eighteen may marry”. Yet while the
former is an essential component of our civil liberties, the latter is totalitarian excess,
made all the more dangerous by its uncompromising clarity and generality.’); Dworkin,
A Matter of Principle (n 110) 12 (holding that ‘(. . .) compliance with the rule book is
plainly not sufficient for justice; full compliance will achieve very great injustice if the
rules are unjust’).
114 Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80) 102.
115 Casper (n 65) 1109; Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 340.
116 Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (n 110) 12.
117 Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (n 69) 22.
118 Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (n 110) 11 f.
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exercised in accordance with rules on the books that are made public and
available to all and amendable only in line with rules satisfying the same
standards.119 Rule-book conceptions are concerned with the content of rules but
view this aspect connected to the ideal of substantive justice, which shall be
dealt with independently from the principle of the rule of law.120 Dworkin
adhered to the rights conception, which builds upon the rule-book conception
but further assumes that ‘citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to
one another, and political rights against the state as a whole’.121 These rights
should be reflected in positive law in order for courts or similar institutions to
enforce them upon individual complaint. Thus, whereas the source of the
citizens’ extra-legal moral rights is to be found in the community itself, the
rules on the rule-book are understood to reflect the ‘community’s effort to
capture moral rights’.122 Any legal system and the laws that constitute it will
thus be measured against the question of whether and to what extent they
embody and realise the moral and political rights of the individual.123 If the
rules on the rule-book do not provide any or only competing answers to a
question arising in a particular case, Dworkin demanded that judges trying to
arrive at the right decision be guided by the aspiration to realise the moral and
political rights of the parties rather than the merely speculative will of the
legislative.124 Dworkin did not describe the content of these moral and political
rights or how they are to be identified in cases where a community does not
agree on their scope or existence and was thus criticised for relocating
contentious moral and social issues from the community to the judiciary.125
John Rawls is another legal philosopher often ranked among proponents of a
substantive theory of the rule of law. Akin to formal approaches he theorised the
rule of law according to the idea that law should organise human conduct and
manage the legitimate expectations of its subjects.126 He proposed four general
precepts of a rule of law-abiding legal system, which in their essence closely
correlate with the above-discussed concepts of Fuller, Raz and Finnis. For
Rawls, ‘ought’ implied ‘can’ which means that the law shall not require the
impossible and that impossibility be accepted as a legal defence.127 Further,





123 ibid 12 f.
124 ibid 16.
125 ibid 13; Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80) 104.
126 Rawls (n 66) 207 f.
127 ibid 208.
II. Contestations about the Rule of Law in Legal Discourse
27
discretion.128 There should not be an ‘offence without a law’ from which
follows that laws be known, clear, expressly promulgated, general and
prospective and the precept of natural justice must be satisfied which requires
judicial enforcement of the laws in a manner consistent with some form of due
process, including principles such as judicial independence as well as fair,
unbiased and open trials.129 What renders Rawls’ rule of law narrative
substantive in the view of several commentators, is the justification he provided
for his proposed requirements: they are meant to assist in the accomplishment of
the greatest equal liberty of all members of a given society.130 The ostensibly
formal and procedural requirements of the rule of law are thus understood as a
vehicle to realise a maximum of individual liberty.131 This, it is claimed,
distinguishes Rawls’ understanding of the rule of law from traditional formal
conceptions, which are primarily concerned with the effectiveness of rules.132
In theory, a central difference between formal and substantive rule of law
theories is that the latter aspire for law and legal systems to accomplish more
than the mere restraint of sovereign power but to guarantee a particular vision
of society.133 According to substantive conceptions, the rule of law thus means
government based on rules that are meant to realise the aspirations of the social
contract such as liberty or justice.134 A legal system falling short of guaranteeing
the precepts of the social contract does not comply with the rule of law. A
common way of trying to achieve this ideal is to require the law and all agents
of sovereign authority to respect and enforce political and civil rights. The
panoply of rights may also extend to the guarantee of economic, social and
cultural rights or even include environmental protections.135 This understanding
128 ibid 208 f.
129 ibid 209 f.
130 Radin (n 79) 788–790; Daniel Rodriguez, Mathew McCubbins and Barry Weingast, ‘The
Rule of Law Unplugged’ (2010) 59 Emory L.J. 1455, 1470.
131 Rawls (n 66) 210–213.
132 Radin (n 79) 783, 790; Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse’ (n 69) 8, 15.
133 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (3rd impr, Fontana Press 1990) 413 (‘Law’s attitude is
constructive: it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the
best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past. It is, finally, a fraternal
attitude, an expression of how we are united in community though divided in project,
interest, and conviction. That is, anyway, what law is for us: for the people we want to be
and the community we aim to have.’).
134 Radin (n 79) 792.
135 For the inclusion of the guarantees of a social state and environmental protection
standards into the German constitution, see Paul Tiedemann, ‘The Rechtsstaat-Principle
in Germany: The Development from the Beginning Until Now’ in James Silkenat, James
Hickey and Peter Barenboim (eds), The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal
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of the rule of law was prominently criticised by Joseph Raz who argued that ‘[i]f
the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its nature is to
propound a complete social philosophy’ which would strip the term of its
independent and useful function.136
C. Procedural Rule of Law
Not a separate theory but rather a different perspective, one may also speak of
procedural notions of the rule of law. The ‘regular and impartial administration
of public rules’ has been qualified as representing a concept of formal justice as
applied to legal systems.137 When legal theorists such as Raz or Finnis propose
procedural or institutional mechanisms as elements of the rule of law, they
acknowledge that the mere existence of ideal rules does not yet satisfy the
principle.138 It is the realisation of the inherent qualities of these rules by a legal
system that determines whether the rule of law is effective. This requires
impartiality and fairness on behalf of those who administer and apply the
rules.139 Guarantees such as the independence of the judiciary, access to courts,
transparency of state action, due process, judicial review or the separation of
powers aspire to create the institutional conditions necessary to ensure the
impartial and fair management of rules.140 They can be qualified as procedural
elements of the rule of law, which in their richest manifestation may also
include participation rights in the exercise of public authority.141 A rich
procedural understanding of the rule of law demarcates the borderline between
formal and substantive theories of the rule of law to the extent that the inclusion
of extensive participation rights adds aspects of the concept of democracy to the
rule of law, thereby rendering its alignment substantive.142 These considerations
State (Rechtsstaat) (Springer 2014) 171, 188 ff, 190 ff. On the French Charter for the
Environment of 2004 as a standard of review of the constitutionality of French laws, see
Sophie Boyron, The Constitution of France: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing
2013) 42f, 161.
136 Raz (n 61) 211.
137 Rawls (n 66) 206 f.
138 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 64) 7.
139 ibid.
140 Finnis (n 63); Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 64) 8; Vera Gowlland-
Debbas and Vassilis Pergantis, ‘Rule of Law’ in Chetail Vincent (ed), Post-conflict
Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (OUP 2009) 320, 323; Rodriguez, McCubbins and Weingast
(n 130) 1458; Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule
of Law?’ (n 88) 317; Robert McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of Law:
Defying Gravity?’ (2016) 65 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 277, 282.
141 Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 64) 8–9.
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illustrate that the differentiations between formal and substantive theories of the
rule of law are often blurred and seldom rigid.
D. Functional Rule of Law
Functional approaches to the rule of law do not have a predetermined inclination
for a substantive or formal conceptualisation of the principle but rather focus on
its instrumental value. According to a functional approach, the principle’s
content is fleshed out based on the function it is supposed to serve such as, eg,
human rights protection, the maintenance of public security, sustainable
economic development or peaceful conflict management.143 This approach
builds upon an instrumentalist understanding of law, according to which law
is understood as a tool to realise public goods or achieve social change.144 It
does not provide a principled theory about how the rule of law shall be
conceptualised but rather operates like an instruction that assists in determining
what rule of law definition shall apply in order to achieve a particular outcome.
At first sight, a functional approach seems like an appealing method to
determine the concrete content of the rule of law due to its alleged context-
sensitivity: The substance of the rule of law is not developed in the abstract as a
political ideal but rather finds orientation in the concrete needs of a political
community or a particular actor (eg international organisations trying to
improve the prospects of sustainable development in a recipient country). This,
however, seems to belie the fact that functional conceptions do not necessarily
sort out the doctrinal tensions between formal and substantive rule of law
theories. Once the goal to be realised by the rule of law has been identified, the
views on how to get there might diverge drastically among proponents of rich or
thin rule of law theories. Furthermore, conditioning the content of the rule of
law on the identification of a desired political goal, introduces new unresolved
questions: Who legitimately decides what goals are to be achieved in a political
community? How can it be guaranteed that the right goals are chosen? And,
thirdly, identifying the goal does not in itself provide clear guidelines on what
measures should be pursued in order to achieve it.
A common criticism of a functional approach to the rule of law is that law –
understood as a tool – may be of any content as long as it efficiently promotes a
143 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 341; ibid, ‘Rule of Law’ (n 74) para
15.
144 Brian Tamanaha, ‘The Tension between Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law’
(2005) 33 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 131. For an analysis of the implied risks of an
instrumentalist understanding of law for the rule of law, see ibid, Law as a Means to an
End: Threats to the Rule of Law (CUP 2006).
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desired outcome.145 Such a conceptualisation of law might conflict with
substantive as well as with formal theories of the rule of law.146 Consequently, a
functional approach might be the preferred avenue for actors who in practice are
less accountable to the recipient political community such as, eg, non-state or
international development actors whose support might be contingent on the
introduction of certain legal measures that are considered beneficial for future
economic investment. Even though rule of law concepts thus conceptualised
may suffer from a lack of legitimacy, they might be highly authoritative for
a state that depends on foreign aid and thus have a lasting impact on the
concrete design of its legal and political system.147 Chesterman observed that
international actors such as the UN or the World Bank, employ the rule of law
as a means to advance goals such as human rights protection, development or
peace, rather reflecting political exigencies than a real commitment to the
evolution of a legal culture and an international rule of law.148
Despite justified criticism of a functional approach to the rule of law,
however, one must keep in mind the reservation that every rule of law
conception eventually depends on the purposes pursued by its proponents, be it
legal philosophers, governments, international organisations or NGOs.149
Another variation of a functional conception of the rule of law measures the
realisation of a particular function of a legal system, such as the restraint of
governmental discretion, the transparency of governmental decision-making or
the enforcement of judicial decisions.150 The focus of this approach differs
145 Tamanaha, ‘The Tension between Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law’ (n 144)
132 (‘At the systemic level the tension arises because the idea that law is an instrument
is, in itself, devoid of any limits on the content of law.’).
146 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 341 f.
147 Bogdandy and others have proposed that public authority can also be exercised through non-
binding standards whose non-observance might involve overwhelming disadvantages (eg
not receiving much needed development aid) that render non-compliance an illusionary
freedom. See, Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann, ‘Developing
the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global
Governance Activities’ in Armin von Bogdandy and others (eds), The Exercise of Public
Authority by International Institutions (Springer 2010) 3, 12–13.
148 Chesterman, ‘Rule of Law’ (n 74) para 46.
149 Randall Peerenboom, ‘Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China’ in Randall
Peerenboom (ed), Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of
Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France, and the U.S. (Routledge 2004) 113, 135.
150 Erik Wennerström, The Rule of Law and the European Union (Iustus Förlag 2007) 82.
See also, eg, Matthew Stephenson, ‘Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy’
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from the above-discussed functional as well as from formal and substantive
conceptions on a level of application.151 Whereas the latter serve to
conceptualise the rule of law, this approach works more like a measuring
standard that assesses the performance of particular elements of a rule of law
definition.
E. Use(fulness) of Distinctions
While the use of categories such as ‘formal’, ‘substantive’, ‘procedural’ or
‘functional’ provides some orientation for the discussion about different theories
of the rule of law, its analytical capacity shall not be overestimated. Richard
Fallon rightly pointed out that categories such as ‘formal’, ‘substantive’ or
‘procedural’ are ideal-types and that most rule of law theories do not neatly fit
into just one category.152
Most crucially, all substantive understandings of the rule of law build upon
formal concepts and formal theories often contain substantive assumptions.153
Classical elements of formal rule of law narratives such as the generality,
prospectivity or clarity of rules relate to the substantive value of general
fairness and procedural or institutional guarantees aimed at the enforcement of
rules such as access to courts, open and fair hearings or judicial independence
are guaranteed as human rights in many legal systems nowadays.154
It does not come as a surprise, then, that many legal theories on the rule of
law are not easily classified. John Rawls has been considered as advancing
elements of a formal theory, while he was also characterised as a proponent of a
substantive rule of law understanding based on his rationale that all rule of law
elements serve the ideals of liberty and justice.155 Following this line of
thinking, however, many formal theorists may be qualified as advancing a
substantive rule of law understanding to the extent that they consider the rule of
law to serve the purpose of guiding human conduct and thus realising a
particular conception of human dignity. These observations attest to the
inherent ambiguity of such doctrinal distinctions.
151 Wennerström (n 150) 82 f.
152 Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (n 69) 10 f.
153 Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80) 92; Chesterman ‘An
International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 341.
154 Wennerström (n 150) 83.
155 Radin (n 79) 788–790; Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse’ (n 69) 16; Rodriguez, McCubbins and Weingast (n 130) 1470.
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III. Rule of Law Models observed in Different Legal Systems
A. Introduction
The rule of law has been characterised as ‘a fairly empty vessel’ whose content
may strongly vary depending on the prevailing legal culture and history of a
state.156 Despite sharing the common goal of organising and restraining
political power with recourse to the rule of law, different legal cultures have
different understandings of what the rule of law requires. The common law
understanding of the rule of law exhibits a strong focus on procedural
questions.157 It is thus not necessarily tied to the concept of the state and
theoretically better equipped to restrain forms of public authority not exercised
by the state but, eg, by international organisations such as the UN.158 This is the
case since the focus of the rule of law lies on the qualities of rules and legal
systems rather than on the relational link between law and the state. As an
organisational principle, the rule of law may thus conceptually also lend itself
for its application to legal systems of a supra- or international character.159
Concepts such as ‘Rechtsstaat’ or ‘état de droit’ on the other hand, are clearly
tied to the idea of the state and its relationship to law.160 If the Security Council,
an organ whose decisions rest on the consensus of at least nine states – the tacit
consent of the P5 always implied –, invokes the concept of the rule of law, it is
thus to be assumed that at least nine different understandings of the concept’s
meaning underlie the respective reference.
The present chapter provides a summary overview of the rule of law models
observed by the five permanent Council members.161 Focusing on the rule of
law models of the five permanent Council members is justified by their seating-
and voting privileges in the Council and their related enhanced responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security.162 Additionally, the P5 have
historically exerted significant influence on the decision-making process within
156 Casper (n 65) 1110.
157 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 299; Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Rule
of Law versus Rechtsstaat’ in Peter Häberle and Jörg Paul Müller (eds), Menschenrechte
und Bürgerrechte in einer vielgestaltigen Welt (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2000) 49, 58.
158 cf Rosenfeld (n 157) 50.
159 Nick Barber, ‘The Rechtsstaat and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 53 U. Toronto L.J. 443, 452.
160 Rosenfeld (n 157) 49; Mastronardi (n 65) 65.
161 See art 23 (1) UN Charter for the enumeration of the permanent SC members.
162 UNGA Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’
(2009) UN Doc A/63/677 [61] (where the Secretary-General observed that ‘[w]ithin the
Security Council, the five permanent members bear particular responsibility because of
the privileges of tenure and the veto power they have been granted under the Charter’
with regard to the responsibility to protect).
III. Rule of Law Models observed in Different Legal Systems
33
the UN organ.163 This comparative analysis shall enable conclusions regarding
the room for consensus among Council members on the meaning of the rule of
law and serve as an illustration of how differently the rule of law may be
conceptualised in different states.164
B. The Rule of Law in the United Kingdom
The idea that political (and at the time royal) power needs to be restrained by
law of a certain kind can be traced back to medieval times in English law. As a
historical milestone, the Magna Carta of 1215 contained a concept that
resonates with the rule of law principles of legality and legal equality.165 The
Bill of Rights of 1689 also served as a restraint to royal power and introduced
the principle of parliamentary supremacy.166 Today, the rule of law is
considered an integral part of the uncodified democratic constitution of the
United Kingdom and explicitly acknowledged in statutory law.167
163 At a Council meeting on working methods, South Africa observed the ‘numerous
constraints that result from the current configuration, which affords dominance and
permanence to the non-elected members’ for elected Council members, ia because ‘three
permanent members are penholders on almost every country-specific issue on the
Council’s agenda’ and as ‘resolutions and decisions of the Council are often drafted in
small groups and presented as faits accomplis to elected members’. See, 6870th Council
Meeting on working methods, UN Doc S/PV.6870 (26November 2012) [17].
164 Susan Hulton, ‘Council Working Methods and Procedure’ in David Malone (ed), The UN
Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner 2004) 237, 239
(on the circumstance that Council members act on national instructions and that
consensus is only possible if Council members are instructed accordingly from capital
administrations).
165 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane Penguin 2011) 10–13 (the text reads as
follows: ‘39. No free man shall be seized or imprisoned or stripped of his rights or
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will
we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment
of his equals or by the law of the land. 40. No one will we sell, to no one deny or delay
right or justice.’).
166 Peter Leyland, The Constitution of the United Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis (3rd edn,
Hart Publishing 2016) 73.
167 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 1 (establishing that the Act ‘does not adversely affect
(a) the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law, or (b) the Lord Chancellor’s
existing constitutional role in relation to that principle’. This provision is to be
understood in the light of the fact that the role of the Head of the Judiciary of England
and Wales was transferred from the Lord Chancellor to the Lord Chief Justice by virtue
of the Constitutional Reform Act). See, Jeffrey Jowell, ‘The Rule of Law’ in Jeffrey
Jowell, Dawn Oliver and Colm O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (8th edn,
OUP 2015) 13, 14.
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1. Constitutional Restraint
Public – originally royal – authority had been subjected to some kind of
fundamental law in England since the 17th century.168 Royal courts were
authorised to review royal and parliamentary acts for their conformity with the
common law, which was considered supreme.169 The basic idea behind the
common law, ie the protection of individual liberty in the form of personal
freedom, property and contract rights as well as individual interests in physical
integrity and reputation, was subsequently captured by a modernised concept of
the constitution.170
For a long time, the United Kingdom had lacked a written constitution. This
situation changed to a certain extent with the enactment of the Human Rights
Act of 1998, giving effect to the European Convention on Human Rights.171
Sources of constitutional law are further found in statutory-, common- and
EU law, legal treaties, the law and customs of parliament and, eventually,
the royal prerogative.172 Constitutional conventions, custom-like rules that
determine certain aspects of state conduct, add to the sources of English
constitutional law.173 Accordingly, even though the United Kingdom does
not have a single codified constitution, it still features various sources of
substantive constitutional law.
2. Parliamentary Sovereignty & Judicial Review
For much of its existence, the general constitutional principle of parliamentary
sovereignty largely defined the structure of the English legal system.174 This
salient feature of the English legal order has important ramifications for the rule
of law principles of separation of powers and judicial review. An Act of
Parliament is generally considered valid if it was enacted according to the
applicable legislative procedure and obtained royal consent.175 English courts
168 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 274 f.
169 ibid 273 f.
170 Stanley Bailey, Jane Ching and Nick Taylor, The Modern English Legal System (5th edn,
Sweet & Maxwell 2007) ch 1, paras 1-004; Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de
droit”’ (n 64) 273 f.
171 Matt Qvortrup, ‘“Let Me Take You to a Foreign Land”: The Political and the Legal
Constitution’ in Matt Qvortrup (ed), The British Constitution: Continuity and Change
(Hart Publishing 2013) 55, 56.
172 Leyland (n 166) 26–32.
173 David Feldman, ‘Constitutional Conventions’ in Matt Qvortrup (ed), The British
Constitution: Continuity and Change (Hart Publishing 2013) 93-119.
174 UKHL, Jackson and others v Her Majesty’s Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1
AC 262 [102] (Lord Steyn).
175 Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (11th edn, Routledge 2016) 122.
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do not enjoy the legal authority to declare legislative acts inapplicable or void
and the rule of law was for a long time primarily identified with formal ideals
related to the virtues of legislation such as legal certainty or predictability.176
The primary corrective of the legislature’s law-making power was seen in its
political accountability to the electorate.177 English courts traditionally
reviewed public authority acts exclusively for their compliance with formal rule
of law principles. One standard of review was the compliance of public
authority acts with parliamentarily delegated powers, whereby the courts
effectuated the rule of law principle of formal legality.178 Procedural concerns
such as unbiased decision-making and the granting of a fair hearing in advance
to deprivations of rights and significant legal interests provided another basis
of review.179 The most substantive traditional ground for review, only
conservatively implemented by the courts, was the reasonableness-test which
public authority acts needed to withstand.180 Incrementally, however, the
English courts expanded their review powers over administrative and royal
executive action in order to strengthen the protection of individual rights
against encroachments by the state.181 The initially predominantly procedural
standards of judicial review, focusing on the conformity of state action with
correct procedure, were further augmented by substantive standards as a result
of the United Kingdom’s accession to the European Union and the enactment
of the Human Rights Act of 1998.182
3. Human Rights Protection
With the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 1998, the rights and fundamental
freedoms of the European Convention on Human Rights became directly
applicable in the English legal order.183 As a consequence, the Act binds courts
and tribunals to the judgments, decisions, declarations and advisory opinions of
the European Court of Human Rights and requires that primary and secondary
legislation be read and given effect to by courts in accordance with the
176 Rainer Grote, ‘The German Rechtsstaat in a Comparative Perspective’ in James Silkenat,
James Hickey and Peter Barenboim (eds), The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the
Legal State (Rechtsstaat) (Springer 2014) 193, 203.
177 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 296; Barnett, Constitutional
& Administrative Law (n 175) 118, 131 f.
178 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 298 f.
179 Jowell (n 167) 30.
180 Michael Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (6th edn, Hart Publishing 2012) 569–576.
181 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 298 f.
182 Fordham (n 180) 101, 116.
183 Human Rights Act of 1998, s 1(2).
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Convention.184 In addition, the Human Rights Act requires that public authorities
act in conformity with Convention rights and provides a remedy in domestic
courts in cases of non-compliance.185 The Act, however, still respects the
constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty to the extent that the latter
obligation does not bind ‘either House of Parliament or a person exercising
functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament’.186 In addition, all
public authority acts based on primary legislation or acts that are giving effect to
primary legislation that cannot be read or given effect to in accordance with the
Convention, are exempted from the requirement of Convention conformity.187 If
the courts find an act of primary or subordinate legislation incompatible with the
Convention, they are not authorised to invalidate it but may only issue a
‘declaration of incompatibility’ of a provision with the Convention.188 A soft
power of the courts to ensure the compliance of parliamentary legislation with
the Convention, however, is their authority to read and give effect to primary and
subordinate legislation in a way compatible with Convention rights.189
Another factor that resulted in a de facto limitation of parliamentary
sovereignty was the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Union.190
With the enactment of the European Communities Act of 1972, Community law
was to be given legal effect and to be applied in the United Kingdom without
further national enactment.191 European Union law was not only considered to
become part of but also to rank above domestic law as a consequence of the
European Communities Act.192 In its ultimate consequence, the EU membership,
thus, expanded the scope of judicial review of English courts in order to ensure
the compatibility of Acts of Parliament with EU law.193 This included the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was deemed to extend human rights
protection substantively and procedurally beyond the scope of the Human
Rights Act of 1998 in cases involving the implementation of EU law.194 The
European Union Act of 2011, which made the post-Lisbon treaties applicable,
184 Human Rights Act of 1998, ss 2(1) and 3(1).
185 Human Rights Act of 1998, ss 6 and 7.
186 Human Rights Act of 1998, s 6(3).
187 Human Rights Act of 1998, s 6(2).
188 Human Rights Act of 1998, ss 4(2) and (4).
189 Human Rights Act of 1998, s 3(1).
190 The United Kingdom joined what was originally the European Economic Community in
1973.
191 European Communities Act 1972, s 2(1).
192 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151 [1; 69]
(Lord Justice Laws).
193 Slapper and Kelly (n 86) 703.
194 Fordham (n 180) 103.
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however, established that the application of EU law ultimately depended on
parliamentary assent and introduced the popular referendum for the adoption of
any future EU treaties or amendments to the existing treaties.195 This arrangement
reinforced the principle of parliamentary and popular sovereignty in an age
characterised by the rise of binding substantive regional, supra- and international
law. The UK exit of the European Union and plans of recent years by the
conservative party to repeal the Human Rights Act of 1998 in order to replace it
with a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland are further reasons for concern with regard to the future scope and
effectiveness of human rights protection in the UK.196
4. Separation of Powers & Judicial Independence
Historically, the English legal system did not provide for a robust separation
of powers. Rather, the powers of the governmental branches overlapped
considerably.197 In the early 2000s, however, the introduction of the
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 initiated substantial reforms in order to
more meaningfully separate the governmental powers.
Until the enactment of the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, it was
particularly the office of the Lord Chancellor – combining executive, legislative
and judicial functions –, which sat uncomfortably with the rule of law principle
of separation of powers.198 Before the reform, the Lord Chancellor, a cabinet
minister, had been sitting as a judge in the House of Lords and in the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.199 Additionally, he had been involved in the
parliamentary law-making procedure as the Speaker of the House of Lords.200
Since the 2005 reform, the Lord Chancellor heads the newly created Ministry
of Justice, being responsible for the administration of the court and prison
system in this capacity, and no longer acts as the Speaker of the House of Lords
nor functions as a judge.201
195 European Union Act 2011, ss 6 and 18.
196 UNCESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (14 July
2016) UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/CO/6 [9f]; UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(17August 2015) UN Doc CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7 [5]; LSE Commission on the Future of
Britain in Europe: Overview and Summary of Reports (August 2016) 10 f.
197 Leyland (n 166) 72.
198 Lord Windlesham, ‘The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Ministers, Judges and
Constitutional Change’ (2005) PL 806, 812.
199 Leyland (n 166) 75.
200 ibid 75.
201 Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (n 175) 79.
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Another former peculiarity of the English legal system regarding the
separation of powers was the placement of the highest appellate court of the
country in the House of Lords. This arrangement was abolished with the
creation of the UK Supreme Court, a central reason behind the court’s creation
being the need for a ‘free-standing’ Supreme Court ‘separating the highest
appeal court from the second house of Parliament and removing the Lords of
Appeal in Ordinary from the legislature’.202 Before the enactment of the
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, the Appellate Committee of the House of
Lords, the highest court of the United Kingdom, had been sitting in Parliament
and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were involved in the law-making
procedures of the House of Lords.203 The UK Supreme Court was then
established as a ‘superior court of record’ and authorised to ‘determine any
question necessary to be determined for the purposes of doing justice in an
appeal to it under any enactment’.204 Regarding the principle of judicial review,
however, the creation of the Supreme Court has not contributed to a
strengthened review process. Supreme Court judges are still not authorised to
invalidate Acts of Parliament.205
Although the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 strengthened the
separation of powers in the English legal system, certain peculiarities have been
preserved such as the arrangement that the executive depends on a majority in
the House of Commons. As long as this majority prevails, the executive can
basically rely on parliamentary consent to its legislative programmes, which
results in weak supervision of the executive through the legislative and a de
facto executive supremacy through parliamentary supremacy.206
The introduction of the Constitutional Reform Act, however, had positive
implications for the independence of the judiciary insofar as it transferred the
authority to appoint judges from the Lord Chancellor to a newly created
Judicial Appointments Commission, thereby reducing the role of the former in
the selection process.207 Section 3 of the Act then also explicitly provides for the
guarantee of judicial independence.208
202 Department of Constitutional Affairs, ‘Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the
United Kingdom’ (2003) 4.
203 Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (n 175) 80.
204 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, ss 40 (1) and (5).
205 Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (n 175) 80.
206 Leyland (n 166) 74 f.
207 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Part 4 Judicial Appointments and Discipline.
208 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 3.
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5. Conclusion
The constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty accounts for the
salient formal features of the English model of the rule of law. Ultimately,
Parliament enjoys the authority to enact laws contrary to the Human Rights Act
of 1998 or (up to now) European Union law. To be sure, English courts strive to
interpret and apply Acts of Parliament in a manner compatible with Convention
and EU law as long as Parliament has not legislated in such a clear and
unambiguous manner that incompatibility with Convention- or EU law is
inevitable. The latter arrangement has been qualified as implementing the
principle of legality insofar as Parliament may indeed derogate from European
Union- or Convention law but it needs to do so in express language, for
otherwise courts will give effect to the basic rights of individuals.209 In essence,
thus, it seems that the introduction of more meaningful standards of judicial
review of public authority acts for their human rights compliance has tilted the
English legal system towards a more substantive model of the rule of law. The
exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union will, of course, affect
this trend.
The constitutional principle of parliamentary supremacy also defines the
English model of the separation of powers. Parliament is the foremost state
organ in the English legal system, which does not allow for a separation of
powers as pronounced as in the US, which establishes the three governmental
branches as independent and equal powers.210
C. The Rule of Law in the United States
1. The Supreme Law of the Land
The normative underpinning of the US understanding of the rule of law is the
liberal concept of individual liberty. The individuals constituting the American
society have agreed to restrain their natural freedom through a government of
laws in order to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of the liberties of all
members of society.211 The US Constitution is understood to embody this act of
popular sovereignty and derives from this fact its supreme character as a
limitation on all governmental action, an idea explicitly captured in art VI of
209 UKHL, Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Simms [1999]
UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 (Lord Hoffmann).
210 Peerenboom, ‘Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China’ (n 149) 119 f.
211 Brian Tamanaha, ‘Rule of Law in the United States’ in Randall Peerenboom (ed), Asian
Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian
Countries, France, and the U.S. (Routledge 2004) 56.
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the Constitution, which establishes the supremacy of the Constitution over all
other laws.212 It is this document which is the source and guardian of the US
understanding of the rule of law, characterised by a robust system of checks
and balances among the branches of the federal government and separation of
powers between the federal and state governments as well as by a broad range
of fundamental rights guarantees.213 The US system of fundamental rights
protection is based on basic rights which were already provided for in the
original Constitution of 1787 (the prohibition of retroactive penal laws, the
right to vote and the right to equal treatment of citizens of the different US
states), the first ten Amendments forming the Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction
Amendments adopted after the American Civil War and the guarantees
developed by the US Supreme Court in interpreting the due process and equal
protection clauses to restrain federal and state action.214 In their origin, the
basic rights guarantees of the US Constitution are owed to an urge of the states
to contain the power of the federal government against their citizens. Over more
than two centuries, however, the basic rights of the US Constitution were
expanded and interpreted to also constrain the power of state and local
authorities and constitute a crucial source of the still evolving US constitutional
law.215 Importantly, the expansive scope of fundamental rights protection in the
US legal system is intimately connected with the power vested in the judicial
branch of government and its evolution based on the interpretation of the US
Constitution.216
2. Judicial Independence & Judicial Review
The judicial power of the United States is vested in the Supreme Court and in
inferior federal courts as established by Congress.217 The US Supreme Court is
the highest appellate court of the country with regard to federal matters,
enjoying original jurisdiction in only selected cases.218 Supreme Court judges
212 Gosalbo-Bono (n 71) 272. Art VI of the Constitution contains the ‘supremacy clause’. It
establishes that ‘[t]his Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding’.
213 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 301 f.
214 Peter Hay, The Law of the United States (Routledge 2017) 30.
215 Richard Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution (2nd edn, CUP 2013) 128 f.
216 ibid 280.
217 art III US Constitution.
218 art III (2) US Constitution states that ‘[i]n all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall
III. Rule of Law Models observed in Different Legal Systems
41
are nominated and appointed by the President and US Presidents have
traditionally appointed judges they expected to be faithful to their own political
agenda regarding sensitive social issues such as abortion or affirmative
action.219 Bar the politics of the appointment procedure, however, the
independence of the judiciary is solidly protected in the US Constitution.220 A
central reason behind the importance of the presidential right to appoint
Supreme Court judges is not only their lifetime tenure but also the considerable
powers of judicial review enjoyed by the highest court.
The authority of the Supreme Court to invalidate legislative or executive acts
based on their unconstitutionality was not envisaged by the Constitution. The
court itself established its right to judicial review in Marbury v. Madison. In
this landmark decision, the court held the congressional Judiciary Act of 1789
to be unconstitutional to the extent that it conveyed on the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent with the text of the Constitution.
The court held that if the Constitution was considered the paramount law of the
country, acts of the legislature repugnant to this supreme law must be void and
established that as a court charged with the function to determine what the law
is, it was authorised to invalidate unconstitutional congressional statutes.221
3. Due Process & the Bill of Rights
In subsequent years, the court did not shy away from actively using its review
powers and interfered extensively with congressional and state legislation
based on its interpretation of the Constitution. A prominent avenue for the
court to exercise constitutional review and to promote an important element of
the rule of law, namely due process, were the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.222 Whereas the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause restricts the exercise of federal governmental
authority only, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause restrains state
action. Both clauses have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to contain
have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under
such regulations as the Congress shall make’.
219 art II (2) US Constitution. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of the United States of
America: A Contextual Analysis (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2015) 129 f.
220 art III (2) US Constitution stipulates that ‘[t]he judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive
for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office’.
221 SCOTUS, Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137 [1803].
222 Gosalbo-Bono (n 71) 273.
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substantive as well as procedural guarantees and as avenues to extend the scope
of individual rights protection that may be asserted against the federal and the
state governments.223
Based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, most provisions
of the Bill of Rights, which were originally directed at restricting the exercise of
federal authority, were incorporated against the states to also guarantee these
rights against acts of state and local governments.224 In a similar move, the
court declared the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause to be
applicable to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s due
process clause in order to ban racial discrimination by the federal
government.225 The Bill of Rights, the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments as well as the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment have served the US Supreme Court as a source to
evolve fundamental rights guarantees and to ‘discover’ rights, which were not
explicitly provided for in the Constitution. The court, thus, opposed racial
segregation in education based on the equal protection clause, upheld the
procedural rights of people held in custody, developed the right to publicly
criticise government and public officials, invalidated a state statute prohibiting
the use of contraceptives based on the unenumerated right to privacy,
established the constitutional right to abortion and legalised same-sex sexual
conduct and same-sex marriages.226
4. Separation of Powers
The rule of law principle of separation of powers is a salient feature of the US
Constitution. In its first three Articles, the Constitution assigns the legislative
power to Congress and establishes its scope, attributes the executive power to
the President of the United States and vests the judicial power in the US
223 Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution (n 215) 111 ff; Akhil Amar, America’s Constitution: A
Biography (Random House 2005) 389.
224 Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (Yale University Press
1998) 163–180.
225 SCOTUS, Bolling v Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 [1954]. Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution
(n 215) 153.
226 SCOTUS, Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [1954]; SCOTUS, Miranda v
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [1966]; SCOTUS, New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
[1964]; SCOTUS, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 [1965]; SCOTUS, Roe v Wade,
410 U.S. 113 [1973]; SCOTUS, Webster v Reproductive Health Service, 492 U.S. 490
[1989]; SCOTUS, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505
U.S. 833 [1992]; SCOTUS, Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 [2003]; SCOTUS;
Obergefell v Hodges, 576 U.S. ____ [2015].
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Supreme Court and in congressionally created inferior courts.227 The concrete
balance among the different branches of government, however, results not only
from the Constitution but also from the case law of the US Supreme Court.
Whereas states may legislate on any subject as far as they respect the
Constitution, Congress needs to base its regulatory activity on a constitutional
authorisation in order to do so.228 This constitutional arrangement caters not
only to the separation of powers between federal, state and local governments
but also between Congress and the President.229
In spite of the constitutional arrangement of a federal government of limited
powers, Congress has considerably expanded the scope of its constitutionally
designated powers over time. Article I (8) of the Constitution, which authorises
Congress to regulate commerce among the states, has been employed by the
legislative branch as a basis for regulatory activity with sometimes only
tenuous connections between the subject of federal regulation and interstate
commerce.230 The extensive use of the commerce clause as a basis of
congressional regulation might be seen as being in tension with the rule of law
principle of legality to the extent that it is questionable whether the Constitution
really provides for such far reaching congressional powers. Similar concerns
may be raised with regard to Congress’s ‘Taxing and Spending Powers’ which
were broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court as to authorise congressional
spending of funds as long as it promoted the general welfare or with regard to
the broadly construed ‘Necessary and Proper Clause’, authorising Congress to
enact all laws necessary to implement its enumerated powers.231
Regarding the separation of powers between Congress and the President, a
landmark decision of the US Supreme Court is interpreted to establish a
tripartite analysis in cases of conflict between the exercise of congressional and
227 art I US Constitution establishes the legislative branch, art II the presidency and art III the
judiciary.
228 Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution (n 215) 228.
229 Whereas art I (8) US Constitution contains a detailed catalogue of congressional
authorities, the Tenth Amendment explicitly states that ‘the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people’. Art II of the Constitution outlines the scope of the
presidential powers.
230 Robert Sedler, Constitutional Law in the United States (2nd ed, Wolters Kluwer 2014)
43 ff; Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution (n 215) 229.
231 Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution (n 215) 7, 244 f. Art I (8) cl 1 US Constitution
establishes that ‘Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States (. . .)’. Art I (8) cl 17 US Constitution holds that ‘Congress shall have power
(. . .) to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers’.
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presidential powers.232 Based on the ‘Take Care Clause’, the President is
empowered to act in conformity with an express or implied authorisation by
Congress. In the absence of a congressional grant or denial of authority,
the President may only act based on his independent powers or – where
he enjoys concurrent authority with Congress, eg in the field of war powers, –
his authority may be implied from congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence.233 The last scenario concerns presidential acts that are incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress and therefore unconstitutional to
the extent that they cannot be attributed to the President’s independent powers
and are not beyond congressional control.234
Another field of contention regarding the separation of powers between
Congress and the President have been the war powers.235 Whereas Congress
enjoys the right to declare war based on art I (8) of the Constitution, the
President is the commander in chief of the federal army and navy and the
militia of the states and may deploy the troops.236 The compromise struck
between the two branches of government is that the President will usually try to
receive a certain kind of congressional approval before engaging the military in
armed conflict, a compromise further entrenched with the enactment of the
congressional War Powers Resolution of 1973.237
5. Conclusion
As can be drawn from the previous analysis, the US understanding of the rule of
law rests on a more balanced distribution of powers among the different
governmental branches than the English model. Congress enjoys only
constitutionally enumerated powers but the Supreme Court has repeatedly
accepted the broad congressional interpretation of its legislative authority.
Nonetheless, the substantial powers of constitutional review of the US Supreme
Court allow it to struck down congressional acts that are considered
unconstitutional – an arrangement not foreseen in English law. As the US legal
232 SCOTUS, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 [1952]. This framework
is based on Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion, which enjoys more authority in
constitutional theory today than the majority opinion. Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution
(n 215) 259.
233 The ‘Take Care Clause’ is found in art II (3) US Constitution which holds that the
President ‘(. . .) shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed (. . .)’, with laws
meaning congressional laws.
234 See Youngstown (n 232) [635–638] (Justice Jackson Concurring Opinion).
235 Sedler (n 230) 268–275.
236 art II (2) US Constitution.
237 Tushnet (n 219) 113.
III. Rule of Law Models observed in Different Legal Systems
45
system provides for constitutional judicial review and features a broad catalogue
of fundamental rights, the rule of law model it epitomises is of a substantive
nature. Whereas Supreme Court judges are elected by the US President, their
independence is firmly established, ia by their lifetime tenure. The system of
checks and balances among the governmental branches as evidenced by the
shared war powers of Congress and the US President further contributes to a
refined institutional framework to prevent or address the arbitrary exercise of
sovereign power.
D. The French État de Droit
Already the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789
invoked two principles of the rule of law, stipulating that a constitution required
that rights and freedoms be guaranteed and the separation of powers defined.238
The specific concept of the ‘état de droit’ was introduced to France only at the
beginning of the twentieth century by Raymond Carré de Malberg who had
drawn his inspiration from the German concept of the ‘Rechtsstaat’.239 The
French Constitution, however, nowhere explicitly invokes the ‘état de droit’.240
Nonetheless, the introduction of the concept to French constitutional law
eventually led to a weakening of the omnipotent position of the French
Parliament and a loosening of the profound reservations against the judiciary
distinctive for the French legal system and institutionalised the idea that all
state power needs to be confined by a supreme law, including the legislature.241
1. Parliamentary Sovereignty
Until the mid-20th century, the French legal system had not installed effective
guarantees to ensure the supremacy of the constitution and the French
Parliament enjoyed considerable institutional supremacy over the other
branches of government.242 The trust placed in parliament resulted from its
238 art 16 Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 stipulates that ‘[a] society in which
the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has
no constitution at all.’ ‹http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp› accessed
14 July 2017.
239 Laurent Pech, ‘Rule of Law in France’ in Randall Peerenboom (ed), Asian Discourses of
Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries,
France, and the U.S. (Routledge 2004) 79, 80; Grote, ‘The German Rechtsstaat in a
Comparative Perspective’ (n 176) 193.
240 Olivier Jouanjan, ‘Frankreich’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Peter M Huber (eds),
Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum, vol I (CF Müller Verlag 2007) § 2, para 104.
241 Gosalbo-Bono (n 71) 249.
242 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 281; Pech (n 239) 86.
Part 1 – Defining the Rule of Law – The Rule of Law as a Contested Concept?
46
perception as the body most accurately representing the popular will, which had
historically been entrusted with the realisation of the individual rights as
enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.243
The rule of law was, thus, for a long time identified with the rule of
parliamentary law with the main yardstick for legitimacy of governmental
action being the principle of legality.244 The confidence in the governing
expertise of the legislature went hand in hand with a profound distrust in the
judiciary. Scepticism towards judges can be traced back to Montesquieu’s
writings, which explicitly envisaged the appropriate task of the judiciary in the
mere application of laws made by the legislature.245 The rejection of a strong
judiciary dated back to a time when royal courts had thwarted progressive
legislation of the royal administration before the French Revolution and
resulted in the establishment of purely internal administrative review
mechanisms and the creation of the Conseil d’État by Napoleon in 1799.246
2. Judicial Review
Over time, however, the French courts strengthened their role. The Conseil
d’État, the supreme administrative body, was originally only entrusted with the
review of administrative acts for their conformity with parliamentary laws. The
development of general principles of law by the Conseil marked the beginning
of a reorganisation of the French legal system towards the inclusion of more
meaningful standards of review and a weakening of the principle of formal
legality.247 The general principles of law did not only serve the Conseil d’État
to review executive acts for their procedural soundness but also contained
substantive guarantees such as the principle of legal equality or the freedoms of
thought, opinion and movement.248 The Conseil d’État retrieved these principles
from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, the
Preamble of the 1946 Constitution and from concepts such as justice and
equity grounded in natural law.249 The subsequent incremental strengthening of
the standards of judicial review was a response to the extended law-making
243 Olivier Jouanjan, ‘Verfassungsrechtsprechung in Frankreich’ in Armin von Bogdandy
and Peter Huber (eds), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum, vol VI (CF Müller Verlag
2016) § 6, para 10.
244 Pech (n 239) 85 f.
245 Gosalbo-Bono (n 71) 246.
246 Boyron (n 135) 78.
247 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 292.
248 ibid 293.
249 ibid 292.
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powers of the executive, which had to be guarded in the interest of the principle
of separation of powers.250
In 1958, the Conseil Constitutionnel was established to ensure respect for
the boundary between the jurisdictions of parliament and the executive with
the main focus lying on preventing the legislature from encroaching upon
executive authority.251 The review powers of the Conseil Constitutionnel were
initially limited to the scrutiny of parliamentary acts for their formal and
procedural constitutionality.252 In an act of self-empowerment, however, the
Conseil expanded its authority to also review parliamentary legislation for
its compatibility with the fundamental rights guarantees contained in the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and the preamble
of the Constitution of 1946.253 Whereas the right to apply for judicial review of
parliamentary laws was initially reserved for the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister and the Presidents of the two houses of Parliament, it was
incrementally expanded to include a group of at least sixty members of the
National Assembly or sixty senators and extended again in 2008 to also
encompass private individuals under restricted circumstances.254 Today, the
Conseil Constitutionnel systematically examines organic laws and regulations
of the houses of Parliament for their compatibility with the Constitution before
they enter into force.255 In addition, the Conseil enjoys the authority to
determine the constitutionality of international treaties and agreements before
their ratification and since 2008 also of popular referendums.256 While the
Conseil was initially restricted to review the constitutionality of laws referred to
him before they were promulgated by the President, the constitutional reform in
2008 granted claimants of a case that crucially depends on the interpretation of a
legislative provision already in force, the right to have their case referred to the
Conseil Constitutionnel by the Conseil d’État or the Cour de cassation to
determine its compatibility with the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
constitution.257
250 Boyron (n 135) 37.
251 ibid 151. See arts 56–63 French Constitution of 1958.
252 Grote, ‘The German Rechtsstaat in a Comparative Perspective’ (n 176) 203.
253 Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No 71–44 of 16 July 1971 (‘Liberté d’association’).
See, eg, Jouanjan, ‘Frankreich’ (n 240) § 2, para 40.
254 ibid § 2, para 40.
255 art 46 (5) French Constitution of 1958 (for a clarification of the concept of ‘organic
laws’); art 61 (1) French Constitution of 1958.
256 arts 11 (3) and 54 French Constitution of 1958.
257 art 61(2) French Constitution of 1958; art 61-1 French Constitution of 1958, implemented
by the organic law of 9December 2009. Grote, ‘The German Rechtsstaat in a
Comparative Perspective’ (n 176) 203.
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3. Restraint by the Bloc de Constitutionnalité
The substantive standards of constitutional review are found in various sources.
The modern French Constitution consists of more than one document and
is traditionally referred to as the ‘bloc de constitutionnalité’. Besides the
constitution of 4th October 1958, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen of 1789 and the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution were
incorporated by the Conseil Constitutionnel into the 1958 Constitution based
on their mention in its preamble.258 Additionally, the general principles
recognised in the laws of the Republic and the Charter for the Environment of
2004 enjoy constitutional status.259 The 1789 Declaration, the 1946 Preamble
and the general principles provide for a rich catalogue of fundamental rights
guarantees ranging from political to social and economic rights, complemented
since 2004 by environmental protections.260
4. Judicial Independence & Separation of Powers
The French Constitution provides explicitly only for the judicial independence
of private law courts while omitting the reference to administrative courts
altogether.261 Article 64 (4) contains the principle of irremovability, while rules
pertaining to the recruitment, education, accountability, appointment, career,
promotion, duties and salaries of private law judges are regulated in organic
laws as foreseen in art 64 (3).262 The protection gap with regard to the
independence of judges sitting in other judicial bodies than private law courts
was closed by statutory law and the case law of the Conseil Constitutionnel.263
In contrast to the guarantee of judicial independence, the principle of
separation of powers figured prominently already in art 16 of the Declaration of
258 ‘Liberté d’association’ Decision (n 253).
259 Boyron (n 135) 38 f.
260 On the French environmental constitution, see David Marrani, Dynamics in the French
Constitution (Routledge 2013) 37–55. On social rights in the French constitution, see,
eg, Rainer Geesmann, Soziale Grundrechte im deutschen und französischen
Verfassungsrecht und in der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (Peter
Lang 2004) 61-167.
261 arts 64–66 French Constitution of 1958. See, Boyron (n 135) 142 f.
262 Boyron (n 135) 143–145.
263 art L231-3 of the Code of Administrative Justice regulates the irremovability of judges of
the first instance- and appeal administrative courts. Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision
No 80-199 DC of 22 July 1980 established that the principle of judicial independence
extends also to administrative courts. Remarkably though, the judicial independence of
the Conseil d’État is not guaranteed either by positive or case law. While this raises
concerns under art 6(1) ECHR, in practice the independence of the judges of the Conseil
d’État has not been a problem. See, Boyron (n 135) 147–150.
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the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 which stipulated that ‘a society in
which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers
defined, has no constitution at all’.264 This, of course, did not clarify how
exactly the separation of powers should be ensured by the French legal system.
The modern French Constitution, then, enumerates the parliamentary powers in
arts 34 and 35, while reserving the remaining matters for the executive
according to art 37. The French legal system of the Fifth Republic is
characterised by a concentration of power in the executive, especially in
the office of the President of the Republic, which can be traced back to the
politics of self-empowerment of Charles de Gaulle that culminated in the
introduction of presidential elections by direct universal suffrage in 1962.265
The pivotal role of the President in the French legal system is evidenced, eg,
by its authority to ensure due respect for the Constitution, the proper
functioning of the public authorities and the continuity of the state and to
guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and due respect for
Treaties.266 As a peculiarity with regard to the principle of separation of powers,
the President of the Republic is further tasked in art 64 of the 1958 Constitution
to guarantee the independence of the judiciary. The President also enjoys
considerable powers over the other branches of government. The presidential
right to appoint the Prime Minister according to art 8 of the Constitution has
been converted into the practice of the President to choose his favourite
candidate who during his term of office depends on the favour of the President
more than being responsible to Parliament.267 Additionally, the President
promulgates primary as well as secondary legislation and may dissolve the
National Assembly.268 He furthermore enjoys extensive appointment rights
pertaining to army and civil service positions.269 Establishing the most
extensive presidential authority, art 16 of the French Constitution entrusts the
President with all constitutional powers in cases of national emergency.
5. Conclusion
Even though the French model of the rule of law was in its origins characterised
by a strong focus on the principle of legality to guarantee and institutionalise the
best possible representation of the popular will, the modern-day French legal
system clearly features substantive rule of law elements. This, however, is
264 ‹http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp› accessed 14 July 2017.
265 Jouanjan, ‘Frankreich’ (n 240) § 2, paras 30–32.
266 art 5 French Constitution of 1958.
267 Boyron (n 135) 71.
268 arts 12, 10 and 13 (1) French Constitution of 1958.
269 art 13 (1) French Constitution of 1958.
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owed primarily to the self-empowerment of the Conseil d’État and the Conseil
Constitutionnel. As a consequence, parliamentary acts nowadays need to
withstand not only a review of their enactment in line with established
procedures but are also subjected to substantive standards of review. A central
substantive standard of review constitutes the French constitution, which
contains broad political, social, economic and even environmental protections.
Owed to the constitutional framework and acts of self-empowerment, the office
of the President of the Fifth Republic has shifted the separation of powers with
its originally strong focus on parliament to a concentration of power in the
executive. This authority goes so far that the President even figures as the
guarantor of the French Constitution.
E. The Rule of Law in Russia
The Russian Constitution refers to the rule of law in art 1 (1) and defines Russia
as a ‘democratic federated rule-of-law State with a republic form of
government’.270 The explicit mention of the rule of law in the Russian
Constitution is a novelty of the post-Soviet Russian state. While the Soviet
Union still existed, the rule of law was not practised and law was seen as
subordinate to state power.271 The implementation of this programmatic
constitutional provision in modern Russia, however, lags behind the aspiration
of the constitutional text.272
1. The Supreme Law of the Country & the Principle of Formal Legality
Following art 4 (2) of the Russian Constitution, the Constitution of the Russian
Federation and federal laws are supreme throughout the entire Russian territory.
Article 15 (1) further provides the Constitution with ‘the highest legal force’ and
‘direct effect’ and establishes that laws and other legal acts shall not contravene
the Constitution.273 Article 15 (2) complements the hierarchy of norms and
270 See the English translation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 12December
1993 in William Butler, Russian Law and Legal Institutions (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill
Publishing 2014) 363–404. On the difficulties and ambiguities attached to the
translation of the Russian phrase ‘pravovoe gosudarstvo’ into the concept of ‘rule of
law’, see Jane Henderson, The Constitution of the Russian Federation: A Contextual
Analysis (Hart Publishing 2011) 7 f.
271 Irina Bogdanovskaia and Tatiana Vassilieva, Constitutional Law in Russia (Wolters
Kluwer 2012) 32.
272 Henderson (n 270) 85.
273 art 15 (1) Russian Constitution of 1993. See also art 90 (3) Russian Constitution of 1993,
which requires that edicts and regulations of the President of the Russian Federation shall
not be contrary to the constitution and federal laws.
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stipulates that agencies of state power and the local self-government, officials,
citizens, and their associations are obliged to comply with the Constitution and
federal laws. Article 15 (4) establishes the supremacy of generally recognised
principles and norms of international law and of ratified international treaties
over federal laws. This includes the European Convention on Human Rights
and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The Constitution
further enshrines several important rule of law requirements with regard to the
formal qualities of legal rules. Article 15 (3) requires that laws be officially
published and that unpublished laws shall not be applied.274 Article 54 (1)
prohibits the retroactivity of laws ‘establishing or aggravating responsibility’
and paragraph 2 establishes that ‘no one may bear responsibility for an act
which at the moment of its commission was not deemed to be a violation of
law’.
2. Presidential Supremacy & Separation of Powers
Whereas Soviet Russia was informed by the ideal of the unity of state power, the
1990 Declaration on State Sovereignty explicitly included the principle of the
separation of powers.275 The principle reappeared in art 3 of the 1978
Constitution and was later adopted by art 10 of the 1993 Constitution.276
Article 10 of the 1993 Constitution stipulates that the state power in the
Russian Federation ‘shall be effectuated on the basis of separation into
legislative, executive, and judicial’ and maintains that the agencies of the three
branches shall be autonomous. The term ‘autonomous’ is to be distinguished
from the concept of ‘independence’ which was not intended by the
constitutional text as the constitutional system of checks and balances does
provide for mutual dependencies such as appointment rights into high office of
one governmental branch by members of another.277 Article 11 (1) explains in
more detail that the state power shall be exercised by the President, the Federal
Assembly (the Council of the Federation and the State Duma), the Government
and the courts.
The state organ enjoying the foremost powers in the Russian Federation,
however, is the President. Article 80 of the Constitution makes the President
the head of state. He is the supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian armed
forces, represents the federation in foreign relations, and enjoys emergency
274 art 15 (3) Russian Constitution of 1993.
275 Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
of 12 June 1990.
276 Henderson (n 270) 88.
277 ibid 87.
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powers and the authority to confer state awards and titles of honour and to grant
citizenship, amnesties, pardons and political asylum.278 Most importantly, the
President is actively involved in the law-making process of the Russian
Federation. He frequently introduces bills in the State Duma and has the right
to veto laws of the Federal Assembly.279 Additionally, art 90 of the Constitution
authorises the President to issue edicts and regulations that are binding
throughout the entire Russian territory, a power criticised of having been
subjected to repeated presidential overuse, as exemplified by Yeltsin’s
extensive economic regulation.280 Additionally, the President may dissolve the
State Duma under specific circumstances.281
With regard to the government, the President enjoys near absolute control.
He appoints the Chairmen of the Government, ie the Prime Minister, and the
deputy chairmen and federal ministers following the request of the Prime
Minister. He may dismiss the Government and has the right to preside over
sessions of the Government, which he frequently does.282
The President further enjoys the peculiar authority to repeal decrees and
regulations of the central government in cases of their alleged incompatibility
with the Constitution, federal laws or presidential edicts.283 He may further
suspend executive acts of subjects of the Russian Federation if they contravene
the Constitution, federal laws, international obligations or the rights and
freedoms of the man and citizen until a court has decided upon the alleged
violation.284 In spite of these far reaching presidential powers, which define
large parts of the Russian legal order, the Constitutional Court has developed a
doctrine of implied presidential powers which may comprise everything that is
compatible with the overall spirit of his constitutional prerogative.285 These
constitutional arrangements do not only concede the President broad powers
over the Russian Constitution but also over the other governmental branches,
resulting in an accumulation of power in the office of the President.
278 arts 86, 87 (1), 88, 89 (a) (b) and (c) Russian Constitution of 1993.
279 arts 84 (d) and 107 (3) Russian Constitution of 1993. The presidential veto may then
again be overridden by a two-thirds vote in both chambers. See, Butler (n 270) 300.
280 Henderson (n 270) 123.
281 arts 84 (b) and 109 Russian Constitution of 1993.
282 arts 83 (a) (b) (e) and 117 (2) Russian Constitution of 1993.
283 art 115 (3) Russian Constitution of 1993.
284 art 85 (2) Russian Constitution of 1993.
285 Henderson (n 270) 129 f.
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3. Human Rights Protection
The Russian Constitution contains an extensive catalogue of fundamental rights
and freedoms which includes civil and political liberties such as freedom of
thought, speech or assembly as well as economic and social rights, eg, the right
to land in private ownership, labour rights, the guarantee of social security for
age, illness, disability, unemployment, nurturing children and health protection
and medical assistance.286 Article 19 (1) of the Constitution provides for the rule
of law principle of legal equality and requires that ‘all shall be equal before law
and court’. In addition, the Constitution contains a rich catalogue of procedural
rights. Article 45 of the Constitution stipulates that the ‘state defence of the
rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be guaranteed in the Russian
Federation’ and that every rightholder may use all legal means to defend his
rights and freedoms. The article introduces the chapter of the rights catalogue
devoted to procedural guarantees. This catalogue aspires to grant the right to a
remedy, the right of access to a court established by law, the right to qualified
(free) legal assistance and a defence counsel, the presumption of innocence, the
prohibition of double jeopardy, the right to appeal a conviction, the right against
self-incrimination, victim access to justice and state compensation.287 The
enforcement of these rights, then, is mainly entrusted to the Russian courts,
which in practice, however, enjoy only limited authority in the Russian political
reality.
Article 2 of the Constitution establishes the binding nature of these rights
and holds that ‘man, his rights and freedoms are the highest value’ and that
‘recognition of, compliance with, and defence of the rights and freedoms of
man and citizen shall be the duty of the State’. The guarantee implies that the
state shall recognise and establish fundamental rights in the form of positive
legislation, refrain from unwarranted interference, enforce rights by means of
positive action and ensure their realisation among private actors.288 The
fundamental rights catalogue binds the legislature in that legislation abolishing
or diminishing the rights and freedoms must not be issued in the Russian
Federation.289 Limitations on these rights are only justified to the extent that
they are necessary to defend the foundations of the constitutional system,
morality, health, rights and legal interests of other persons or to ensure the
286 arts 29 (1), 31, 36 (1), 37, 39 (1) and 41 (1) Russian Constitution of 1993. The entire
rights-catalogue ranges from art 17 to art 64 of the Constitution.
287 arts 47, 48, 49, 50 (1) (3), 51, 52, 53 Russian Constitution of 1993.
288 Rainer Arnold and Helena Sieben, ‘Art. 2’ in Bernd Wieser (ed), Handbuch der
Russischen Verfassung (Verlag Österreich 2014) paras 10–14.
289 art 55 (2) Russian Constitution of 1993.
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defence of the country and security of the state.290 The requirement of
necessity introduces the principle of proportionality to the justification of
rights curtailments.291 The Constitutional Court also applies the principle of
proportionality as a balancing standard in cases of collision between
fundamental rights positions of different rightholders.292 Additionally, rights
curtailments are admissible under restricted circumstances in extraordinary
situations with the exemption of a selected catalogue of rights, which are
considered non-derogable even during a state of emergency such as the right to
life or the dignity of the person.293
4. Judicial Review
Chapter 7 of the Russian Constitution contains the provisions on the judiciary.
Article 125 of the Constitution creates the Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation and furnishes it with the right of constitutional review of the federal
laws and normative acts of the President, the Council of the Federation, the State
Duma and the Government of the Russian Federation. The court may further
review the constitutions, charters, laws and other normative acts of the federal
subjects for their constitutionality, as well as treaties concluded between the
federal government and the governments of the federal subjects, treaties
concluded between the governments of the federal subjects and international
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation which have not yet entered
into force.294 Additionally, the court is supposed to interpret the Constitution
and to review the constitutionality of laws being applied or subject to
application in a specific case in the procedure established by a federal law with
regard to appeals against a violation of constitutional rights and freedoms of
citizens.295 If the court determines the unconstitutionality of an act or provision,
they should cease to have legal effect.296 On the books, thus, the Russian legal
system knows a robust system of constitutional review.
Additionally, the Procuracy, a distinct Russian supervisory body originally
entrusted to supervise the legality of the acts of parliamentary and
governmental agencies of the subjects of the Russian Federation, enjoys the
authority to monitor the compliance of state organs and commercial as well as
non-commercial organisations with the Constitution as well as with laws of
290 art 55 (3) Russian Constitution of 1993.
291 Arnold and Sieben (n 288) paras 27–32.
292 ibid paras 18.
293 art 56 Russian Constitution of 1993.
294 art 125 (b) (c) and (d) Russian Constitution of 1993.
295 art 125 (4) and (5) Russian Constitution of 1993.
296 art 125 (6) Russian Constitution of 1993.
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superior state authorities.297 The procurator, however, has no authority to review
the acts of the President, the Government or the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation.298 The review of their acts falls within the jurisdiction of
the Constitutional Court.299 In cases of an alleged contravention of a legal act
or omission with a superior law, a procurator may file a protest with the
responsible state authority, which has to be addressed by the respective
organ.300 Regarding conflicts of laws of the Federal Assembly with the
Constitution, the Procurator General may refer such alleged violations to the
President.301
If citizens approach the Procuracy regarding alleged violations of their
constitutional rights and freedoms, it may advise them and take steps to address
such violations by appealing to courts for the invalidation of the concerned act,
preventative or compensating measures or the initiation of civil, administrative
and criminal proceedings.302
Another avenue for citizens to enforce their constitutionally guaranteed
rights is foreseen in art 58 (2) of the Russian Constitution which grants citizens
a right to appeal in cases of rights infringements by state officials. The 1993
‘Law of the Russian Federation on appealing to a court actions and decisions
violating the rights and freedoms of citizens’ introduces appeals by citizens,
non-citizens and legal entities against concrete acts and decisions and their
legal basis.303 Crucially, art 46 (3) of the Constitution contains the right of
everyone in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation to
apply to inter-state agencies for the defence of the rights and freedoms of man
if domestic remedies have been exhausted. Since the entry into force of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Russia
in 1998, individuals can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in
cases of an alleged infringement of a Convention right.304 This also implies that
Russian courts have to apply Convention rights and follow the jurisprudence of
the Strasbourg court.305 In practice, however, judges seldom apply international
norms and standards or international and regional case law.306
297 Henderson (n 270) 240; Butler (n 270) 245.
298 Butler (n 270) 245.
299 Henderson (n 270) 240.
300 Butler (n 270) 246.
301 ibid 247.
302 ibid.
303 Henderson (n 270) 241 f.
304 ibid 247.
305 ibid 251.
306 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers
(30April 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/32/Add.1 [27f].
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In theory, the Russian legal system appears to have a robust system of
judicial review in place, catering to the rule of law. In practice, however, the
independence and impartiality of Russian judges is only insufficiently
guaranteed and judicial decisions are often not implemented with detrimental
consequences for the effectiveness of the courts’ review powers.
5. Judicial Independence
The Russian Constitution provides for judicial independence in that it
establishes the irremovability, inviolability and immunity of judges, the
publicness of court cases and the funding of the courts.307 The guarantee of
judicial independence was further substantiated in the Federal Act No. 3132-1
‘On the Status of Judges’ of 26 June 1992.308 Yet, several factors impede the
effective implementation of the Constitution and its extensive fundamental
rights catalogue. A concerning constitutional arrangement with regard to the
principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary is the
right of the President to present to the Council of the Federation candidates for
appointment as judges of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the
Higher Court of Arbitration, the Procurator-General and other federal courts.309
He also appoints the procurators of the subjects of the Russian Federation
upon recommendation of the Procurator General.310 Additionally, the President
appoints the presidents and deputy presidents of all courts of general jurisdiction
and recommends the Chairperson of the Constitutional Court and the Chief
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Arbitration Court who are
claimed to enjoy disproportionate influence over their colleague judges and
to entertain close relations with the executive.311 According to the UN
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the current
appointment mechanisms exert undue political influence upon judges and
affect their impartiality towards members of the executive. Accordingly, he
recommended the creation of qualification collegia that are independent from
both the executive and the legislative.312
Another serious concern for the enjoyment of rights and the effective
implementation of the Russian laws are the tremendous deficiencies in the
Russian legal system regarding the implementation of judicial decisions, which
307 arts 120–124 Russian Constitution of 1993.
308 Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/26/32/Add.1 (n 306) [7].
309 arts 128 (1) (2) and 129 (2) Russian Constitution of 1993.
310 art 129 (3) Russian Constitution of 1993.
311 Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/26/32/Add.1 (n 306) [24f].
312 ibid [17f].
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are reported to amount to 50 to 60 per cent of all court rulings.313 A considerable
amount of cases reaching the European Court of Human Rights are then also
concerned with the failure to implement domestic court decisions.314
6. Conclusion
The Russian political reality is characterised by the practice of rule by law and
an instrumental understanding of the law rather than by the principle of the rule
of law.315 The law can rule in areas such as commercial, private or criminal law
but only to the extent that no interests of the ruling political class are affected.316
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and many Russian legal
theorists promote a substantive rather than formal understanding of the rule of
law, which binds all state organs to the basic rights and freedoms enshrined in
the Constitution as well as to the principle of democracy.317 The Constitutional
Court has established a list of guarantees and elements that are associated with
its understanding of the rule of law under the Russian Constitution: The
supremacy of the constitution and its binding force for all state organs, the duty
of the state to guarantee human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms
provided for in the Constitution, the principle of separation of powers, the
prohibition of arbitrariness, the principles of justice and proportionality, the
right to protection against violations through private individuals by police,
courts and criminal legislation, procedural guarantees, including the rights
to a remedy and fair trial as well as the criteria of determinacy, clarity and
consistency as qualities of state laws.318 Russian commentators, however, admit
that the implementation and full realisation of these rule of law elements remain
a challenging aspiration in light of present-day Russian politics and that the
process of creating a rule of law-abiding Russian state must still be considered
to be in its infancy.319
313 ibid [52].
314 Henderson (n 270) 250.
315 Jeffrey Kahn, ‘The Law Is a Causeway: Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Russia’ in
James Silkenat, James Hickey and Peter Barenboim (eds), The Legal Doctrines of the
Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat) (Springer 2014) 229, 231, 235 f.
316 ibid 235, 237.
317 Otto Luchterhandt, ‘Art. 1’ in Bernd Wieser (ed), Handbuch der Russischen Verfassung
(Verlag Österreich 2014) para 21.
318 ibid para 22.
319 Bogdanovskaia and Vassilieva (n 271) 32.
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F. The Rule of Law in China
The Amendment to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China of March
1999 added the first paragraph to art 5 of the Constitution which reads that ‘the
People’s Republic of China governs the country according to law and makes it a
socialist country under rule of law’.320 Invoking this formal recognition of the
principle of the rule of law in the Chinese constitution, the Chinese government
observed at the occasion of the 56th session of the Human Rights Commission
that ‘Chinese society was in a phase of transition between two systems;
supremacy of power was about to give way to supremacy of law’.321 The
import of the said constitutional provision for the governance of the Chinese
legal system, however, has been claimed to be of only modest reach as the
reference to the rule of law has not been interpreted and implemented to
effectively restrain the powers of the administrative state.322
1. Supremacy of the Constitution
According to the constitutional text, the Chinese Constitution is the supreme
law of the land. Several constitutional provisions attest to this.323 Article 5 of
the Chinese Constitution of 1982 prominently stipulates that no laws,
administrative or local regulations may contravene the Constitution and that all
state organs, the armed forces, all political parties, public organisations,
enterprises and institutions must abide by the Constitution and other laws. It
320 English translation provided for on website of The National People’s Congress of the
People’s Republic of China ‹http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2824.
htm› accessed 14 July 2017.
321 Fifty-sixth Session of the Commission on Human Rights – Summary Record of the 31st
Meeting (25October 2000) UN Doc E/CN. 4/2000/SR.31 [14].
322 Qianfan Zhang, The Constitution of China: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing 2012)
149.
323 According to art 67 (7) (8) Chinese Constitution of 1982, the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress shall annul those administrative regulations, decisions and
orders of the State Council that contravene the Constitution or other laws as well as
those local regulations and decisions of the organs of state power of provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government that
contravene the Constitution, other laws or administrative regulations. Art 89 (1) of the
Constitution commits the State Council to the Constitution and other laws when
adopting administrative measures and regulations and issuing decisions and orders.
Art 99 requires local people’s congresses at various levels to ensure the observance and
implementation of the Constitution and other laws and the administrative regulations in
their respective administrative areas. Art 100 binds the people’s congresses of provinces,
and municipalities and their standing committees to the Constitution, other laws and
administrative regulations when adopting local regulations.
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further establishes that no organisation or individual shall be privileged to be
beyond the Constitution or other laws. In practice, however, the Constitution is
claimed to suffer from the absence of effective implementing mechanisms and is
superseded by so called non-positive rules authored and enforced by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).324 A case in point of how far Chinese politics
deviate from the constitutional text is the reversal of the democratic structure in
the Chinese legal system. The constitutionally established state structure that
is supposed to derive its legitimacy from the people and shall be organised
bottom-up, works just the other way around, with superior congresses and
governments appointing and supervising governing bodies on subordinate
federal levels.325 The top-down control by the central government is opposed to
the constitutional design. Additionally, the sweeping powers of the National
People’s Congress (NPC) over the Constitution strongly compromise the
supremacy of the document.326
2. The Principle of Legality
Such as the supremacy of the Constitution, the principle of legality is
deeply entrenched in the constitutional text. Article 2 of the Constitution,
which entrusts the people with the exercise of state power, stipulates that the
administration of state affairs and the management of economic, cultural and
social affairs must be in accordance with the law. Many other constitutional
provisions attest to a hierarchy of norms and to the principle that all state action
shall abide by the law as established.327 Several constitutional provisions
also reflect that the law is the source and limitation of the authority of state
organs such as the local people’s congresses, the people’s congresses of
nationality townships, the standing committee of a local people’s congress, the
local people’s governments or the organs of self-government of autonomous
regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties.328 Article 40 of the
Constitution which guarantees the freedom and privacy of correspondence
stipulates that censorship of correspondence needs to be in accordance with
procedures prescribed by law.
In practice, however, the principle of legality suffers from the same
constraints as the Constitution, namely that ‘governments at all levels will
follow “latent rules”, which bear no resemblance to the laws in the books, and
324 Zhang, The Constitution of China (n 322) 97–99.
325 ibid 97.
326 See further down in this document, 55.
327 arts 41, 67 (7) (8), 89 (1), 99, 100 Chinese Constitution of 1982
328 arts 99, 104, 107, 115 Chinese Constitution of 1982.
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the people will be institutionally incapable of making any use of the latter for
protecting themselves’.329 With an eye to the realisation of social justice,
however, Chinese scholarship has suggested that given the ‘all-encompassing
omnipotence in Chinese behaviours’ of informal rules and networks, they may
‘serve disciplinary and co-ordinating functions that supplant the transparency,
accountability and predictability the rule of law is presumed to provide’.330
3. Separation of Powers
A crucial feature of the Chinese legal system is the principle of parliamentary
supremacy. As a consequence, its institutional design does not have much in
common with a separation of powers model as known in US constitutional
law.331 The entire Chinese legal system is dominated by the NPC.332
The National and Local People’s Congresses enjoy supreme authority in the
Chinese legal system to ensure – in theory – the people’s rule over the
republic.333 Article 2 of the Constitution bears witness of this arrangement in
that it entrusts all power in the People’s Republic of China to the people and
prescribes that the NPC and the Local People’s Congresses are the organs
through which the people exercise state power. Article 57 of the Constitution,
then, establishes the NPC as the highest organ of state power. Its permanent
body, the Standing Committee (SCNPC), exercises its functions and powers
and enjoys supreme authority over the Constitution as it has the power to
interpret and amend it, annul acts and laws in contravention to it and supervise
its enforcement.334 The notion of parliamentary supremacy in the contemporary
Chinese constitution does, thus, even involve the far reaching authority to
determine the meaning of the constitution.335
Article 76 of the Constitution seems to provide one of the few limitations to
this institutional supremacy in that it requires all NPC deputies to play an
exemplary role in abiding by the Constitution and other laws. This appeal,
however, appears to be rather toothless with the NPC’s extensive constitutional
329 Zhang, The Constitution of China (n 322) 106.
330 Phil Chan, China, State Sovereignty and International Legal Order (Brill Nijhoff 2015)
150.
331 Randall Peerenboom, ‘Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded
Assumptions’ in Randall Peerenboom (ed), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for
Global Rule of Law Promotion (CUP 2010) 69, 81.
332 Peerenboom, ‘Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China’ (n 149) 116.
333 Zhang, The Constitution of China (n 322) 121.
334 arts 62 (1) (2), 64, 66 and 67 (1) (7) (8) Chinese Constitution of 1982.
335 Rainer Grote, ‘The People’s Republic of China: Introductory Note’ (OUP 2005) Oxford
Constitutional Law Online.
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authority in mind. The only institutional control seems to be envisaged by art 77,
which stipulates that the NPC’s deputies are subject to supervision by the units,
which elected them and further have the power to recall them through
procedures prescribed by law.
The supremacy of the NPC is further reflected in the institutional design of
the Chinese legal order. The Congress is superior to the State Council, the
Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate and other important state organs and may not be
restricted by them.336 It elects the President and the Vice-President of the
People’s Republic of China, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission,
the President of the Supreme People’s Court and the Procurator-General of the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate.337 In addition, it decides on the choice of
the Premier of the State Council and the Vice-Premiers, State Councillors,
Ministers in charge of ministries or commissions, the Auditor-General, the
Secretary-General of the State Council and the members of the Central Military
Commission.338 Furthermore, the Chinese state organs are not only established
by the NPC but also required to implement its laws and resolutions.339 This
constitutional arrangement illustrates the omnipresence of centralism as an
organising principle of the Chinese legal system as opposed to the principle of
separation of powers.340
The principle of centralism operates to the benefit of the political power of
the Chinese Communist Party. The special historic role of the CCP for the
Chinese republic is reflected in the preamble of the 1982 Constitution. It
testifies to the historic role of the CCP in ‘China’s New-Democratic
Revolution’ and requires the Chinese people ‘under the leadership of the
Communist Party of China’ to ‘adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship
and the socialist road’ and ‘the system of the multi-party cooperation and
political consultation led by the Communist Party of China’ to ‘exist and
develop for a long time to come’. The party’s rule over state affairs in China,
however, is neither reflected in the main text of the Constitution, nor in any
other laws or statutes of the land.341 The main reason for the CCP’s supreme
position is the party’s majority in the NPC. Article 57 of the Constitution
creates the NPC’s permanent body, the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress. Since the CCP makes up the majority of the members of the
336 Xu Chongde and Niu Wenzhan, Constitutional Law in China (Wolters Kluwer 2013) 56.
337 art 62 (4) (6)-(8) Chinese Constitution of 1982.
338 art 62 (5) (6) Chinese Constitution of 1982.
339 Chongde and Wenzhan (n 336) 56.
340 ibid 15.
341 Zhang, The Constitution of China (n 322) 99.
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NPC, it dominates the Standing Committee and consequently the activities of
the NPC. The domination of the NPC by the CCP also flows from the authority
of the Presidium which conducts the yearly plenary session of the NPC and
nominates candidates for Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, Secretary-General and
other members of the SCNPC, the President and Vice-President of the People’s
Republic of China, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the
President of the Supreme People’s Court and the Procurator-General of the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate.342 Since a majority of the members of the
Presidium belong to the CCP, the party exerts great control over the NPC.343
4. Judicial Independence
Article 126 of the 1982 Constitution stipulates that ‘the people’s courts exercise
judicial power independently, in accordance with the provisions of law, and not
subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization or
individual’. In political reality, however, the Chinese legal system is often
blamed for an absence of judicial independence due to the firm grip of the CCP
on all state organs.344 Whereas such allegations cannot be denied, the concrete
assessment of the severity of the curtailment may vary. Peerenboom,
proceeding from the fact that China is a single-party, socialist state, maintains
that the party influences ideology, policy and personal matters of the courts but
that it does not determine all cases decided by them – a very modest standard
admittedly.345 Arrangements commonly perceived as incompatible with judicial
independence such as the diversion of particular socioeconomic conflicts
from the courts to alternative resolution mechanisms (e.g. administrative
reconsideration, mediation or arbitration) for capacity reasons may also be
qualified as conducive to the preservation of the courts’ authority if their
handling of such cases risks undermining public respect for the courts.346
Generally, however, interferences of the party with judicial decisions take place
often, usually at the hands of the Political-legal Committee, the party committee,
342 art 13 Organic Law of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China
‹http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384019.htm› accessed
14 July 2017.
343 Zhang, The Constitution of China (n 322) 126.
344 Qianfan Zhang, ‘Judicial Reform in China: An Overview’ in John Garrick and Yan
Chang Bennett (eds), China’s Socialist Rule of Law Reforms under Xi Jinping (2016)
17, 18.
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Global Rule of Law Promotion (CUP 2010) 69, 79.
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individual CCP members, the adjudicative committee or court presidents.347 The
entire constitutional design is tilted towards the institutional control of the courts
by the NPC. Not only does the NPC elect important court officials, the SCNPC
also supervises the work of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate and appoints or removes the Vice-Presidents and Judges
of the Supreme People’s Court, members of its Judicial Committee and the
President of the Military Court.348 Also on the local level, courts depend on
local governments regarding appointments of judges and financial support.349
The NPC also controls the Supreme People’s Court of China. The court is
the highest judicial organ of the Republic. It is supposed to supervise the
administration of justice by the people’s courts at various local levels and by
the special people’s courts.350 The arrangement that the Supreme Court is
responsible to the NPC and its SCNPC, however, seriously compromises the
independence of its judicial personnel, keeping in mind to what extent the CCP
rules the NPC. Its authority is further undermined by the fact that it is not
authorised to interpret the constitution – a right reserved for the SCNPC – but
may only propose bills to the NPC or the SCNPC.351
At least for reputational purposes, however, the Chinese government appears
to be committed to the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary. In its
last national report under the UN universal periodic review process, China
pledged that the judicial and procuratorial organs should exercise their powers
independently in accordance with the law.352 The CCP Central Committee
Decision concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Promoting
Governing the Country According to Law of 23October 2014, which intends
to accelerate the construction of a socialist rule of law country and to rule the
country according to the law, also refers to the aspiration to strengthen the
independence of the courts.353
347 Peerenboom, ‘Judicial Independence in China’ (n 331) 80.
348 arts 128, 67 (6) (11) Chinese Constitution of 1982.
349 Zhang, ‘Judicial Reform in China’ (n 344) 19.
350 art 127 Chinese Constitution of 1982.
351 Grote, ‘The People’s Republic of China’ (n 335).
352 UNHRC, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to
Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21 (5August 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/17/
CHN/1 [98].
353 For an English translation, see ‹https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/1
0/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehen
sively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/› accessed 14 July
2017. Para IV. (1) of the Decision holds that ‘[p]erfect systems to ensure judicial
authority and procuratorial authority are exercised fairly and independently, according
to the law. All levels’ Party and government bodies and leading cadres must support the
courts and procuratorates in exercising their functions and authorities independently and
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5. Judicial Review & Human Rights Protection
As regards the authority of Chinese courts of judicial review, the supervision of
the Constitution is not entrusted to a supreme constitutional court but to the
SCNPC.354 This arrangement is typical of communist states where the
legislature is viewed as the prime guarantor of the people’s will and welfare.355
Chinese courts are not authorised to invalidate generally applicable laws and
regulations or to review legislation for its conformity with higher laws,
including the Constitution.356 The only area where some kind of judicial review
exists is administrative law. Here, courts may review concrete administrative
acts.357 The absence of a robust arrangement for judicial review in the Chinese
legal systems has serious implications for the effective protection of the
fundamental rights of the Chinese citizens.
As a central provision for socialist constitutions, art 33 guarantees equality
before the law. China was the first Asian country to explicitly adopt the
principle of legal equality in its 1923 Constitution, albeit limited its application
to citizens.358 Today, art 33 of the Constitution is understood to contain a
substantive understanding of equality and complemented by several other
equality guarantees.359 In practice, however, especially peasants suffer from
discrimination in many spheres of life such as access to justice, labour or
education and freedom of movement.360 Another area of discrimination of the
fairly according to the law’. For an analysis of the Decision, see Randall Peerenboom,
‘Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics! What
Does the 4th Plenum Decision Mean for Legal Reforms in China?’ (2015) 7 HJRL 49–
74.
354 According to art 67 (7) (8) Chinese Constitution of 1982, the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress exercises the power to annul those administrative regulations,
decisions or orders of the State Council that contravene the Constitution or other laws as
well as those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state power of provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government that
contravene the Constitution, other laws or administrative regulations.
355 Wen-Chen Chang and others, Constitutionalism in Asia: Cases and Materials (Hart
Publishing 2014) 309.
356 Peerenboom, ‘Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China’ (n 149) 117.
357 ibid; Zhang, The Constitution of China (n 322) 95.
358 Chang (n 355) 551.
359 See, eg, art 4 (equality of nationalities), art 34 (political equality), art 48 (equality of
women and men).
360 For a depiction of the Household Registration System which requires inhabitants of urban
or rural areas to receive a permit from the People’s Security Bureau when leaving their
abode as registered in the household registration system for the other (rural/urban) part
of the country, de facto resulting in the discrimination of the rural population, see Zhang,
The Constitution of China (n 322) 199–202. On the discrimination of rural non-residents
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rural population pertains to land-takings by the government.361 Whereas just
compensation for land-takings is still in its infancy, peasants are particularly
affected by the practice of local governments to increase their revenues by
means of property takings with state compensations below market value.362
Chinese political reality also lags behind the constitutional aspiration with
regard to the guarantee of gender equality, the discrimination of women in
areas such as employment still being a pervasive phenomenon in the Chinese
society.363
Another issue of concern regarding the protection of human rights pertains
to procedural legal guarantees in China. Despite improvements in the
enforcement of procedural rights, guarantees such as the presumption of
innocence or the prohibition of prolonged detention and extorted confessions
are still violated by the Chinese police and prosecuting authorities or non-
existent such as the right to habeas corpus.364 A particularly troublesome aspect
has been the violation of procedural rights in connection with the infliction of
death penalties.365
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the consciousness of civil society –
and seemingly the government – for human rights issues has been on the rise,
finding its expression in the positions of Chinese academia as well as in the
activities of human rights lawyers and NGOs.366 As UN reports witness,
however, these initiatives suffer considerable setbacks with human rights
defenders in China being intimidated, illegally detained, physically abused,
abducted or denied fair trial rights and medical treatment in detention.367 The
prominent placement of the fundamental rights catalogue in the second chapter
of the Constitution does thus not reflect the reality that many of the guarantees
are not realised in the lives of the Chinese people. In line with this rather low
standard of national fundamental rights protection, China has made no secret of
its scepticism towards the imposition of international human rights standards




363 Chan (n 330) 140.
364 Zhang, The Constitution of China (n 322) 208–210.
365 ibid 211 f.
366 Yu Xingzhong, ‘Western Constitutional Ideas and Constitutional Discourse in China,
1978–2005’ in Stéphanie Balme and Michael Dowdle (eds), Building Constitutionalism
in China (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 111, 113 f.
367 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
(4March 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/63/Add.1 [136–239].
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and review mechanisms that are allegedly insensitive to national political,
economic and socio-cultural realities.368
6. Conclusion
On the books, the Chinese legal system seems to satisfy a wide array of central
rule of law elements. The principle of separation of powers is explicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution, as is a broad catalogue of fundamental rights.
The principle of legality is deeply entrenched in the constitutional text and the
supremacy of the Constitution guaranteed. The political reality of the Chinese
legal system, however, is characterised by the organising principle of
centralism, which results in a concentration of power in the National People’s
Congress and through it in the Chinese Communist Party, which essentially
rules the country. Many arrangements foreseen in the Constitution such as that
the state should derive its legitimacy and authority from local governing bodies
and be ruled bottom-up or that the people’s courts should exercise their judicial
power independently, are not at all reflected in practice and many fundamental
rights provisions of the Constitution realised in an only discriminatory fashion.
The most fundamental commitment of modern China to the rule of law must
probably be seen in its on-going efforts to fight corruption among state
officials. The concrete implementation of anti-corruption campaigns by the
Chinese Communist Party, however, does itself often disregard the due process
rights of those suspected and, thus, the rule of law.369
G. Concluding Observations
As can be inferred from the preceding comparative analysis, the rule of law
figures prominently as a constitutional principle in the legal systems of the P5.
Most constitutions even explicitly refer to the rule of law in their text. Rule of
law guarantees such as the independence of the judiciary, the principles of
legality and separation of powers, due process guarantees, fundamental rights
protection or the institution of judicial review more or less define the
organisational structure of the discussed legal systems – at least on the books.
This, theoretically, provides a sufficient common basis for the P5 to discuss
and agree on the use of certain terms or references to particular principles and
368 Chan (n 330) 129 (referring to China’s official reaction to the UNHRC universal periodic
review mechanism).
369 Chongyi Feng, ‘China’s Socialist Rule of Law: A Critical Appraisal of the Relationship
between the Communist Party and Comprehensive Law Reform’ in John Garrick and
Yan Chang Bennett (eds), China’s Socialist Rule of Law Reforms under Xi Jinping
(Routledge 2016) 45, 50.
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guarantees associated with the rule of law in Security Council documents.
Evidently, the national implementation of rule of law guarantees such as the
separation of powers or judicial review vary drastically in the legal systems of
the P5 as exemplified, eg, by a comparison of the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty and its implications for the separation of powers and judicial
review in the United Kingdom with the nuanced system of checks and balances
and the far reaching rights of judicial review of the Supreme Court in the United
States.
In practice, several rule of law principles are also only guaranteed in theory
or largely replaced by informal practices, examples being the extensive
appointment rights of the Russian President of members of the judiciary and
their implications for judicial impartiality and independence in the Russian
legal system. In China, eg, the prevalence of non-positive rules superseding the
Chinese Constitution curtails the principles of formal legality and constitutional
supremacy, while the arrangement that the SCNPC supervises the Constitution
rather than a judicial body undermines the institution of judicial review.
The differing conceptualisation and realisation of rule of law principles in
the legal systems of the P5 or their sometimes even absent implementation or
circumvention, however, does not necessarily bar them from agreeing on a
vocabulary intimately related to the rule of law or achieving a general
consensus as to the meaning of particular rule of law guarantees. The language
in Security Council resolutions usually does not go into too much detail. As a
rule, the language used by the Council will be sufficiently abstract to leave
room for different understandings of the invoked concepts and terms. The
concretisation of the meaning of Council resolutions then usually happens on a
level of implementation. What a Council reference to the guarantee of the
independence of the judiciary implies concretely, is, thus, usually decided by
implementing actors such as, eg, UNDPKO, UNDPA or OHCHR. This
concretisation through implementation, however, has to be sanctioned by
Council members at least by acquiescence.
Another reason why Council members may find sufficient common ground
to develop a consensual rule of law vocabulary of course also pertains to the fact
that the P5 decide against which states the Council issues resolutions containing
rule of law language. This allows them a controlled diffusion of rule of law
measures which is quite obviously not inhibited by the fact that some members
of the P5 themselves do not satisfactorily implement several rule of law
guarantees.
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IV. A Core Definition of the Rule of Law
Despite the controversies on what the rule of law implies in detail, it is claimed
that it is possible to identify its core meaning with which most theories and
political models correspond.370 To agree with this claim means to reject the idea
that the rule of law is an essentially contested concept and to suggest that it may
be contested but not in its very essence. A core definition of the rule of law
focuses on the question of what must be qualified as being at the heart of the
principle devoid of which one could no longer speak of its existence. It thus
presupposes that any rule of law concept worthy of the name must at least
embody these elements.
Common to all rule of law concepts is the aspiration to restrain the exercise
of public authority in a manner that forecloses arbitrary rule.371 What is
necessary – at a minimum – in order to achieve this goal by means of law, shall
be qualified as the core of the rule of law.
In order to reduce the risk of arbitrary rule, the rule of law requires that law
and legal institutions are the sole legitimate tools by which public authority is
exercised and that they serve as limitations on the exercise of such authority.372
For law to be capable of performing this function, it needs to conform to a
certain set of core requirements. As such core requirements count the
predictability, the supremacy of the law and the equality before the law. This
account, as ‘thin’ as it may seem at first sight, does imply a number of sub-
criteria. In order for law to satisfy the requirement of predictability, it needs to
be clear, stable, certain, consistent, intelligible, accessible, prospective and not
require the impossible.373 The supremacy of the law requires that no one be
above the law, that it applies not only to citizens but also to the sovereign itself.
It precludes the ‘rule of man’ as well as the ‘rule by law’. Equality before the
law, then, requires that the law be of general application and treat all of its
subjects equally without unwarranted discrimination.
Chesterman frames the core definition of the rule of law in a slightly
different way but principally in line with the elements just proposed. According
to Chesterman, the core definition of the rule of law entails that power is not
exercised arbitrarily, which precludes the rule of man and requires laws to be
prospective, accessible and clear.374 For Chesterman, thus, what has been
370 Tamanaha, ‘The History and Elements of the Rule of Law’ (n 73) 232.
371 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 342.
372 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 270 f.
373 These sub-elements correspond more or less with the ‘laundry lists’ of Raz and Fuller.
See part 1 ch II A. pp 18–20.
374 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 342.
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defined as the goal of the rule of law above, counts as one of its key
components. He then, however, relates it to similar sub-elements as discussed
under the heading of predictability just above. In addition, Chesterman’s core
definition requires that the law applies to the sovereign and its instruments and
that it treats all persons equally, thus establishing the exact same elements as
proposed above.375
All of these elements contribute to the eradication of arbitrariness by hands
of those in charge of ruling, thereby advancing the core idea of the rule of law.
They do not, however, tell us anything about the process in which the law is
created or by whom and what substantive standards it is supposed to satisfy.376
This factor is the very reason why most rule of law concepts will correspond
with each other regarding this core meaning. Tamanaha emphatically excludes
distinct concepts such as democracy or human rights from his core definition
since including them would amount to reserving the achievement of the rule of
law for liberal democracies.377 Such a concept, it is claimed, cannot represent
the core of the rule of law.378
Is the rule of law, reduced to its core, indeed capable of achieving its
principal goal, ie the eradication of arbitrary rule? One notices the remarkable
resemblance of the core definition with formal conceptions of the rule of law.
As Raz prudently pointed out, the rule of law formally understood does not
eradicate all possible manifestations of arbitrary rule.379 Even if the law
satisfies all of the aforementioned criteria, sovereign power may still be
exercised arbitrarily. It may be arbitrary if it pursues the mere self-interest of
the rulers or if it is indifferent as to whether it will achieve the purposes it is
allowed to pursue or if it is employed in the knowledge that it will not achieve
its purported purposes.380 Substantive standards might assist in filling the gaps
giving room for arbitrary rule by this core understanding of the rule of law. The
requirements that the exercise of authority needs to be in the public interest or
that it shall not violate human rights might mitigate the risk that authority is
exercised in the mere self-interest of the rulers. Such an understanding of the
rule of law, however, would no longer count as representing the ideal’s core
meaning nor would it clearly avert the risk of arbitrary rule insofar as the
375 ibid 342.
376 Tamanaha, ‘The History and Elements of the Rule of Law’ (n 73) 234.
377 ibid 234. See also Peerenboom, ‘Competing Conceptions of Rule of Law in China’
(n 149) 135.
378 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 342 (to whom the core definition of
the rule of law must be necessarily a formal one); Tamanaha, ‘The History and Elements
of the Rule of Law’ (n 73) 234.
379 Raz (n 61) 219.
380 ibid 219 f.
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selection and application of substantive standards involves a risk of arbitrariness
of its own.381 To conclude, one probably must accept that the rule of law –
whatever concept one decides to follow – can only assist in approaching a state
of non-arbitrary rule rather than fully guarantee it.
V. The International Rule of Law
In recent years, the rule of law discourse has transcended the national realm and
also focused on the question what the rule of law implies if applied to the
international society. The historical breeding ground of the rule of law is the
national legal system.382 Descending from this national constitutional principle,
the rule of law has been ‘upheaved’ to an international standard referred to as the
international rule of law.383 Concepts of an international rule of law have to reflect
this circumstance and deviate from national conceptions insofar as the context of
their application differs.384 While the national rule of law is meant to restrain and
legitimise centralised authority exercised by national governments and to protect
the freedom of individuals from the arbitrary use of state power, the international
rule of law works analogously only to a certain extent. One of the most pivotal
structural differences is the absence of a central authority governing international
legal subjects comparable to a national government.385 In the domestic realm, the
rule of law is aligned in the vertical direction, shaping the relationship between a
sovereign and individuals. On the international plane, by contrast, the rule of law
is mainly aligned in the horizontal direction and primarily applies to relationships
between ‘equal’ subjects such as states or international organisations.386 An inapt
381 Raz (n 61) 211; Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (n 110) 13.
382 Barber (n 159) 452.
383 ibid; Anne Peters and Ulrich Preuss, ‘International Relations and International Law’ in
Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner and Cheryl Saunders (eds), Routledge Handbook of
Constitutional Law (Routledge 2013) 33.
384 Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998)
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of Law in a Globalizing World – An Asian Perspective’ (2009) 8 Wash. U. Global Stud.
L. Rev. 187, 192f; Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International
Rule of Law?’ (n 88) 317; Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (n 18) 40.
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(n 88) 317; Machiko Kanetake, ‘The Interfaces between the National and International
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analogy between the implications of the rule of law for the individual on the
national level and the implications of the rule of law for sovereign states on the
international level may suggest that – as the rule of law is meant to guarantee the
freedom of the individual in the national legal system – it is similarly supposed to
guarantee the freedom of states on the international plane. However, as Waldron
notes, if one changes from the national to the international level, the central goal
of the rule of law and its relationship to sovereign states does not change
fundamentally.387 Accordingly, Ian Hurd rightly observes:
The international rule of law is premised on the opposite concern. In a system of
atomistic, decentralized authority units such as sovereign states, the ‘individuals’
have more legal autonomy than the common good can tolerate. The excess
autonomy of the units must be limited in order to preserve international society
itself.388
The perspective of the international rule of law can thus not be that states need
to be protected by law from the exercise of arbitrary power by a superior
international sovereign as compared to individuals subject to a national
sovereign. Like in the national realm, states themselves are the primary
addressees (as opposed to beneficiaries) of the international rule of law also on
the international level.389 As the national rule of law, the goal and purpose of the
international rule of law is to ensure the ‘well-being, liberty, and dignity of
individuals’.390 Consequently, also on the international level the rule of law
387 Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?’ (n 88)
341.
388 Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (n 18) 41.
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government, we should not demand less at the international level than we do at the
domestic level’. See, André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of
Law (OUP 2011) 3. See also, Stephan Schill, ‘The Rule of Law and the Division of
Labour Between National and International Law: The Case of International Energy
Relations’ in Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the
National and International Levels: Contestations and Deference (Hart Publishing 2016)
409, 441 (who, invoking Nollkaemper’s position in National Courts and the
International Rule of Law, stipulates that ‘[i]nstead of understanding the rule of law as a
concept that exists independently at the national and the international level, depending on
whether the exercise of domestic or international public authority is at stake, one should
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341 (‘Ultimately the reasons for continuing to insist that ROL requirements apply to the
nation-state are the same as they always are. Those requirements apply to the state for the
sake of the well-being, liberty, and dignity of individuals. Those values are as much at
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requires states to be law-abiding. Understood this way, the international rule of
law may, however, also be considered to guarantee a particular notion of
freedom for the subjects of international law to the extent that it aims at
inhibiting the abuse and violation of or noncompliance with international law
by other subjects of international law.
But what exactly does the international rule of law refer to and require? In its
most literal understanding, the international rule of law may be conceptualised
as the rule of international law. This can mean very different things. It may
refer to an international legal regime that directly regulates the normative
situation of individuals without national institutions figuring as intermediaries,
a prominent example being the administration of territories by international
organisations.391 It could relate to a structural aspect and concern the
supremacy of international over national law, which today applies to
peremptory norms of international law or certain human rights treaties.392
Usually, however, the meaning of the international rule of law is construed with
reference to the rule of law in the national context, bearing in mind the
differences between a national and the international legal order.393 The rule of
international law understood this way is concerned with the application of rule
of law principles to the relationship between states, international organisations
and other subjects of international law.394 Along these lines, the UN General
Assembly has held that the ‘rule of law applies to all States equally, and to
international organizations, including the United Nations and its principal
organs, and that respect for and promotion of the rule of law (. . .) should guide
all of their activities and accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions’.395
stake when the state acts externally as they are when it acts internally: the main difference
is that many more individuals may be affected by the state’s external action than by its
internal action.’).
391 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 355 f.
392 ibid 355.
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12 (being aware of the differences between the national and international legal sphere but
also noting the relativity of this distinction); Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History,
Politics, Theory (n 80) 129 (cautioning against simple analogies between the
international and national rule of law); Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’
(n 18) 358 (criticising a nonreflective application of national legal principles to the
international sphere); Beaulac (n 385) 204.
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395 UNGA, Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of
Law at the National and International Levels, UNGA Res 67/1 (30November 2012) UN
Doc A/RES/67/1 [2]. With regard to the application of the rule of law to the United
Nations and its organs, see also UNGA Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Strengthening
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Several authors have examined the conformity of the international legal
order with different rule of law principles. For these endeavours, the national
rule of law provides the backbone of analysis.396 Some share the view that it is
thin or formal rule of law theories that are most suitably applied to the
international legal order rather than substantive concepts as it is already
challenging to satisfy the requirement of ‘formal legality’ on the international
plane, let alone elements such as participation rights in decision-making.397
This position, however, ignores the wide array of human rights- and
humanitarian law treaties that enjoy almost universal membership, the
institutional arrangements supposed to monitor and ensure state compliance
with such instruments and the circumstance that certain human rights and
principles of international humanitarian law today enjoy the status of
customary- or even peremptory international law.398
Elements of a so-called ‘thin’ rule of law conception are, eg, the principles
of formal legality, legal certainty, legal supremacy or legal equality.
When applying the principle of formal legality to the international legal
order, the results are mixed.399 Indeed, many global interests have been
legalised and institutionalised, particularly in fields such as international human
rights-, humanitarian-, criminal-, trade- or security law.400 The requirement of
and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities’ (2014) UN Doc A/68/213/
Add.1 [89] (‘As other institutions at the international level must be accessible and
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Representative and responsive governance at the international level, based on the rule of
law, makes for a more credible, influential and effective organization and thus strengthens
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‘peace and security arm’ of the UN).
398 Owada (n 384) 195-97; Robert McCorquodale, ‘The Rule of Law Internationally’ in
Clemens Feinäugle (ed), The Rule of Law and its Application to the United Nations
(Nomos 2016) 51, 66 f.
399 Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (n 389) 3f
(Nollkaemper’s proposal for a rule of law concept applicable to the international level
builds upon the parallels between the rule of law applied to the national and international
level. He thus, ia, requires that ‘the exercise of public powers should be based upon
authority conferred by law and must be controlled by law’ and ‘that public powers
cannot set or change law at will. They have to act within the powes conferred by law’).
See also Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80) 131.
400 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 359; Beaulac (n 385) 206.
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clarity of international legal rules, however, varies drastically between different
regulative regimes. Whereas human rights treaties often contain relatively open-
ended concepts that require interpretation, more technical fields of regulation
may display a high degree of specificity and clarity such as, eg, in the field of
the international law of the sea.401 On the international plane, however, a lack
of clarity of rules should not be interpreted to free states from their general
obligation to comply with them.402 With regard to the promulgation of
international legal rules, one may refer to the Vienna Convention and its
detailed regulation of the creation and entry into force of international
treaties.403 Also, legal documents issued by UN organs are adopted according
to rules contained in the UN Charter and the codes of procedure of the
respective bodies.404 One may further point to art 102 of the UN Charter which
requires the publication of treaties and international agreements entered into by
UN members.405 Of course, none of this applies to rules of customary or
peremptory international law. It pertains primarily to international treaty law,
certain soft law instruments (such as, eg, General Assembly resolutions) or
Security Council resolutions. On the other hand, non-transparent procedures,
the omitted publication of decisions of international judicial bodies and the
often incalculable reception process of international law by national law and
vice versa are qualified as undermining the guarantee of formal legality.406
Another formal requirement of the rule of law is the principle of legal
certainty. It is catered to, eg, by the general principle of law pacta sunt
servanda or the increasing codification of international law.407 In July 2015,
more than 560 multilateral treaties had been concluded under the auspices of
the United Nations and the Secretary-General processed over 900 treaty actions
401 See, eg, the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks (adopted 4August 1995, entered into force 11December 2011) 2167 UNTS 3.
402 Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?’ (n 88)
326.
403 Beaulac (n 385) 208 f.
404 For the General Assembly, see ch IV UN Charter and Rules of Procedure of the General
Assembly, UN Doc A/520/Rev.18. For the Security Council, see ch V UN Charter and
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, UN Doc S/96/Rev.7.
405 Beaulac (n 385) 209.
406 Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80) 132 (Tamanaha refers to
the closed hearings of the WTO dispute settlement body, to the unpublished arbitration
decisions of the International Court of Arbitration and the restricted publication of the
decisions of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.).
407 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 359 (who, however, discusses the
pacta sunt servanda rule under the heading of ‘government of laws’).
Part 1 – Defining the Rule of Law – The Rule of Law as a Contested Concept?
74
clarity of international legal rules, however, varies drastically between different
regulative regimes. Whereas human rights treaties often contain relatively open-
ended concepts that require interpretation, more technical fields of regulation
may display a high degree of specificity and clarity such as, eg, in the field of
the international law of the sea.401 On the international plane, however, a lack
of clarity of rules should not be interpreted to free states from their general
obligation to comply with them.402 With regard to the promulgation of
international legal rules, one may refer to the Vienna Convention and its
detailed regulation of the creation and entry into force of international
treaties.403 Also, legal documents issued by UN organs are adopted according
to rules contained in the UN Charter and the codes of procedure of the
respective bodies.404 One may further point to art 102 of the UN Charter which
requires the publication of treaties and international agreements entered into by
UN members.405 Of course, none of this applies to rules of customary or
peremptory international law. It pertains primarily to international treaty law,
certain soft law instruments (such as, eg, General Assembly resolutions) or
Security Council resolutions. On the other hand, non-transparent procedures,
the omitted publication of decisions of international judicial bodies and the
often incalculable reception process of international law by national law and
vice versa are qualified as undermining the guarantee of formal legality.406
Another formal requirement of the rule of law is the principle of legal
certainty. It is catered to, eg, by the general principle of law pacta sunt
servanda or the increasing codification of international law.407 In July 2015,
more than 560 multilateral treaties had been concluded under the auspices of
the United Nations and the Secretary-General processed over 900 treaty actions
401 See, eg, the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks (adopted 4August 1995, entered into force 11December 2011) 2167 UNTS 3.
402 Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?’ (n 88)
326.
403 Beaulac (n 385) 208 f.
404 For the General Assembly, see ch IV UN Charter and Rules of Procedure of the General
Assembly, UN Doc A/520/Rev.18. For the Security Council, see ch V UN Charter and
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, UN Doc S/96/Rev.7.
405 Beaulac (n 385) 209.
406 Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80) 132 (Tamanaha refers to
the closed hearings of the WTO dispute settlement body, to the unpublished arbitration
decisions of the International Court of Arbitration and the restricted publication of the
decisions of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.).
407 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 359 (who, however, discusses the
pacta sunt servanda rule under the heading of ‘government of laws’).
V. The International Rule of Law
75
per year.408 States’ ultimate authority over the implementation and effectiveness
of international legal rules, however, seriously hampers the notion of legal
certainty in the international legal sphere, as does the fragmentation of the
international legal order.409
The rule of law principle of the supremacy of the law is fulfilled only
partially in the international legal order. If it is understood as the compliance of
international legal subjects with international law, the absence of an
international body authorised to enforce international law in cases of its breach,
has detrimental effects. To this can be added the lacking compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ and other international judicial bodies and the ultimate authority of
states to decide whether to accept the jurisdiction of international tribunals
or to implement their decisions.410 Additionally, the ICJ has no right to judicial
review over decisions and acts of other UN organs or to interpret the UN Charter
authoritatively.411 Consequently, international human rights guarantees such as
due process rights cannot be enforced against international organisations as
could be seen in the case of targeted sanctions issued by the UN Security
Council.412 UN or EU administrations in post-conflict situations exercising
state-like functions without the ensuing accountability for their actions are just
another example.413
With regard to the rule of law element of legal equality, one may invoke the
principle of the sovereign equality of states as provided for by art 2 (1) UN
Charter and the General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
408 UNGA Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations
Rule of Law Activities’ (2015) UN Doc A/70/206 [5].
409 See, eg, Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80) 132; Hurd, ‘The
International Rule of Law’ (n 18) 41; Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, ‘Revisiting the
Reservations Dialogue: Negotiating Diversity while Preserving Universality Through
Human Rights Law’ in Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of
Law at the National and International Levels: Contestations and Deference (Hart
Publishing 2016) 289, 295.
410 Crawford (n 393) 11f; Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (n 80)
129f; Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 359; Beaulac (n 385) 213f;
Holger Hestermeyer, ‘A Rights-based Approach to the Rule of Law in International
Law’ in Clemens Feinäugle (ed), The Rule of Law and its Application to the United
Nations (Nomos 2016) 131, 140.
411 Beaulac (n 385) 215 f.
412 Chesterman, ‘‘I’ll Take Manhattan’’ (n 16) 70 f.
413 Simon Chesterman, ‘UNaccountable? The United Nations, Emergency Powers, and the
Rule of Law’ (2009) 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1509, 1529. See also Tilmann Altwicker
and Nuscha Wieczorek, ‘Bridging the Security Gap through EU Rule of Law Missions?
Rule of Law Administration by EULEX’ (2016) 21 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 115–133.
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Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.414 The universality of
international law, including that the international community has essentially
attained global membership, thereby achieving the application of international
law to almost all states, may also be considered as contributing to the principle
of legal equality.415 Of course, not all international law applies equally to all
states but its application depends on their particular situation and the degree to
which they have committed themselves to treaty rules or rules of customary
international law. Accordingly, ‘[o]ne cannot assess the legality of an
international act without knowing the identity of the actor’.416 But to the extent
that states are in comparable situations, international law is supposed to apply to
them even-handedly.417 It is also for this reason that the principle of legal
equality does not apply directly to the legal treatment of international legal
subjects (states, international organisations, multinational corporations, non-
governmental organisations or individuals) to the extent that they fulfil very
different functions in the international legal order and accordingly bear
different rights and have different obligations.418 Legal arrangements such as
the veto power of the P5 in the UN Security Council may be considered
incompatible with a notion of legal equality as well as the lack of the
predictable and general application of international law to all of its subjects.419
The scrutiny of the international legal system for its compatibility with rule
of law elements developed for the national realm reveals salient deviations from
the rule of law or must focus on selected aspects of the international legal order
to arrive at more satisfying results. The rule of law element seemingly best
satisfied on the international plane is the ‘rule by law’ to the extent that the UN
Charter, international treaties and customary law largely govern international
relations.420
414 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (24October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. For a critique of
attempts to compare the principle of sovereign equality of states with the national rule of
law principle of legal equality, see Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the
International Rule of Law?’ (n 88) 334 f.
415 Beaulac (n 385) 210.
416 Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (n 18) 42.
417 Arthur Watts, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1993) 36 German Y.B. Int’l L. 15, 31.
418 Beaulac (n 385) 209.
419 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 360; Krygier, ‘The Security Council
and the Rule of Law’ (n 18) 23.
420 See, eg, Beaulac (n 385) 207f; Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the
International Rule of Law?’ (n 88) 319 (on doubts regarding customary international law
as a body of binding law following an understanding compatible with the rule of law);
Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper, ‘The International Rule of Law in the Cycle
of Contestations and Deference’ in Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper (eds), The
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The fulfilment of the international rule of law, thus, depends on the decision
of international legal actors to abide by existent international legal rules.421 It is
in this context that statements by the UN Security Council with regard to its
‘commitment to ensure that all UN efforts to restore peace and security
themselves respect and promote the rule of law’ merit attention.422 The Council
may be said to have subjected its actions – to a certain degree – to a self-
imposed notion of the rule of law in the context of targeted sanctions.423 In
response to considerable political and legal opposition to the due process
deficits of the Council’s sanctions regime, UN organs initiated a process to
address these concerns.424 In the World Summit Outcome of 2005, the General
Assembly called upon the Security Council to ensure ‘that fair and clear
procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and
for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exceptions’.425 The
Rule of Law at the National and International Levels: Contestations and Deference (Hart
Publishing 2016) 445.
421 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave (Pall Mall Press 1968) 42 (who famously observed
that ‘[i]t is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time’).
422 UNSC Presidential Statement 11 (2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/11.
423 See, eg, Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats
(Duncker & Humblot 1996) 274f (who inquires whether the Council should exercise
self-constraint with regard to the question against whom it issues enforcement measures
in cases of an international conflict).
424 For reactions from European Union courts, see EGC, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of
the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Case T-315/01
[2005] ECR II-3649 (21 September 2005); CJEU, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the
European Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P [2008] ECR I-6351
(3 September 2008); EGC, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission, Case T-85/09
[2010] ECR II-0000 (30 September 2010); CJEU, European Commission and the Council
of the European Union v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and
C-595/10 P [2013] ECR not yet reported (18 July 2013). For reactions from the European
Court of Human Rights, see ECtHR, Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (App No 27021/08)
7 July 2011; ECtHR, Nada v Switzerland (App No 10593/08) 12 September 2012. For
national case law see, eg, UKSC, HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others,
HM Treasury v Mohammed al-Ghabra, R (Hari El Sayed Sabaei Youssef) v HM Treasury
[2010] UKSC 2 (Judgment of 27 January 2010); CFC, Abousfian Abdelrazik v The
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of Canada, 2009 FC 580 (Judgment
of 4 June 2009). For an illustration of the UN response, see Kanetake (n 385) 267–338. See
also Bardo Fassbender, ‘Targeted Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due
Process Rights: A Study Commissioned by the UN Office of Legal Affairs and Follow-Up
Action by the United Nations’ (20March 2006) ‹http://www.un.org/law/counsel/
Fassbender_study.pdf› accessed 14 July 2017.
425 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UNGA Res 60/1 (24October 2005) UN Doc A/
RES/60/1 [109] (emphasis added).
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Security Council subsequently adopted this wording in its own resolutions on
targeted sanctions and expressed its commitment to the rule of law principles of
fairness and clarity regarding the listing procedure.426 As a first implementing
measure of the ‘fair and clear procedures’ requirement, Council resolution 1730
(2006) created the ‘focal point’ to receive de-listing requests by individuals,
groups, undertakings or entities on the sanction’s committees’ lists.427 The
‘focal point’ was subsequently authorised to receive exemption requests for
travel bans and asset freezes and communications from individuals who had
been removed from the Al-Qaida sanctions list or who claimed they had
mistakenly been subjected to the sanctions.428 Additionally, the Office of the
Ombudsperson was established in 2006 to review delisting requests of
individuals and entities, which had been listed on the Al-Qaida sanctions list
and to issue delisting recommendations.429 The Ombudsperson process was
further refined by the requirement that the Ombudsperson meets personally
with a petitioner, an overall acceleration of the delisting procedure and the
enhanced transparency of the entire process.430 This process – as unsatisfying
426 UNSC Res 1730 (19December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1730 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC
Res 1822 (30 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1822 [28]; UNSC Res 1844 (20November
2008) UN Doc S/RES/1844 [22]; UNSC Res 1857 (22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/
1857 [25]; UNSC Res 1904 (17December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904 [34]; UNSC Res
1988 (17 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1988 [26; 30(g)]; UNSC Res 1989 (17 June 2011)
UN Doc S/RES/1989 [42]; UNSC Res 2082 (17December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2082
[30]; UNSC Res 2083 (17December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2083 [45]; UNSC Res 2129
(17December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2129 [preamble, indent 15]; UNSC Res 2161
(17 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2161 [24].
427 UNSC Res 1730 (19December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1730 [1].
428 UNSC Res 2083 (17December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2083 [37]; UNSC Res 2161
(17 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2161 [63].
429 UNSC Res 1904 (17December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904 [20; 21]; UNSC Res 1989
(17 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1989 [21; 23; Annex II, para 12].
430 See UNSC Res 1989 (17 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1989 [6(c); Annex II, paras 5, 8, 13,
16(a)] (introducing the right of the Ombudsperson to shorten the time of engagement and
report drafting, shortening the time period for placing a delisting request on the
Committee’s agenda from 30 to 15 days and calling upon the Committee to set out its
reasons for rejecting a delisting request and to abandon the request requirement for the
distribution of publicly releasable information about Committee procedures by the
Ombudsperson); UNSC Res 2083 (17December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2083 [14; 17;
29; 36] (strongly urging member states to provide reasons for submitting delisting
requests while in the previous resolution only encouraging them to do so, allowing the
Ombudsperson to notify the petitioner, and states relevant to the case which are not
members of the Committee, of the stage which the process has reached, requiring the
Committee to provide reasons for its decision to accept a delisting request, allowing
for the transmission of the updated narrative summary of reasons for listing to the
petitioner, where appropriate and requiring that the Ombudsperson meets personally
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as its results may still be from a rule of law perspective – must be qualified as an
act of self-restraint by the Security Council catering to the international rule of
law.431
The above illustrations suggest that the international rule of law does not yet
achieve its desired goal of effectively restraining the exercise of public authority
at the international level. For the success of the rule of law on the international
plane, the exercise of so-called self-restraint by international legal subject is thus
a crucial determinant in the meantime. This applies to states as well as to
international organisations and their organs such as the UN Security Council.432
VI. Conclusion
As illustrated in the present chapter, a core content of the rule of law may
be identified but it also leaves ample room for so-called rich or thin
concretisations of the principle’s content based on such a core. The rule of law
models enshrined in the constitutional law of the P5 further demonstrate that the
understanding, commitment to and implementation of concrete rule of law
guarantees varies drastically in different states. It does not seem far-fetched,
thus, to characterise the rule of law as a contested concept even if it may not be
contested with regard to its very essence. Against this background, the fact that
an international organ such as the UN Security Council makes active use of a
concept that can be conceptualised so differently seems of utmost interest. The
question that arises immediately is, whether the organ’s engagement with the
rule of law indicates an already existing consensus among Council members or
even the wider UN membership about its content or whether it only indicates an
agreement within the Council about the function or instrumental value of the
rule of law. If the Council’s engagement with the rule of law cannot be
qualified as evidencing an already existing or emerging consensus on the rule
of law in the international society, the follow-up question must be, whether
with a petitioner); UNSC Res 2161 (17 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2161 [44; 50; Annex
II, paras 1(e), 3] (authorising the Committee to shorten the 60-days period after which
states shall terminate sanctions measures in case of a delisting recommendation by the
Ombudsperson or delisting request by a designating state; requiring an appropriate
explanation by the Ombudsperson to the petitioner in case of a return of a repeated
request and authorising the Ombudsperson to shorten the information gathering period
of four months under certain circumstances).
431 cf Nico Krisch, ‘Article 41’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United
Nations: A Commentary on the UN Charter, vol II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 23f (speaking of
the formulation of rights standards in Council practice); Happold (n 16) 96.
432 Chesterman, ‘‘I’ll Take Manhattan’’ (n 16) 70f; Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law’
(n 18) 41.
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Council resolutions invoking the rule of law may affect the emergence of a
global understanding of the principle’s content. To address these questions, the
subsequent chapters will portray the Council’s function and powers as they
determine the legal and political implications of its rule of law language. To
determine whether this language may even indicate an already existing or
emerging consensus on the rule of law, the organ’s composition and working
methods will further be discussed to determine the body’s representativeness
of the wider UN membership. Subsequently, the chapter scrutinises the
preconditions of a Council impact on the evolution of a global understanding of
the rule of law from a social-constructivist perspective.
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Part 2 – The Role of the Security Council as an
International Actor Contributing to the
Emergence of a Global Concept of the
Rule of Law
I. Introduction
In the 1990s, Western governments and private donors started to employ the rule
of law with a view to stabilising or reforming the legal systems of war-torn,
developing and post-communist countries in order to make them amenable to
the introduction of a market economy model.433 The basic idea behind such
endeavours can be traced back to liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith who
considered the rule of law as an essential prerequisite for a functioning free
market and was often informed by strategic economic and political interests of
powerful states and organisations to yield their influence abroad.434 Many
international and regional organisations, their organs or advisory bodies have
since adopted this functional rationale and closely connected the rule of law to
the fulfilment of their diverse interests or mandates.435 From this, however, it
433 Thomas Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’ (1998) 77 Foreign Aff. 95-106; Paris, At
War’s End (n 6) 19; Monika Heupel, ‘Rule of Law Promotion through International
Organizations and NGOs’ in Michael Zürn, André Nollkaemper and Randy Peerenboom
(eds), Rule of Law Dynamics in an Era of International and Transnational Governance
(CUP 2012) 133.
434 Paris, At War’s End (n 6) 48; Outi Korhonen, ‘The “State-building Enterprise”: Legal
Doctrine, Progress Narratives and Managerial Governance’ in Brett Bowden, Hilary
Charlesworth and Jeremy Farrall (eds), The Role of International Law in Rebuilding
Societies after Conflict: Great Expectations (CUP 2009) 15 f.
435 See, eg, UNGA, United Nations Millennium Declaration, UNGA Res 55/2 (8 September
2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2 and the annual resolutions of the UNGA on the agenda item
“the rule of law at the national and international levels”, starting in 2006 with UNGA,
The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, UNGA Res 61/39
(11 September 2006) UN Doc A/61/39, with the most recent resolution on the agenda
item being UNGA, The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, UNGA
Res 71/148 (20December 2016) UN Doc A/RES/71/148 and the Declaration of the
High-level Meeting A/RES/67/1 (n 395). See also, eg, EU Commission Communication,
A new Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law (COM (2014)158) (11March 2014);
ODIHR of the OSCE, ODIHR and the Rule of Law (2013); Venice Commission, Report
on the Rule of Law, No 512/2009 (4April 2011) CDL-AD(2011)003rev.; OAS,
Declaration of San Salvador on Citizen Security in the Americas (7 June 2011) OAS Doc
AG/DEC.66 (XLI-O/11); AU, Constitutive Act of the African Union (11 June 2000).
Part 2 – Security Council & Emergence of a Global Concept of the Rule of Law
82
neither follows that there exists a regionally or globally universal consensus on
how to define the rule of law nor that these actors have developed a coherent
approach to how they refer to or implement the rule of law.436 In fact,
international and regional organisations largely avoid providing a definition of
the rule of law, presumably to leave ample room for diverging understandings of
the principle’s concrete meaning and related policy measures.437 This may also
explain Nollkaemper’s observation that, ‘apart from human rights law, the
general concern of the international community with the significance of the
domestic rule of law, for instance as a means to make failed states more effective,
has only to a very limited extent been made part of positive international law’.438
Within the UN, the Secretary-General issued the only official definition of
the rule of law. According to his seminal report on the rule of law and
transitional justice in conflict- and post-conflict societies, the rule of law is:
[A] principle of governance, in which all persons, institutions and entities, public
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as
well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law,
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of
the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty,
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.439
This definition, however, was neither officially endorsed by the Security
Council nor the General Assembly and is still a subject of controversy among
member states in the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee.440 It can, thus, not
be qualified as the UN’s official definition of the rule of law and the Secretary-
General has made it clear that it does not apply outside the Secretariat.441
References to the rule of law in official documents of an international organ
such as the Security Council – enjoying a pivotal function in the international
436 Per Bergling, Erik Wennerström and Richard Sannerholm, ‘Rule of Law and Security
Sector Reform: Casual Assumptions, Unintended Risks and the Need for Norms’ (2012)
4 HJRL 98, 103.
437 Michael Trebilcock and Ronald Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting
the Fragile Path of Progress (Edward Elgar 2008) 12 f.
438 Nollkaemper, ‘Process of Legalisation’ (n 5) 99.
439 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616 [6].
440 UNDPKO, Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers in United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations (2013) [16]. See also Sannerholm (n 3) 53 (who remarks that it is unclear
what legal implications the definition might have).
441 Thomas Fitschen, ‘Inventing the Rule of Law for the United Nations’ (2008) 12 Max
Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 347, 355.
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society and being equipped with unique and considerable powers to fulfil it –
may, however, trigger or influence the evolution of a converging understanding
of the rule of law among actors addressed by its resolutions and those
interacting with the Council.442
The Council’s ‘norm-creating function’ seems established with regard to its
activities that regulate the normative situation of its addressees.443 If the Council,
thus, imposes binding rule of law measures on states, its decisions may affect
their rule of law understanding by way of re-building or amending their state
strutures based on such an understanding. Apart from issuing binding rule of law
measures that may –more or less coercively – shape states’ understanding of the
rule of law, the Council may further affect the emergence of an international
understanding of the rule of law by means of participating in an international
legal discourse with regard to its meaning.444 In this discourse, the Council is a
crucial actor in determining the meaning of the Charter articles relevant for the
maintenance of international peace and security.445 In interpreting these articles,
the Council may present the rule of law as a prerequisite for the maintenance of
international peace and security and identify how it should be conceptualised in
order to fulfil this task.446 The Council’s more common promotion of the role of
law to settle or prevent disputes may thus be considered to have expanded to also
include the promotion of the rule of law as a means of conflict management.447
Owing to the Council’s pivotal role in international society, its contribution to an
442 Steven Ratner, ‘The Security Council and International Law’ in David Malone (ed), The
UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner 2004) 591,
602 (observing that ‘[t]o those mapping the legal landscape and gauging how
expectations of states change over time, the resolutions and practice of the Council are
critical evidence. But they can also be more: by virtue of the power behind the Council’s
resolutions – or at least the potential power behind them – they stand a greater chance of
influencing state decisionmaking than do many other pronouncements of international
law’).
443 Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Sources of International Law’ (MPEPIL 2011) para 42.
444 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law – On Semantic Change and
Normative Twists (OUP 2012) 69 (‘it may often be more plausible and illuminating to
look at international actors not as agents under the tutelage of their creators but as
independent participants in legal discourse’).
445 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 452.
446 ibid (on how the interpretation of existing norm texts by international organisations
frequently does ‘more than contributing to changes in meaning’ but also ‘create new
reference points for legal discourse’). See also, True-Frost (n 20) 121 (arguing ‘that even
where the resolutions have not had material effects, they have undeniably provided a
discursive framework for the development and implementation of the relevant norms’).
447 Ratner (n 442) 600 (who in 2004 still observed that ‘[t]his sort of promotion of the role –
as opposed to the rule – of law in settling disputes is common’ when discussing the
Council’s function to promote the deployment of international law).
Part 2 – Security Council & Emergence of a Global Concept of the Rule of Law
84
international legal discourse on the function and content of the rule of law may
thus create an international standard and exert considerable influence on the
legal and political views and reasoning of other international actors and states.448
Instead of affecting the emergence of a global understanding of the rule of
law, references to the rule of law in Council resolutions may also reflect an
already existing or emerging international consensus among states with regard
to its function and content.449 In order to assess whether the Security Council
may contribute to the emergence of a global concept of the rule of law and
whether its recommendations and decisions may be reflective of an already
existing or emerging international consensus, a closer look at its function and
powers, its composition, working methods and general representativeness of
the wider UN membership is required.
II. Function and Powers of the Security Council and their Political
and Legal Implications for its Rule of Law Language
In order to assess whether the UN Security Council is able to contribute to the
evolution of a global concept of the rule of law, one needs to have a look at the
function and powers of the UN organ. It is namely the body’s function and
powers, which, ia, determine the extent to which it may act as a standard-
setting authority on a global concept of the rule of law – both politically and
legally.
A. Council Function and Powers
1. The Legal Basis of the Council’s Function and Powers
The Security Council of the United Nations is one of the organisation’s principal
organs.450 Article 24 (1) UN Charter stipulates that the United Nations members
confer on the Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
448 For a related observation, see ibid 593 (holding that ‘[a]s for the products of those
deliberations, when a body as politically significant as the Security Council – one in
which the most (or most of the most) powerful states must agree in order for it to decide
a matter – addresses, even indirectly, the legal issues underlying many international
disputes, it cannot but influence how states regard the contours of the relevant norms’).
449 McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of Law: Defying Gravity?’ (n 140) 286.
See also, Månsson (n 11) 91 (who suggests that Council resolutions may reflect a ‘general
political consenus at the international level as to the current status of international human
rights law’).
450 art 7 (1) UN Charter.
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international peace and security and that in carrying out these duties, the
Council acts on their behalf. In order to discharge the related duties, the
Council is vested with specific powers laid down in chapters VI, VII, VIII and
XII of the UN Charter. The said Charter chapters regulate the pacific settlement
of disputes, action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and
acts of aggression, regional arrangements and the international trusteeship
system, which is no longer of practical relevance.451 Further powers of the
Council are found scattered over the Charter, including arts 4 and 6 of chapter
II, art 12 (1) in chapter IV, art 26 in chapter Vor art 94 (2) in chapter XIV.452
The question of whether the specific powers listed in art 24 (2) UN Charter
should be understood as an exhaustive enumeration of competences or whether
the explicit mention of specific powers e contrario suggests the existence of
general powers, seems more or less settled nowadays in the latter sense.453
Whereas the ICJ has clearly expressed its position that art 24 (2) does not
preclude the existence of general Council powers, the ICTY adopted a
restrictive reading of the Charter, limiting the Council to the list of specific
powers.454 To reconcile the positions of the two courts one may have reference
to the ICJ’s case law on the principle of implied powers and argue ‘that the
Council must possess further unspecified powers to take various kinds of
measures to the extent that these are essential to discharging its responsibility
to maintain international peace and security’.455 Article 24 (1) of the UN
Charter would then not serve as a legal basis for general Council powers but
451 Dietrich Rauschning, ‘Article 75’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary, vol II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) para 2.
452 Anne Peters, ‘Article 24’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United
Nations: A Commentary, vol I (3rd edn, OUP 2012) para 58.
453 Thomas Giegerich, ‘Article 36’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary, vol I (3rd edn, OUP 2012) para 13.
454 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory
Opinion of 21 June 1971) [1971] ICJ Rep 16 [110] (‘The reference in paragraph 2 of this
Article to specific powers of the Security Council under certain chapters of the Charter
does not exclude the existence of general powers to discharge the responsibilities
conferred in paragraph 1’); ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic, (Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber of 2October 1995; Case
No IT-94-1-AR72) [28] (‘The Charter thus speaks the language of specific powers, not of
absolute fiat.’).
455 Peters, ‘Article 24’ (n 452) para 60 (citing ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion of 11April 1949) [1949] ICJ Rep 174,
182 and ICJ, Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal (Advisory Opinion of 13 July 1954) [1954] ICJ Rep 47, 56).
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rather any Charter provision pertinent to the fulfilment of the Council’s
responsibility to maintain international peace and security.456
2. Triggers of Council Action
Besides the legal basis in the UN Charter, the Council itself determines the
concrete scope of its powers by interpreting its mandate.457 In this regard, art 39
UN Charter, the gateway for Council enforcement measures, requires particular
attention. Based on the said provision, the Council determines the existence of a
threat to or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression and consequently
decides whether it is authorised to act or not under chapter VII.458 The Council
has used its wide discretionary powers under art 39 to creatively interpret its
mandate and adapt it to changing realities, needs and perceptions within
international society.459
Reflecting the incremental expansion of its understanding of the concept of
a threat to international peace and security, the Council in 1992 recognised that
‘non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and
ecological fields have become threats to peace and security’.460 In determining
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the Council had
started from a traditional notion of threats flowing from interstate conflicts to
later include threats resulting from internal armed conflicts and to eventually
even encompass threats of an abstract nature such as the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction or terrorism. In addition, the Council had linked
HIV/Aids, drug trafficking, climate change, food insecurity, the illegal
exploitation of natural resources as well as wildlife- poaching and trafficking to
the notion of a threat to international peace and security.461 The Council also
456 Peters, ‘Article 24’ (n 452) para 61.
457 The ICJ held that every UN organ is the ultimate arbiter of its own jurisdiction in light of
the fact that ‘proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate
authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted’.
See, ICJ, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter) (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 168.
458 Prosecutor v Tadic (n 454) [28] (‘It is clear from this text that the Security Council plays a
pivotal role and exercises a very wide discretion under this Article.’).
459 Bardo Fassbender, ‘Quis judicabit? The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal
Control’ (2000) 11 EJIL 219, 224.
460 UNSC Note by the President 23500 (1992) UN Doc S/23500.
461 Nico Krisch, ‘Article 39’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United
Nations: A Commentary, vol II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) para 32f; Anne Peters, ‘Novel
Practice of the Security Council: Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking as a Threat to the
Peace’, EJIL: Talk! (12 February 2014) ‹http://www.ejiltalk.org/novel-practice-of-the-
security-council-wildlife-poaching-and-trafficking-as-a-threat-to-the-peace/› accessed
14 July 2017 (discussing UNSC resolutions 2134 on the Central African Republic and
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initiated a ‘humanisation’ of the concept when qualifying widespread and
systematic breaches of international human rights- and humanitarian law as
threats to international peace and security.462 In most of these cases, however,
factors such as cross-border refugee flows, arms trade or violence on a massive
scale had additionally qualified the respective situations, making it impossible
to conclude that violations of human rights- or international humanitarian law
alone – regardless of their transborder effects – had led the Council to
determine a threat to international peace and security.463
Of particular interest for the present thesis, several Council resolutions
issued during the past six years may also be read to indicate that the Council
started to consider rule of law deficiencies as contributing to insecurity and
instability and, thus, relatable to the notion of a threat to international peace
and security. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council
characterised, ia, the limited progress in building professional and accountable
rule of law institutions as a significant security challenge.464 In the Central
African Republic, the Council expressed its deep concern at the security
situation characterised by a total breakdown in law and order and the absence
of the rule of law.465 It must be noted, however, that in both situations rule of
law deficiencies were accompanied by a volatile security situation with
transborder effects, thus not allowing for the conclusion that the Council would
consider the collapse of rule of law structures in a single country without
transborder repercussions as a valid stand-alone basis for its action.466
Other resolutions have also linked rule of law deficits to security threats.
The causality they imply, however, seems to be that sources of instability and
insecurity exacerbate efforts to establish or guarantee the rule of law rather
than vice versa. This has been the case in Guinea-Bissau, where the Council
2136 on the Democratic Republic of Congo); Chesterman, Johnstone and Malone (n 7)
127.
462 See, eg, Andrea Bianchi, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-
terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion’ (2006) 17 EJIL 881, 889f;
George Andreopoulos, ‘The Challenges and Perils of Normative Overstretch’ in Bruce
Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International
Authority (Routledge 2008) 103, 110 ff; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Security Council
as Enforcer of Human Rights’ in Bardo Fassbender (ed), Securing Human Rights? (OUP
2011) 36, 42–46.
463 Ratner (n 442) 598; Krisch, ‘Article 39’ (n 461) para 26 f.
464 UNSC Res 1991 (28 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991 [preamble, indent 5].
465 UNSC Res 2121 (10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2121 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC
Res 2127 (5December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2127 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res
2134 (28 January 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2134 [preamble, indent 3].
466 Peters, ‘Novel Practice of the Security Council: Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking as a
Threat to the Peace’ (n 461).
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observed that a resurgence of political violence, a lack of civilian oversight
and control of the armed forces and continued detentions without due process
of law jeopardised efforts to consolidate peace and stability, as well as the rule
of law.467 With regard to the situation in Sudan and South Sudan, the Council
expressed its concern at the rule of law vacuum in the Abyei Area, which it
linked to delays in the establishment of the Abyei Area Administration,
Council and Police, which were essential to maintain law and order and
prevent intercommunal conflict in Abyei.468
3. Council Measures to Fulfil its Mandate
It is not only in the determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach
of the peace or act of aggression that the Council enjoys considerable discretion
but also with regard to the selection of measures to respond to a threat.469
Article 39 UN Charter holds that after the Council has determined the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, it ‘shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security’.
Based on a traditional understanding of its mandate and particularly with an
eye to chapter VII measures, the Council was long considered to mainly
467 UNSC Res 1876 (26 June 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1876 [preamble, indents 2 & 3]; UNSC
Res 1949 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1949 [preamble, indents 2 & 3].
468 UNSC Res 2126 (25November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2126 [preamble, indent 18];
UNSC Res 2156 (29May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2156 [preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res
2179 (14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2179 [preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res 2205
(26 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2205 [preamble, indent 15]; UNSC Res 2230
(14 July 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2230 [preamble, indent 16]; UNSC Res 2251
(15December 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2251 [preamble, indent 16]; UNSC Res 2287
(12May 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2287 [preamble, indent 18]; UNSC Res 2318
(15November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2318 [preamble, indent 18]; UNSC Res 2352
(15May 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2352 [preamble, indent 19].
469 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the
International Legal System’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International
Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (OUP 2000) 277, 287
(holding that the ‘Council was deliberately given wide discretionary powers in (. . .) its
choice of responses following a determination under Article 39’); Eric Rosand, ‘The
Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?’ (2004-5) 28
Fordham Int’l L.J. 542, 555 (holding that ‘[t]his broadening of the Council’s view of
what constitutes a “threat to international peace and security” has resulted in a
corresponding broadening of the types of measures it has chosen to impose on States in
an attempt to address the threat’); Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez, ‘The Legislative Role
of the Security Council in its Fight against Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical
Limits’ (2008) 57 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 333, 334f (with regard to art 41 UN Charter
measures).
Part 2 – Security Council & Emergence of a Global Concept of the Rule of Law
88
observed that a resurgence of political violence, a lack of civilian oversight
and control of the armed forces and continued detentions without due process
of law jeopardised efforts to consolidate peace and stability, as well as the rule
of law.467 With regard to the situation in Sudan and South Sudan, the Council
expressed its concern at the rule of law vacuum in the Abyei Area, which it
linked to delays in the establishment of the Abyei Area Administration,
Council and Police, which were essential to maintain law and order and
prevent intercommunal conflict in Abyei.468
3. Council Measures to Fulfil its Mandate
It is not only in the determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach
of the peace or act of aggression that the Council enjoys considerable discretion
but also with regard to the selection of measures to respond to a threat.469
Article 39 UN Charter holds that after the Council has determined the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, it ‘shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security’.
Based on a traditional understanding of its mandate and particularly with an
eye to chapter VII measures, the Council was long considered to mainly
467 UNSC Res 1876 (26 June 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1876 [preamble, indents 2 & 3]; UNSC
Res 1949 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1949 [preamble, indents 2 & 3].
468 UNSC Res 2126 (25November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2126 [preamble, indent 18];
UNSC Res 2156 (29May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2156 [preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res
2179 (14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2179 [preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res 2205
(26 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2205 [preamble, indent 15]; UNSC Res 2230
(14 July 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2230 [preamble, indent 16]; UNSC Res 2251
(15December 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2251 [preamble, indent 16]; UNSC Res 2287
(12May 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2287 [preamble, indent 18]; UNSC Res 2318
(15November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2318 [preamble, indent 18]; UNSC Res 2352
(15May 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2352 [preamble, indent 19].
469 Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the
International Legal System’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International
Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (OUP 2000) 277, 287
(holding that the ‘Council was deliberately given wide discretionary powers in (. . .) its
choice of responses following a determination under Article 39’); Eric Rosand, ‘The
Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?’ (2004-5) 28
Fordham Int’l L.J. 542, 555 (holding that ‘[t]his broadening of the Council’s view of
what constitutes a “threat to international peace and security” has resulted in a
corresponding broadening of the types of measures it has chosen to impose on States in
an attempt to address the threat’); Luis Miguel Hinojosa Martinez, ‘The Legislative Role
of the Security Council in its Fight against Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical
Limits’ (2008) 57 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 333, 334f (with regard to art 41 UN Charter
measures).
II. Function and Powers of the Security Council
89
exercise executive-like functions, ie as being in charge of ensuring international
order by issuing decisions with preventive or repressive effects in response to
concrete threats to or breaches of international peace and security.470 Its task
was primarily related to the enforcement of international peace and not to the
enforcement of international law, even though these endeavours often
coincided.471
Over the years and particularly after the end of the Cold War, however, the
Council extensively interpreted the notion of ‘measures to maintain or restore
international peace and security’ and thus expanded its powers, particularly
when interpreting art 41 UN Charter. Accordingly, it established UN peace
missions and territorial administrations, set up international courts and
tribunals, created sanctions regimes targeting non-state actors and issued
legislative resolutions. The creativity of the Council in developing measures
to maintain or restore international peace and security has resulted in an
expanded perception of how it may fulfil its responsibility, encompassing
dispute settlement, adjudication, legislation and administration beyond its
traditional police function.472 As a related evolution, the traditional perception
of the Council as an enforcer of the peace slowly changed and it was
also considered as enforcing international law by identifying breaches of
international law and their authors as well as issuing measures against
individuals or states in order to rectify such violations.473
Council resolutions that contain legal determinations of situations or acts are
discussed in legal scholarship under the headings of ‘declarative’ Council
action, quasi-adjudication or (binding) dispute settlement.474 Examples include
470 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Police in the Temple. Order Justice and the UN: A Dialectical
View’ (1995) 6 EJIL 325, 338f; Peters, ‘Article 24’ (n 452) para 65.
471 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental
Problems (Stevens & Sons Limited 1950) 294. See also, Krisch, ‘Article 39’ (n 461) para
10. Orakhelashvili, however, maintains that coercive measures are only legitimately
imposed based on art 39 UN Charter in response to a violation of international law. See,
Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Power of the UN Security Council to Determine the
Existence of a “Threat to the Peace”’ (2006) 1 Irish Y.B. Int’l L. 61, 75.
472 Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 25.
473 Ratner (n 442) 601; Bruce Cronin, ‘International Consensus and the Changing Legal
Authority of the UN Security Council’ in Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds), The UN
Security Council and the Politics of International Authority (Routledge 2008) 57, 49;
Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council Change: The Pressure of Emerging
International Public Policy’ (2009-10) 65 Int’l J. 119, 122.
474 Dispute settlement has been a traditional function of the Council under ch VI UN Charter
based on which, however, the Council is not authorised to issue binding decisions.
Dispute settlement in this context refers to Council action based on ch VII of the UN
Charter. See, eg, Ratner (n 442) 593f; Ian Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication in
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the Council’s determination that Rhodesia’s new government was an ‘illegal
racist minority regime’, that Namibia’s occupation by South Africa was
‘illegal’, that the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq was
a ‘violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict’,
that Iraq ‘was liable under international law for any direct loss, damage or (. . .)
injury’ resulting from its unlawful invasion of Kuwait, that those violating
international humanitarian law in the internal conflict in Somalia would be held
‘individually responsible’ or its endorsement of the SRSG’s declaration that
Cambodia’s elections had been ‘free and fair’.475 Similarly, with regard to the
situations in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council
was considered to have indirectly established responsibility for human rights
violations in the conflict.476 The creation of court-like sanctions committees
aimed at preventing non-state actors from engaging in terrorist activities by
imposing penalties such as asset freezes and travel bans, have also been
attributed to the Council’s (quasi-) judicial function.477 The Council’s own
awareness of the potential legal consequences of its legal determinations is
sometimes clearly evidenced such as, eg, in several of its thematic resolutions
in which the Council explicitly stressed that it did not ‘seek to make any legal
determination as to whether situations which will be referred in the Secretary-
General’s report are or are not armed conflicts within the context of the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto’ and that it did not intend to
‘prejudge the legal status of the non-State parties involved in these situations’.478
the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit’ (2008) 102 AJIL 275,
294; Krisch, ‘Article 41’ (n 431) para 30; Chesterman, Johnstone and Malone (n 7) 138 f.
475 These examples are taken from Ratner (n 442) 593 f. See also the discussion in Alvarez
(n 7) 190 and Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, ‘The Role of the United Nations Security
Council in the International Legal System’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (OUP
2000) 269, 272 f.
476 Månsson (n 11) 87, 92 f.
477 Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart
Publishing 2004) 352-57; Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security
Council’ (n 474) 294-99; John Beuren, Das Al Qaida-Sanktionenregime als Ausübung
supranationaler Kompetenzen durch den Sicherheitsrat (Duncker & Humblot 2016) 231.
For a critical review of the legality of the Council’s quasi-judicial action in this context,
see Hans Köchler, The Security Council as Administrator of Justice? Reflections on the
Antagonistic Relationship between Power and Law (International Progress Organization
2011) 59–67.
478 UNSC Res 1539 (22April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1539 [preamble, indent 9]. For the same
formulation see further UNSC Res 1612 (26 July 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1612 [preamble,
indent 8]; UNSC Res 1882 (4August 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1882 [preamble, indent 11];
UNSC Res 1888 (30 September 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1888 [preamble, indent 17];
UNSC Res 1960 (16December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1960 [preamble, indent 17];
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As Council legislation were qualified resolutions establishing obligations
for all UN member states in response to abstract threats, usually with long-term
effects.479 For long, legal scholarship had qualified this form of Council action
as not within the confines of its function and powers.480 The most prominent
legislative resolutions are resolution 1373 (2001) on measures to counter the
financing of terrorism and resolution 1540 (2004) on the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. Most recently, the Council
issued resolution 2178 (2014) on foreign terrorist fighters.481 By means of these
resolutions, the Council obliged all UN member states to undertake a certain
range of measures against terrorist financing, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and the support to and travel of terrorist fighters in order to
counter terrorism as an abstract threat to international peace and security.482
UNSC Res 1998 (12 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1998 [preamble, indent 10]; UNSC Res
2068 (19 September 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2068 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 2106
(24 June 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2106 [preamble, indent 13]; UNSC Res 2225 (18 June
2015) UN Doc S/RES/2225 [preamble, indent 11]. See also, eg, UNSC Res 1817
(11 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1817 [5] (‘Calls upon States that have not done so to
consider ratifying or acceding to, and State parties to implement fully the multilateral
treaties whose aim is to fight against the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, notably the
United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol
of 25March 1972 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, underlines the importance for all States
parties to these treaties to implement them fully, and stresses that nothing in this
resolution will impose on State parties new obligations with regard to these treaties.’).
479 Axel Marschik, ‘Legislative Powers of the Security Council’ in Ronald Macdonald and
Douglas Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering
of the World Community (Nijhoff 2005) 457, 461; Chesterman, Johnstone and Malone
(n 7) 145. For a recent monograph on the legality, legitimacy and legal consequences of
Council legislation, see Theresia Kloke, Der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen als
Weltgesetzgeber – eine kritische Betrachtung aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht (Cuncker &
Humblot 2016).
480 See, eg, Michael Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (1998) Max
Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 73, 78 (who held that the Council ‘does not lay down new rules of
general application’); Georg Nolte, ‘The Limits of the Security Council’s Powers and its
Functions in the International Legal System: Some Reflections’ in Michael Byers (ed),
The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and
International Law (OUP 2000) 315, 322.
481 For a comment on this resolution, see Anne Peters, ‘Security Council Resolution 2178
(2014): The “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” as an International Legal Person – Parts I & II’
EJIL: Talk! (20 & 21November 2014) ‹https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolu
tion-2178-2014-the-foreign-terrorist-fighter-as-an-international-legal-person-part-i/› and
‹https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolution-2178-2014-the-foreign-terrorist-figh
ter-as-an-international-legal-person-part-ii/› accessed 14 July 2017.
482 Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 AJIL 175, 176
(describing international legislation as characterised by ‘the general and abstract
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Other resolutions that were discussed in the context of Council law-making
are resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 (2003) on the exemption of
peacekeepers dispatched by non-member states of the Rome Statute from the
jurisdiction of the ICC and resolutions 827 (1993) and 955 (1994) on the
establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR to the extent that the court statutes
annexed to the said resolutions contained criminal provisions of a general-
abstract nature.483
The notion of so-called Council territorial administration is used with
reference to the situations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, where the Council
installed UN territorial administrations with executive functions that replaced
the respective state administrations in their entirety, including law enforcement,
legislation and adjudication.484
A related field of Council action and the centre of interest of the present
thesis, are its observations, recommendations or decisions aimed at re-
establishing or strengthening national rule of law institutions and structures and
thus its efforts to propose or implement changes to the ‘internal governance
structures of states’.485 Predominantly in the context of conflict prevention,
conflict management and peacebuilding, the Council applied rule of law
measures to tackle state instability and inter- or intrastate conflicts.486 Based on
chapter VII mandates of UN multidimensional peacekeeping or peacebuilding
missions but often also consent-based, the Council has interfered with the
internal affairs of states by means of establishing rule of law institutions and
character of the obligations imposed. These may well be triggered by a particular
situation, conflict, or event, but they are not restricted to it. Rather, the obligations are
phrased in neutral language, apply to an indefinite number of cases, and are not usually
limited in time’); Bianchi (n 462) 890 (‘the peculiarity lies, rather, in the fact that the
threat in question is neither situation-specific nor time-limited. International terrorism
remains fairly indeterminate, given the controversy surrounding its definition or, at least,
the scope of application of current definitions, particularly at times of armed conflict’);
Chesterman, Johnstone and Malone (n 7) 288–292.
483 Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 480) 78. For the position
that the Council did not ‘legislate’ when establishing the international criminal tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda but only established courts with jurisdiction over
already existing rules of international criminal law, see Alexander Orakhelashvili,
Collective Security (OUP 2011) 42. The creation of international courts and tribunals has
also been qualified as an act of ‘promotion of international law’. See, Ratner (n 442) 599.
484 See UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244 (establishing the UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK); UNSC Res 1272 (25October 1999) UN
Doc S/RES/1272 (establishing the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor,
UNTAET).
485 Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 36 f.
486 See part 3 ch II C. 2. Farrall, ‘Rule of Accountability or Rule of Law?’ (n 19) 391 f.
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procedures.487 Another field in which the Council invoked the need to
strengthen or establish the rule of law is the prevention and fight of crime
committed in the context of armed conflict or with transborder effects.488 The
Council’s rule of law engagement in UN member states is an act of Charter
interpretation. It may be an evolution of the Council’s understanding of non-
military enforcement measures according to art 41 UN Charter or of its dispute
settlement apparatus based on chapter VI or – as was indicated above – be based
on its implied powers in order to fulfil its primary responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security.489
As illustrated in the present chapter, the scope of the Council’s powers was
considerably expanded, particularly after the end of the Cold War. To the extent
that UN member states accept the Council’s expansive interpretation of its
mandate, however, it must be considered legitimate and legal as it may be
qualified as ‘subsequent practice’ relevant for the interpretation of the Charter
in accordance with art 31 (3) (b) VCLT.490
B. The Council’s Power to Recommend and Decide
To fulfil its main responsibility of maintaining international peace and security,
the Council may issue recommendations whose observance shall be considered
by their addressees with good faith or binding decisions, which they must
implement.491
487 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 459 f.
488 See part 3 ch II C. 3.
489 Oscar Schachter, ‘Metaphors and Realism in International Law’ (2002) 96 ASIL
Proceedings 268, 269; Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 452 (claiming
that ‘every operational decision it [the Council] makes is an implicit interpretation of the
Charter and other relevant law’). See also René Provost, ‘Interpretation in International
Law as Transcultural Project’ in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor
(eds), Interpretation in International Law (OUP 2015) 290, 301.
490 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23May 1969, entered into force
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT).
491 Tono Eitel, ‘The UN Security Council and its Future Contribution in the Field of
International Law’ (2000) 4 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 53, 60; Jochen Frowein,
‘Implementation of Security Council Resolutions Taken under Chapter VII in Germany’
in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed), United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer
2001) 253, 263; Security Council Report, ‘Security Council Action under Chapter VII:
Myths and Realities’ (23 June 2008) 12.
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1. Binding Council Decisions
Article 25 of the UN Charter provides the Charter basis for the binding legal
effect of Council resolutions for UN member states. Article 25 holds that
member states agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. The
provision is complemented in chapter VII on enforcement measures by art 48 (1)
of the Charter which stipulates that ‘the action required to carry out the decisions
of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as
the Security Council may determine’ and by art 49 which holds that Members
‘shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided
upon by the Security Council’. The member states’ duty to give effect to the
Council’s binding decisions is further solidified by art 103 of the Charter which
establishes that the members’ obligations under the Charter precede their
obligations under any other international agreement in cases of conflict between
the obligations. The text of the provision speaks generally of Charter obligations,
not of obligations flowing from Council decisions. Since the Council’s authority
and the bindingness of its decisions flow from the Charter, obligations resulting
from Council decisions are considered obligations under the UN Charter and
accordingly covered by the precedence rule.492 Whereas the wording of art 103
may be read to establish the prevailing effect of Charter obligations only with
respect to obligations established by international treaties, it has also been
suggested that the rule extends to obligations of conflicting customary law.493 It
is established, however, that the provision does not give precedence to Council
decisions over ius cogens rules.494 Furthermore, the legitimate application of the
prevailing clause depends on the Council’s compliance with the Charter which
may be understood to include the human rights compatibility of Council
decisions in accordance with arts 25 and 1 (3) UN Charter.495
The requirements for the bindingness of Council decisions have been a
matter of debate among UN member states with certain states proposing that
only measures based on chapter VII should be binding and others holding that
492 ICJ, Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v
United Kingdom) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures) (Order of
14April 1992) [1992] ICJ Rep 3 [39].
493 Anne Peters, ‘Article 25’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United
Nations: A Commentary, vol I (3rd edn, OUP 2012) para 209f (holding that it ‘seems not
yet settled whether Council decisions also prevail over pre-existing contrary customary
obligations of members’).
494 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the Security Council: Meaning and Standards of
Review’ (2007) 11 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 143, 150 f.
495 ibid 149; Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 205.
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the Council could enact binding decisions based on other Charter chapters
too.496 In its 1971 Namibia opinion, the ICJ held that it was not only under
chapter VII that the Council could enact binding measures. Since arts 48 and
49 of the Charter already provided for the binding legal effect of enforcement
measures under chapter VII, so the court reasoned, art 25 would be devoid of
independent meaning if it did not imply that the Council could also issue
binding decisions outside of chapter VII.497 The court supported this position
by highlighting that art 25 applied to ‘the decisions of the Security Council’
that are not confined from the outset to chapter VII and that the provision was
included in the part of the Charter generally delineating the functions and
powers of the Council.498 According to the court, the binding character of a
Council resolution or its provisions must be determined in the concrete case
with consideration to the ‘terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the
discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all
circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the
resolution’.499 This implies that binding measures could also be based on
chapter VI on peaceful dispute settlement.500 Consequently, resolutions can
also contain binding provisions in the absence of a reference to chapter VII, eg
when following up on preceding resolutions that were clearly of a mandatory
character or when speaking explicitly of ‘obligations’.501 A reference to chapter
VII to issue binding provisions should not be considered necessary to establish a
binding legal effect if following the ICJ’s Namibia opinion that the Council
enjoys general binding powers based on articles 24 and 25 and thus does not
need to base its decisions on chapter VII in order to issue mandatory measures.
The fact that resolutions are never binding in their entirety but often contain
decisions as well as recommendations, further exacerbates the identification of
binding provisions.502 Council resolutions do not necessarily contain binding
496 Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (4th edn, OUP
2014) 384; Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities (n 491) 5.
497 Legal Consequences (n 454) [113].
498 ibid.
499 Legal Consequences (n 454) [114].
500 Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) paras 11–14 (it is particularly art 34 (2) UN Charter, which
authorises the Security Council to investigate disputes or situations that may lead to
international frictions or give rise to a dispute which is considered to be the basis of
binding measures in order to enable the Council to effectively exercise its function). See
also Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities (n 491) 6.
501 Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities (n 491) 8 (referencing to
UNSC Res 783 (1992) on Cambodia); Sievers and Daws (n 496) 388.
502 Marko Öberg, ‘The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General
Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ’ (2005) 16 EJIL 879, 880; Munir Akram and
Syed Haider Shah, ‘The Legislative Powers of the United Nations Security Council’ in
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provisions. Usually only some provisions of Council resolutions are binding
and their identification may require recourse to the criteria developed by the
ICJ. Even with the ICJ’s criteria in mind, however, it might not always be
simple to identify binding provisions. Council discussions – which might assist
in determining the Council’s intention – are usually neither public nor recorded
and not all terms used by the Council in its resolutions have an unequivocal
meaning.
In the sparse literature dealing expressly with the language used by the
Council in order to invoke mandatory or recommendatory measures, different
assessments exist regarding the common legal consequences of terms used by
the Council. Whereas some authors regard terms such as ‘requests’ or
‘demands’ as ‘fairly definite’, others qualify them as ‘more equivocal’.503 The
legal implications of the operative word ‘requests’ are relatively unambiguous
for some authors, while creating ‘some uncertainty as to whether a binding
decision has been intended’ for others.504 The same uncertainties apply to the
term ‘urges’, which by some authors is clearly identified as introducing non-
binding provisions, while others consider the term to have an equivocal
meaning.505 Phrases such as ‘calls upon’ are viewed as possibly indicating
binding as well as non-binding measures.506 The most uncontroversial terms
seem to be ‘decides’ and ‘recommends’ as direct correlates to the terms
‘decision’ and ‘recommendation’.507
Ronald Macdonald and Douglas Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism:
Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Nijhoff 2005) 431, 437.
503 See Sievers and Daws (n 496) 382 (for the first assessment) and Krisch, ‘The General
Framework’ (n 10) para 56 (for the latter view).
504 See Sievers and Daws (n 496) 382 (for the former position) and Orakhelashvili, Collective
Security (n 483) 38 (for the latter point).
505 Clearly against potential bindingness: Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths
and Realities (n 491) 4 (where it is observed that ‘clearly, the term “urges” cannot be
interpreted as imposing a mandatory obligation’). See also Paul Szasz, ‘The Security
Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 96 AJIL 901, 902. For a more cautious position, see
Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 56 and Sievers and Daws (n 496) 382.
506 Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities (n 491) 9;
Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 37; Sievers and Daws (n 496) 382.
507 Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 56; Daniel Joyner, Iran’s Nuclear Program
and International Law (OUP 2016) 196. See, however, Security Council Action under
Chapter VII: Myths and Realities (n 491) 6, 9 (holding that ‘the Council has tended to
use the word “decides” in a broad sense, especially when establishing operations with no
reference to Chapter VII’ but later remarking that ‘it can be clearly established that by
using “urges” and “invites,” as opposed to “decides,” the paragraph is intended to be
exhortatory and not binding’).
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Remaining uncertainties regarding the bindingness of particular provisions
may be clarified with recourse to the ICJ’s Namibia opinion and in analogous
application of the interpretation rules of the VCLT, reverting to the text of the
resolution, the context and drafting history of its creation as well as to its object
and purpose. As becomes evident in direct comparison, the interpretation
criteria of the VCLT do not differ strongly from those invoked by the ICJ.
It cannot be ruled out, however, that different actors will interpret
resolutions differently which is the unfortunate result of the Council’s lacking
authorship over the implementation of its decisions and recommendations for
which it mostly relies on the Secretariat or UN member states.508 In response to
diverging interpretations regarding the bindingness of its resolutions or
provisions thereof, the Council has tended to make its intentions clear, often
expressly citing chapter VII, art 39 of the Charter or determining the existence
of a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression in order to imply
the mandatory character of particular provisions.509
The legal effects of binding Council decisions can be manifold. The Council
may reinforce, implement or amend international law with regard to a particular
situation.510 As a consequence of its newly asserted function to issue legislative
resolutions, it may also supervene, adapt, or enforce international law by rules
of general-abstract application and thus change international treaty law and –
according to some authors – customary international law.511 Due to its
508 Jared Schott, ‘Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative
Ideal of Emergency’ (2008) 6 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 24, 66 f. In the most deciding
cases, diverging interpretations of Council resolutions may not only pertain to their
bindingness but extend to whether they include an authorisation to use force or not and
can result in the unilateral use of force with reference to Council resolutions as happened
with resolutions 678 and 688, which were invoked by the allied forces, including the
United States, the United Kingdom and France, when moving their armed forces into
Iraq in order to allegedly force Iraqi compliance with the said resolutions. For a
discussion of the lawfulness of these interventions see Frowein, ‘Unilateral Interpretation
of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 22) 97. For a discussion of the legality of the military
NATO-intervention in Kosovo, which was not authorised by the Security Council, see,
eg, Bruno Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL
1-22 and Antoni Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’
(1999) 10 EJIL 23–30.
509 Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities (n 491) 1; Sievers and
Daws (n 496) 387, 391.
510 Kelsen (n 471) 295 (‘The decision enforced by the Security Council may create new law
for the concrete case’); Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’
(n 480) 78; Wheatley (n 23) 534.
511 See, eg, Szasz (n 505) 902; Akram and Shah (n 502) 437; Michael Wood, ‘The UN
Security Council and International Law’ (Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures 2006;
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composition, voting procedure, mandate and unique powers, the legal effects of
Council decisions have been compared to those of the ICJ, whereas their impact
on the evolution of international law is sometimes ranked even higher.512
2. Council Recommendations
Council recommendations are non-binding as opposed to Council decisions.513
They may, however, have a normative effect akin to that of binding
decisions.514 This may be the case when the Council issues recommendations
in a tense context where the non-compliance of the addressees might result in a
deterioration of the security situation and prompt the Council to transform
previous recommendations into decisions.515 The propensity of a situation to
result in a threat to the peace if the addressed actors do not follow the
First Lecture: ‘The Legal Framework of the Security Council’) 19 para 55; Ian Johnstone,
‘The Security Council as Legislature’ in Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds), The UN
Security Council and the Politics of International Authority (Routledge 2008) 80, 81f;
Stefan Talmon, ‘Security Council Treaty Action’ (2009) 62 RHDI 65, 89; Jan Wouters
and Jed Odermatt, ‘Quis custodiet consilium securitatis? Reflections on the Law-making
Powers of the Security Council’ in Vesselin Popovski and Trudy Fraser (eds), The
Security Council as Global Legislator (Routledge 2014) 71, 75. For a sceptical analysis
as to whether the prevailing effect of art 103 UN Charter can be read to also apply to
international customary law, see Rain Liivoja, ‘The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of
the United Nations Charter’ (2008) 57 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 583–612.
512 Eitel (n 491) 61; Ratner (n 442) 595.
513 On the discussions at the San Francisco Conference about the Council’s decision-making-
and recommendatory powers, see Jost Delbrück, ‘Article 25’ in Bruno Simma (ed), The
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, vol I (C.H. Beck 2002) para 3.
514 Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities (n 491) 12 (holding that
‘the mere fact that the Security Council, the body conferred with primary responsibility
for international peace and security, has pronounced itself on an issue may give rise to
the obligation to duly consider Council messages in good faith’ and refererring to Judge
Lauterpacht’s position regarding legal effects of General Assembly resolutions proposing
that ‘[a] resolution recommending (. . .) a specific course of action creates some
legal obligation which, however rudimentary, elastic and imperfect, is nevertheless a
legal obligation (. . .) The state in consideration, while not bound to accept the
recommendation, is bound to give it due consideration in good faith’. While this position
relates to recommendations of the General Assembly, the thought should be even more
valid with regard to recommendations of the Council, taking into account its function
and powers.) See also Giegerich, ‘Article 36’ (n 453) para 72 (who holds that Council
recommendations ‘are not legally irrelevant; they may not simply be disregarded by
member States. They do have some legal effects beyond their political “compliance
pull”: member States to whom such recommendations are addressed are, by virtue of
their membership status and their ensuing duty to cooperate, at a minimum legally
obliged to consider them in good faith, although not to comply with them.’).
515 Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 10.
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exhortatory provisions of a Council resolution may thus be one factor in the
identification of recommendations of a higher normative relevance.516 A
pertinent example are recommendations based on arts 36 and 37 UN Charter
which presuppose a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security according to art 33 (1) of the
Charter.517
Another factor that could affect the normative relevance of Council
recommendations might be the precision of their wording, assuming that the
clearer and more specifically the Council expresses its position on a course of
action conducive to ameliorating a conflict, addressing a situation or settling
a dispute, the more likely states are going to act on it and the more likely
the Council might follow-up with enforcement action (if non-compliance
contributes to a threat to the peace).518 At times, the Council may also
deliberately blur the line between decisions and recommendations to create the
impression of bindingness even for non-binding provisions.519
From a social-constructivist perspective that is interested in the ideation that
Council resolutions may initiate and stimulate among states addressed by such
acts or other actors involved with the Council’s rule of law agenda, the legal
effects of Council pronouncements on the rule of law do not matter much. Also
516 Kelsen (n 471) 293 (‘But, as pointed out, decisions of the Security Council which, in
accordance with the Charter, are not binding upon the Members, such as a mere
recommendation, may nevertheless assume a binding character if the Security Council,
under Article 39, considers non-compliance with its decision as a threat to the peace and
takes enforcement action against the recalcitrant Member.’).
517 Giegerich, ‘Article 36’ (n 453) para 77; ibid, ‘Article 37’ in Bruno Simma and others
(eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, vol I (3rd edn, OUP 2012)
para 48.
518 cf Nigel White and Matthew Saul, ‘Legal Means of Dispute Settlement in the Field of
Collective Security: The Quasi-Judicial Powers of the Security Council’ in Duncan
French, Matthew Saul and Nigel White (eds), International Law and Dispute Settlement:
New Problems and Techniques (Hart Publishing 2010) 191, 211 (holding that ‘on
occasions, the Council’s recommendations for settlement based on a combination of
Article 24 and Chapter VI, are more comprehensive and detailed so that they suggest a
more intense and concerted effort by the Council to achieve a settlement than on other
occasions’). For the claim that clear and specific norms have a higher potential of
influence see, eg, Thomas Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’
(1992) 86 IO 46, 56 (‘The determinacy of a rule directly affects its legitimacy because it
increases the rule’s transparency and thus its capacity to pull members of the international
community toward voluntary compliance’). See also ibid, Fairness in International Law
and Institutions (Clarendon Press Oxford 1995) 31 (postulating that ‘indeterminate
normative standards make it harder to know what conformity is expected, which in turn
makes it easier to justify noncompliance’).
519 Akram and Shah (n 502) 437.
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recommendations or provisions of an even lesser normative quality may endorse
a particular understanding of the rule of law and thus contribute to the
construction of a collective understanding in international society of the
principle’s content and function.
C. Legal Limits to the Council’s Powers
As has been illustrated above, the Council enjoys a broad mandate, the scope of
which it has expanded by means of Charter interpretation particularly during the
past three decades. Its powers, however, are nonetheless bound by legal
limitations that flow – at the very least – from the instrument that created it, ie
the UN Charter.520 These limitations are, ia, the United Nations’ jurisdiction,
the particular function and powers delegated to the Council and the Charter-
inscribed division of power among the UN organs.521
To the present day, legal scholarship has not come to an agreement as to the
sources and scope of legal limitations to Council action. Most uncontroversial
nowadays is the view that ius cogens binds the Council in all its activities.522
This position is more or less established in literature as well as in the
jurisprudence of regional and national courts.523 Widely shared agreement
520 ICJ, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of
the Charter) (Advisory Opinion of 28May 1948) ICJ Rep 57 [64] (‘The political
character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions
established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for
its judgment.’). See also Prosecutor v Tadic (n 454) [28] (‘The Security Council is an
organ of an international organization, established by a treaty which serves as a
constitutional framework for that organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to
certain constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution may
be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the
Organization at large, not to mention other specific limitations or those which may
derive from the internal division of power within the Organization. In any case, neither
the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus
(unbound by law).’).
521 Certain Expenses (n 457) [168]. See also Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World
Legislature’ (n 482) 182; Martinez (n 469) 345; Beuren (n 477) 178.
522 For a recent study on the concept of ius cogens, see, Robert Kolb, Peremptory
International Law – Jus Cogens (Hart Publishing 2015).
523 See, eg, Terry Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN
Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter’
(1995) 26 NYIL 33, 79; Karl Doehring, ‘Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council
and their Legal Consequences’ (1997) 1 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 91, 99; Michael Fraas,
Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und Internationaler Gerichtshof (Peter Lang 1998)
84; Nigel White, ‘To Review or Not to Review? The Lockerbie Cases Before the World
Court’ (1999) 12 LJIL 401, 419; Nils Meyer-Ohlendorf, Gerichtliche Kontrolle des
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seems to prevail also with regard to procedural limitations to Council acts that
relate to the Charter-based rules on the adoption of its resolutions as well as to
the limitation of its function and powers by the confines of its mandate and with
regard to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as referred to in art
24 (2) UN Charter.
1. The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as Limits
Article 24 (2) UN Charter requires the Council to ‘act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ when discharging the duties
flowing from its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security. These purposes and principles – contained in chapter I of
the Charter – suggest that different legal limits apply to Council enforcement
action under chapter VII as compared to its dispute settlement activities under
chapter VI. Article 1 (1) of the Charter can be read to restrict the requirement of
the conformity with ‘the principles of justice and international law’ to Council
actions under chapter VI, while excluding its activities under chapter VII from
this legal restraint. Article 2 (7) UN Charter further exempts enforcement
measures under chapter VII from the domestic jurisdiction clause. From this it
can be inferred that non-coercive Council action needs to be in line with
general international law, while it remains open which legal limits apply to
chapter VII enforcement measures.
A restrictive reading of the Charter considers only the purposes and
principles of the United Nations to restrain the Council’s enforcement action
Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Verlag
für Wissenschaft und Forschung 2000) 144-46; de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the
United Nations Security Council (n 477) 187–191 (for references to other authors
sharing this view, see 187, n 40); Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the Security Council:
Meaning and Standards of Review’ (n 494) 177; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying
the Security Council: Contermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions (OUP 2011) 71. For a
differentiated view, however, see Fassbender, ‘Quis judicabit?’ (n 459) 227 (who
maintains that ius cogens norms cannot be set against the Charter as peremptory rules of
international law ‘rest on the foundation of the Charter and could not be imagined without
it’). Similarly, Martenczuk (n 423) 273 f. For case law see, eg, ICJ, Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Order of
13 September 1993) [1993] ICJ Rep 325 (Separate Opinion Judge Lauterpacht) [440,
para 100]; ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeals Chamber Judgment of 15 July 1999; Case
No IT-94-1-A) [296]; EGC, Yassin Abdullah Kadi (n 424) paras 226–230 and
EGC, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the
European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Case T-306/01 [2005]
ECR II-3533 (21 September 2005) [281]; Swiss Federal Court, Youssef Nada
(14November 2007) BGE 133 II 450 [7.3].
Part 2 – Security Council & Emergence of a Global Concept of the Rule of Law
102
based on art 24 (2) UN Charter.524 These limits, however, were characterised as
too vague and abstract as to meaningfully restrain the Council in the exercise of
its powers.525 Restrictive positions with regard to legal limits of Council action
are usually motivated by the rationale that the Council’s powers to maintain
international peace and security should not be unduly restrained by
considerations of law with the risk of rendering the organ ineffective.526
2. The Charter as a Limit
Other authors hold the view that the entire UN Charter binds the Council based
on the argument that an international organisation and its organs are bound by
the legal rules of its constituent instrument as long as that instrument does not
authorise its organs to disregard them or based on a constitutionalist approach to
the question whether Council acts need to conform with rules of the founding
instrument.527 The position that the Charter binds the Council also entails that it
may interpret but not amend it.528 Further, articles 2 (5) and 25 UNCharter, which
require UN member states to give the United Nations every assistance and to
carry out the decisions of the Security Council ‘in accordance with the present
Charter’, can be interpreted in a manner supportive of this position.529
524 Certain Expenses (n 457) [168]. See also, Kelsen (n 471) 294f; Meyer-Ohlendorf (n 523)
138, 146f; Thomas Giegerich, ‘“A Fork in the Road” – Constitutional Challenges,
Chances and Lacunae of UN Reform’ (2005) 48 German Y.B. Int’l L. 29, 60 f.
525 Koskenniemi (n 470) 327; Wolfgang Weiß, ‘Security Council Powers and the Exigencies
of Justice after War’ (2008) 12 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 45, 79; Maurizio Arcari, ‘Limits
to Security Council Powers under the UN Charter and Issues of Charter Interpretation’
(2012) XXXII Polish Y.B. Int’l L. 239, 243; Chesterman, Johnstone and Malone (n 7) 129.
526 Gabriel Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council
is Unbound by Law’ (1999) 12 LJIL 521, 553; August Reinisch, ‘Developing Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition
of Economic Sanctions’ (2001) 95 AJIL 851, 855; Ratner (n 442) 592.
527 See, eg, Derek Bowett, ‘The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement
Procedures’ (1994) 5 EJIL 89, 95; Martenczuk (n 423) 163; Stein (n 16) 33; Fassbender,
‘Quis judicabit?’ (n 459) 227; Manusama (n 16) 18–31; Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the
Security Council: Meaning and Standards of Review’ (n 494) 175–190; Talmon,
‘Security Council Treaty Action’ (n 511) 68; Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations
Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 118
(who, however, considers the Charter as ‘the supporting frame of all international law
existing today and, at the same time, the highest layer in a hierarchy of norms of
international law’ and the concomitant position that the Council is bound only by Charter
law); Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 41; Benedetto Conforti and Carlo
Focarelli, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (5th edn, Brill Nijhoff 2016) 460 f.
528 Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 135 f.
529 With regard to the ambiguity of the text of art 25 UN Charter, see Peters, ‘Article 25’
(n 493) paras 56–60.
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based on art 24 (2) UN Charter.524 These limits, however, were characterised as
too vague and abstract as to meaningfully restrain the Council in the exercise of
its powers.525 Restrictive positions with regard to legal limits of Council action
are usually motivated by the rationale that the Council’s powers to maintain
international peace and security should not be unduly restrained by
considerations of law with the risk of rendering the organ ineffective.526
2. The Charter as a Limit
Other authors hold the view that the entire UN Charter binds the Council based
on the argument that an international organisation and its organs are bound by
the legal rules of its constituent instrument as long as that instrument does not
authorise its organs to disregard them or based on a constitutionalist approach to
the question whether Council acts need to conform with rules of the founding
instrument.527 The position that the Charter binds the Council also entails that it
may interpret but not amend it.528 Further, articles 2 (5) and 25 UNCharter, which
require UN member states to give the United Nations every assistance and to
carry out the decisions of the Security Council ‘in accordance with the present
Charter’, can be interpreted in a manner supportive of this position.529
524 Certain Expenses (n 457) [168]. See also, Kelsen (n 471) 294f; Meyer-Ohlendorf (n 523)
138, 146f; Thomas Giegerich, ‘“A Fork in the Road” – Constitutional Challenges,
Chances and Lacunae of UN Reform’ (2005) 48 German Y.B. Int’l L. 29, 60 f.
525 Koskenniemi (n 470) 327; Wolfgang Weiß, ‘Security Council Powers and the Exigencies
of Justice after War’ (2008) 12 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 45, 79; Maurizio Arcari, ‘Limits
to Security Council Powers under the UN Charter and Issues of Charter Interpretation’
(2012) XXXII Polish Y.B. Int’l L. 239, 243; Chesterman, Johnstone and Malone (n 7) 129.
526 Gabriel Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council
is Unbound by Law’ (1999) 12 LJIL 521, 553; August Reinisch, ‘Developing Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition
of Economic Sanctions’ (2001) 95 AJIL 851, 855; Ratner (n 442) 592.
527 See, eg, Derek Bowett, ‘The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement
Procedures’ (1994) 5 EJIL 89, 95; Martenczuk (n 423) 163; Stein (n 16) 33; Fassbender,
‘Quis judicabit?’ (n 459) 227; Manusama (n 16) 18–31; Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the
Security Council: Meaning and Standards of Review’ (n 494) 175–190; Talmon,
‘Security Council Treaty Action’ (n 511) 68; Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations
Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 118
(who, however, considers the Charter as ‘the supporting frame of all international law
existing today and, at the same time, the highest layer in a hierarchy of norms of
international law’ and the concomitant position that the Council is bound only by Charter
law); Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 41; Benedetto Conforti and Carlo
Focarelli, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (5th edn, Brill Nijhoff 2016) 460 f.
528 Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 135 f.
529 With regard to the ambiguity of the text of art 25 UN Charter, see Peters, ‘Article 25’
(n 493) paras 56–60.
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3. General International Law as a Limit
Most convincing – particularly, but not only from a normative perspective – is
the view that the Council is required to respect the UN Charter and general
international law in all its actions regardless of the legal basis in the Charter.530
This position is of particular relevance with regard to the question whether
international human rights- and humanitarian law binds the Council.
Doctrinally, the position can be based on the principle of speciality, which
implies that an international organisation only enjoys those powers conferred
on it by its founders.531 The principle of nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam
ipse habet further implies that the founders – here, UN member states – could
not transfer on the Council powers or rights which they themselves did not
have: the right to disregard general international law.532 An additional doctrinal
explanation why this position is plausible is the argument that international
organisations as international legal persons should be considered bound by
general international law.533 Legal standards applicable to the Council, if it is
530 The notion of ‘general international law’ is meant to refer to international customary law
and general principles of law. Notably, Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) paras 87f, 101, 149.
See also Barbara Lorinser, Bindende Resolutionen des Sicherheitsrates (Nomos 1996)
53; Heike Gadin, Der Schutz der grundlegenden Menschenrechte durch militärische
Maßnahmen des Sicherheitsrates – das Ende staatlicher Souveränität? (Duncker &
Humblot 1996) 48; Jochen Herbst, Rechtskontrolle des UN-Sicherheitsrates (Peter Lang
1997) 372–378; Fraas (n 523) 82–84, 246; White and Saul (n 518) 195f; Gowlland-
Debbas, ‘The Security Council as Enforcer of Human Rights’ (n 462) 39; Beuren (n 477)
176–231. See also, UNCESCR, General Comment No 8: Article 14: The Relationship
between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(12December 1997) UN Doc E/C.12/1997/8 [1; 7f].
531 ICJ, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory
Opinion of 8 July 1996) [1996] ICJ Rep 66 [25] (‘The Court need hardly point out that
international organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States,
possess a general competence. International organizations are governed by the “principle
of speciality”, that is to say, they are invested by the States which create them with
powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion
those States entrust to them.’).
532 arts 40–41 DARIO and Commentary, in particular on art 41: Report of the International
Law Commission: Fifty-ninth Session (7May-5 June and 9 July-10August 2007), UN
Doc A/62/10 (2007) [218-20, paras 2–7]. See also Reinisch (n 526) 858; Beuren (n 477)
225.
533 See Reinisch (n 526) 858 and Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 104. Both refer to ICJ,
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt
(Advisory Opinion of 20December 1980) [1980] ICJ Rep 73 [37] (‘International
organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations
incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or
under international agreements to which they are parties) and to Justice Fitzmaurice’s
dissenting opinion concluding that ‘[e]ven when acting under Chapter VII of the Charter
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accepted that it needs to respect general international law, are, eg, the general
principles of law of proportionality, good faith and abuse of rights.534 This
position, then, also implies that the Council is legally restrained in its actions
by human rights- and humanitarian law, which enjoys the status of customary
or peremptory international law.535
A Charter-based obligation of the Council to respect human rights- and
humanitarian law may be based on articles 1 (3) and 55 (c). Both articles,
however, only require the United Nations to promote and encourage respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms but do not require it – and its organs –
to respect human rights. A historical reading might suggest that the Charter
drafters did not intend to tolerate human rights violations by the United Nations
but rather did not anticipate that the organisation could engage in such
conduct.536 The Council’s obligation to respect human rights law could also be
based on a combined reading of art 1 (3) and the principle of good faith in art 2
(2) of the Charter.537 With regard to the source of the Council’s human rights
obligations, it must respect at least those human rights, which have acquired
the status of customary international law and certainly those that are rules of ius
cogens.538
Crucial policy considerations why the Council should be bound by
international human rights- and humanitarian law relate to the argument
that the Council may only credibly promote respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms as required by arts 1 (3) and 55 (c) UN Charter if it itself
itself, the Security Council has no more power to abrogate or alter territorial rights, (. . .)
This is a principle of international law that is as well established as any there can be, —
and the Security Council is as much subject to it (for the United Nations is itself subject of
international law) as any of its individual member States are (. . .)’ (Legal Consequences
(n 454) [1135]).
534 Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the
International Legal System’ (n 469) 306; Manusama (n 16) 26.
535 Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 120. For Erika de Wet, art 1 (3) UN Charter requires the
Council to respect all ‘human rights instruments developed under the auspices of the
organisation’, including the International Covenants, regardless of the fact that the
Council is not a party to the respective treaties, based on the explanation that these
human rights ‘represent an elaboration upon the Charter’s original vision of human
rights found in Article 1(3) and Articles 55 and 56’. See, de Wet, The Chapter VII
Powers of the United Nations Security Council (n 477) 199.
536 Reinisch (n 526) 857; Bardo Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions and Due Process: The
Responsibility of the UN Security Council to ensure Fair and Clear Procedures are
made available to Individuals and Entities targeted with Sanctions under Chapter VII of
the UN-Charter (Study commissioned by the United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs,
20March 2006) 16 f.
537 de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (n 477) 199.
538 White and Saul (n 518) 195 f.
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leads by example.539 A further argument relates to the attempt to prevent
protection gaps if UN organs assume tasks and functions traditionally fulfilled
by states which are bound by general international law.540 Further, it seems
desirable from a constitutionalist perspective to consider the Council bound by
general international law with a particular emphasis on international human
rights- and humanitarian law if one takes into account the growing realm of
tasks undertaken by the Council based on an extensive interpretation of its
mandate which have far reaching consequences for individual rights such as
targeted sanctions or territorial administration. Along these lines, a mediated
position suggests that the Council should be free to disregard general
international law when exercising its traditional police function and responding
to concrete situations with short-term measures based on chapter VII but
requires the Council to respect the principles of justice and international law
when engaging in activities that were traditionally not perceived as part of its
mandate such as legislation, territorial administration, quasi-adjudication or
dispute settlement – even if they were based on chapter VII.541
The Council’s own practice may be understood to support the position
that it is bound to respect international human rights- and humanitarian law
considering that it has increasingly reacted in response to large-scale
violations of international human- and humanitarian law and enforced
human rights- and humanitarian law standards in various of its resolutions.542
This practice – being directed at state compliance – of course does not
conclusively suggest that the Council considers itself bound by this corpus
of law but it may reflect a Council commitment to these legal standards
which – if consistent – would also require itself to respect international
human rights- and humanitarian law.
As has been demonstrated, several doctrinal arguments can be advanced as a
basis for the position that the Council is bound to respect general international
law and international human rights- and humanitarian law in particular. If the
Council does not comply with these legal limitations, however, there are no legal
539 Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 114. Similarly, Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Security
Council and Issues of Responsibility under International Law’ (Strengthening the Rule
of Law through the United Nations Security Council Workshop Paper Series No 2.2
(2011)) 15. See also, Fraas (n 523) 83; de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United
Nations Security Council (n 477) 199 f.
540 Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) paras 114, 130.
541 See, Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) paras 42, 58. See also Martinez (n 469) 346
(with regard to Council legislation); Beuren (n 477) 225.
542 Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Security Council as Enforcer of Human Rights’ (n 462) 36–73.
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mechanisms in place which may force the Council to do so.543 In lieu of
an international body which can hold the Council accountable for acts in
contravention to such laws, Council decisions and recommendations should at
least be interpreted and implemented based on the assumption that it intended to
respect general international law (with an emphasis on international human rights-
and humanitarian law) unless it has explicitly expressed its opposite intention.544
D. Conclusion
The UN Security Council was endowed by UN member states with the
responsibility to maintain international peace and security and thus with the
task to guarantee a public interest of the international society of the highest
order. This is, ia, reflected in the UN’s primary purpose as inscribed in art 1 (1)
UN Charter. If the Council, thus, develops standards with regard to the national
rule of law in order to realise this pivotal goal, they must be considered of a high
normative and political relevance for the effective and peaceful functioning of
the international society. The Council’s authority to enforce such standards by
means of legally binding decisions provides the UN organ with a powerful tool
to implement its notion of the rule of law in UN member- and third states.
Further, non-binding references to the rule of law in Council recommendations
or mere observations attesting to the value attributed to the concept by the
Council or illustrating how it is best achieved or implemented, may also initiate
or stimulate an ideation among the addressees of Council resolutions and other
international agents interacting with the Council. The fact that the Council
enjoys wide discretionary powers in deciding when and how to intervene
has further resulted in an expanded impact sphere of the UN organ – a
circumstance also underpinned by a lack of external mechanisms to enforce
legal limitations against it. As a consequence of its particular function, the
543 Anne Peters, ‘The Constitutionalisation of International Organisations’ in Walker Neil,
Shaw Jo and Tierney Stephen (eds), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic (Hart Publishing
2011) 253, 268; Giegerich, ‘Article 36’ (n 453) para 14.
544 Al-Jedda (n 424) para 102 (‘Against this background, the Court considers that, in
interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that the Security Council does
not intend to impose any obligation on member States to breach fundamental principles
of human rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a United Nations Security
Council resolution, the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in
harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of
obligations. In the light of the United Nations’ important role in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected that clear and explicit language
would be used were the Security Council to intend States to take particular measures
which would conflict with their obligations under international human rights law.’). See
also Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council (n 523) 73–75.
Part 2 – Security Council & Emergence of a Global Concept of the Rule of Law
106
mechanisms in place which may force the Council to do so.543 In lieu of
an international body which can hold the Council accountable for acts in
contravention to such laws, Council decisions and recommendations should at
least be interpreted and implemented based on the assumption that it intended to
respect general international law (with an emphasis on international human rights-
and humanitarian law) unless it has explicitly expressed its opposite intention.544
D. Conclusion
The UN Security Council was endowed by UN member states with the
responsibility to maintain international peace and security and thus with the
task to guarantee a public interest of the international society of the highest
order. This is, ia, reflected in the UN’s primary purpose as inscribed in art 1 (1)
UN Charter. If the Council, thus, develops standards with regard to the national
rule of law in order to realise this pivotal goal, they must be considered of a high
normative and political relevance for the effective and peaceful functioning of
the international society. The Council’s authority to enforce such standards by
means of legally binding decisions provides the UN organ with a powerful tool
to implement its notion of the rule of law in UN member- and third states.
Further, non-binding references to the rule of law in Council recommendations
or mere observations attesting to the value attributed to the concept by the
Council or illustrating how it is best achieved or implemented, may also initiate
or stimulate an ideation among the addressees of Council resolutions and other
international agents interacting with the Council. The fact that the Council
enjoys wide discretionary powers in deciding when and how to intervene
has further resulted in an expanded impact sphere of the UN organ – a
circumstance also underpinned by a lack of external mechanisms to enforce
legal limitations against it. As a consequence of its particular function, the
543 Anne Peters, ‘The Constitutionalisation of International Organisations’ in Walker Neil,
Shaw Jo and Tierney Stephen (eds), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic (Hart Publishing
2011) 253, 268; Giegerich, ‘Article 36’ (n 453) para 14.
544 Al-Jedda (n 424) para 102 (‘Against this background, the Court considers that, in
interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that the Security Council does
not intend to impose any obligation on member States to breach fundamental principles
of human rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a United Nations Security
Council resolution, the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in
harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of
obligations. In the light of the United Nations’ important role in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected that clear and explicit language
would be used were the Security Council to intend States to take particular measures
which would conflict with their obligations under international human rights law.’). See
also Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council (n 523) 73–75.
III. Composition and Working Methods of the Security Council
107
powers conferred to it and the manner in which the Council exercises them, rule
of law standards disseminated among UN member- and third states by way of
Council documents, thus, have the potential to affect the evolution of a global
understanding of the rule of law. Whether references to rule of law standards in
Council documents may even be considered as evidencing an already existing or
emerging global rule of law understanding depends, ia, on the Council’s
composition, the inclusiveness and transparency of its working methods and its
general representativeness of the wider UN membership.
III. Composition and Working Methods of the Security Council
and their Implications for its Representativeness
References to the rule of law in Council documents, whether binding or not,
may reflect the UN body’s understanding of the concept and reveal how it
considers it best satisfied, achieved or implemented. To the extent that Council
members must be considered delegates of all UN member states, the question
also arises whether Council documents may even be considered pieces of
evidence of an already existing or emerging consensus among UN member
states with regard to the function and content of the rule of law. Such an
assumption, however, presupposes that Council documents also reflect the
political and legal positions of other UN member states rather than only those
of states sitting on the Council (at least to a certain extent). Whether this is the
case depends, ia, on the extent to which the body’s composition and working
methods make it representative of the wider UN membership.
A. Composition
1. Permanent Members
The Council is the most exclusive UN organ. It is composed of only fifteen of
193 United Nations member states.545 A central motive behind the Council’s
exclusive institutional design was to create a body that allowed for ‘prompt and
effective action by the United Nations’ in the maintenance of international peace
and security.546 In response to the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations, the
aspiration was to create an ‘effective centre of international power’ capable of
governing the task of collective security.547
545 art 23 (1) UN Charter.
546 Rudolf Geiger, ‘Article 23’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United
Nations: A Commentary, vol I (3rd edn, OUP 2012) para 1.
547 Koskenniemi (n 470) 338.
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Its exclusivity is further reinforced by the fact that art 23 (1) of the UN
Charter permanently reserves five Council seats for the three victorious powers
of World War II – the United States, the Russian Federation and the United
Kingdom – as well as for China and France.548 Additionally, the five permanent
Council members (P5) are provided with a right to veto in all non-procedural
matters by art 27 (3) of the UN Charter. Additional Charter arrangements, such
as the mandatory ratification of any Charter amendment by the P5 or their
special representation rights in the Military Staff Committee, further perpetuate
their dominant position in relation to the wider UN membership.549 These
arrangements seem to stand in stark contrast to the principle of sovereign
equality of states as enshrined in art 2 (1) of the UN Charter. According to a
contractual reading, however, the privileges conveyed to the five permanent
members could be considered compatible with art 2 (1) UN Charter to the
extent that they are backed by the member states’ sovereign decision to limit
their rights in form of the special Council seating and voting arrangements as
foreseen in the Charter.550 A constitutionalist reading of the Charter also allows
to consider the permanent seats and the veto right as a qualification of the
principle of sovereign equality with the aim of reaching the Charter goal of
guaranteeing international peace and security and based on the view that the
special rights of the P5 correlate with their special obligations.551 The great
powers were, thus, entrusted with special rights as a result of their heightened
responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security and in
order to ensure their commitment to guaranteeing collective security.552
Regardless of this attributed heightened responsibility of the P5, however, they
are often perceived as acting in their national interest only rather than on behalf
of a notion of collective security and the Council’s legitimacy and authority
have been questioned based on the fact that its composition no longer reflects
‘modern power realities’.553
548 Geiger (n 546) para 8.
549 arts 47 (2), 108 and 109 UN Charter.
550 Bardo Fassbender, ‘Article 2(1)’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary, vol I (3rd edn, OUP 2012) para 63.
551 Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International
Community (n 527) 146 f.
552 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘The Permanent and Elected Council Members’ in David Malone
(ed), The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner
2004) 253, 255; Fassbender, ‘Article 2(1)’ (n 550) para 64.
553 Mahbubani (n 552) 262f; Ratner (n 442) 603; Giegerich, ‘“A Fork in the Road” –
Constitutional Challenges, Chances and Lacunae of UN Reform’ (n 524) 34.
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2. Non-permanent Members
The ten non-permanent Council seats, five of which are assigned by General
Assembly election each year for a term of two years, are theoretically open for
appointment to every member of the organisation.554 To enhance the body’s
representativeness, the ten non-permanent seats cannot be occupied for two
subsequent terms by the same state and are distributed in a manner catering to
the principle of ‘equitable geographical distribution’ which grants five seats to
African and Asian states, one to Eastern Europe, two to Latin America and the
Caribbean and two to Western European and other states.555 De facto, however,
many UN member states have never been selected to sit on the Council and have
only slim chances of ever being elected due to the political character of
the selection process and the considerable size of the overall UN
membership.556Additionally, insufficient financial or diplomatic capabilities or
involvement in an issue on the Council’s agenda render a substantial number of
UN member states unlikely candidates for office.557 Those that have been
elected, however, contribute to the expertise of the Council due to diverse
factors such as their role in UN peace operations or conflicts on the Council’s
agenda, their size, geographical position or membership status in relevant
organisations.558 In this way non-permanent Council members enhance the
body’s representativeness to the extent that different political perspectives and
know-how affect the Council’s deliberations and decisions. The circumstance
that the Council has tended to ensure the unanimous adoption of its resolutions
in recent years has also increased the impact of the elected ten.559
It is further the fact that non-permanent members are elected by the
whole UN membership which contributes to the Council’s (albeit limited)
554 art 23 (1) & (2) UN Charter; Rules of Procedure General Assembly (n 404) r 142.
555 art 23 (1) UN Charter; UNGA, Questions of Equitable Representation on the Security
Council and the Economic and Social Council, UNGA Res 1991 A (XVIII)
(17December 1963) UN Doc A/RES/1991 (XVIII) [3]. Of the five seats designated for
African and Asian states, three were assigned to African states and two to Asian states.
See, Sievers and Daws (n 496) 127.
556 According to art 18 (2) UN Charter and Rules of Procedure General Assembly (n 404) r
83, candidates need the support of a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly in order
to be elected for a non-permanent seat in the Council. For a description of the election
process, see Security Council Report, ‘Security Council Elections 2016’ (3 June 2016).
For an illustration of the highly politicised nature of the election campaign, see David
Malone, ‘Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on the UN Security
Council’ (2000) 6 Global Governance 3-23.
557 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 141.
558 ibid 128.
559 Hulton (n 164) 237f; Matthias Wolfram, Entscheidungsprozesse im Sicherheitsrat der
Vereinten Nationen (Nomos 2011) 159.
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representativeness.560 Criticism has been levelled repeatedly, however, at the
P5’s alleged domination of the Council’s decision-making process, which
curtails the impact of elected Council members.561 Consequently, the Council’s
membership has been subjected to manifold reform proposals in order to
address issues such as an ever-increasing UN membership or imbalances in
geographical representation.562 None of them have been successful to the
present day, however.
3. The Council Presidency
The Security Council’s presidency counts as one of the more egalitarian and
representative features of the UN organ due to its rotation mechanism and
decision-making mode. The Council members have explicitly acknowledged
the crucial role of the presidency in facilitating communication and exchange
of information within the Council in order to counterbalance the privileged
position of some of its members.563 Each calendar month, the Council
presidency rotates to another Council member, providing all states with an
opportunity to preside over the body.564 Importantly, presidential statements are
not statements of the president but of the Security Council as an organ of the
United Nations.565
As can be derived from the above-said, the Council is a highly exclusive and
political body. The seating privileges of the P5 and the politicised nature of the
elections to non-permanent Council seats restrain its potential to represent the
wider UN membership by way of its changing composition. Nonetheless,
Council member states must be considered as ‘delegates of all other UN
members, and as trustees of the international community’.566 The question then
of course arises whether these deficits in representation are somehow addressed
by the Council’s working methods.
560 Sabine Hassler, Reforming the UN Security Council Membership (Routledge 2013) 52
referring to Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 461.
561 Mahbubani (n 552) 256.
562 For a comprehensive analysis of the various reform proposals regarding Council
membership, see Hassler (n 560). See also Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and
Politics of UN Security Council Reform (Routledge 2005).
563 UNSC Note by the President 565 (2014) Un Doc S/2014/565.
564 Rules of Procedure Security Council (n 404) r 18.
565 ibid r 19.
566 Anne Peters, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences
for the UN Security Council and its Members’ in Ulrich Fastenrath and others (eds),
From Bilateralism to Community Interest (OUP 2011) 297, 314.
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The repertoire of instruments available to the Council in order to act ranges from
resolutions over presidential statements, letters and notes of the president to
statements to the press. All of these documents are agreements reached among
the fifteen (or nine at the minimum) member states of the Council on a particular
issue based on different voting requirements and can contain decisions of the
Council with the exception of statements to the press by the Council
president.567 Even though in theory each of these documents could have the
same political and legal relevance, it has been the practice of the Council to
revert to the format of resolutions when intending to issue binding decisions or
attributing sufficient political weight to an agenda item.568 Resolutions are the
Council’s preferred instrument to act.569 They can be issued by nine affirmative
votes as long as none of the P5 casts a veto.570 In spite of this fact, the Charter
does nowhere expressly use the term ‘resolution’.571
The legal nature of resolutions is of a sui generis character. Traditionally, the
Security Council has been issuing documents that relate to individual situations
or disputes that are directed at few, specified addressees with the aim of
maintaining international peace and security. This traditional perception of its
task is reflected in the idea that the Council primarily exercises police
functions.572 Due to the organ’s composition and decision-making procedures,
its acts are neither judgments of a judicial body nor international treaties.573
567 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 18th Supplement, Part II, 2012-13
‹http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2012-2013/Part%20II/2012-2013_Part%20II.pdf
#page=58› accessed 14 July 2017. See also Sievers and Daws (n 496) 374 (holding that
the ‘Security Council can adopt a decision in any format it deems appropriate. (. . .) In
agreeing a decision, the action of the Security Council may be seen as comprising
two parts: the first part is achieved when the Council reaches agreement on the substance
of the decision; the second part if “publishing” a decision in a particular format’. On the
nature of Statements to the Press by the President see, Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Article 27’
in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary,
vol I (3rd edn, OUP 2012) para 74.
568 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 376–378, 402.
569 Michael Wood, ‘Security Council’ (MPEPIL 2007) para 13; Sievers and Daws (n 496)
374.
570 art 27 (3) UN Charter.
571 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 374.
572 Peters, ‘Article 24’ (n 452) para 63.
573 See, ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, (Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010) [2010] ICJ
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Their legal nature cannot be clearly determined but only approached by way of
analogy and as Orakhelashvili observed, Council resolutions ‘arguably combine
in themselves the elements of an agreement between states and the elements of
“statutory” or regulatory administrative acts’.574 Although exhibiting certain
features of international treaties, they differ from them insofar as a resolution
must be considered to represent the collective will of the Council as a body
rather than the interests of a multitude of states and with regard to the
circumstance that resolutions often bind states that have not been involved in
their issuance.575
The UN Charter, however, does not exclude the possibility that the Council
issues documents that resemble legislative acts or judgments.576 A major
practical limitation to the Council’s actions, however, relates to the necessity to
preserve the perception among UN member states that its activities are
legitimate in order to ensure its continued effectiveness. As mentioned before,
the Council, eg, issued resolutions of a legislative character albeit only on rare
occasions due to the questionable legitimacy attached to rules of general
Rep 2010 [442, para 94] (where the ICJ held in the context of interpreting the content of
Council resolutions that ‘[w]hile the rules on treaty interpretation embodied in Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may provide guidance,
differences between Security Council resolutions and treaties mean that the
interpretation of Security Council resolutions also requires that other factors be taken
into account. Security Council resolutions are issued by a single, collective body and are
drafted through a very different process than that used for the conclusion of a treaty.
Security Council resolutions are the product of a voting process as provided for in
Article 27 of the Charter, and the final text of such resolutions represents the view of the
Security Council as a body. Moreover, Security Council resolutions can be binding on all
Member States (. . .), irrespective of whether they played any part in their formulation’.
See also, Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 32 (who also acknowledges
differences between Security Council resolutions and international treaties, albeit notes
that ‘decisions of the Council are not formally designated as treaties, but are still
agreements on which the states concerned can place reliance’ and that ‘their binding
force does not differ from that of treaties’).
574 Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the Security Council: Meaning and Standards of Review’
(n 494) 160.
575 Christian Henderson and Noam Lubell, ‘The Contemporary Legal Nature of UN Security
Council Ceasefire Resolutions’ (2013) 26 LJIL 369, 372f, n 23.
576 Prosecutor v Tadic (n 454) [35] (‘It is evident that the measures set out in Article 41 are
merely illustrative examples which obviously do not exclude other measures. All the
Article requires is that they do not involve “the use of force.” It is a negative definition.’).
See also Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (n 482) 181f (with regard
to legislative resolutions of the Council and their compatibility with the wording of art 41
UN Charter in principle); Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security
Council’ (n 474) 275; Peters, ‘Article 24’ (n 452) para 70.
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application imposed on sovereign states by an insufficiently representative
organ.577
b. Documents issued by the Council President
Most of the documents issued by the Council president are of a consensual
nature and represent the position of the Council as a UN body.578 This holds
true for statements, letters and notes as the president issues these documents in
representation of the Security Council ‘in its capacity as an organ of the United
Nations’.579 Statements to the press, by contrast, only represent the view of the
members of the Security Council and are not decisions of the Council in the
meaning of art 27 UN Charter.580 As the Council has developed a penchant for
achieving unanimity when adopting resolutions, however, this feature may no
longer be as decisive a criterion of differentiation between resolutions and
Council documents that require consensus.581
Whereas presidential statements were predominantly issued on behalf of the
Council as a whole since 1948, the Council clarified the attribution of
presidential statements to the Council as an organ in 1996 in reaction to a letter
of the Argentinian representative in the Council.582 As such, they customarily
represent the view agreed upon by all Council members and are considered as
statements made on behalf of the Council as an organ of the United Nations.583
In contrast to Council resolutions, presidential statements are as a general rule
legally non-binding and of recommendatory character only.584 Their consensual
character, however, may vest presidential statements with political clout not to
be underestimated.585 They may also be a valuable source of information when
trying to determine the Council’s intention regarding a particular issue on its
577 See part 2 ch II A. 3. p 82 f.
578 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 397 f.
579 Rules of Procedure Security Council (n 404) r 19. Sievers and Daws (n 496) 379.
580 Stefan Talmon, ‘The Statements by the President of the Security Council’ (2003) 2
Chinese J. Int’l L. 419, 448; Zimmermann (n 567) para 74.
581 Hulton (n 164) 237 f.
582 Until 1995, the majority of presidential statements was issued on behalf of the Council
but practice also involved statements only made on behalf of Council members. Sievers
and Daws (n 496) 398.
583 See, Rules of Procedure Security Council (n 404) r 19. Talmon, ‘The Statements by the
President of the Security Council’ (n 580) 419f; Zimmermann (n 567) para 73.
584 This is not to imply that all resolutions are legally binding. They can also be of a solely
declaratory or recommendatory nature. Equally, it is not precluded that the Council
considers certain provisions of a presidential statement as binding. See, Talmon, ‘The
Statements by the President of the Security Council’ (n 580) 452f and Sievers and Daws
(n 496) 381.
585 ibid 458.
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agenda or when analysing the political dynamics of the body’s decision-making
process. This is mainly due to the fact that presidential statements may serve as
vehicles of compromise in cases where Council members are unable to agree on
a common position or when reacting to new situations on which the members
have not yet come to a conclusion regarding the most appropriate course of
action.586 Additionally, they can assist in interpreting the content of Council
resolutions and sometimes even serve to implement the latter.587
2. Agenda Setting & Drafting of Council Resolutions
All members of the Security Council can propose a new subject matter to be put
on the Council’s agenda for discussion and the issuance of a potential
decision.588 Occasionally, also the Council president or non-member states –
when invited for participation according to arts 31 and 32 UN Charter and rules
37 and 38 of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure – have introduced
proposals. Generally, however, non-Council members are only rarely involved
in the drafting process of resolutions.589 Every now and then, the Secretary-
General or members of the Secretariat have introduced draft resolutions or parts
of them.590 As so-called ‘penholders’, Council members then draft a proposal
and ‘initiate and chair the informal drafting process’ of Security Council
documents.591 Historically, penholding would alternate among different
Council members and individual Council members would not own particular
items on the Council’s agenda.592 With the increase of agenda items after the
end of the Cold War, the Council started to draft resolutions with ‘groups of
friends of states’ that had a particular interest in a specific agenda item. These
groups of friends could involve permanent, non-permanent and even non-
members of the Council.593 By 2010, however, the Council’s unwritten practice
changed and resolution drafting became dominated by the P3 (USA, UK &
France). Only after the P3 had agreed on a text, would they then negotiate it
586 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 402.
587 Talmon, ‘The Statements by the President of the Security Council’ (n 580) 455.
588 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 461.
589 Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (n 482) 186.
590 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 394.
591 UNSC Note by the President 268 (2014) Un Doc S/2014/268.
592 Update website of Sievers and Daws (n 496) ch 5, s 6, ‘Conduct of Meetings and
Participation – Motions, Proposals, and Suggestions’ ‹http://www.scprocedure.org/#!
chapter-5-section-6b/c9dv› accessed 14 July 2017; Security Council Report, ‘Penholders
and Chairs’ (posted 2 February 2017) ‹http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-
council-working-methods/pen-holders-and-chairs.php› accessed 14 July 2017.
593 Penholders and Chairs (n 592).
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with Russia and China before circulating it among elected Council members.594
This has resulted in a predominance of the permanent Council – and particular
its Western – members in the drafting process to the detriment of its
inclusivity.595 The dominance of the permanent Council members in the
drafting of resolutions has then also been subject of complaints by elected or
non-Council members.596
Once Council resolutions have been drafted, they are usually sponsored by
states, attesting to their commitment or interest in the particular matter at issue.
Commonly, there is more than just one sponsoring state, which may even
include non-member states.
Overall, the P5 exert great influence on whether, in what form and with what
content the Council becomes active. It is not only brute facts such as the veto
power or permanent membership that cater to a dominance of the P5 in the
drafting process but also soft factors such as the Council’s main working language.
The simple fact that the Council primarily works in English benefits English-
speaking Council members and in particular the two permanent members USA
and UK.597Access to a larger pool of experts and a profound institutional memory
only add to the advantages of permanent Council members.598
There are of course factors counteracting these power imbalances. The P5 or
P3 are by far not in sync regarding all issues on the Council’s agenda and
deliberate efforts to increase the role of non-permanent Council members as
penholders of agenda items have been made in recent years.599 The Council
594 Wolfram (n 559) 156; Security Council Report, ‘Security Council Working Methods: A
Tale of Two Councils’ (25March 2014) 12; update website Sievers and Daws (n 592).
595 For an overview of ‘penholder-ship’ in the Council in 2017, see: Security Council Report,
‘2017 Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Penholders’ ‹http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/un-security-council-working-methods/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27–4E9C-8CD3-CF6
E4FF96FF9%7D/Penholders%20and%20Subsidiary%20Body%20Chairs.pdf› accessed
14 July 2017. Of 39 situation-specific or thematic matters, the US heads or is involved
with the drafting of resolutions on 16 matters, the UK with 10, France with six and
Russia with four. Notably, China does not lead the drafting of any resolution nor is it part
of any Group of Friends involved in a drafting process. Non-permanent Council members
head or are involved with the drafting of resolutions on 11 matters on the Council’s
agenda.
596 6870th Council Meeting on the Implementation of the Note by the President of the
Security Council (S/2010/507), UN Doc S/PV.6870 (26November 2012) [17].
597 Eitel (n 491) 57; Wolfram (n 559) 155; Sievers and Daws (n 496) 98 f.
598 UNSC, Annex to the Letter dated 27April 2015 from the Permanent Representative of
Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
(27April 2015) UN Doc S/2015/292 [19].
599 Michael Wood, ‘Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent
Developments’ (1996) 45 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 150, 153; Sievers and Daws (n 496) 128.
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itself has issued several documents aimed at correcting the power imbalance
among its members with regard to the working process.600 In a 2010 note by
the president, the Council reaffirmed that all its members ‘should be allowed to
participate fully in the preparation of, inter alia, the resolutions, presidential
statements and press statements of the Council’ and that the drafting of all
Council documents should be carried out in a manner that allows adequate
participation of all Council members.601 With reference to this note, the
members of the Council later affirmed their commitment to an increased
diversity regarding Council members acting as penholders.602 They also
required that states chairing the drafting process ensure timely consultations
with all Council members in order to give them a say in the drafting process –
a requirement probably primarily addressed at regular penholders.603 The
Council members have thus acknowledged the importance of an improved
intra-Council dialogue and more inclusive working mechanisms for the
efficient and transparent functioning of the Council.604 Whether and how these
recommendations will be implemented in practice is difficult to assess at this
time as Council members are still in the process of discussing how to
implement them and the issue of penholders was considered as not yet ‘entirely
ripe’.605 So far, only few agenda items have been spearheaded by non-
permanent Council members, such as, eg, the situations in Afghanistan,
Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste or the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and their residual mechanisms or Council
working methods.606
On the different views of the P5 regarding the notion of collective security, see Frederking
(n 7) 31–40.
600 See, eg, UNSC Note by the President 165 (1999) UN Doc S/1999/165 (on the importance
of allowing all Council members to participate fully in the preparation of resolutions or
presidential statements).
601 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [42].
602 UNSC Note by the President 268 (2014) UN Doc S/2014/268.
603 ibid.
604 UNSC Note by the President 565 (2014) UN Doc S/2014/565.
605 Annex Letter Permanent Representative of Finland S/2015/292 (n 598) [19]. This
circumstance seemed not to have changed drastically one year later: See, UNSC, Annex
to the Letter dated 26May 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (2 June 2016) UN Doc
S/2016/506 [24f].
606 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 128 f.
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3. Meeting Formats
When convening, the Council can choose from a range of meeting formats to
discuss a matter under its consideration.607 Public meetings include ‘open
debates’, ‘debates’, ‘briefings’ and ‘adoptions’, whereas ‘private meetings’ and
‘TCC meetings’ are held behind closed doors.608 Although invitations of non-
Council members are permissible even for private meetings, the different
formats are, ia, characterised by their different arrangements regarding the
participation of third parties.609 The participation of third parties includes a
right to speak at Council meetings but not a right to vote.610
‘Informal Consultations’ are a category of their own. These consultations are
not considered ‘meetings’ by Council members and do not allow for the
involvement of UN member states that are not members of the Council. They
involve various formats of close interaction between the Council with
Secretariat members and senior officials.611 As opposed to the aforementioned
meeting formats, no official records are kept of informal consultations. Council
members have agreed, however, that the Council president provides member
states with substantive and detailed briefings shortly after informal
consultations of the whole.612 Another informal meeting format are the so-
called ‘Arria-formula’ meetings.613 These meetings shall serve Council
607 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [36].
608 ibid [36 (a) (iii), (b) (iii)].
609 ibid. In open debates, non-Council members may be invited to participate in discussions
upon their request; in debates, ‘non-Council members that are directly concerned or
affected or have a special interest in the matter under consideration may be invited to
participate in the discussion upon their request’; in briefings, ‘only Council members
may deliver statements’ and during adoptions, ‘non-Council members may or may not
be invited to participate in the discussion upon their request’. In private meetings, ‘any
Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council, members
of the Secretariat and other persons may be invited to be present or to participate in the
discussion, upon their request, in accordance with rule 37 or 39 of the provisional rules
of procedure’. In TCC meetings, ‘parties described in resolution 1353 (2001) are invited
to participate in the discussion, in accordance with the resolution’. UNSC Res 1353
(13 June 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1353 refers to troop-contributing countries.
610 This follows directly from art 27 (1) UN Charter, which provides only Council members
with a vote but no other entities.
611 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [20–27]. Sievers and Daws
(n 496) 65.
612 ‹http://www.un.org/ar/sc/pdf/methods/meetings.pdf› accessed 14 July 2017. UNSC Note
by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [3]. This practice has been in place
since 1994. See, Sievers and Daws (n 496) 73.
613 For the ‘common understanding’ on the conduct of Arria-formula meetings of the
Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, see 5601st
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members ‘as a flexible and informal forum for enhancing their deliberations’.614
In contrast to informal consultations, these meetings allow for the participation
of third parties such as non-Council member states, relevant organisations or
individuals and are therefore considered improvements of the Council’s
accessibility and legitimacy by some authors.615 They provide the Council
with an opportunity to hear from non-governmental actors and Council
members have agreed to use such meetings to intensify their interaction with
representatives of NGOs and civil society to get a better understanding of
certain situations under their consideration.616 With regard to other aspects,
however, they lag behind informal consultations such as, eg, their publicity as
they are usually not announced in the daily Journal of the United Nations and
only incompletely recorded in the Council’s annual reports.617 They are not
considered an activity of the Council and thus commonly convened at the
initiative of one or more Council members who independently invite the
remaining Council members to join the meeting.618
The Council also regularly holds so-called ‘open debates’ on which
occasion it invites non-Council members, members of other UN organs or civil
society representatives to briefings.619 The impact of such forms of inclusion on
the substance of Council decisions has usually been considered small,
however.620 Even though the Council reaffirmed its commitment to increase the
recourse to open meetings particularly in the early stages of its considerations of
an agenda item, a considerable amount of important negotiations are still taking
place during informal consultations.621
Council Meeting on Briefings by Chairmen of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council,
UN Doc S/PV.5601 (20December 2006) [13].
614 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [65].
615 ibid [65]; Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 461; True-Frost (n 20) 135.
616 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [65]; Sievers and Daws
(n 496) 77.
617 UN Secretariat Background Note on the Arria-Formula Meetings of the Security Council
Members ‹http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.shtml› accessed
14 July 2017; Sievers and Daws (n 496) 76.
618 Background Note on Arria-Formula Meetings (n 617).
619 See UNSC Note by the President 922 (2012) UN Doc S/2012/922 [3–8] on the
organisation of open debates with the aim of benefitting from contributions of the wider
UN membership.
620 True-Frost (n 20) 135.
621 Rudolf Dolzer and Charlotte Kreuter-Kirchhof, ‘Article 31’ in Bruno Simma and others
(eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, vol I (3rd edn, OUP 2012)
para 32. See also UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [28]
(which resolves that the Council will revert more often to open meetings to increase the
transparency of its work).
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The Council has traditionally been accused of a lack of transparency with
regard to its decision-making process.622 Whereas in the beginning, the Council
primarily held public meetings, informal consultations in the absence of the
public in the Council’s consultation room started to be increasingly held since
the 1980s.623 Although the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure establish
the rule that the Council shall meet in public unless it decides otherwise, an
essential part of the drafting process and negotiations resulting in Council
resolutions takes place confidentially in closed consultations or even more
informal outside Council consultations among delegates of Council members
states.624 In its public meetings, the Council usually only presents resolutions
that its members have agreed upon in private and in advance in all their
detail.625 Besides obvious concerns regarding the legitimacy of confidential
Council meetings, the deficiency in transparency of Council deliberations is
particularly troublesome when trying to determine how the Council has reached
at a decision or attempting to construe the meaning of unclear Council wording.
4. Voting & Special Voting Rights
At some point of the deliberations on the text of a resolution – when it has been
agreed upon in its entirety or when agreement among all Council members
seems impossible –, the sponsoring states put the draft to a vote.626 In order to
adopt a decision, each Council member has one vote.627 Article 27 UN Charter
requires that decisions on procedural matters be adopted by an affirmative vote
of nine Council members, whereas decisions on all other matters additionally
require the concurring votes of the five permanent Council members.628 As a
consequence of the voting procedure as foreseen in art 27 of the UN Charter,
unanimity is not required in order to adopt a Council decision which is arrived
622 For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Transparency in the
Security Council’ in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters (eds), Transparency in
International Law (CUP 2013) 367–391. See also Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in
Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of
International Law (OUP 2009) 328 f.
623 Wood, ‘Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments’
(n 599) 155; Eitel (n 491) 59; Dolzer and Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 621) para 32; Sievers and
Daws (n 496) 72 f.
624 Rules of Procedure Security Council (n 404) r 48; Johnstone, ‘Security Council
Deliberations’ (n 24) 461; Sievers and Daws (n 496) 70.
625 Eitel (n 491) 59.
626 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 396.
627 art 27 (1) UN Charter.
628 art 27 (2) and (3) UN Charter.
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at by voting as opposed to presidential statements, letters or notes.629 Nine votes
can be sufficient to adopt decisions binding on all UN member states. When
venturing into new territory such as law-making, adjudication, preventive
action or taking on new agenda items, the Council has, however, tried to ensure
unanimity of its members or invited non-members of the Council to broad
consultations in order to enhance the acceptance of its decisions.630
To the extent that all Council members have one vote, they can be
considered to enjoy formal equality.631 The veto right of the P5 as provided for
in art 27 (3) UN Charter, however, substantially curtails – or qualifies – this
understanding in practice.632 The veto right conceded to the great powers was
considered an indispensable curtailment of the principle of sovereign equality
and was meant to ensure that they were and remained truly committed to their
enhanced responsibility in maintaining international peace and security.633 Its
crucial role in binding the great powers to community interests is mirrored in
the perception of the veto as the ‘foundation on which the UN was built’,
reflecting the circumstance that the great powers would not have consented to
the creation of an organ capable of issuing binding decisions had they not been
granted the right to prevent such acts.634 Whereas the number of official vetoes
is rather low in comparison to the number of adopted resolutions, it is the great
powers’ informal use of their voting privilege in closed consultations that allows
them to exert great influence on the Council’s decision-making process and to
dominate the organ’s deliberations and output.635 Consequently, the content of
every Council resolution reflects at least the passive consent of the P5 or does
not contain language they fear could work against their political interests at
present or in the future. Attempts to reform the voting privilege of the P5 – also
tied to specific subject matters such as the responsibility to protect – remained
629 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 379.
630 Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 44 (referring to Johnstone, ‘Legislation and
Adjudication in the UN Security Council’ (n 474) 292f and Talmon, ‘The Security
Council as World Legislature’ (n 482) 186–188).
631 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 461.
632 For a constitutionalist interpretation and reconciliation of the principle of sovereign
equality in art 2 (1) with the membership- and voting privileges of the P5 in arts 23 (1)
and 27 (3) UN Charter, see Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the
Right of Veto: A Constitutionalist Perspective (Kluwer Law International 1998) 289 ff.
633 Mahbubani (n 552) 255; Fassbender, ‘Article 2(1)’ (n 550) para 64.
634 Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg (Methuen 1971) 63; Paul Kennedy, The
Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government (Penguin
Allen Lane 2006) 26f; David Bosco, Five to Rule them All: The UN Security Council
and the Making of the Modern World (OUP 2009) 30.
635 Eitel (n 491) 55; Mahbubani (n 552) 259; Security Council Report, ‘The Veto’
(19October 2015) 7; Chesterman, Johnstone and Malone (n 7) 651.
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unsuccessful to the present day due to the arrangement in art 108 UN Charter
that such amendments would require the approval of all permanent members of
the Council.636 To interpret the content of Council decisions, an understanding
of the interests of the great powers is thus pivotal, whereas the content of a
resolution in turn allows for the drawing of conclusions with regard to the
position of the P5 on a particular subject matter.
As a result of the Council’s working methods and voting rules it must thus
be concluded that if in doubt, Council resolutions are dominated by the
positions of the P5 and sometimes even only one or a few of them. This must
be kept in mind when trying to assess what may be inferred from such
documents about a process of ideation in the international society.
C. Council Representativeness of the wider UN Membership
When imposing binding rule of law measures on UN member- or third states or
disseminating its rule of law understanding by way of (non-coercive)
persuasion, the question to what degree the Council is representative of the
wider UN membership takes centre stage.637 The representativeness of a body
is ‘a function of its composition and the relative participatory rights of its
members’.638 Whereas the concept of representativeness is not explicitly
enshrined as a legal principle in the UN Charter, it is reflected in Charter
articles on the composition and decision-making procedure of the Council.639
With regard to the Council, the question of representativeness is often
associated with the legitimacy of its function and powers and the related
obligations of UN member states.640 In the context of the Council’s rule of law
agenda, the question further pertains to the perceived legitimacy of interferences
with the internal governance structure of states. While this is an important
concern, the measure of the Council’s representativeness also matters when
trying to determine whether and to what degree Council resolutions including
636 Chesterman, Johnstone and Malone (n 7) 650f (referring to the Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect
(December 2001) [6.20f] and the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) UN Doc A/59/565
[256–259].
637 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 24) 895, 902 (on persuasion as a process of norm emergence).
638 Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto (n 632) 296.
639 ibid 300 (qualifying that ‘[i]f representativeness means that a body truly reflects the
dissimilarity of its constituent members, Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter can be read as
having given effect to the concept by introducing special rights for certain states in
accordance with their respective status and role’).
640 See, eg, Hassler (n 560) 96.
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references to the rule of law or some of its elements are representative of a
process of ideation within the wider UN membership. The issue of
representativeness, thus, also relates to the question of whether measures of a
more or less representative Council may reveal something about the potential
universality of the notions and concepts it develops or may at least contribute to
the development of a universal notion of certain rule of law principles.
1. The Council acting on behalf of UN Members
Article 24 (1) UN Charter stipulates that in discharging its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the
Council acts ‘on behalf of’ the United Nations’ members. The wording of the
provision could be read to imply a classical model of representation, ie that a
selected number of a group of actors represents the larger part of the group and
is obliged to act in their best interest when representing them.641 It could,
however, also be understood as a mere rule of attribution, meaning that every
act of the organ is attributable to the UN members, including acts, the
represented actors might not be supportive of. Legally, the Council as a UN
organ acts on behalf of the organisation and not on behalf of UN member
states.642 Since UN member states have created the organisation with the
expectation that it fulfil particular functions in their interest, acting on behalf of
the organisation, however, may in many cases coincide with what the organ
would be doing if acting on behalf of UN member states. Certainly, the phrase
‘on their behalf’may be interpreted to imply that the Council should be acting in
the interest of all UN member states even though it is composed of only a few
representatives of the international community of states.643 At least, arts 49, 56
and 103 UN Charter seem to establish an obligation of loyalty of the UN
membership and its organs to the organisation’s fundamental principles and
purposes. This obligation of loyalty requires that UN member states implement
Council resolutions but also implies their freedom not to implement Council
641 Peters, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (n 566) 314 (‘Members of the Security Council act
as delegates of all other UN members, and as trustees of the international community.’).
642 Peters, ‘Article 24’ (n 452) para 45 with reference in n 77 to art 6 (1) DARIO, which holds
that ‘[t]he conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the
performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of that
organization under international law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in
respect of the organization’ (Report of the ILC, 63rd Session, UNGA Res 66/10 GAOR
66th Session Supp 10). See also Kelsen (n 471) 280 (who goes as far as to qualify the
statement that the Council acts on behalf of the UN member states as incorrect);
Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 22.
643 Peters, ‘Article 24’ (n 452) para 45; Sievers and Daws (n 496) 7.
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resolutions that run counter the UN purposes and principles.644 It, thus, also
implies the existence of an obligation of loyalty on behalf of the Council. This
obligation of loyalty may be understood to entail a minimum version of
representation which requires the Council not to issue resolutions that force UN
member states to violate their international law obligations or even core values
and principles of their own constitutions.645 Indirectly, the obligation of loyalty
may thus result in the representation of member states’ positions in Council
documents if acknowledged by the Council.
2. Inclusivity to enhance Representativeness
An obvious factor affecting the Council’s representativeness of the wider UN
membership is its composition. While changes to the Council’s membership or
the tenure of non-permanent members were not feasible until today, the Council
has incrementally and informally implemented modest changes to its working
methods and procedures in order to enhance the inclusiveness of its decision-
making process.646 To the extent that any Council composition mindful of
preserving the Council’s particular function would always be exclusive
and could, thus, only partially address concerns with regard to the
representativeness of the body’s membership, reform of the Council’s working
methods and procedure seems to be the more promising field of reform with
regard to an enhanced representativeness of the body’s decisions.647 The
Council’s lack of representativeness with regard to its composition does not, eg,
keep it from involving non-Council members and non-UN member states in
Council discussions in an attempt to enhance the representativeness of its
644 Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Rechtskontrolle des UN-Sicherheitsrates durch staatliche und
überstaatliche Gerichte’ (2006) 66 ZaöRV 41, 62 citing Doehring (n 523) 105 ff.
645 Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) paras 28 & 193.
646 The last change to the Council membership was effectuated in 1965 when the number of
Council members was raised from eleven to fifteen based on UNGA, Questions of
Equitable Representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council,
UNGA Res 1991 A (XVIII) (17December 1963) UN Doc A/RES/1991 (XVIII), entering
into force on 31August 1965, (1965) UNYB 232. See also, Annex Letter Permanent
Representative of Finland S/2015/292 (n 598) [4] (in his keynote address on the occasion
of the twelfth annual workshop for newly elected Council members, Gareth Evans, the
former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, noted that ‘even modest proposals, such
as allowing non-permanent members to serve consecutive terms, had not gained
traction’).
647 Of course, abolishing permanent membership and establishing a neutral, depoliticised
election procedure of Council members would address these concerns but such measures
seem to be out of question at the present time. For the position that the greatest potential
for Council reform consists in ‘incremental and informal adjustments’ see, Wood,
‘Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments’ (n 599) 161.
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deliberations and the resulting documents. An inclusive approach towards non-
Council members seems particularly important when the Council acts under
chapter VII and issues binding measures against UN member- or third states.648
As a point of departure, art 31 of the UN Charter in connection with rule 37
of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure provide for the involvement of
non-Council members in the discussions before the Council if the Council
considers their interests to be specially affected or when a member brings a
dispute or situation in accordance with art 34 UN Charter to the Council’s
attention. Article 32 of the Charter provides states parties to a dispute under
consideration of the Council which are not members of the Council or the
United Nations with the right to participate in Council deliberations related
to the dispute.649 The participation rights of non-Council members invited
according to rule 37 or art 32 UN Charter involve the right to submit proposals
and draft resolutions which can be put to a vote at the request of a Council
member but do not extend to a right to vote on draft Council decisions.650
In the majority of cases, the Council has granted the right to participate
when receiving requests from states.651 The question nevertheless surfaced
whether art 31 UN Charter provides a right to participate once it has been
established that a state is ‘specially affected’ or whether the participation is
entirely subject to the Council’s discretion.652 Particularly in the context of
Council legislation which directly affects the entire community of states, it has
been argued that states should enjoy a right of participation and to the holding of
public or private meetings.653 The recognition of a right to participation based
on art 31, however, seems to depend on the Council’s fact-based assessment of
whether a state is specially affected, thereby leaving the exercise of the right at
the Council’s discretion.654 The provision’s reach is further limited by the fact
that art 31 is considered to only apply to formal Council meetings and the
frequent recourse of the Council to informal meeting formats.655
648 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 59 f.
649 Dolzer and Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 621) para 7.
650 Rules of Procedure Security Council (n 404) r 38. Arts 31 and 32 UN Charter explicitly
hold that participation in discussions shall occur ‘without vote’.
651 Dolzer and Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 621) para 19.
652 It seems less of a debate that art 32 UN Charter establishes a right to participate for states,
parties to a dispute.
653 Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (n 482) 187; The UN Security
Council and the Rule of Law: The Role of the Security Council in Strengthening a Rules-
based International System (n 16) para 35.
654 Dolzer and Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 621) para 24.
655 ibid para 35.
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The Council’s own efforts to address the perceived deficiencies of its working
methods and procedures started in 1994 following a French initiative and continue
to the present day.656 In the 2005World Summit Outcome Document, the General
Assembly endorsed a more representative and transparent Council in order to
enhance, ia, the legitimacy of its decisions and recommended the increased
involvement of non-Council member states in the work of the Council to enhance
its accountability to the UN membership and the transparency of its work.657
These suggestions attest to longstanding calls from non-Council- and elected
Council member states to increase the inclusiveness and representativeness of the
Council which – among others – resulted in the creation of the Security Council
Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions in
June 1993 under whose auspices several presidential notes were published with
the aim of improving the Council’s working methods.658
The most central pieces of self-imposed reform were included in presidential
notes S/2006/507 and S/2010/507, which consolidated a multitude of previous
notes on Council working methods.659 Hereby, the Council expressed its
commitment to hold more open meetings, particularly at the early stages of its
consideration of a matter.660 Essential for the present context, the Council also
organised several open debates on the promotion and strengthening of the rule
of law in the maintenance of international peace and security, thus providing a
platform for UN member states to deliberate on the content and function of the
rule of law.661
To improve its access to first-hand experience and expertise when drafting
responses to situations on its agenda, the Council further set out to consult and
cooperate more closely and directly with regional and subregional organisations,
troop- and police-contributing countries as well as member states parties to a
conflict or other interested and affected parties.662
656 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 15.
657 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UNGA Res 60/1 (24October 2005) UN Doc A/
RES/60/1 [153f].
658 Most of the Council’s work to improve its working methods has been published in the
form of presidential notes under the auspices of the Informal Working Group on
Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. See ‹http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/
methods/introduction.shtml› accessed 14 July 2017.
659 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2006) UN Doc S/2006/507 and UNSC Note by the
President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507; ‹http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/
introduction.shtml› accessed 14 July 2017.
660 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [28].
661 See n 4.
662 UNSC Res 1353 (13 June 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1353/2001; UNSC Note by the
President 56 (2002) UN Doc S/2002/56; UNSC Presidential Statement 24 (2009) UN
Doc S/PRST/2009/24; UNSC Presidential Statement 1 (2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/1;
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The Council also expressed its intention to informally consult with the
broader UN membership when drafting, eg, resolutions, presidential- or press
statements and to seek the views of non-Council members particularly
interested or concerned.663 Additional measures envisaged by the Council
include the organisation of informal exchanges of views with the wider UN
membership when preparing the draft introduction to the Council’s annual
report, the hearing of the broader membership on the working methods of the
Council, including in open debates on the implementation of presidential note
S/2010/507, or improving the communication between the Council and the
General Assembly as a body representative of the entire UN membership.664
Additionally, non-Council member states can coalise with members on the
Council, an example being the traditionally close political ties between the US
and Israel, create groups of friends of states, regional groups or groups of like-
minded states that influence Council deliberations through their members
temporarily sitting on the Council or through the lobbying of the Council by
coordinated proposals on specific subject-matters.665
Particularly in the context of legislative resolutions, the Council has made an
effort to address concerns regarding the involvement of non-Council members in
order to enhance the legitimacy of its decisions, thereby improving the
representativeness of the process of their creation. With regard to resolution
1373 (2001) on measures to counter the financing of terrorism, several operative
paragraphs were based on provisions of the already existing International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as well as on
UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [32, 33; 59]; UNSC
Presidential Statement 12 (2013) UN Doc S/PRST/2013/12; UNSC Note by the
President 515 (2013) UN Doc S/2013/515 [2 (f) (g)]; UNSC Note by the President 630
(2013) UN Doc S/2013/630 (on consultations with TCC and PCC).
663 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [43] (it specifically referred
to interested member states, including countries directly involved or specifically affected,
neighbouring states, countries with particular contributions to make, regional
organisations and Groups of Friends); also see UNSC Note by the President 268 (2014)
UN Doc S/2014/268 for a reiteration and UNSC Note by the President 402 (2012) UN
Doc S/2012/402 [10] (holding that the ‘members of the Security Council will consider
ways and means of further enhancing interaction with and seeking the views of non-
Council members, particularly the interested or concerned States, on issues on its
agenda’).
664 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [60]; UNSC Note by the
President 922 (2012) UN Doc S/2012/922 [9]; UNSC Note by the President 515 (2013)
UN Doc S/2013/515 [2 (h)].
665 Wolfram (n 559) 166–179. On the theoretically considerable impact of informal groups of
states on the deliberations and decision-making of the Council, see Jochen Prantl, The UN
Security Council and Informal Groups of States (OUP 2006).
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General Assembly resolutions, which had either enjoyed unanimity or garnered
majority support among UN member states.666 The Convention, however, had
neither entered into force, nor had the majority of states to whom the resolution
applied signed or ratified the treaty.667 As a response to legitimacy concerns in
connection with resolution 1373 (2001), the Council arranged for more inclusive
deliberations, involving open debates, when drafting resolutions 1422 (2002) and
1487 (2003) on the exemption from ICC investigation and prosecution of
peacekeeping personnel from member states not parties to the Rome Statute.668
In the case of resolution 1540 (2004) on the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction to non-state actors, broad consultations with UN member states were
held in order to legitimise the Council enacting norms of a general-abstract
character on an issue with regard to which member states had not managed to
arrive at an agreement in international treaties and filling gaps of the existing
non-proliferation treaty regime.669 Negotiations leading to the adoption of the
resolution were ‘intentionally porous’ and non-Council members, NGOs and the
media were allowed to follow Council deliberations and provide input.670
Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), albeit criticised for their
legislative character, were considered as more or less legitimate in light of the
fact that the majority of member states were in agreement regarding the
necessity of the enacted provisions.671 The overall approval of the legislative
resolutions by the UN membership has to be considered as an essential element
contributing to the legality of Council law-making in addition to its potential
support by the text of the Charter.672
666 Szasz (n 505) 902f; Martinez (n 469) 335.
667 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted
9December 1999, entered into force 10April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197. See Szasz (n 505)
903 (observing that when resolution 1373 was adopted, only four states had ratified and
only forty-six states signed the Convention).
668 Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (n 482) 188; Johnstone,
‘Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council’ (n 474) 292; Martinez (n 469)
353.
669 Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council’ (n 474) 292f
(noting that even ‘changes were made in the draft as a result of the broad consultations’);
Masahiko Asada, ‘Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism:
Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Legislation’ (2009) 13 J. Conflict & Sec.
L. 303, 315.
670 Merav Datan, ‘Security Council Resolution 1540: WMD And Non-State Trafficking’
(28May 2004) ‹http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/dd/dd79/79md.htm› accessed 14 July
2017.
671 Martinez (n 469) 350 f.
672 ibid 335 (qualifying the unanimous decisions adopting resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540
(2004) and ‘the general support for them shown by the General Assembly’ as subsequent
Part 2 – Security Council & Emergence of a Global Concept of the Rule of Law
128
The holding of open debates before adopting resolutions during which
affected states can share their concerns with the Council and attempts to
achieve their unanimous adoption, are conducive but not sufficient ways to
address the body’s lacking inclusiveness.673
The illustrated efforts, however, have led to the general assessment that
the Council has developed a more open and transparent relationship with
non-Council members and other actors relevant for fulfilling its primary
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security such as TCC and
PCC, the wider UN membership, other UN organs such as ECOSOC, UNGA
and the Secretariat, NGOs and civil society.674
3. Transparency to enhance Representativeness
A Charter-based tool aiming at a certain degree of transparency of the Council’s
work are its annual reports to the General Assembly based on arts 15 (1) and 24
(3) of the UN Charter.675 Unfortunately, these reports have so far been of only
limited analytical value due to their ‘largely descriptive approach’ and do not
amount to ‘a meaningful and substantive exchange of views between the
Security Council and the General Assembly’.676
The Council, however, also enacted several informal measures in order to
increase the transparency of its work and thereby enhance its accountability to
non-Council members as a crucial element of its representativeness. To
mitigate the confidential nature of informal consultations of the whole, Council
members have agreed that the president provides member states with
substantive and detailed briefings shortly after the holding of such meetings.677
Council members also encouraged the president to hold informal briefings on
the programme of work after its adoption open to all UN member states.678 In
addition, Council members agreed to:
practice according to art 31 (3) (b) VCLTwith regard to art 41 UN Charter in the sense of
an approval of its interpretation as a legal basis for Council law-making).
673 Peters, ‘Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014)’ (n 481) (discussing the ‘deficits of
inclusiveness and transparency’ of Council resolutions as a possible obstacle to their
direct effect but holding in this context ‘that res. 2178 was adopted unanimously and
was acclaimed by 50 states taking the floor at the summit, but still the procedure of
deliberation and adoption could and should be improved’).
674 Hulton (n 164) 241–244; Johnstone, ‘The Security Council as Legislature’ (n 511) 88f;
Dolzer and Kreuter-Kirchhof (n 621) para 34.
675 Tzanakopoulos, ‘Transparency in the Security Council’ (n 622) 368.
676 Mahbubani (n 552) 264; Security Council Working Methods: A Tale of Two Councils
(n 594) 10.
677 UNSC Note by the President 507 (2010) UN Doc S/2010/507 [3].
678 ibid para 4.
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[C]onsider making draft resolutions and presidential statements as well as other
draft documents available as appropriate to non-members of the Council as soon
as such documents are introduced within informal consultations of the whole, or
earlier, if so authorized by the authors of the draft document.679
The rather soft language, however, is to be noted, as the Council only ‘agrees to
consider’. These measures are further contrasted by clear attempts of the Council
to remain fully in charge of what reaches the public and what remains
confidential, exemplified, eg, by proposals to limit the number of representatives
of the UN Secretariat and UN agencies present at informal consultations.680
D. Conclusion
As argued above, the question whether Council documents may reflect an
emerging or already existent consensus among UN member states with regard
to the function and content of the rule of law depends on the body’s
representativeness of the wider UN membership and thus, ia, on its
composition as well as the inclusiveness and transparency of its deliberations
and decision-making process. Due to the body’s restricted membership, the
only chances UN member states have to affect Council deliberations and
decisions by way of its composition are either their active election as non-
permanent Council members or – more mediated – their passive election of
other member states to sit on the Council. The political dynamics of Council
elections which depend, ia, on the financial and diplomatic capabilities of the
candidates, however, curtail the potential of the annual event to result in the
representation of all UN member states, a factor further exacerbated by the
considerable membership of the organisation and the thus great pool of
potential candidates.
Even more decisive seems the fact that the permanent Council members –
and the P3 in particular – exert great influence on the selection of agenda items
and the concrete design of Council measures, often bypassing elected member
states in this process. Such developments have been deplored by elected and
non-Council member states in response to which the Council resolved to
involve elected Council members more intensively in the initiation and drafting
process of Council documents.
Another criterion of the body’s representativeness relates to its willingness
to take into account the interests and demands of non-Council members as well
as to its accountability to the wider UN membership. The Council has made use
679 ibid para 44.
680 UNSC Note by the President 749 (2007) UN Doc S/2007/749 [2].
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of the Charter-based mechanisms to involve non-Council members and adapted
its working methods to allow for more inclusive deliberations, eg through open
debates or consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries or states
affected by a conflict. Its accountability to non-Council members was also
enhanced by increasing the transparency of its work, eg by providing briefings
after informal Council meetings.
The Council’s efforts to address concerns with regard to its
representativeness must be taken seriously and have certainly at times
enhanced its perceived legitimacy as exemplified by its adapted procedure to
adopt legislative resolutions. However, due to its limited composition, the
politicised elections to its non-permanent seats, the far reaching powers of its
permanent members and the insufficient inclusivity and transparency of its
deliberations, its representativeness of non-Council members does not seem
substantial enough for a convincing claim that the content of its resolutions – at
least potentially – reflects the views of the wider UN membership. Of course,
the Council must be and is concerned about its legitimacy as far as it affects the
effective implementation of its decisions and as Ian Johnstone asserted, Council
‘debates in private are animated by arguments that will be used later to justify
positions in public’, which might result in Council endeavours to ensure a
certain degree of acceptability of the content of its decisions even if for
instrumental reasons.681 Its documents will, thus, usually try to reflect positions
that are acceptable to the majority of UN member states.682 Also, the body’s
member states are deeply involved in the broader international discourse on law
and politics and thus influenced by notions, interests and positions reflected in
it.683 In this context, Cora True-Frost rightly observed that Council positions
may be influenced to accept certain norms ‘by social pressure from the
community of other IOs’ or by other member states’ acceptance of that norm
rather than because the members themselves have internalized the norm’.684 It
can, thus, be assumed that ‘the degree to which states and international
organizations make reference to (. . .) emerging legal norms when making
decisions and articulating policies’ is one factor in identifying the evolution of
consensus on certain issues in international law.685 These sources of impact,
however, seem too fleeting and uncertain to allow for the conclusion that the
681 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 463.
682 See Månsson (n 11) 91 (who even assumes that Council ‘resolutions are reflective of a
general consensus at the international level as to the current status of international human
rights law’).
683 cf Andreopoulos (n 462) 112.
684 True-Frost (n 20) 122.
685 Cronin (n 473) 68.
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Council’s references to the rule of law reflect an emerging or already existing
consensus about the concept among the international community of states or
the broader international society.
IV. The Role of the Security Council as an International Actor
Contributing to the Emergence of a Global Concept of the
Rule of Law
As has been illustrated, the Council’s composition, its deliberations and
decision-making processes are not sufficiently representative of the wider UN
membership to infer that the content of Council documents and the terms and
concepts they contain may reflect an emerging or already existing consensus
among UN member states regarding the function and content of the rule of law.
When investigating the implications of Council references to the rule of law, the
focus must thus rather be on whether Council documents may initiate, affect or
steer the emergence of a global understanding of the function and content of the
rule of law.
From a legal perspective, legally binding rule of law standards that are
regularly implemented in states by subsidiary bodies of the Council, ie
peacekeeping operations or political missions, are most relevant with regard to a
potential diffusion of a Council understanding of the rule of law. Such measures
directly shape the legal and factual situation of the countries concerned by way of
coercive imposition.686 Consent-based rule of law reforms by the Council in
states subject to UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding programmes may be equally
coercive if the consenting country heavily depends on outside support and
consequently considers itself forced to accept the programme designed by the
Council and its implementing actors.687 Such rule of law measures oblige states
or UN peace operations to implement rule of law reform as foreseen by the
Council and thus have a high potential of affecting the addressed state’s future
rule of law understanding. In political terms, the Council’s use of its
enforcement powers can be described as coercion ‘whereby (. . .) institutions
influence the behavior of other states by escalating the benefits of conformity or
the costs of nonconformity through material rewards and punishments’.688
686 Von Bogdandy, Dann and Goldmann (n 147) 11. See also, Katharina Holzinger and
Christoph Knill, ‘Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence’ (2005)
12 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 775, 781 (who observe that ‘supranational institutions often play an
important role in coercive policy transfer’).
687 Von Bogdandy, Dann and Goldmann (n 147) 12–13.
688 The sustainability of such rule of law measures in the affected countries, ie whether they
are capable of affecting long-term changes in their legal-political structure, depends on
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It is, however, not only coercive rule of law measures in Council documents
that may affect the emergence of a global understanding of the rule of law.689 A
social-constructivist analysis allows inquiring into the process of ideation that
may be initiated by Council documents and to what extent and for what actors
they may construe the meaning of the rule of law. It allows considering
the influence of ideas on state behaviour and world politics rather than
exclusively focusing on the impact of material capabilities and costs.690 Social
constructivism assumes that state interests and behaviour are also shaped by
meaning, norms, ideas and social values and that ‘states are socialized to want
certain things by the international society in which they and the people in them
live’.691 From this angle it does not matter much whether rule of law standards
espoused in Council resolutions are binding or non-binding, whether they
require implementation or not and by whom. Even if non-binding and not
enforced coercively, they may still contribute to the emergence of the rule of
law as an international norm understood as a collective expectation for the
proper behaviour of states and thus ultimately affect how states construe their
identity and interests.692
Importantly, when dealing with the influence of the Council – an organ of an
international organisation – on state behaviour, a social constructivist analysis
views international organisations as independent agents in the global
distribution of ideas.693 They are not considered mere instruments of states to
pursue their interests more effectively but as so-called ‘agents of change’
the ‘domestic structure of the target state, that is, the nature of its political institutions,
state-society relations, and the values and norms embedded in its political culture’. See,
Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic
Structures, and the End of the Cold War’ (1994) 48 IO 185, 187. See also Goodman and
Jinks (n 48) 633 (who observe that ‘coercion does not necessarily involve any change in
the target actor’s underlying preferences’).
689 True-Frost (n 20) 178–181 (on the fact that ‘coercive force and material rewards are not
the sole mechanisms that may be used to effectively diffuse norms’ and on the utility of
non-coercive soft law for norm diffusion).
690 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (n 33) ch 3. The present thesis focuses on
states as the traditional addressees of Council resolutions. The realm of agents that might
be involved in and influenced by an ideational process regarding the meaning of the rule
of law stimulated by Council documents, however, may encompass other agents of the
international society that interact with the Council.
691 Finnemore (n 41) 2 f.
692 For this definition of norms, see Katzenstein (n 54) 5. See also Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’
(n 33) 5 (‘Socially shared ideas—be it norms (“collective expectations about proper
behavior for a given identity”) or social knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships
—not only regulate behavior but also constitute the identity of actors.’).
693 David Dolowitz and David Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer
in Contemporary Policy-Making’ (2000) 13 Governance 5, 11.
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be involved in and influenced by an ideational process regarding the meaning of the rule
of law stimulated by Council documents, however, may encompass other agents of the
international society that interact with the Council.
691 Finnemore (n 41) 2 f.
692 For this definition of norms, see Katzenstein (n 54) 5. See also Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’
(n 33) 5 (‘Socially shared ideas—be it norms (“collective expectations about proper
behavior for a given identity”) or social knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships
—not only regulate behavior but also constitute the identity of actors.’).
693 David Dolowitz and David Marsh, ‘Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer
in Contemporary Policy-Making’ (2000) 13 Governance 5, 11.
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capable of shaping the interests and identities of states and other actors of the
international society.694 International organisations or their organs can even
figure as so-called norm entrepreneurs – agents with ‘strong notions about
appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community’.695 To be successful,
norm entrepreneurs at the international level require an organisational
platform.696 The UN and also the Security Council as an institution qualify as
such organisational platforms. Due to the Council’s pivotal function – which is
reflected in its mandate, powers and composition –, it enjoys considerable
authority in defining how concepts such as ‘peace’ and ‘security’ are
understood in the international society and in identifying the basic
requirements for their maintenance.697 The fact that the Council has invoked the
concept of the rule of law for more than twenty years now suggests the existence
of an at least tentative intersubjective understanding among Council members
(certainly the P5) of the concept’s function and maybe even content in the
context of peace and security maintenance.698 They are, thus, accurately
described as an interpretive community whose members ‘collectively are
continuously engaged in construing the UN Charter on issues of security’ and
in this context attribute meaning to the principle of the rule of law.699
If the Council persistently portrays the rule of law as a means to achieve and
maintain state stability and as a prerequisite of international peace and security,
it may contribute to the creation of a collective understanding among states and
other agents of the international society about the function of the rule of law and
maybe even – more specifically – about how the rule of law must be
conceptualised to fulfil this particular function. Council documents articulating
rule of law standards could thus contribute to the emergence of the rule of law as
694 Finnemore (n 41) 12f, 22; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World:
International Organizations in Global Politics (Cornell University Press 2004) 7, 11.
695 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 24) 896. For an (incomplete) overview of literature on
international organisations as norm diffusers, see Susan Park, ‘Theorizing Norm
Diffusion Within International Organizations’ (2006) 43 In’l Pol. 342–344. On the
Security Council as a norm promoter, see True-Frost (n 20) 176 f.
696 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 24) 899 f.
697 Barnett and Finnemore (n 694) 32 (on how international organisations ‘can fix meanings
in ways that orient action and establish boundaries for acceptable action’). See also,
Michael Barnett, ‘The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty
to Empirical Sovereignty’ (1995) 1 Global Governance 79, 90 f.
698 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 460 (who claims that the P5 ‘have
learned about each other from working together and have developed shared
understandings’).
699 Schachter (n 489) 269.
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an international norm that redefines how states conceive their own identities and
interests.700
Consequently, all Council documents which contribute to an evolving
understanding of what the Council may mean when referring to the rule of law,
are relevant from a social-constructivist perspective – not only those that have
legal consequences due to their legal bindingness.
Norm research has proposed several criteria that determine the potential
influence of norms.701 They relate to their intrinsic formal and substantive
qualities. Drawing loosely on such norm research it is suggested here that the
odds of the Council to affect the emergence of a global understanding of the
function and content of the rule of law depend on the precision of its language,
the consistency of its reactions (ie invocations of particular rule of law
guarantees in response to comparable situations) and the legitimacy of the
institutions and procedures it relates to the rule of law.702 These requirements
700 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 24) 902.
701 ibid 906.
702 The following claims have been developed primarily with respect to the preconditions of
compliance with international norms (originating in international treaty- or customary
law) that are legally binding. This thesis proceeds based on the assumption that they
apply equally to the emergence of norms that are not legally binding and draws loosely
on Jeffrey Legro, ‘Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism’
(1997) 51 IO 31, 34 (identifying ‘specificity’ as one feature of norm robustness which
‘refers to how well the guidelines for restraint and use are defined and understood’);
Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 518) 30f (identifying
determinacy of international rules as one condition of their legitimacy and ensuing
compliance and observing that ‘[r]ules which have a readily accessible meaning and
which say what they expect of those who are addressed are more likely to have a real
impact on conduct.’. Franck further considers coherence of rules a crucial determinant of
their legitimacy and the related compliance-pull which involves, ia, consistency, which
requires ‘that a rule, whatever its content, be applied uniformly in every “similar” or
“applicable” instance’). See, ibid 38; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘On
Compliance’ (1993) 47 IO 175, 188 (identifying, ia, ambiguity and indeterminacy of
treaty language as circumstances lying ‘at the root of behavior that may seem prima facie
to violate treaty requirements’); Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions (CUP
1989) 78–81 (who invokes the concept of norm explicitness as a related concept to
precision as a determinant of norm emergence and considers explicit formulation
necessary ‘in cases in which the interacting parties do not share in a common history or
culture’ and in light of the ‘imprecision of tacit rules’). See also Friedrich Kratochwil,
‘How Do Norms Matter?’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International
Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (OUP 2000) 35, 57
(for an approval of Franck’s proposed requirements for a compliance-pull of
international norms). Onuf investigates which speech acts have the potential of
producing rules but unfortunately does not examine what role specificity, determinacy or
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determine the potential of Council documents to diffuse an understanding of the
concept’s meaning.
If Council references to the rule of law, its function and content are vague or
inconsistent, they are unlikely to affect an influential process of ideation in the
international society as regards the meaning of the rule of law. This means
concretely that the more precisely the Council frames its language when
invoking the rule of law and its sub-guarantees, the clearer it becomes why the
rule of law is implied and what is required for the rule of law to be fulfilled.
Clarity of Council invocations of the rule of law further requires consistency of
its reactions, ie that the Council consistently refers to the rule of law and sub-
guarantees of it in reaction to similar circumstances. Both the precision of
Council language when describing the function or content of the rule of law
and the consistent use of references to it affect the intelligibility of Council
action and are thus crucial prerequisites for a potential impact of Council
resolutions on a meaningful process of ideation in the international society with
regard to the meaning of the rule of law and its related emergence as an
international norm that (re-)defines state identities and interests.
Another crucial element determining the potential of Council references to
the rule of law or its sub-guarantees to contribute to the emergence of an
international norm is their perceived legitimacy in the international society.703
Franck suggested that the perceived legitimacy of rules depends, ia, on their
procedural fairness, ie ‘the extent to which the rules are made and applied in
accordance with what the participants perceive as right process’ which relates,
ia, to the question whether the rules were ‘made by those duly authorized’.704
The present thesis proposes that in lieu of substantial involvement of states in
Council deliberations on the meaning of the rule of law, Council rule of law
standards are most likely perceived legitimate if they relate directly to
guarantees established in regional or international human rights treaties, in
whose elaboration a multitude of states were directly involved.705 Drawing on
precision of language play in the determination of rule-candidates among speech acts.
See, Onuf (n 36) 78–95.
703 Bianchi (n 462) 887 (holding that ‘the ultimate test of the legitimacy of the SC’s action
remains the level of acceptance of its practice by the UN Member States’).
704 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 518) 7 (focusing, however, on
rules of treaty- and customary international law).
705 For a similar argument see Cronin (n 473) 58 (‘As the main decision-making body within
the world’s only universal-membership organization, the Security Council has developed
the authority to interpret and implement consensus-based international law. Thus, so long
as the Council acts on the basis of generally accepted legal norms, the expansion of the
Council’s legal authority has been accepted as legitimate, even though there was no
formal process of achieving state consent’).
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regional and international human rights law does not only contribute to the
legitimacy of rule of law standards advanced by the Council with regard to
procedural fairness but also on a substantive level with regard to their content.
Finnemore and Sikkink observe that ‘norm entrepreneurs must speak to aspects
of belief systems or life worlds that transcend a specific cultural or political
context’ and thus invoke the need for norms to be universal in order to be
influential – a requirement that can be approached by basing rule of law
standards on regional and international human rights law.706 The legitimacy of
Council-promoted rule of law standards drawing on regional and international
human rights law is further enhanced by the fact that such an approach would
be in line with the purpose of the United Nations to promote and encourage
respect for human rights according to art 1 (3) as well as with art 55 (c) UN
Charter.707 Further, an interpretation of Council resolutions in line with – at
least international – human rights law reflects the rule of interpretation that
Council resolutions should be read to contribute to the realisation of the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.
706 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 24) 907. The present thesis understands universality both
formally and substantively. Formally, universality relates to the validity and bindingness
of international law for all states. Substantively, it relates to substantive international
rights or obligations that are binding for all states. See André Nollkaemper,
‘Universality’ (MPEPIL 2011) paras 2, 5. On contestations concerning the universality
of regional and international human rights law, see Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette,
International Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 2016) 35–40. See also, Philip
Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (OUP 2013) 532 (who observe
that ‘[o]n their face, human rights instruments (which in their treaty form mean to impose
legal obligations, to convert moral rules into legal rules) are surely on the “universalist”
side of this debate’ in their discussion of universalist and cultural-relativist approaches to
the question as to whether universalism is possible and normatively desirable). China, a
member of the P5, has traditionally been sceptical of the imposition of international
human rights standards. If, however, state consent had been guaranteed, China has not
been opposed to the promotion of international human rights standards via specific
country mandates such as, eg, UN Special Rapporteurs. See, Chan (n 330) 130.
707 On the success of UN statebuilding that draws on existing international human rights
norms see, eg, Susan Woodward, The Ideology of Failed States: Why Intervention Fails
(CUP 2017) 54.
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Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the
Rule of Law
I. Methodological Questions
A. Selection of Relevant Council Resolutions
The selection of documents based on which the present thesis assesses the
function ascribed to the rule of law in Council resolutions and analyses aspects
of the content of a possible Council rule of law understanding, follows a text-
based search of all Council resolutions for resolutions that explicitly contain
the phrase ‘rule of law’.708 The focus on decisions explicitly referring to the
rule of law is chosen to ensure that only those documents are analysed which
relate to situations in which the Council evidently considered the principle
implied and relevant. Since the rule of law does not have a functional
equivalent or common synonym, it did not seem useful to search for alternative
terms.
While the Council may act in the format of resolutions, presidential
statements, letters and notes by the president or statements to the press, the
thesis focuses on resolutions due to their legal and political relevance.
Resolutions are the Council’s preferred instrument to act.709 It has been its
practice to revert to resolutions when intending to enact legally binding
decisions or to attribute sufficient political weight to an issue on its agenda.710
This text-based selection of Council resolutions has resulted in a focus on
Council resolutions issued between the late 1990s and today as the Council
started to invoke the rule of law repeatedly only after 1996.711
708 For this purpose, the thesis made use of the UN Official Document System search mask
‹https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/xpSearchResultsE.xsp›. It encompasses Council
resolutions issued until and including 24 June 2017.
709 Wood, ‘Security Council’ (n 569) para 13.
710 Sievers and Daws (n 496) 376–378, 402.
711 After the first invocation of the rule of law in a resolution on the situation in the Congo in
1961, ie UNSC Res 161 (21 February 1961) UN Doc S/4741 [section B, preamble,
indent 2], the Council invoked the rule of law again with regard to the situation in
Burundi more than 30 years later. See, UNSC Res 1040 (29 January 1996) UN Doc S/
RES/1040 [2].
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B. Interpretation of Council Resolutions
The ICJ held that ‘the rules on treaty interpretation embodied in Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may provide guidance’ for
the interpretation of Council resolutions. It substantiated this statement,
observing that ‘differences between Security Council resolutions and treaties
mean that the interpretation of Security Council resolutions also require that
other factors be taken into account’.712 The court did not, however, identify
these factors. It only referred to ‘statements by representatives of members of
the Security Council made at the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the
Security Council on the same issue, as well as the subsequent practice of
relevant United Nations organs and of States affected by those given
resolutions’ as sources supporting the interpretation of Council resolutions.713
In its earlier Namibia advisory opinion, the Council had identified the sources
of interpretation that should be consulted to determine the bindingness of
provisions in Council resolutions. It referred to ‘the terms of the resolution to
be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and,
in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal
consequences of the resolution of the Security Council’ and highlighted the
centrality of Council language for interpretation, cautioning that ‘[t]he
language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed
before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect’.714
The interpretation tools enumerated by the court do not conflict with the
interpretation rules of the VCLT, nor do they really expand them. To the extent
that the ICJ did not identify alternative factors that need to be considered when
interpreting Council resolutions, the present analysis interprets Council
resolutions in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the resolution in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.715
712 Accordance with International Law (n 573) [442, para 94]. For positions in favour of an
analogy between treaties and resolutions with regard to their interpretation see, eg,
Frowein, ‘Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 22) 99; Talmon,
‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (n 482) 190; Orakhelashvili, Collective
Security (n 483) 42; Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 26. For a position against such an
analogous application, see, eg, Efthymios Papastavridis, ‘Interpretation of Security
Council Resolutions under Chapter VII in the Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis’ (2007) 56
Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 83, 94.
713 Accordance with International Law (n 573) [442, para 94].
714 Legal Consequences (n 454) [114].
715 art 31 (1) VCLT. See also Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 40 (who observes
that ‘[a]lthough not formally applicable to resolutions, Article 31 and 32 of the
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Focusing on the ordinary meaning of the terms when interpreting resolutions
does justice to the circumstance that Council members should not be expected to
consent to resolutions containing language that could be interpreted against their
political will and thus increases the likeliness of an adequate interpretation.716
The subjective views or intentions of Council members which do not emerge
clearly from the terms of a resolution or its object and purpose, are generally
considered irrelevant in the present analysis.717 This relates to the fact that the
positions of individual Council members cannot be considered as representing
the view of the Council as a body and takes into account that Council decisions
are often binding on states, which were not involved in the drafting process of
the resolution as opposed to international treaties.718 For the latter reason,
Frowein suggested that the interpretation of resolutions should be guided by the
objective view of a neutral observer.719 Ultimately, however, the Council or any
body it has authorised to do so, enjoy the right of authentic interpretation of its
documents, as ‘it is an established principle that the right of giving an
authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body
who has power to modify or suppress it’.720 While there are multiple actors
Convention constitute customary law on interpretation which, given that there is no
alterative set of interpretative rules, must be deemed to apply to resolutions’).
716 It is, of course, also possible that Council members deliberately decide to use vague
wording in resolutions in order to allow for consensus and the adoption of a text. In
general, however, Council members will carefully draft the language of Council
documents so as to avoid political or legal consequences they do not approve of. See, eg,
Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 480) 82; Månsson (n 11)
99; Wolfram (n 559) 156; Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and
Realities (n 491) 6 (speaking of ‘constructive ambiguity’). With regard to resolutions that
are intended by Council members to allow for different interpretations, see Michael Byers
‘Agreeing to Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and Intentional Ambiguity’
(2004) 10 Global Governance 165, 170–173.
717 Accordance with International Law (n 573) [442, para 94] (‘Security Council resolutions
are issued by a single, collective body and are drafted through a very different process
than that used for the conclusion of a treaty. Security Council resolutions are the product
of a voting process as provided for in Article 27 of the Charter, and the final text of such
resolutions represents the view of the Security Council as a body.’).
718 Accordance with International Law (n 573) [442, para 94] (‘Security Council resolutions
can be binding on all Member States (. . .), irrespective of whether they played any part in
their formulation’). See also Frowein, ‘Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council
Resolutions’ (n 22) 99; Peters, ‘Article 25’ (n 493) para 26 (who, however, puts the
alleged differences between international treaties and Council resolutions into
perspective).
719 Frowein, ‘Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 22) 99.
720 PCIJ, Delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier (Question of Jaworzina)
(Advisory Opinion of 6December 1923) PCIJ Series B no 8 [80]. See also, Certain
Expenses (n 457) [168] (holding that every UN organ is the ultimate arbiter of its own
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involved in the interpretation of Council resolutions such as, eg, the Secretariat,
the ICJ or UN member states, the Council is not bound by their interpretation.721
Their interpretive acts can be taken into account, however, when analysing
Council decisions as long as the Council has not objected to or clearly
disregarded them in subsequent acts.
The present thesis reverts primarily to a comparative study of Council
resolutions on the same or a similar agenda item as well as to Secretary-
General reports as sources of interpretation of Council resolutions. This
selection reflects the circumstance that most crucial Council negotiations
leading to the adoption of a resolution take place informally behind closed
doors and the absence of ‘an institutional memory of the proceedings of the
informal consultations’.722 It is, thus, rarely possible to construe the meaning of
a resolution with reference to Council negotiations that preceded its issuance.
Secretary-General reports are an important source of background
information to the extent that Council resolutions are often based on them,
include parts of them or expressly commission the Secretary-General to
implement particular measures on the ground and report back on the situation
that has triggered the issuance of a resolution and on the implementation of
Council decisions.723 These reports do, thus, provide insights as to the
circumstances that have initiated Council action and shed light on the
implementation of Council resolutions. The thesis thereby remains aware of the
fact that conclusions drawn from Secretary-General reports for the interpretation
of Council resolutions are never absolutely conclusive and that subsequent
Council resolutions contradicting an interpretation based on such sources
would prevail.724
An additional reference point for the interpretation of Council resolutions
are the legal limitations that apply to the Council’s actions. This includes
general international law at least in those cases in which the Council has
jurisdiction in light of the fact that ‘proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to
place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice
were not accepted’).
721 Papastavridis (n 712) 90 f.
722 Mahbubani (n 552) 260; Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (n 482)
190.
723 Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 480) 80; Eitel (n 491) 57f;
Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 40 (‘the difficulty of obtaining the Council’s
authoritative interpretation arguably means that in practice the Secretary-General will
assert an authoritative interpretation of his delegated powers without that being subject to
agreement with member States’); Sievers and Daws (n 496) 436.
724 Papastavridis (n 712) 91; Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 39; Krisch, ‘The
General Framework’ (n 10) para 55.
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An additional reference point for the interpretation of Council resolutions
are the legal limitations that apply to the Council’s actions. This includes
general international law at least in those cases in which the Council has
jurisdiction in light of the fact that ‘proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to
place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice
were not accepted’).
721 Papastavridis (n 712) 90 f.
722 Mahbubani (n 552) 260; Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (n 482)
190.
723 Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 480) 80; Eitel (n 491) 57f;
Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 40 (‘the difficulty of obtaining the Council’s
authoritative interpretation arguably means that in practice the Secretary-General will
assert an authoritative interpretation of his delegated powers without that being subject to
agreement with member States’); Sievers and Daws (n 496) 436.
724 Papastavridis (n 712) 91; Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 39; Krisch, ‘The
General Framework’ (n 10) para 55.
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not expressly indicated an opposite intention.725 A particularly important
benchmark are further the purposes and principles of the United Nations. All
Council resolutions must, thus, be interpreted to aspire to realise the
maintenance of international peace and security, respect for the principle of
self-determination and for human rights- and humanitarian law.726
C. Identification of Circumstances triggering Rule of Law References
and their Purposes in Council Resolutions
Part 3, chapter II of the present thesis consists of a qualitative analysis of the
selected Council resolutions in order to determine the circumstances triggering
rule of law references by the Council which shall shed light on the purposes the
Council seems to be pursuing when invoking the rule of law. This chapter serves
a contextualisation of the Council’s engagement with the rule of law. Council
resolutions are predominantly issued to facilitate the pacific settlement of
disputes or to address a threat to or breach of the peace.727 The Council usually
describes the concrete nature of such disputes, threats or breaches and the
necessary measures to address them in its resolutions. Based on a comparative
text-based analysis of all relevant Council resolutions, the study identifies the
concrete nature of the disputes, threats or breaches of the peace that have
triggered a reference to the rule of law and determines whether the rule of law
is invoked as a measure to address these threats and disputes. This analysis will
further be informed by pertinent reports of the UN Secretary-General, which are
often a source of wording for Council decisions and provide background
information on the situations that have prompted the Council to enact a
decision.728
D. Identification of Rule of Law Requirements for National
Judiciaries
Part 3, chapter III of the present thesis deals with the identification of sub-
guarantees, which the Council associates, with the rule of law. For this purpose,
the thesis focuses on rule of law requirements for national judiciaries as referred
725 See, part 2 ch II C. 3.
726 Krisch, ‘The General Framework’ (n 10) para 57.
727 See ch VI UN Charter on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and ch VII UN Charter on
Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of
Aggression.
728 For the impact of the Secretary-General on the content of SC decisions see, Rules of
Procedure Security Council (n 404) r 39. See also Eitel (n 491) 58.
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to in Council resolutions. As the present thesis examines rule of law
requirements for national judiciaries, it does not consider the statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which
were adopted by the Council in the resolutions establishing the two courts.729
Even though these statutes feature several fair trial guarantees and thus rule of
law requirements pertaining to the judiciary, they bind international bodies and
are thus considered less influential with regard to the question of whether the
Council’s rule of law requirements for judiciaries may affect how states
conceive the rule of law nationally.730
This part of the thesis applies the legal methodology of text-based analysis,
focusing on those resolutions that explicitly refer to the rule of law and
analysing their wording to ascertain which rule of law requirements the
Council imposes on national judiciaries. Occasionally, the thesis also considers
resolutions that do not explicitly invoke the rule of law but that use terms or
language that the Council clearly related to the principle in other resolutions.
The Council, eg, consistently portrayed the independence of the judiciary as an
element of the rule of law starting with resolution 1493 (2003) on the situation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.731 In advance to the issuance of the
said resolution, however, the Council invoked the principle of judicial
independence in three preceding resolutions, which did not relate the principle
to the rule of law.732 Such resolutions are also included in the present analysis if
they invoke principles that the Council clearly and repeatedly portrayed as
elements of the rule of law in other resolutions. The identification of rule of law
institutions and procedures in Council resolutions is further backed up by the
foundational chapter on the concept of the rule of law as well as by reports of
the UN Secretary-General.
729 UNSC Res 827 (25May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827; UNSC Res 955 (8November 1994)
UN Doc S/RES/955.
730 The establishment of the tribunals should, however, be counted as an element of the
Council’s rule of law work to the extent that they contributed to the enforcement of
international humanitarian law and aimed to ensure accountability for the violation of
international crimes. In this sense, resolution 1966 (2010), which established the
International Residual Mechanism for the two tribunals acknowledged ‘the considerable
contribution the Tribunals have made to (. . .) the re-establishment of the rule of law in the
countries of the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda’. See UNSC Res 1966 (22December
2010) UN Doc S/RES/1966 (2010) [preamble, indent 3].
731 UNSC Res 1493 (28 July 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1493 [11].
732 UNSC Res 923 (31May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/923 [preamble, indent 6]; UNSC Res
1436 (24 September 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1436 [7]; UNSC Res 1470 (28March 2003)
UN Doc S/RES/1470 [7].
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To identify the possible sources that have informed the Council’s references
to the rule of law, the thesis takes a closer look at regional and international
human rights law as several rule of law requirements for national judiciaries in
Council resolutions seem to explicitly invoke or resonate with human rights
guarantees as provided for in regional and international human rights treaties.
To ascertain whether the Council borrows (aspects of) its rule of law standards
from existing regional and international human rights law, the thesis examines
selected human rights guarantees of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention on Human Rights and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The thesis then undertakes a comparative legal analysis of the scope of those
human rights guarantees, which seem to be implied by the Council’s rule of law
language. The concrete selection of regional and international human rights
treaties reflects the human rights obligations applicable to those countries
primarily addressed by Council rule of law measures. The ICCPR enjoys
almost universal membership, thus usually also including the members of the
UN Security Council – another reason for a possible borrowing practice of the
Council.733 Of fifteen states with regard to which the Council issued
observations, recommendations and decisions pertaining to rule of law
requirements for national judiciaries, fourteen are members of the ICCPR, of
which eight have also ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.734
Furthermore, all African states addressed by the resolutions analysed in the
present thesis except for South Sudan, are members of the ACHPR, and Haiti is
a member state of the ACHR.735
As another determinative factor, most European Council members will be
members of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
733 Of the P5, the United States, France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland have ratified the ICCPR. France and the Russian
Federation have further ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. China only
signed the ICCPR and has taken no action with regard to the First Optional Protocol.
‹http://indicators.ohchr.org/› accessed 14 July 2017.
734 Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sudan and Timor-Leste have ratified the ICCPR. The Central African Republic, Chad,
Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Sierra
Leone and Somalia have further ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. South
Sudan by contrast has not even signed the ICCPR. See ‹http://indicators.ohchr.org/›
accessed 14 July 2017.
735 For the ACHPR see ‹http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/› accessed
14 July 2017. For the ACHR see ‹https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Con
vention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm› accessed 14 July 2017.
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Fundamental Freedoms.736 Even though no resolution analysed in the present
thesis was issued against European UN member states, the comparative legal
analysis also examines the scope of selected human rights guarantees of the
ECHR. This relates to the circumstance that the rich jurisprudence of the
European Commission of Human Rights and especially the European Court of
Human Rights on the scope of the human rights guarantees contained in the
ECHR figures as a crucial point of reference for the interpretation of human
rights guarantees contained in the ACHR and ACHPR. The same applies to the
jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee on the guarantees contained
in the ICCPR.737
An analysis of the scope of those human rights guarantees that are
seemingly implied by Council rule of law requirements for national judiciaries
shall assist in determining whether the interpretation of these guarantees by the
competent regional and international human rights bodies informs the Council’s
decision to invoke them. Concretely, this means that the thesis tries to determine
whether the Council refers to certain rule of law requirements that resonate with
particular human rights guarantees in reaction to situations that are considered
encroachments on these guarantees by human rights bodies responsible for
their interpretation.
736 47 states have ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, among them three permanent Council members, ie the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France and the Russian Federation. See
‹https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?
p_auth=sl7ucxce› accessed 14 July 2017.
737 On the borrowing practice of the IACtHR and the IACHR from the ICCPR and the ECHR
see, eg, IACHR, Garcia v Peru (Case No 11.006, Report No 1/95) (7 February 1995);
IACHR, Raquel Martín de Mejía v Peru (Case No 10.970, Report No 5/96) (1March
1996); IACHR, Andrews v the United States of America (Case No 11.139, Report
No 57/96) (6December 1996) [159 ff]; IACtHR, Genie Lacayo v Nicaragua (Judgment
of 29 January 1997; Series C No 30) (Merits, Reparations and Costs) [77]; IACtHR,
Constitutional Court v Peru (Judgment of 31 January 2001; Series C No 71) (Merits,
Reparations and Costs) [73–75]. See also, eg, Laurence Burgogue-Larsen and Amaya
Úbeda de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ in The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (OUP 2011) paras 25.03, 25.20f & 25.27f; Yves Haeck and others, The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, Present and Future (Intersentia
2015) 743; Thomas Antkowiak and Alejandra Gonza, The American Convention on
Human Rights (OUP 2017) 175 f. On the borrowing practice of the AComHPR from the
ICCPR and the ECHR see, eg, AComHPR, Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, Com
No 224/98 (2000) [51f]; AComHPR, Civil Liberties Organisation et al v Nigeria, Com
No 218/98 (2001) [35 ff]; AComHPR, Article 19 v Eritrea, Com No 275/03 (2007) [97,
99]. See also Bronwen Manby, ‘Civil and Political Rights in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Articles 1–7’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds),
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 171, 206, 212.
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As articulated above, the present thesis proceeds based on the assumption
that universalism of rule of law standards relates to their legitimacy and
favourably affects norm influence. Thus, if the Council borrows from regional
and international human rights law, it can claim that its rule of law
understanding is at least relatively universal. Accordingly, the prospects of its
successful reception in states affected by Council rule of law measures may be
relatively good.
II. The Function of the Rule of Law in Council Resolutions
A. Introduction
The present chapter examines the circumstances that have triggered references
to the rule of law in Security Council resolutions. More precisely, it looks into
the question which purposes the Council pursues when invoking the rule of law
in the fulfilment of its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and
security. The chapter thereby contextualises Council references to the rule of
law.
B. The Council’s Functional Approach to the Rule of Law
The rule of law as a concept gained traction in Council resolutions during the
past two decades. The first explicit reference to the rule of law in a Council
resolution dates back to the year 1961 in response to a threat to international
peace and security stemming from an impending civil war in the Congo.738 The
Security Council noted ‘with deep regret and concern the systematic violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the general absence of the rule
of law in the Congo’. More than thirty years passed until the Council picked up
on the term again and expressed its support to the efforts of the Secretary-
General to facilitate a comprehensive political dialogue in response to a coup
d’état by the Burundian armed forces with the objective, among others, of
promoting the rule of law in the country.739 The two resolutions illustrate a
changing attitude of the Council towards the rule of law. Whereas in the 1961
resolution, the rule of law reference was included in the preambular part and
not connected to any UN activities promoting the rule of law, the Burundi
resolution mentioned the rule of law in an operative paragraph and referred to
an involvement of the UN with regard to the re-establishment of the rule of law
in the country.
738 UNSC Res 161 (21 February 1961) UN Doc S/4741 [section B, preamble, indent 2].
739 UNSC Res 1040 (29 January 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1040 [2].
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The Burundi resolution, thus, marked the beginning of an episode – lasting
until today – during which the Security Council referred more and more often to
the rule of law. It did so particularly in country-specific resolutions when
establishing UN peace operations in conflict- and post-conflict states or when
adapting their respective mandates.740 Other security-relevant phenomena that
have triggered references to the rule of law in Council resolutions are terrorism,
piracy, sexual violence in conflict or the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons. Council resolutions responding to these phenomena present the rule
of law as a principle serving the purpose of mitigating or eradicating them. The
Council, thus, approaches the rule of law from a functional perspective: It
employs the rule of law as a tool catering to the fulfilment of its primary
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Its endeavours in
this regard can be read in light of the UN rationale that security, human rights
and development can only be achieved within a broad framework of the rule of
law.741
Functional approaches to the rule of law are readily employed by
international organisations.742 They are attractive due to their ends-based focus,
approaching the rule of law as a means to achieve a desired outcome.743 The
Council has taken on an active part in this international trend and discovered
the rule of law as a tool conducive to the fulfilment of its mandate to maintain
international peace and security.744
C. The Purposes attributed to the Rule of Law in Council Resolutions
An analysis of Council resolutions which can be considered to speak on the
purposes served by the rule of law, broadly reveals three broad categories: The
Council views the rule of law as (1) catering to peace, security and stability, as
740 Sannerholm (n 3) 51. The term ‘UN peace operation’ is meant to include UN special
political-, peacebuilding- as well as peacekeeping missions.
741 UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Securing Peace and Development: The
Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform’ (2008) UN Doc A/
62/659-S/2008/39 [1].
742 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 343.
743 Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’ in Thomas Carothers (ed),
Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace 2006) 31.
744 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 343. The Council’s language of the
rule of law appears to develop in sync with its human rights language, which also
assumed a more prominent role in Council resolutions in the past three decades. See
Månsson (n 11) 79.
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
146
The Burundi resolution, thus, marked the beginning of an episode – lasting
until today – during which the Security Council referred more and more often to
the rule of law. It did so particularly in country-specific resolutions when
establishing UN peace operations in conflict- and post-conflict states or when
adapting their respective mandates.740 Other security-relevant phenomena that
have triggered references to the rule of law in Council resolutions are terrorism,
piracy, sexual violence in conflict or the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons. Council resolutions responding to these phenomena present the rule
of law as a principle serving the purpose of mitigating or eradicating them. The
Council, thus, approaches the rule of law from a functional perspective: It
employs the rule of law as a tool catering to the fulfilment of its primary
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Its endeavours in
this regard can be read in light of the UN rationale that security, human rights
and development can only be achieved within a broad framework of the rule of
law.741
Functional approaches to the rule of law are readily employed by
international organisations.742 They are attractive due to their ends-based focus,
approaching the rule of law as a means to achieve a desired outcome.743 The
Council has taken on an active part in this international trend and discovered
the rule of law as a tool conducive to the fulfilment of its mandate to maintain
international peace and security.744
C. The Purposes attributed to the Rule of Law in Council Resolutions
An analysis of Council resolutions which can be considered to speak on the
purposes served by the rule of law, broadly reveals three broad categories: The
Council views the rule of law as (1) catering to peace, security and stability, as
740 Sannerholm (n 3) 51. The term ‘UN peace operation’ is meant to include UN special
political-, peacebuilding- as well as peacekeeping missions.
741 UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Securing Peace and Development: The
Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform’ (2008) UN Doc A/
62/659-S/2008/39 [1].
742 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 343.
743 Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’ in Thomas Carothers (ed),
Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace 2006) 31.
744 Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (n 18) 343. The Council’s language of the
rule of law appears to develop in sync with its human rights language, which also
assumed a more prominent role in Council resolutions in the past three decades. See
Månsson (n 11) 79.
II. The Function of the Rule of Law in Council Resolutions
147
(2) facilitating conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding, and
as (3) contributing to the prevention of and fight against crime.
Whereas an expansive interpretation of relevant Council resolutions may
suggest even more categories, these are the purposes that can be identified
based on a literal reading of the text of Council resolutions in combination with
relevant background information found in Secretary-General reports.745
The fact that most resolutions speaking on the purposes served by the rule of
law are country-specific rather than thematic, underlines another obvious factor
with regard to the results of the present analysis: Since the Council
predominantly develops the content of its resolutions in reaction to concrete
situations, its language on an overarching theme such as the rule of law will
always be selective, as will be the analysis of this language.746 The purposes
attributed to the rule of law in Council resolutions can thus not be qualified as
representing the Council’s conclusive view on the subject and it is not
suggested here that the Council might not consider the rule of law to be
conducive to other goals and tasks which have not yet emerged on its agenda.
The following sections will discuss and analyse the purposes served by the
rule of law as can be inferred from Council resolutions.
1. Rule of Law Catering to Peace, Security and Stability
In developing its broadly framed mandate, the Council generally suggests that
the goals it pursues and the tools it employs to achieve them are tied to its
primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.747
Accordingly, the rule of law is contextualised in Council resolutions in close
connection with the goal of attaining peace, security and stability. This appears
to be the most obvious way for the Council to approach the rule of law to the
extent that its mandate is geared towards the attainment of these goals.
Paragraphs emphasising how the rule of law caters to peace, security and
stability are predominantly found in country-specific resolutions with few
exceptions in thematic resolutions and seem to appear just as often in
resolutions dealing with countries supported by peacekeeping operations as in
745 For the reasons why this interpretative approach is chosen, see part 3 ch I. 3.
746 Of the 120 Council resolutions examined in the present thesis that speak on the purposes
of the rule of law, 97 are country-specific resolutions and five topic-specific (eg on
foreign terrorist fighters), as compared to 18 thematic resolutions.
747 With regard to the nature and practice of the Council’s discretion under arts 39–42 UN
Charter see, eg, de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council
(n 477) 134-74, 182-87; Orakhelashvili, ‘The Power of the UN Security Council to
Determine the Existence of a “Threat to the Peace”’ (n 471) 61.
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resolutions mandating peacebuilding or special political missions, underlining
that the rule of law is considered crucial in different phases of a conflict for the
attainment of peace, security and stability.748
Some paragraphs plainly attest to the Council’s view that the rule of law is a
crucial requirement of peace, security and stability. In this spirit, eg, Council
resolutions on Afghanistan reaffirmed that the country’s peaceful future lies in
the building of a state based on the rule of law.749 With regard to the situation in
Haiti, the Council emphasised that the rule of law, among other factors, remains
key to the stability of the country.750 Regarding the situation in Guinea-Bissau,
the Council held that addressing the root causes of instability required particular
attention to the rule of law.751 In Liberia, the Council expressed its appreciation
to the international community for its support to consolidate peace, security and
stability, welcoming in particular contributions to support Liberia’s efforts with
regard to, ia, the rule of law.752
Another type of paragraph, highlighting the linkages between the rule of
law, peace, security and stability is found in connection with the tasks of UN
peace operations. These references are, however, not necessarily more concrete
despite their inclusion in mission mandates. Council resolutions regularly
emphasise that the rule of law activities of UN peace missions are supposed to
promote peace, security and stability in the countries they were sent to support.
The thematic resolution on multidimensional peacekeeping missions notes that
such missions may be mandated by the Council to ‘support the strengthening
of rule of law institutions of the host country (. . .) within the scope of
respective mandates, in helping national authorities develop critical rule of law
priorities and strategies to address the needs of police, judicial institutions and
corrections system (. . .) as a vital contribution to building peace’.753 In this
spirit, the Council required the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
748 Out of 97 resolutions, 47 were issued in a peacekeeping-, 48 in a peacebuilding context or
during an ongoing special political mission, one in a development context and one during
pre-mission deployment.
749 UNSC Res 2069 (9October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2069 [preamble, indent 33]; UNSC
Res 2096 (19March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096 [preamble, indent 19]; UNSC Res
2120 (10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2120 [preamble, indent 34]; UNSC Res 2210
(16March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2210 [preamble, indent 18]; UNSC Res 2274
(15March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2274 [preamble, indent 19] (emphasis added).
750 UNSC Res 1658 (14 February 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1658 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC
Res 1702 (15August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1702 [preamble, indent 5] (emphasis added).
751 UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203 [4]; UNSC Res 2267
(26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [5] (emphasis added).
752 UNSC Res 2333 (23December 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2333 [preamble, indent 14]
(emphasis added).
753 UNSC Res 2086 (21 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2086 [8 (c)] (emphasis added).
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resolutions mandating peacebuilding or special political missions, underlining
that the rule of law is considered crucial in different phases of a conflict for the
attainment of peace, security and stability.748
Some paragraphs plainly attest to the Council’s view that the rule of law is a
crucial requirement of peace, security and stability. In this spirit, eg, Council
resolutions on Afghanistan reaffirmed that the country’s peaceful future lies in
the building of a state based on the rule of law.749 With regard to the situation in
Haiti, the Council emphasised that the rule of law, among other factors, remains
key to the stability of the country.750 Regarding the situation in Guinea-Bissau,
the Council held that addressing the root causes of instability required particular
attention to the rule of law.751 In Liberia, the Council expressed its appreciation
to the international community for its support to consolidate peace, security and
stability, welcoming in particular contributions to support Liberia’s efforts with
regard to, ia, the rule of law.752
Another type of paragraph, highlighting the linkages between the rule of
law, peace, security and stability is found in connection with the tasks of UN
peace operations. These references are, however, not necessarily more concrete
despite their inclusion in mission mandates. Council resolutions regularly
emphasise that the rule of law activities of UN peace missions are supposed to
promote peace, security and stability in the countries they were sent to support.
The thematic resolution on multidimensional peacekeeping missions notes that
such missions may be mandated by the Council to ‘support the strengthening
of rule of law institutions of the host country (. . .) within the scope of
respective mandates, in helping national authorities develop critical rule of law
priorities and strategies to address the needs of police, judicial institutions and
corrections system (. . .) as a vital contribution to building peace’.753 In this
spirit, the Council required the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
748 Out of 97 resolutions, 47 were issued in a peacekeeping-, 48 in a peacebuilding context or
during an ongoing special political mission, one in a development context and one during
pre-mission deployment.
749 UNSC Res 2069 (9October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2069 [preamble, indent 33]; UNSC
Res 2096 (19March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096 [preamble, indent 19]; UNSC Res
2120 (10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2120 [preamble, indent 34]; UNSC Res 2210
(16March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2210 [preamble, indent 18]; UNSC Res 2274
(15March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2274 [preamble, indent 19] (emphasis added).
750 UNSC Res 1658 (14 February 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1658 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC
Res 1702 (15August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1702 [preamble, indent 5] (emphasis added).
751 UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203 [4]; UNSC Res 2267
(26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [5] (emphasis added).
752 UNSC Res 2333 (23December 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2333 [preamble, indent 14]
(emphasis added).
753 UNSC Res 2086 (21 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2086 [8 (c)] (emphasis added).
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(UNAMA) and the SRSG to support efforts of the governing authority in
Afghanistan and later the Afghan government to improve the rule of law
throughout the country with a view to helping bring the benefits of peace.754
Similarly, the Council decided that the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
(UNOCI) was to assist the government in re-establishing the rule of law
throughout the country in order to contribute to the remaining tasks of the
peace process.755 In a similar vein, the Council held that the advice and
technical assistance in support of the rule of law by the UN Integrated
Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) was
directed at the stabilisation of the security situation in the country.756
Assistance with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law was also
required of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in order
to contribute to the creation of a secure and stable environment, whereas a
substantially strengthened rule of law capacity of a new UN mission in
754 The respective paragraph was included in several resolutions on the situation in
Afghanistan with similar wording. The changing realities on the ground with regard to
the institutions in charge of the governing responsibility is reflected in the changing of
the addressee of UNAMA’s and the SRSG’s support. See UNSC Res 1806 (20March
2008) UN Doc S/RES/1806 [4 (e)] (‘support efforts, including through the Independent
Directorate for Local Governance, to improve (. . .) the rule of law’); UNSC Res 1917
(22March 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1917 [6 (b)] (very generally requiring UNAMA and
the SRSG to ‘support and strengthen efforts to improve (. . .) the rule of law’); UNSC
Res 1974 (22March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1974 [6 (c)] (‘support the efforts of the
Afghan Government to improve (. . .) the rule of law’); UNSC Res 2041 (22March
2012) UN Doc S/RES/2041 [7 (b)] (‘support the efforts of the Afghan Government, in
fulfilling its commitments as stated at the London, Kabul and Bonn Conferences, to
improve (. . .) the rule of law’); UNSC Res 2096 (19March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096
[7 (b)] (‘support the efforts of the Afghan Government, in fulfilling its commitments as
stated at the London, Kabul and Bonn Conferences, to improve (. . .) the rule of law’);
UNSC Res 2145 (17March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2145 [6 (b)] (‘support the efforts of
the Afghan Government, in fulfilling its commitments as stated at the London, Kabul,
Bonn and Tokyo Conferences, to improve (. . .) the rule of law’); UNSC Res 2210
(16March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2210 [7 (b)] (‘support the efforts of the Afghan
Government, in fulfilling its commitments as stated at the London, Kabul, Bonn and
Tokyo Conferences, to improve (. . .) the rule of law’); UNSC Res 2274 (15March 2016)
UN Doc S/RES/2274 [8 (b)] (‘support the efforts of the Afghan Government in fulfilling
its commitments as stated at the London, Kabul, Bonn and Tokyo Conferences, to
improve (. . .) the rule of law’); UNSC Res 2344 (17March 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2344
[6 (b)] (‘support the efforts of the Afghan Government in fulfilling its commitments as
stated at the London, Kabul, Bonn and Tokyo Conferences, to improve (. . .) the rule of
law’) (emphasis added).
755 UNSC Res 1933 (30 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1933 [16 (j)] (emphasis added).
756 UNSC Res 2121 (10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2121 [10 (c)]; UNSC Res 2134
(28 January 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2134 [2 (d)] (emphasis added).
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Somalia was considered necessary for it to provide advice on, ia, security and
stabilisation.757
Beyond attesting to the Council’s general assessment that the rule of law
caters to peace, security and stability, a comparative survey of relevant
resolutions suggests that the Council considers the rule of law conducive to the
sustainability of peace, security and stability. In line with their predominantly
abstract character, the majority of such paragraphs are found in the preambular
parts of Council resolutions, often providing the contextual background for
more concrete rule of law measures in operative paragraphs. Most of these
paragraphs highlight in one way or another that the Council does not consider
the rule of law as a tool geared towards addressing emergency situations or
urgent threats but rather as a structural measure to consolidate peace and
stability in the long term. This makes sense taking into account that rule of law
structures and institutions are neither quickly established nor easily maintained
but need to be cultivated in order to emerge and last.758 In this spirit, resolutions
on the situation in Guinea-Bissau stressed that the consolidation of peace and
stability can only result from, among others, the promotion of the rule of law.759
Resolutions on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan stressed the need for an
approach to peace consolidation and sustainable peace respectively, that
strengthens coherence between a variety of activities, including rule of law
activities.760 The same formulation is found in the thematic resolution on
Women, Peace and Security, shedding light on the background against which
the Council included the paragraphs in the Sudan resolutions.761 Three thematic
resolutions on UN peacekeeping operations and conflict prevention broaden the
757 UNSC Res 1542 (30April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1542 [7 (d)]; UNSC Res 2093 (6March
2013) UN Doc S/RES/2093 [22 (c)] (emphasis added).
758 Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law and
Strengthening the Criminal Justice System’, Tenth UN Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (14December 1999) UN Doc A/CONF.187/3 [7f]
759 UNSC Res 2092 (22 February 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2092 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC
Res 2103 (22May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2103 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC Res 2157
(29May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2157 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC Res 2186
(25November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2186 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC Res 2203
(18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2267
(26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2343
(23 February 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2343 [preamble, indent 9] (emphasis added).
760 UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC Res
2057 (5 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2057 [preamble, indent 10]; UNSC Res 2109
(11 July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2109 [preamble, indent 12]; UNSC Res 2241 (9October
2015) UN Doc S/RES/2241 [preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res 2252 (15December 2015)
UN Doc S/RES/2252 [preamble, indent 21] (emphasis added).
761 UNSC Res 2122 (18October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2122 [preamble, indent 11].
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context in accordance with their more general thematic focus when emphasising
that a comprehensive approach to sustainable peace requires the strengthening
of the rule of law not only at the national but also at the international level.762
The rule of law as a crucial ingredient of the peace consolidation process is also
highlighted in a resolution on Burundi, where the Council took note of the
progress achieved in key peace consolidation areas which includes ensuring
that the security forces and justice institutions effectively protect the rule of
law.763 In the Central African Republic, the Council emphasised that respect for
the rule of law was necessary, ia, for lasting peace, while lasting stability in
Liberia required, ia, a well-functioning, accountable, sustainable and effective
rule of law sector.764
Comparable to the preambular paragraphs, several operative paragraphs
emphasise the connection between the rule of law and the sustainability of peace
762 UNSC Res 2171 (21August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2171 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC
Res 2185 (20November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2185 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res
2282 (27April 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2282 [preamble, indent 12] (emphasis added).
763 UNSC Res 1858 (22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1858 [preamble, indent 5]
(emphasis added).
764 On the Central African Republic, see UNSC Res 2088 (24 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/
2088 [preamble, indent 12]. Regarding the situation in Liberia, the text of the paragraph
was included in various resolutions with slight changes in language reflecting the
changing realities on the ground: UNSC Res 1885 (15 September 2009) UN Doc S/RES/
1885 [preamble, indent 5] (‘lasting stability in Liberia and the subregion will require
well-functioning and sustainable (. . .) rule of law sector(s)’); UNSC Res 2008
(16 September 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2008 [preamble, indent 4] (‘lasting stability in
Liberia and the subregion will require well-functioning and sustainable government
institutions, including (. . .) rule of law sector(s)’); UNSC Res 2066 (17 September 2012)
UN Doc S/RES/2066 [preamble, indent 7] (‘lasting stability in Liberia and the subregion
will require well-functioning, accountable, and sustainable government institutions,
including (. . .) rule of law sector(s)’); UNSC Res 2116 (18 September 2013) UN Doc S/
RES/2116 [preamble, indent 4) (‘lasting stability in Liberia and the subregion will require
well-functioning, accountable, and sustainable government institutions, including
security and rule of law sector(s)’); UNSC Res 2176 (15 September 2014) UN Doc S/
RES/2176 [preamble, indent 3] (‘lasting stability in Liberia will require the Government
of Liberia to sustain well-functioning and accountable government institutions,
particularly of the rule of law (. . .) sector(s)’); UNSC Res 2237 (2 September 2015) UN
Doc S/RES/2237 [preamble, indent 7] (‘lasting stability in Liberia will require the
Government of Liberia to sustain effective and accountable government institutions,
particularly in the rule of law (. . .) sector(s)’); UNSC Res 2288 (25May 2016) UN Doc
S/RES/2288 [preamble, indent 9] (‘lasting stability in Liberia will require the
Government of Liberia to sustain effective and accountable government institutions,
particularly in the rule of law (. . .) security sector(s)’); UNSC Res 2308 (14 September
2016) UN Doc S/RES/2308 [preamble, indent 4] (‘lasting stability requires the
Government of Liberia to maintain well-functioning, accountable and responsive
national institutions, particularly to provide for rule of law’) (emphasis added).
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and stability. The support of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) to
the Burundian government in consolidating the rule of law, in particular by
strengthening the justice and corrections system, including independence and
capacity of the judiciary, was thus included in the mission’s peace consolidation
mandate.765 Similarly, the stabilisation and peace consolidation mandate of
the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUSCO) involved supporting the efforts of the Congolese
government to develop rule of law institutions and territorial administration.766
The UNMission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was mandated to assist the parties to the
Comprehensive- and the Darfur Peace Agreement respectively, in promoting the
rule of law with the aim of contributing to long-term peace and stability.767
Although the Council’s wording varies, references to lasting, long-term and
sustainable peace or to the consolidation of peace can all be read as testifying to
the same expectation: That the rule of law cater to conditions or state structures
that foster the sustainability of peace, security and stability.
2. Rule of Law as a Facilitator of Conflict Prevention, Conflict
Management and Peacebuilding
a. The Rule of Law as a Key Element of Conflict Management
On a more concrete level, albeit ultimately directed at the same ends as the
preceding category, the Council views the rule of law as serving the purposes
of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
On the occasion of an open debate on the agenda item ‘the promotion and
strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and
security’, the president of the Security Council held that ‘the Council
emphasizes the importance of the rule of law as one of the key elements of
conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding’.768
The General Assembly adopted this wording subsequently in its Declaration on
the rule of law at the national and international levels, in which it also
recognised the positive contribution of the Council to the rule of law while
discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, thus furnishing the Council’s assessment with enhanced
legitimacy and representativeness.769 The Council later reaffirmed the
765 UNSC Res 1719 (25October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719 [2 (d)] (emphasis added).
766 UNSC Res 1925 (28May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1925 [12 (p)] (emphasis added).
767 UNSC Res 1590 (24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590 [4 (a) (viii)]; UNSC Res 1706
(31August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706 [8 (k)] (emphasis added).
768 UNSC Presidential Statement 1 (2012) UN Doc S/PRST/2012/1.
769 Declaration of the High-level Meeting A/RES/67/1 (n 395) [18; 28].
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assessment in thematic resolutions on Women, Peace and Security and security
sector reform as well as in country-specific resolutions on the situation in Sudan
and South Sudan.770 Even though the Council reverts to more precise language
in this context when describing the purposes served by the rule of law, it is
ultimately still peace, security and stability that shall be attained through
conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The
second purpose ascribed to the rule of law in Council resolutions can thus be
qualified as a specification of the first and most general one, ie, the attainment
of peace, security and stability.
b. Conflict Prevention
As the Secretary-General observed in one of his reports on the strengthening
and coordination of United Nations rule of law activities, it is increasingly
recognised at the national level ‘that States marked by weak rule of law (. . .)
pose significant threats to peace and security’.771 In line with this general
observation, several thematic Council resolutions have acknowledged the role
of the rule of law in preventing armed conflict and its recurrence as well as in
addressing its root causes.
Conflict prevention was described in the Brahimi Report as addressing the
structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace and
attempting to reinforce those foundations, usually in the form of diplomatic
initiatives.772 Preventive diplomacy, a concept coined by former Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld, was defined in the Agenda for Peace as ‘action to
prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from
escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’.773
Although a primary responsibility of UN member states, conflict prevention
has also been a field of UN engagement.774 On the occasion of a high-level
770 UNSC Res 2122 (18October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2122 [preamble, indent 11]; UNSC
Res 2151 (28April 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2151 [preamble, indent 15]; UNSC Res 2241
(9October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2241 [preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res 2252
(15December 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2252 [preamble, indent 21]; UNSC Res 2327
(16December 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2327 [preamble, indent 23].
771 SG Report A/68/213/Add.1 (n 395) [42].
772 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) UN Doc A/55/305-S/
2000/809 (Brahimi Report) [10].
773 UNGA Report of the Secretary-General, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping’ (1992) UN Doc A/47/277-S/24111 [20]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results’ (2011) UN
Doc S/2011/552 [1].
774 art 33 UN Charter holds that ‘parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
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meeting on the agenda item ‘the responsibility of the Security Council in the
maintenance of international peace and security’ in 1992, the Council president
prominently observed that ‘non-military sources of instability in the economic,
social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and
security’, thus indicating the Council’s awareness of its potential role in
addressing the root causes of future conflicts.775 Whereas the Council was
originally more engaged in responding to conflicts and emergencies that had
already occurred, the Secretary-General observed in 2011 that the Council had
gotten more involved in recent years with conflict prevention.776 The Council
itself had stressed its crucial role in this field in a thematic resolution on the
inclusion of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration components in the
mandates of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, expressing ‘its
determination to pursue the objective of prevention of armed conflict as an
integral part of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security’.777 Its activities to further the goal of conflict prevention
range from the holding of ‘informal interactive dialogues’ on situations that
might result in conflicts, over ‘horizon scanning’ briefings on current and
emerging conflicts with the Department of Political Affairs of the UN
Secretariat, to the strengthening of its relationship with regional organisations,
the issuance of targeted sanctions and the creation of political and
peacekeeping missions with the respective mandate to prevent conflicts from
escalating or recurring.778
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice’. See SG Report S/2011/552 (n 773) [10–34]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations and Conflict
Prevention: A Collective Recommitment’ (2015) UN Doc S/2015/730 [2]. See also
UNSC Res 1366 (30August 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1366 [2] (where the Council stresses
‘that the essential responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments,
and that the United Nations and the international community can play an important role in
support of national efforts for conflict prevention and can assist in building national
capacity in this field’).
775 UNSC Note by the President 23500 (1992) UN Doc S/23500 [3].
776 SG Report S/2011/552 (n 773) [12].
777 UNSC Res 1366 (30August 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1366 [1].
778 SG Report S/2011/552 (n 773) [12–14] (further Council initiatives in the context of
conflict prevention are luncheons with the Secretary-General to informally discuss items
not yet on its agenda, the consideration of the item ‘Peace and Security in Africa’,
initiatives by its president and press communiqués aimed at creating political momentum
for prevention activities and the support of mediation initiatives by the UN and regional
actors).
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Given the broad range of tools available to the Council, its ability to employ
its far reaching powers when getting involved and its related privileged position
to affect state interests and identities, the fact that it considers the rule of law as a
crucial element of conflict prevention, proves of great significance. The first
resolution expressly stressing the importance of the rule of law as an essential
factor in the prevention of conflicts was issued in the context of conflict
prevention and the promotion of durable peace and security in Africa in
1998.779 A later resolution included ‘a democratic society based on a strong
rule of law’ in a list of the biggest deterrents to violent conflict when trying to
address the root causes of conflict.780 The rule of law as a crucial component of
a strategy to address the root causes of conflict has generally been a recurring
theme in Council thematic resolutions. It has been addressed in thematic
resolutions on the strengthening of the Council’s effectiveness in conflict
prevention in Africa, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, conflict
prevention in general, the role of policing in peacekeeping and post-conflict
peacebuilding or on small arms and light weapons.781 Whereas the general
message – that the rule of law caters to the prevention of conflict – remains the
same, thematic resolutions cast a different light on the purpose of the rule of law
in the context of conflict prevention in line with their respective thematic focus.
They generally assert the value of the rule of law in confronting abstract threats
to international peace and security independently of individual conflicts.
Resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict view the rule of law
as an essential requirement of conflict prevention with a view to enhancing the
protection of civilians on a long-term basis, while the thematic resolution on
small arms and light weapons portrays rule of law activities and addressing the
root causes of conflict as necessary long-term measures to accompany short-
term measures against the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and misuse
of small arms and light weapons.782
779 UNSC Res 1170 (28May 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1170 [preamble, indent 13].
780 UNSC Res 1327 (13November 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1327 [Annex V, 1].
781 UNSC Res 1625 (14 September 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1625 [Annex, preamble, indent 6];
UNSC Res 1738 (23December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1738 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC
Res 2171 (21August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2171 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res 2185
(20November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2185 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 2220
(22May 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2220 [preamble, indent 12].
782 For resolutions on the protection of civilians see, eg, UNSC Res 1265 (17 September
1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 [preamble, indent 6]; UNSC Res 1674 (28April 2006) UN
Doc S/RES/1674 [2]; UNSC Res 1738 (23December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1738
[preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res 2222 (27May 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2222 [preamble,
indent 19]. For resolutions on small arms and light weapons, see UNSC Res 2220
(22May 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2220 [preamble, indent 12]. For background information
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
156
While most resolutions seem to focus on national rule of law measures in
order to avert the emergence of conflict, the thematic resolutions on conflict
prevention and on the role of policing in peacekeeping and post-conflict
peacebuilding additionally require the strengthening of the international rule of
law as an operational and structural measure for the prevention of armed
conflict.783
c. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
i. Rule of Law as an Element of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
Strengthening the rule of law is a central element of UN peacebuilding.784 This
is underlined, ia, by the mandates of several UN peacebuilding missions. The
mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
(UNOGBIS), for example, involved the active support of efforts of the UN
system and Guinea Bissau’s other partners, towards strengthening state
institutions and structures to enable them to uphold the rule of law.785 The UN
Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was requested to
support Sierra Leone in meeting its peacebuilding priorities, which included
strengthening the capacity of the country’s rule of law institutions.786 In
Somalia, the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission (UNSOM) involved the
provision of strategic and policy advice on the rule of law as part of its task to
support the peacebuilding and state-building process of the country.787
Nowadays, however, not only UN peacebuilding- but also UN peacekeeping
missions are tasked with rule of law activities to accomplish their strategic goals.
Traditionally, rule of law activities were not included in the mandates of UN
peacekeeping missions. Original UN peacekeeping was of a predominantly
military nature, directed at preserving peace where fighting was suspended, at
observing cease-fires and force separations as well as at assisting with the
on the respective paragraph, see UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Small Arms and
Light Weapons’ (2015) UN Doc S/2015/289 [85–90].
783 UNSC Res 2171 (21August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2171 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC
Res 2185 (20November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2185 [preamble, indent 3].
784 Brahimi Report A/55/305-S/2000/809 (n 772) [13]. See also, eg, UNSC Res 2143
(7March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2143 [preamble, indent 14] (depicting rule of law
activities as an element of strategies for peacebuilding priorities).
785 UNSC Res 1580 (22December 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1580 [2 (h)].
786 UNSC Res 2065 (12 September 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2065 [11].
787 UNSC Res 2093 (6March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2093 [22 (c)]; UNSC Res 2102 (2May
2013) UN Doc S/RES/2102 [2 (b) (ii)]; UNSC Res 2158 (29May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/
2158 [1 (b) (ii)].
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implementation of agreements achieved by peacemakers.788 During the 1990s,
however, the nature of UN peacekeeping changed to become more
multidimensional.789 Today, UN multidimensional peacekeeping also involves
political measures to resolve conflict and comprises police and civilian
capabilities directed at building peace and implementing comprehensive peace
agreements and the UN supports national authorities in the development of
peacebuilding strategies in the context of multidimensional peacekeeping.790
As a consequence, multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations can be
mandated by the Council to engage in peacebuilding tasks such as rule of law-
related activities.791 Strengthening rule of law institutions and helping national
authorities develop critical rule of law priorities is thus no longer reserved for
UN peacebuilding but can also figure in its peacekeeping agenda.792 For
example, despite being a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in the
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was required to work out a plan for UN
system support to specific peacebuilding tasks such as rule of law and justice
sector support.793
Council resolutions that invoke the rule of law imply that it caters to
several different peacekeeping and peacebuilding goals such as the restoration
and extension of state authority, the protection of civilians, the fight
against impunity, post-conflict transition, national reconciliation, or democratic
governance. As was just illustrated, a clear-cut delineation between peace-
keeping and peacebuilding goals and activities is often impossible. When
discussing the rule of law as a means to achieve various peacekeeping and
788 SG Report A/47/277-S/24111 (n 773) [15]; Brahimi Report A/55/305-S/2000/809 (n 772)
[12].
789 Brahimi Report A/55/305-S/2000/809 (n 772) [12].
790 UNDPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New
York 2008) (Capstone Doctrine) 22. See also UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/
RES/1996 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 2057 (5 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2057
[preamble, indent 13]; UNSC Res 2086 (21 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2086
[preamble, indent 11]; UNSC Res 2109 (11 July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2109 [preamble,
indent 16]; UNSC Res 2143 (7March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2143 [preamble, indent 14]
(all resolutions emphasise the vital role of the United Nations in supporting national
authorities in developing strategies for peacebuilding priorities in the context of
multidimensional peacekeeping). See also UNSC Res 2057 (5 July 2012) UN Doc S/
RES/2057 [21] and UNSC Res 2109 (11 July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2109 [29] (both
resolutions explicitly speak of the peacebuilding tasks of the UN peacekeeping mission
in South Sudan).
791 UNDPKO, Capstone Doctrine (n 790) 26.
792 ibid 25f; UNSC Res 2086 (21 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2086 [8 (c)].
793 UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996 [18]; UNSC Res 2057 (5 July 2012)
UN Doc S/RES/2057 [21].
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peacebuilding goals, the following chapters thus forgo an attribution of the
purposes served by the rule of law to either a peacekeeping or a peacebuilding
context since most of them are relevant to both fields.
ii. Restoration and Extension of State Authority
Mandates of UN peace missions imply that the Council considers the rule of law
as serving the purpose of contributing to the restoration and extension of state
authority in countries affected by conflict or crisis. Even though the restoration
and extension of state authority is considered a critical peacebuilding activity,
the Council also tasked UN peacekeeping operations with the establishment of
the rule of law in order to restore and extend state authority.794 UN peace
missions support the restoration and extension of state authority ‘by creating an
enabling security environment, providing political leadership or coordinating
the efforts of other international actors’.795 This support may ‘include efforts to
develop political participation’, ‘operational support to the immediate activities
of state institutions’, ‘small-scale capacity-building or support to larger
processes of constitutional or institutional restructuring’.796
Along these lines, MONUSCO was mandated to support the government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the consolidation of state authority
throughout the territory through the deployment of, ia, rule of law
institutions.797 Similarly in Mali, the Council required the Secretary-General to
provide support to Malian rule of law institutions in order to extend Malian state
authority.798 Accordingly, the subsequently created UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was tasked to support
national and international efforts towards the rebuilding of the Malian rule of
law and justice sectors as part of its mandate to support the re-establishment of
state authority throughout the country.799 The mandate of MINUSTAH in Haiti
to support the government’s decentralisation efforts with a view to further
enhancing the government’s ability to extend state authority can most likely be
added to this category, considering that the government’s decentralisation
efforts aimed, ia, at building institutional capacity in the rule of law.800
794 UNDPKO, Capstone Doctrine (n 790) 26.
795 ibid 27 f.
796 ibid 28.
797 UNSC Res 1925 (28May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1925 [6 (iii)]; UNSC Res 1991 (28 June
2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991 [4 (c)]; UNSC Res 2053 (27 June 2012) UN Doc S/RES/
2053 [4 (c)].
798 UNSC Res 2085 (20December 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2085 [12].
799 UNSC Res 2100 (25April 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2100 [16 (a) (iii)]; UNSC Res 2164
(25 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2164 [13 (c) (ii)].
800 UNSC Res 2070 (12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [7].
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iii. Protection of Civilians
The rule of law figures as an important parameter in Council resolutions
recommending or deciding on the requirements of an effective protection of
civilians. Thematic resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict
portray the promotion of the rule of law as a necessary measure to address the
causes of armed conflict in order to enhance the protection of civilians on a
long-term basis.801 The re-establishment of the rule of law was also listed
among the specific measures for the protection of civilians that should be
included by conflict parties in peace processes and agreements as well as in
post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning.802
Against this backdrop, UN peace operations are mandated by the Council to
support the development of the rule of law in order to enhance and strengthen
the protection of civilians under threat, in line with the basic tenet that
‘unarmed strategies must be at the forefront of United Nations efforts to protect
civilians’.803 In this vein, eg, the Council required UNOCI to support the Ivorian
parties in implementing the recommendations of the Working Group on
Children and Armed Conflict, notably to ensure that the rule of law be
strengthened.804
It also called on national governments to strengthen their rule of law
institutions and structures in order to ensure the protection of civilians. For
example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council repeatedly
encouraged, urged and called upon the government to establish and later
consolidate the rule of law in order to protect the civilian population which
involved, ia, the deployment of an accountable civil administration, in
particular the police, judiciary, prison and territorial administration.805
801 UNSC Res 1265 (17 September 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1265 [preamble, indent 6]; UNSC
Res 1738 (23December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1738 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res
2222 (27May 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2222 [preamble, indent 19].
802 UNSC Res 1674 (28April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674 [11].
803 Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our
Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People (2015) UN Doc A/70/95–S/
2015/446 [86].
804 UNSC Res 1933 (30 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1933 [13].
805 UNSC Res 1991 (28 June 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1991 [2]; UNSC Res 2053 (27 June
2012) UN Doc S/RES/2053 [3]; UNSC Res 2098 (28March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098
[preamble, indent 24]; UNSC Res 2147 (28March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147
[preamble, indent 28] (here, the wording changed to ‘the consolidation of the rule of
law’ from the previous ‘the establishment of the rule of law’, allegedly reflecting the
progress in the re-establishment of the rule of law); UNSC Res 2211 (26March 2015)
UN Doc S/RES/2211 [16]; UNSC Res 2277 (30March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2277 [2];
UNSC Res 2348 (31March 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2348 [21].
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iv. Fighting Impunity
In its thematic resolution on the role of multidimensional peacekeeping missions,
the Council identified the strengthening of rule of law institutions as a vital
contribution to ending impunity and thus included it in its list of possible tasks
of UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions.806 In this spirit, the Council
mandated UNMIS in Sudan to assist the parties to the Comprehensive- and
Darfur Peace Agreements in promoting the rule of law with the aim to, ia,
combat impunity.807 Far more concrete, the mandate of the UN Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to support the
strengthening of the rule of law included assistance in the investigation of
human rights violations and the publishing of its findings, with a view to putting
an end to impunity.808
v. Post-Conflict Transition
In its resolutions on the situation in Liberia, the Council emphasised repeatedly
that the consolidation of Liberia’s post-conflict transition required the extension
of the rule of law throughout the country and eventually called on the UN
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to enhance its support for rule of law reforms
with a view to contributing to a sustainable transition planning process.809
With a slightly different focus but ultimately also underlining the crucial
role assigned to the rule of law in the facilitation of a sustainable post-conflict
transition, the Council reiterated the need that the transitional period in Libya
be underpinned by a commitment to the rule of law in several of its resolutions
dealing with the country.810 The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was
consequently established in order to, ia, support Libyan efforts to promote the
rule of law which involved ‘supporting the development and implementation of
806 UNSC Res 2086 (21 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2086 [8 (c)].
807 UNSC Res 1590 (24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590 [4 (a) (viii)]; UNSC Res 1706
(31August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706 [8 (k)].
808 UNSC Res 1756 (15May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1756 [3 (c)]; UNSC Res 1856
(22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1856 [4 (c)].
809 UNSC Res 1750 (30March 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1750 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res
1777 (20 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1777 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res 1836
(29 September 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1836 [preamble, indent 11]; UNSC Res 2066
(17 September 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2066 [8].
810 UNSC Res 2009 (16 September 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2009 [2]; UNSC Res 2016
(27October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2016 [2]; UNSC Res 2040 (12March 2012) UN Doc
S/RES/2040 [2]; UNSC Res 2095 (14March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2095 [2]; UNSC Res
2144 (14March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2144 [1].
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a comprehensive transitional justice strategy’ and evolved later to supporting the
full implementation of Libya’s transitional justice law.811
vi. National Reconciliation
The Council pointed out repeatedly that it considers the rule of a law to
contribute to national reconciliation. National reconciliation refers to a process
of reconciling societies that have been divided by the political dynamics of a
conflict into various internal, national or international factions.812
Council resolutions on the situation in Guinea-Bissau reaffirmed that the
government and all stakeholders must remain committed to national
reconciliation, which is achieved, ia, through the promotion of the rule of
law.813 The Council also repeatedly recognised that sustainable progress on the
rule of law and national reconciliation in Haiti are mutually reinforcing,
underpinning its position that the rule of law contributes to or is at least
connected to the achievement of national reconciliation.814 The Council also
emphasised the connection between the rule of law and national reconciliation
in its resolutions on the situation in Libya. In this context, however, it rather
811 UNSC Res 2040 (12March 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2040 [6 (b)]; UNSC Res 2095
(14March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2095 [7 (b)]; UNSC Res 2144 (14March 2014) UN
Doc S/RES/2144 [6 (b)].
812 UNGA, International Year of Reconciliation, 2009, UNGA Res 61/17 (23 January 2007)
UN Doc A/RES/61/17 [preamble, indent 2] (‘Recognizing that reconciliation processes
are particularly necessary and urgent in countries and regions of the world which have
suffered or are suffering situations of conflict that have affected and divided societies in
their various internal, national and international facets’). On the lack of an established
definition of the concept of reconciliation see, eg, Tamar Hermann, ‘Reconciliation:
Reflections on the Theoretical and Practical Utility of the Term’ in Yaacov Bar-Siman-
Tov (ed), From Conflict to Reconciliation (OUP 2004) 37, 41–49 or Pierre Hazan,
‘Reconciliation’ in Chetail Vincent (ed), Post-conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (OUP
2009) 256, 259–261.
813 UNSC Res 1949 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1949 [preamble, indent 6]; UNSC
Res 2030 (21December 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2030 [preamble, indent 5].
814 UNSC Res 1743 (15 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1743 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC
Res 1780 (15October 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1780 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC Res
1840 (14October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1840 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 1892
(13October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1892 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 1944
(14October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1944 [preamble, indent 11]; UNSC Res 2012
(14October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2012 [preamble, indent 13]; UNSC Res 2070
(12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [preamble, indent 20]; UNSC Res 2119
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [preamble, indent 16]; UNSC Res 2180
(14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2180 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 2243
(14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [preamble, indent 10]; UNSC Res 2313
(13October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2313 [preamble, indent 17].
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seemed to enumerate the two goals as independent prerequisites of achieving a
sustainable transitional period in the country.815 Nonetheless, UNSMIL was
mandated by the Council to support Libyan efforts to promote the rule of law,
which explicitly included the provision of assistance towards national
reconciliation.816 In a similar vein, MONUC was mandated to strengthen
democratic institutions and the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and, to that end, promote national reconciliation.817
Whereas fostering national reconciliation is a typical element of
peacebuilding as was the case in Guinea-Bissau and Libya, its achievement can
also figure in a peacekeeping context as it did in the cases of Haiti and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.818 Fostering national reconciliation aims at
achieving sustainable peace and was thus identified by the High-level
Independent Panel on Peace Operations as a crucial element of the mandates of
UN peace operations.819 The purpose of the rule of law to contribute to national
reconciliation is thus ultimately directed at serving the attainment and
consolidation of peace, security and stability.
vii. Elections and Democratic Governance
Council resolutions have emphasised the crucial role of the rule of law in
creating the necessary conditions for successful elections and in fostering
democratic governance. In order to support the Burundian government in
achieving democratic governance in the country, BINUB was tasked by the
Council to consolidate the rule of law, which required in particular the
strengthening of the justice and corrections system, including the independence
and capacity of the judiciary.820
815 UNSC Res 2016 (27October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2016 [preamble, indent 4; 2]; UNSC
Res 2040 (12March 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2040 [preamble, indent 4; 2]; UNSC Res
2095 (14March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2095 [preamble, indent 4; 2]; UNSC Res 2144
(14March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2144 [preamble, indent 4; 1].
816 UNSC Res 2040 (12March 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2040 [6 (b)]; UNSC Res 2095
(14March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2095 [7 (b)].
817 UNSC Res 1756 (15May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1756 [3 (b)]; UNSC Res 1856
(22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1856 [4 (b)].
818 Christian Schaller, ‘Towards an International Legal Framework for Post-conflict
Peacebuilding’ (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 2009)
9; UNDPKO, Capstone Doctrine (n 790) 24.
819 Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations A/70/95–S/2015/446
(n 803) [160]. See also UNGA, International Year of Reconciliation, 2009, UNGA
Res 61/17 (23 January 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/17 [preamble, indent 7] (qualifying
reconciliation processes as ‘necessary to and a condition for the establishment of firm
and lasting peace’).
820 UNSC Res 1719 (25October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719 [2 (d)].
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In a resolution dealing, ia, with the run-up to the next electoral cycle in the
Central African Republic, the Council urged the government to ensure that the
rule of law be fully respected, which it described as ‘essential for
democracy’.821 Invoking the other side of the coin, the Council repeatedly
underlined the importance of elections for the establishment and later
promotion of the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.822
MONUC’s mandate to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and
the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo consequently involved
providing advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at the
national, provincial, regional and local levels, assistance to the Congolese
authorities in the organisation, preparation and conduct of local elections and
the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment for the holding of free
and transparent elections.823
3. Preventing and Fighting Crime
The third purpose that Council resolutions can be considered to ascribe to the
rule of law, is to serve the effective prevention of and fight against crimes that
constitute or contribute to the emergence of a threat to international peace and
security or are committed in the context of armed conflict. Here again, the
prevention of and fight against crime is a crucial element of the Council’s
general endeavour to maintain peace, security and stability and the rule of law
ultimately caters to this overarching goal. Resolutions highlighting the
important role of the rule of law in this context were issued in response to
terrorism, piracy, sexual violence in conflict or the illicit transfer, accumulation
and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The following section will discuss
these linkages in more detail.
821 UNSC Res 2031 (21December 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2031 [5].
822 UNSC Res 1621 (6 September 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1621 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC
Res 1635 (28October 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1635 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 1649
(21December 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1649 [preamble, indent 2]; UNSC Res 1671
(25April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1671 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 1693 (30 June
2006) UN Doc S/RES/1693 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 1711 (29 September 2006)
UN Doc S/RES/1711 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC Res 1756 (15May 2007) UN Doc S/
RES/1756 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 1794 (21December 2007) UN Doc S/RES/
1794 [preamble, indent 19]; UNSC Res 1797 (20 January 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1797
[30 January 2008) [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 1906 (23December 2009) UN Doc
S/RES/1906 [preamble, indent 13]; UNSC Res 1925 (28May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/
1925 [preamble, indent 10].
823 UNSC Res 1756 (15May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1756 [3 (a) (d) (e)]; UNSC Res 1856
(22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1856 [4 (a) (d) (e)].
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a. Terrorism
The need to respect the rule of law as an essential requirement of a successful
counter-terrorism effort was highlighted by several Council resolutions.824
Council resolutions containing counter-terrorism measures present the rule of
law as serving a crucial purpose in the context of counter-terrorism efforts after
the commission of terrorist acts as well as in preventing them. Remarkably, the
Council consistently emphasises the rule of law’s function in enhancing the
effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures, which might be counter-intuitive at
first sight from a perspective of efficient intelligence- or law enforcement
operations to curb terrorist threats.825 The position, however, may be read as
suggesting that respect for the rule of law will cater to the legitimacy of
counter-terrorism measures and thus eventually enhance their effectiveness.
This connection is often emphasised with respect to the Council’s listing
procedure regarding sanctions against alleged terrorists whose efficiency
proved to be hampered by challenges in national and regional courts of UN
member states due to their encroachments upon human rights guarantees.826
An alternative reading could relate to the Council’s repeated finding that a
failure of member states to comply with their obligations under international
law when countering terrorism, in particular international human rights-,
824 UNSC Res 2129 (17December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2129 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC
Res 2170 (15August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2170 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 2178
(24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2214
(27March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2214 [6]. The same wording was used in previous
resolutions but restricted to respect for human rights. See UNSC Res 1963 (20December
2010) UN Doc S/RES/1963 [10].
825 UNSC Res 1963 (20December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1963 [10]; UNSC Res 2129
(17December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2129 [preamble, indent 5; 21]; UNSC Res 2178
(24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2214
(27March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2214 [6].
826 See, eg, Bianchi (n 462) 904f (anticipating challenges before domestic courts);
Chesterman, ‘‘I’ll Take Manhattan’’ (n 16) 71–73; Proposal to the United Nations
Security Council by the Group of Like-Minded States on Targeted Sanctions: Fair and
Clear Procedures for a More Effective UN Sanctions System (New York, 12November
2015) ‹http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/contentblob/4662362/Daten/6041651/151112
fairclearproceduressanctions.pdf› accessed 14 July 2017; Veronika Fikfak, ‘Judicial
Strategies and their Impact on the Development of the International Rule of Law’ in
Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the National and
International Levels: Contestations and Deference (Hart Publishing 2016) 45, 53 f.
For an overview of targeted sanctions regimes and national and regional case law
challenging them see, eg, Farrall, United Nations Sanctions (n 16); Thomas Biersteker,
‘Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human Rights’ (2009-10) 65 Int’l J. 99-117; Monika
Heupel, ‘Multilateral Sanctions against Terror Suspects and the Violation of Due Process
Standards’ (2009) 85 Int’l Aff. 307–321; Kanetake (n 385) 267.
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refugee- and humanitarian law, including those flowing from the UN Charter, is
one of the factors contributing to an increased radicalisation and thus eventually
to terrorism.827 The latter finding also underlines that respect for the rule of law
has preventive effects with regard to the emergence of terrorist threats. This
seems to be confirmed by several resolutions explicitly noting the importance
of respect for the rule of law to effectively prevent terrorism.828 Also
resolutions on the extension of the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) describe the promotion of the rule of
law as a measure to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,
thus indicating that respect for the rule of law may work against the emergence
of terrorist threats.829
Respect for the rule of law is also considered crucial with regard to measures
taken after the commission of terrorist acts. The Council, thus, repeatedly
encouraged the CTED to further develop its activities in the area of rule of law
and counter-terrorism and to ensure that all human rights and rule of law issues
relevant to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) be
addressed.830 To the extent that these resolutions do not only contain measures
of a preventive nature but also measures addressing the situation after a terrorist
act was (sometimes only allegedly) committed, the Council’s encouragement
can be read to emphasise the importance of the rule of law also with regard to
non-preventive counter-terrorism efforts.
Several resolutions shed light on what the Council might be referring to
when speaking of respect for the rule of law in the context of counter-terrorism.
Many paragraphs highlighting the importance of respect for the rule of law to
effectively prevent and combat terrorism also reaffirm that member states must
ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their
obligations under international law, in particular international human rights-,
827 UNSC Res 2178 (24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC
Res 2214 (27March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2214 [6].
828 UNSC Res 2129 (17December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2129 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC
Res 2170 (15August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2170 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 2178
(24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2214
(27March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2214 [6].
829 UNSC Res 1963 (20December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1963 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC
Res 2129 (17December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2129 [preamble, indent 3].
830 UNSC Res 2129 (17December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2129 [21]; UNSC Res 1963
(20December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1963 [10] (also encouraging the CTED to further
develop its activities regarding rule of law and counter-terrorism but only asking it to
ensure that all human rights issues are addressed when implementing resolutions 1373
(2001) and 1624 (2005)).
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refugee-, and humanitarian law.831 Considering the implied connection, respect
for the rule of law in the context of counter-terrorism may thus be understood as
to invoke the rule of international law, emphasising the aspect of the
international rule of law that relates to the compliance of international legal
subjects with their international law obligations.832 The above-mentioned
encouragement directed at the CTED to ensure that all human rights and rule of
law issues relevant to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624
(2005) be addressed, further underlines the Council’s focus on the international
rule of law: It requests one of its subsidiary organs to ensure that member states
respect their international obligations under human rights-, refugee- and
humanitarian law and all relevant rule of law issues when implementing the
respective counter-terrorism resolutions.833
831 UNSC Res 2129 (17December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2129 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC
Res 2170 (15August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2170 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 2178
(24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2214
(27March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2214 [6]. The reference to UN member states’
international law obligations in countering terrorism was originally not contained in
paragraphs also highlighting the necessity to respect the rule of law, see UNSC Res 1535
(26March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1535 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC Res 1566 (8October
2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566 [preamble, indent 6]; UNSC Res 1624 (14 September 2005)
UN Doc S/RES/1624 [preamble, indent 2; 4]; UNSC Res 1787 (10December 2007) UN
Doc S/RES/1787 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC Res 1805 (20March 2008) UN Doc S/
RES/1805 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 1963 (20December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/
1963 [preamble, indent 13]. See also, Annex of the Letter dated 17August 2011 from
the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373
(2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the Secretary-General (1 September
2011) UN Doc S/2011/463 [281, 286] (specifying that ‘while it is true that human rights
law affords some flexibility in addressing security challenges, States must respect certain
core principles in all circumstances, including the principles of necessity, proportionality,
legality and non-discrimination (. . .) States are also obliged at all times to respect rights
that are non-derogable under international law or that have attained the status of jus
cogens, such as the right of all persons to be free from torture and the prohibition against
enforced disappearances’. Since ‘[c]ounter-terrorism measures in some States take place
in the context of armed conflict’, they raise ‘questions of compliance with international
humanitarian law. The use of deadly force in such situations must respect the principle of
distinction and proportionality, and violations should be subject to accountability’).
832 See, eg, Ian Hurd, ‘Three Models of the International Rule of Law’ (2015) 23 Revista de
Filosofía de la Universidad del Norte 37, 39–41 or – for a similar argument – Beaulac
(n 385) 206 f.
833 UNSC Res 2129 (17December 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2129 [21]; UNSC Res 1963
(20December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1963 [10]. See Security Council Committee
established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-Terrorism (ed),
Conclusions for Policy Guidance regarding Human Rights and the CTC (25May 2006)
UN Doc S/AC.40/2006/PG.2 and the recommendations to Member States, the CTC and
CTED contained in the Annex of the Letter dated 17August 2011 from the Chair of the
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In light of the fact that terrorist acts are qualified as threats to international
peace and security, the rule of law employed as a means to curb such threats,
again ultimately serves the purpose of facilitating the maintenance of
international peace and security.834
b. Piracy
Council resolutions on the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia have repeatedly emphasised that respect for the rule of law is
necessary to create the conditions for a full and durable eradication of piracy
and armed robbery.835 The abstract nature of this phrase makes it difficult to
assess what role exactly the Council ascribes to the rule of law in the fight
against piracy in Somalia. One possible interpretation could be that the phrase,
which is found in most Council resolutions on piracy and armed robbery off the
coast of Somalia, is linked to the lacking law enforcement capacity of the
Somali government to effectively control its territory and sea in order to
prevent and combat piracy.836 The Secretary-General planned to address this
lack of law enforcement power, ia, by assisting the ‘Transitional Federal
Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia in developing
and coordinating a coherent strategy to build Somalia’s Transitional Security
Forces and Police, rule of law and correctional facilities’.837 He specified in a
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning
counter-terrorism addressed to the Secretary-General (1 September 2011) UN Doc S/
2011/463 [289].
834 See, eg, UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373 [preamble, indent
3]; UNSC Res 1566 (8October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC
Res 1904 (17December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1904 [preamble, indent 2]; UNSC Res
1963 (20December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1963 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 2178
(24 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2178; UNSC Res 2253 (17December 2015) UN
Doc S/RES/2253 [preamble, indents 2 & 3].
835 UNSC Res 1838 (7October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1838 [preamble, indent 11]; UNSC
Res 1846 (2December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 [preamble, indent 10]; UNSC Res
1897 (30November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897 [preamble, indent 13]; UNSC Res 1918
(27April 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1918 [preamble, indent 16]; UNSC Res 1950
(23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1950 [preamble, indent 19]; UNSC Res 2020
(22November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020 [preamble, indent 25]; UNSC Res 2077
(21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077 [preamble, indent 26]; UNSC Res 2125
(18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [preamble, indent 30]; UNSC Res 2184
(12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [preamble, indent 28]; UNSC Res 2246
(10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [preamble, indent 31]; UNSC Res 2316
(9November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2316 [preamble, indent 31].
836 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008)’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/146 [48].
837 ibid (emphasis added).
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subsequent report that long-term as well as short-term measures to combat
piracy and armed robbery required an integrated approach, which includes the
further development of rule of law institutions.838 In the same report, the
Secretary-General also observed that ‘it will be crucial for the Somali
authorities to continue to re-establish (. . .) the rule of law (. . .) in order to
address the root causes of piracy and armed robbery’ and that ‘there is a need
for the authorities to demonstrate the political will to counter piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia by establishing an effective law
enforcement and independent justice system’.839 These paragraphs might
support a reading of the reference to the necessity to respect the rule of law as
to invoke a need to re-establish rule of law structures and institutions in the
Somali state in order to be capable to address the regional piracy threat. Such a
reading is further underpinned by the fact that all paragraphs in Council
resolutions referring to the rule of law as a requirement to eradicate piracy, also
count the strengthening of state institutions among the necessary factors to
achieve this goal. The Council’s request for assistance to the Transitional
Federal Government and regional authorities in Somalia ‘in establishing a
system of governance, rule of law and police control in lawless areas where
land-based activities related to piracy’ are taking place, further supports this
reading.840 Council resolutions on the African Union Mission (AMISOM) or
UNSOM in Somalia also highlight the necessity to re-establish and strengthen
Somali security- and rule of law institutions.841 Congruously, UNSOM was
mandated to provide strategic policy advice on the rule of law, including police,
justice and corrections.842 Several Secretary-General reports further support this
838 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008)’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/590 [87].
839 SG Report S/2009/590 (n 838) [92]. See also para 95 of the same report, which holds ‘that
the only sustainable solution will be effective governance, the establishment of the rule of
law and security institutions and the creation of alternative livelihoods in Somalia for
stable and inclusive economic growth’ (emphasis added).
840 UNSC Res 1976 (11April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1976 [4].
841 UNSC Res 1863 (16 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1863 [22, 24]; UNSC Res 1872
(26May 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1872 [10]; UNSC Res 1910 (28 January 2010) UN Doc
S/RES/1910 [12]; UNSC Res 1964 (22December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1964 [12];
UNSC Res 2010 (30 September 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2010 [16]; UNSC Res 2067
(18 September 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2067 [5; 11]; UNSC Res 2093 (6March 2013) UN
Doc S/RES/2093 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC Res 2124 (12November 2013) UN Doc S/
RES/2124 [25]; UNSC Res 2232 (28 July 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2232 [19]; UNSC Res
2275 (24March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2275 [preamble, indent 9].
842 UNSC Res 2093 (6March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2093 [22 (c)]; UNSC Res 2102 (2May
2013) UN Doc S/RES/2102 [2 (b) (ii)]; UNSC Res 2158 (29May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/
2158 [1 (b) (ii)].
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view and the Council’s observation that the ‘continuing limited capacity and
domestic legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected
pirates after their capture has hindered more robust international action against
the pirates off the coast of Somalia’ also ties in with this reading.843
843 For Secretary-General reports supporting this view, see UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1897
(2009)’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/556 [67] (‘As I have said previously, acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia are a symptom of the instability and lack
of rule of law in Somalia. The Transitional Federal Government is attempting to
establish its governance structures and the rule of law, including through the
development of the security and justice sectors’); UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2020
(2011)’ (2012) UN Doc S/2012/783 [75] (‘A significant gap still exists in land-based
programmes in Somalia to address piracy. This is primarily owing to the lack of security
on the ground and lack of sufficient funding to support capacity-building and alternative
livelihoods. An ever-greater emphasis must now be placed on providing focused
assistance to States in the region and to authorities in Somalia to build their capacity to
deal with the institutional and operational challenges to governance, the rule of law,
maritime law enforcement and security, and economic growth. In addition, counter-
piracy actions should run alongside a concerted effort to rebuild the civil structures and
institutions of Somalia in close cooperation with the Somali authorities and civil
society’); UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of
Somalia’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/623 [71] (‘The resilience of pirates points to the main
challenge: the onshore rule of law and governance vacuum in which they operate. As the
number of pirate attacks decreases and as the international community shows renewed
commitment to supporting State-building and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia, now is
the opportunity to undertake long-term and sustainable efforts to repress piracy,
including the construction of viable and accountable Somali State structures, the re-
establishment of responsive law enforcement capabilities both at sea and onshore.’);
UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the
Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia’
(2014) UN Doc S/2014/740 [23] (‘The Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States
Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, chaired by the Department of Political
Affairs of the Secretariat, continues to provide financial assistance to strengthen the rule
of law and the judicial and correctional capacity of States in the region to combat
impunity of pirates. It also supports other activities relating to implementing the Contact
Group’s objective of addressing piracy in all its aspects. Priority is generally accorded to
projects that improve prison and judicial systems, strengthen the rule of law through
training and capacity-building and reform the legislative framework in Somalia and the
States in the region’); UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast
of Somalia’ (2015) UN Doc S/2015/776 [57; 66] (‘I call upon the international
community to increase its support to Somali efforts in the areas of governance, the rule
of law and economic development to tackle the root causes of piracy off the coast of
Somalia. (. . .) The activities to support development, governance and the rule of law in
Somalia are the final “hard laps” that must be run if we are to secure sustained victory
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Another possible interpretation of the phrase correlates closely with the
position taken by the Council with regard to the fight against terrorism: The
invocation of the rule of law relates to the requirement that all measures aimed
at preventing and combatting piracy and armed robbery are supposed to respect
the rule of law. If respect for the rule of law is understood to refer to the
compliance of states with obligations under international law while countering
piracy, Council resolutions on piracy in Somalia could be read to support such
an interpretation as they contain manifold calls on states to act in accordance
with international human rights law.
The Council, eg, repeatedly called on member states and the Somali
authorities to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan,
facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery and that all
such measures should be consistent with applicable international human rights
law.844 More concretely, it required that investigations directed at persons
suspected of acts of piracy and armed robbery, including their incitement or
facilitation, be consistent with international human rights law.845 Even more
persistently the Council required that the prosecution of suspected pirates and of
those inciting, facilitating or financing their acts, be consistent with applicable
international human rights law or commended efforts undertaken in this
against piracy. Only through such efforts can we reach the bedrock that will underpin the
elimination of piracy as a threat, namely, a peaceful and stable Somalia’). For the cited
resolution text see, UNSC Res 1897 (30November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897
[preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 1950 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1950
[preamble, indent 11]; UNSC Res 2020 (22November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020
[preamble, indent 13]; UNSC Res 2077 (21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077
[preamble, indent 14]; UNSC Res 2125 (18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125
[preamble, indent 19]; UNSC Res 2184 (12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184
[preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res 2246 (10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246
[preamble, indent 8].
844 UNSC Res 1897 (30November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897 [11]; UNSC Res 1950
(23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1950 [11]; UNSC Res 2020 (22November 2011)
UN Doc S/RES/2020 [13]; UNSC Res 2077 (21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077
[16]; UNSC Res 2125 (18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [7]; UNSC Res 2184
(12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [7]; UNSC Res 2246 (10November 2015)
UN Doc S/RES/2246 [7] (emphasis added).
845 UNSC Res 1846 (2December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 [14]; UNSC Res 1897
(30November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897 [12]; UNSC Res 1950 (23November 2010)
UN Doc S/RES/1950 [12]; UNSC Res 2020 (22November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020
[14]; UNSC Res 2077 (21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077 [17]; UNSC Res 2125
(18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [preamble, indent 28; 16]; UNSC Res 2184
(12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [preamble, indent 26; 17]; UNSC Res 2246
(10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [preamble, indent 29; 18] (emphasis added).
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regard.846 Finally, the Council emphasised at various occasions that it also
expects the imprisonment of convicted pirates to be consistent with international
human rights law as well as their repatriation back to Somalia under suitable
prisoner transfer arrangements.847 This reading could again be supported by the
fact that all paragraphs referring to the rule of law as a requirement to eradicate
piracy also call for respect of human rights in pursuing this objective.848
The Council did not qualify piracy as a threat to international peace and
security. It rather determined that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery
against vessels in the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the
coast of Somalia exacerbate the situation in Somalia, which it considered to
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.849 To the
846 UNSC Res 1846 (2December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 [14]; UNSC Res 1897
(30November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897 [preamble, indents 8 & 9; 12]; UNSC Res
1918 (27April 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1918 [preamble, indents 6 & 13; 2]; UNSC Res
1950 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1950 [preamble, indent 13; 12; 13]; UNSC
Res 2020 (22November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020 [14; 15]; UNSC Res 2077
(21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077 [preamble, indent 18; 17; 18]; UNSC Res
2125 (18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [preamble, indents 23 & 28; 16; 17; 19];
UNSC Res 2184 (12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [preamble, indents 21 & 26;
17; 18]; UNSCRes 2246 (10November 2015) UNDoc S/RES/2246 [preamble, indents 21
& 29; 18; 19; 20] (emphasis added).
847 UNSC Res 1897 (30November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897 [preamble, indents 8, 9 &
11]; UNSC Res 1918 (27April 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1918 [preamble, indent 6; 2];
UNSC Res 1950 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1950 [preamble, indents 13, 14 &
17; 13]; UNSC Res 2020 (22November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020 [preamble, indent
23; 15]; UNSC Res 2077 (21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077 [preamble, indents
18, 19 & 24; 18]; UNSC Res 2125 (18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [preamble,
indents 23 & 28; 19]; UNSC Res 2184 (12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184
[preamble, indent 21, 22 & 26; 18]; UNSC Res 2246 (10November 2015) UN Doc S/
RES/2246 [preamble, indents 21 & 29; 19; 20] (emphasis added).
848 With regard to a possible derogation from derogable human rights law in accordance with
art 103 UN Charter when states exercise enforcement powers based on chapter VII in
detaining, transferring or prosecuting suspected pirates, some authors interpret the
reference to international human rights law in Council resolutions on piracy as a clear
sign that the Council did not intend to authorise derogations from human rights law. See,
Anna Petrig, Human Rights and Law Enforcement at Sea: Arrest, Detention and Transfer
of Piracy Suspects (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 146f (citing Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Counter-Piracy
Law Enforcement and Human Rights’ (2010) 59 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 141, 152).
849 UNSCRes 1816 (2 June 2008) UNDoc S/RES/1816 [preamble, indent 12]; UNSCRes 1838
(7October 2008) UNDoc S/RES/1838 [preamble, indent 12]; UNSC Res 1846 (2December
2008) UNDoc S/RES/1846 [preamble, indent 14]; UNSCRes 1851 (16December 2008) UN
Doc S/RES/1851 [preamble, indent 11]; UNSC Res 1897 (30November 2009) UN Doc S/
RES/1897 [preamble, indent 14]; UNSC Res 1950 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/
1950 [preamble, indent 20]; UNSC Res 1976 (11April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1976
[preamble, indent 18]; UNSC Res 2015 (24October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2015 [preamble,
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extent that the rule of law shall cater to the eradication of piracy, however, it is
ultimately one of the elements the Council considers necessary to address the
security threat posed by the situation in Somalia.
c. Sexual Violence in Conflict
The rule of law is portrayed in Council resolutions as a crucial factor in
addressing the occurrence of sexual violence in the context of conflict. Council
resolution 1888 (2009) called upon the Secretary-General to identify and take
appropriate measures to deploy rapidly a team of experts to situations of
particular concern with respect to sexual violence in armed conflict in order to
assist national authorities to strengthen the rule of law.850 The said resolution
brought into being the Office of the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict and
the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict.851
The Council repeatedly emphasised the importance of deploying the team of
experts to situations of particular concern with respect to sexual violence in
order to assist national authorities to strengthen the rule of law and encouraged
concerned member states to draw upon its experience also in assisting with the
strengthening of civilian and military justice systems.852 Since its inauguration,
the team has been employed to several conflicts and assisted, ia, in creating a
rapid response unit of trained gendarmes and police officers to improve
investigations of sexual violence in the Central African Republic, in drafting a
law on access to justice for victims of sexual violence in Colombia, in revising
a rape- and sexual violence bill in Somaliland or in drafting a law on
the protection of victims and witnesses in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.853 Additionally, the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict received
indent 17]; UNSC Res 2020 (22November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020 [preamble, indent
27]; UNSC Res 2077 (21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077 [preamble, indent 29]. For
the claim that the securitisation of piracy off the coast of Somalia was not connected to the
state failure of Somalia but rather to concerns of Western states with regard to oil supplies,
commercial fishery or a possible collaboration between pirates and Al-Shabaab, see Peter
Lehr, ‘Security Council Resolutions on Somali Piracy’ in Vesselin Popovski and Trudy Fraser
(eds), The Security Council as Global Legislator (Routledge 2014) 143, 153 f.
850 UNSC Res 1888 (30 September 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1888 [8].
851 ibid [4, 8]; Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict (ed),
Progress Report January – May 2011 (New York 2011) [1].
852 UNSC Res 1960 (16December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1960 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC
Res 2106 (24 June 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2106 [18].
853 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Conflict-related Sexual Violence’ (2015) UN
Doc S/2015/203 [93]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organizations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of Congo’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/233 [46]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/27 [66].
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high-level commitments from the governments of the Central African Republic,
Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Somalia and
South Sudan to ensure accountability for sexual crimes and collaborated with
Security Council sanctions committees regarding sanctions against individuals
involved in the perpetration of sex crimes. These measures also have to be read
in the context of UN rule of law activities to address sexual violence.854
Beyond these special measures to strengthen the rule of law in order to curb
the occurrence of sexual violence in the context of conflict, this task can also
be part of a UN peace operation’s mandate. The Council, for example,
required UNOCI to support Ivorian parties in ensuring that the rule of law
be strengthened in order to address sexual violence against women and
children.855 In Burundi, the Council urged the government to adhere to the rule
of law and hold accountable all those responsible for crimes involving violations
of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights,
including those involving sexual violence.856 More generally, the Council
stressed that trafficking in persons – a crime closely related to institutionalised
sexual violence – undermines the rule of law.857
Taking into account the assessment that sexual violence in conflict has far
reaching implications for efforts to consolidate peace, the Council’s ambition to
fight sexual crime in the context of conflict also qualifies as a sub-category of its
overarching goal to maintain international peace and security and the rule of law
serves this objective.858
d. Small Arms and Light Weapons
Lastly, Council resolutions suggest that the strengthening of the rule of law
contributes to the mitigation or eradication of security threats connected to
small arms and light weapons. In its thematic resolution on small arms and
854 SG Report A/70/206 (n 408) [31].
855 UNSC Res 1933 (30 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1933 [13] (the paragraph also required
that ‘all reported abuses are investigated and those responsible for such violations be
brought to justice’, which might be read as a substantiation of the requirement to
strengthen the rule of law).
856 UNSC Res 2303 (29 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2303 [2].
857 UNSC Res 2331 (20December 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2331 [1].
858 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1820’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/362 [6] (holding that
‘conflict environments, characterized by a breakdown in the rule of law and a prevailing
climate of impunity, create the conditions whereby parties, State and non-State alike,
emboldened by their weapons, power and status, essentially enjoy free reign to inflict
sexual violence, with far reaching implications for efforts to consolidate peace and
secure development’).
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light weapons, the Council held that efforts of the United Nations aimed at
addressing the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and misuse of small
arms and light weapons should be part of a comprehensive and integrated
approach that incorporates and strengthens coherence between political-,
security-, development-, human rights- and rule of law activities.859
The position that a strengthened rule of law is key to tackling the illegal use,
trade or circulation of small arms and light weapons is backed by the
observation that a weak rule of law often coincides with a lacking capacity of
state governments to control the circulation, trade or use of small arms and
light weapons. Somalia, eg, was incapable of monitoring and enforcing the
arms embargo established against it due to the insufficient capacity of its
authorities and thus lacked control over the illicit circulation of small arms and
light weapons across its borders.860 Consequently, a UN rule of law- and
security programme was tasked to strengthen the capacity of Somali authorities
in order to support the management of and report on arms imported into the
country.861 To address such weaknesses, ‘the United Nations, often supported
by the global focal point for the police, justice and corrections, provides
support to strengthen the effectiveness and accountability of institutions in such
areas to uphold the rule of law’.862
The Council’s reiteration that it may mandate UN peacekeeping operations
and special political missions to assist host governments in capacity-building in
order ‘to address the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons,
including inter alia through (. . .) strengthening judicial institutions, policing
and other law enforcement capacities’ is to be read in this light.863
Taking into account that access to illicit weapons by armed groups and
civilians in post-conflict situations is viewed as contributing to the risk of
relapsing into conflict and as diminishing the chances of achieving sustainable
peace, the rule of law as a means to address the illicit use, trade or circulation
of small arms and light weapons ultimately serves the goal of ensuring peace,
security and stability.864
859 UNSC Res 2220 (22May 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2220 [preamble, indent 12].
860 SG Report S/2015/289 (n 782) [62].
861 ibid.
862 ibid [86].
863 UNSC Res 2117 (26 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2117 [5]; UNSC Res 2185
(20November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2185 [25]; UNSC Res 2195 (19December 2014)
UN Doc S/RES/2195 [18].
864 SG Report S/2015/289 (n 782) [87].
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D. Analysis
From an analysis of the circumstances that have triggered Council references to
the rule of law, four main observations emerge. Firstly, the Council has invoked
the rule of law primarily in country-specific rather than thematic resolutions
allowing for inferences with regard to the principle’s political and normative
standing among Council members. Secondly, most invocations of the rule of
law pertain to its function in the national realm rather than to its implications
on an international level. Thirdly, the Council primarily invokes the constitutive
rather than the restraining function of the rule of law, ie that aspect of the rule of
law that relates to the creation of the very conditions that enable an entity to
exercise public authority. Fourthly, the Council’s engagement with the rule of
law must be read in light of the tradition of the liberal peace thesis that
considers law as a requirement to achieve and ensure peace.
1. Country-specific Situations
A first and rather plain observation relates to the fact that most paragraphs on
the purposes served by the rule of law are found in country-specific resolutions
rather than thematic resolutions. This differentiation matters greatly. Often, what
is said in a country-specific resolution says much more about the degree of
acceptability and validity of a specific subject matter under the Council’s
consideration than what is included in thematic resolutions.865 This is
particularly true if the Council supplements general paragraphs on the purposes
served by the rule of law with a concrete mandate of a UN peace operation or
concrete obligations for UN member states how to establish or strengthen the
rule of law. The fact that the Council predominantly invokes the rule of law in
country-specific resolutions is thus of crucial importance if it comes to
assessing the political acceptance of a certain rule of law understanding and to
the legal and political effects of a potential consensus with regard to the rule of
law.
2. The National versus International Rule of Law
A related observation is the different prevalence of references to the national and
international rule of law in Council resolutions. Mostly, the Council invokes the
national rule of law. It usually reacts to rule of law deficits in countries affected
by conflict or crisis and determines based on binding measures how the rule of
law shall be re-established or strengthened, thereby imposing a constitutional
865 Månsson (n 11) 99.
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standard. The international rule of law is invoked only rarely in Council
resolutions and very abstractly as opposed to the national rule of law.
Only two thematic resolutions contain explicit references to the international
rule of law. The thematic resolutions on conflict prevention and on the role of
policing in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding reiterate that the rule
of law needs to be strengthened at the international level in order to prevent
armed conflict and ensure sustainable peace.866 Both references are only
included in the preambular part. Then, of course, there are paragraphs that can
be interpreted as implicitly invoking aspects of the international rule of law
such as in resolutions on terrorism or piracy, which require member states to
respect their international law obligations while preventing and fighting these
crimes.
So far, the impression, thus, prevails that the Council is rather engaged in the
promotion of the national rule of law than in the strengthening of the
international rule of law. Quite clearly, thus, the Council’s engagement with the
rule of law does not contribute to a consolidation of the international rule of law
or an international legal discourse on its concrete implications or addressees.
This may relate to the fact that the Council itself is often criticised for being
non-compliant with the international rule of law, which may also be said about
some of its permanent members.867
3. The Constitutive and Restraining Function of the Rule of Law
Thirdly, one can observe that Council references to the rule of law invoke two of
its most basic functions: The constitutive and the restraining function of the rule
of law.868 The constitutive function of the rule of law relates to the institutions,
procedures and rights that are required to create an entity capable of exercising
public authority – in the present context a state – and to the creation of
conditions that enable it to provide ‘essential public goods’.869 Along these
866 See, UNSC Res 2171 (21August 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2171 [preamble, indent 9];
UNSC Res 2185 (20November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2185 [preamble, indent 3].
867 See n 16.
868 This idea takes its inspiration from Aust and Nolte (n 17) 53 who speak of the ‘enabling’
and ‘constraining’ function of the rule of law. Also see Christoph Möllers, ‘Pouvoir
Constituant–Constitution–Constitutionalisation’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen
Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010)
169, 171–178 (who formulates a similar thought and speaks of ‘order-founding’ and
‘power-shaping constitutional traditions’ in the context of European constitutional
theory. Whereas the first tradition is directed at determining the content and form of
sovereign power, the second aims at restraining it).
869 Magen Amichai, ‘The Rule of Law and its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope’
(2009) 45 Stan. J. Int’l L. 51, 72. See, eg, in the context of Afghanistan, where Council
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lines, Fuller described the rule of law as a sine qua non for the existence of a
legal system.870 With this focus in mind, the rule of law primarily relates to the
institutional and legal structures that ensure the physical security of the people
living on the territory, which is supposed to be (re-)introduced to (enhanced)
conditions of statehood.871
When invoking the restraining function of the rule of law, the existence of an
entity capable of exercising public authority is presumed and the rule of law is
supposed to prevent its arbitrary exercise or illegitimate encroachments upon
rights and liberties of the individuals subjected to it.872 This may be understood
with Raz who qualified the rule of law as just one of the many virtues of a legal
system.873
When the Council refers to the purpose of the rule of law to facilitate
conflict prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, it
is usually the constitutive function of the rule of law that is invoked: The
Council primarily employs the rule of law in order to re-establish or stabilise
conditions of statehood in this context in order to facilitate a state of peace and
security. This is most obvious when the rule of law serves the purpose of
restoring state authority as described above but also reflected in the mandates
of UN peace operations to strengthen state institutions and structures to enable
them to uphold the rule of law, to re-establish the rule of law or to strengthen the
capacity of rule of law institutions.874 When the Council calls on governments to
establish the rule of law in order to protect its civilian population, it also appeals
resolutions repeatedly referred to the ‘delivery of services in a timely and sustainable
manner’ as one of the goals to be pursued by the rule of law support provided by
international civilian efforts: UNSC Res 1806 (20March 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1806 [4
(e)]; UNSC Res 1917 (22March 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1917 [6 (b)]; UNSC Res 1974
(22March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1974 [6 (c)]; UNSC Res 2041 (22March 2012) UN
Doc S/RES/2041 [7 (b)]; UNSC Res 2096 (19March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096 [7
(b)]; UNSC Res 2145 (17March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2145 [6 (b)]; UNSC Res 2210
(16March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2210 [7 (b)].
870 Fuller (n 61) 39.
871 Amichai (n 869) 72.
872 Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and “État de droit”’ (n 64) 304. For a definition of
‘public authority’, see von Bogdandy, Dann and Goldmann (n 147) 11 who define it as
the ‘legal capacity to determine others and to reduce their freedom, i.e. to unilaterally
shape their legal or factual situation’. In the present context, public authority is
understood as legitimate authority.
873 Raz (n 61) 211, 219.
874 See, eg, UNSC Res 1933 (30 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1933 [16 (j)] (mandate
UNOCI); UNSC Res 1580 (22December 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1580 [2 (h)] (mandate
UNOGBIS); UNSC Res 2065 (12 September 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2065 [11] (mandate
UNIPSIL).
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to the constitutive function of the rule of law which relates to the conditions of
statehood required in order to ensure the physical security of civilians.875
By contrast, when the Council refers to the purpose of the rule of law to
prevent and address crime, it generally invokes the restraining function of the
rule of law: Here, the perspective usually is that measures taken to curb crimes
such as terrorism or piracy shall respect the rights of alleged perpetrators and
take place within rule of law structures. This is exemplified in the Council’s
call on member states to respect their obligations under international human
rights-, refugee- or humanitarian law when countering terrorism or when
prosecuting or imprisoning (alleged) pirates. In the case of piracy, the Council
seems to imply both functions of the rule of law, its constitutive function –
relating to the creation of sufficient state capacity of Somalia to prevent and
fight piracy – as well as its restraining function – relating to the rule of law-
conforming treatment of alleged perpetrators. Regarding the purposes ascribed
to the rule of law in the context of sexual violence in conflict and small arms
and light weapons, it is again the constitutive function of the rule of law that
seems to be implied: The rule of law is invoked based on the observation that
weak or non-existent rule of law structures nurture the emergence of these
crimes.
4. The Liberal Peace Thesis
Lastly, the Council’s use of the rule of law as a means to fulfil its mandate – the
maintenance of international peace and security – can be related to the liberal
peace thesis which in its origins dates back to the thinking of 18th century
Enlightenment philosophers.876 The concept of liberal peace rests on the
assumption that national and international peace can only be ensured if states
are politically stable and has in its modern form primarily relied on the export
and establishment of free market economies and liberal democracies to achieve
this goal.877 Strengthening or even re-building states by reforming their rule of
law systems with the justification of creating conditions for sustainable peace is
an integral element of the liberal peace agenda.878 The focus of Council
resolutions on the constitutive function of the rule of law, thus, can be related to
the legal jurisprudence of Locke who considered the establishment of law-based
875 See the resolutions in n 805 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
876 Paris, At War’s End (n 6) 37.
877 Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of
Transitional Justice’ in Vincent Chetail and Oliver Jütersonke (eds), Peacebuilding, vol
II (Routledge 2015) 357, 358.
878 Oliver Richmond, ‘Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding’
(2007) 62 Int’l J. 458, 462; Nollkaemper, ‘Process of Legalisation’ (n 5) 97.
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regimes and constitutional restraints on sovereign power as crucial prerequisites
for the existence of peaceful and stable societies.879 Immanuel Kant also posited
that the rule of law – enforced by a sovereign which is itself subject to the rule of
law – was a necessary precondition for the peaceful co-existence of individuals
and that republican states would not go to war with one another due to their
republican constitution whereas wars would break out amongst liberal and non-
liberal states.880 Nowadays, this assumption is applied to liberal states that base
their common identity on values such as democracy, human rights and the rule
of law. Their commitment to these liberal values is assumed to contribute to and
foster peace among them.881 This rationale has largely informed post-Cold War
statebuilding by states, international organisations and their organs such as the
UN Security Council.882
III. No Council Definition of the Rule of Law
The fact that the Council has developed a notion of the function of the rule of
law does not necessarily imply that it has committed itself to a definition of the
principle. In a 2011 report, the UN Secretary-General observed that the Security
Council had assumed ‘an increased role in promoting the rule of law’ as
illustrated ‘by a multitude of thematic resolutions and country-specific
mandates’.883 This development had commenced in the aftermath of the Cold
War when the Council started to increasingly invoke the principle in its
resolutions.884 As has been illustrated, issue areas in which the Council most
prominently invoked the rule of law are the prevention and fight against crime
of a cross-border dimension or with cross-border effects such as terrorism,
piracy or sexual violence, the stabilisation of crisis-affected states or the
879 Paris, At War’s End (n 6) 47.
880 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch’ in Hans Reiss (ed), Kant:
Political Writings (2nd edn, CUP 1991) 93, 99–100; Michael Doyle, ‘Liberalism and
World Politics’ (1986) 80 Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1151, 1160.
881 See, eg, Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’ (1983) Philos.
Public. Aff. 205, 213; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal
States’ (1995) EJIL 503, 514; Russell Buchan, ‘International Community and the
Occupation of Iraq’ (2007) 12 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 37, 51.
882 Korhonen (n 434) 15.
883 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’ (2011) UN Doc S/2011/634 [10].
884 Jeremy Farrall, ‘Impossible Expectations? The UN Security Council’s Promotion of the
Rule of Law after Conflict’ in Brett Bowden, Hilary Charlesworth and Jeremy Farrall
(eds), The Role of International Law in Rebuilding Societies after Conflict: Great
Expectations (CUP 2009) 134, 139; Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law (n 3) 7 f.
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prevention and resolution of conflicts with significant regional or international
ramifications. Particularly in the context of conflict prevention, peacekeeping,
conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the Council also elaborated on the
principle’s function.885 Additionally in 2003, the Council started holding open
thematic debates on the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the
maintenance of international peace and security, allowing UN member states to
exchange their views on the elements and implications of the rule of law with
the Council.886 The significant role attributed to the rule of law by the Security
Council seems to culminate in its qualification of a deteriorating security
situation characterised by the ‘absence of the rule of law’ as a threat to
international peace and security.887
Despite the obvious importance attributed to the concept in Council
resolutions in recent years, none of them offer a definition.888 It has generally
been claimed that the rule of law is often approached as a vague political ideal
that is supposed to bring about social and political change and that various
concepts and activities may be associated with it.889 As to the Council’s
engagement with the rule of law, authors have doubted that the Council has ‘a
coherent vision of the rule of law’ in light of the manifold measures it relates to
the term.890 Others attempted to shed some light on the Council’s engagement
with the rule of law by creating categories of the references to it in Council
resolutions.891
Only indirectly (and vaguely at that) has the Council expressed its
commitment to the rule of law definition provided by the Secretary-General in
its seminal report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict- and
post-conflict societies.892 In a presidential statement, the Council resolved to
‘consider, as appropriate in its deliberations, the recommendations set out in
paragraph 64 of the report’ which requires that Security Council resolutions
and mandates respect and implement several elements referred to in the rule of
law definition provided for by the Secretary-General.893 One has to note the very
885 Charlesworth and Farrall (n 3) 3.
886 See n 4.
887 See n 465.
888 See also, Farrall, ‘Impossible Expectations? The UN Security Council’s Promotion of the
Rule of Law after Conflict’ (n 884) 144.
889 Chesterman, ‘Rule of Law’ (n 74) para 23.
890 Aust and Nolte (n 17) 55.
891 See, Farrall, ‘Impossible Expectations? The UN Security Council’s Promotion of the Rule
of Law after Conflict’ (n 884) 144–146 and Farrall, ‘Rule of Accountability or Rule of
Law?’ (n 19) 395–397 for an extended list of categories.
892 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [6].
893 UNSC Presidential Statement 34 (2004) UN Doc S/PRST/2004/34.
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soft language used by the Council and that it only pledged to consider the
Secretary General’s rule of law definition in its deliberations, not in its
decisions.894
Although the Council has not come up with a definition of the rule of law,
it nonetheless identified elements of the rule of law in its resolutions, thus
contributing to a concretisation of what institutions or procedures it associates
with the concept. In this vein, eg, it invoked the principle of separation of powers
and constitutional checks and balances in close connection with the rule of law in
several resolutions onAfghanistan andGuinea-Bissau.895 In resolutions on thirteen
different country situations, the Council invoked the need to respect due process –
mainly in response to illegal or arbitrary pre-trial and prolonged detention or as a
requirement for the investigation of crimes, prosecutions and trials.896 It also
894 Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law (n 3) 12.
895 On Afghanistan see UNSC Res 2274 (15March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2274 [preamble,
indent 19]; UNSC Res 2210 (16March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2210 [preamble, indent
18]; UNSC Res 2145 (17March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2145 [preamble, indent 19];
UNSC Res 2120 (10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2120 [preamble, indent 34]; UNSC
Res 2096 (19March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096 [preamble, indent 19]; UNSC Res 2069
(9October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2069 [preamble, indent 33]; UNSC Res 2041
(22March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2041 [preamble, indent 19]; UNSC Res 2011
(12October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2011 [preamble, indent 34]; UNSC Res 1974
(22March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1974 [preamble, indent 11] (in resolutions 2011 and
1974, however, the principle of separation of powers is referred to without a mention of
the rule of law). On Guinea-Bissau see UNSC Res 2343 (23 February 2017) UN Doc S/
RES/2343 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 2267 (26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/
2267 [preamble, indent 6]; UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203
[preamble, indent 6].
896 It is to be noted that the Council varied between depicting the principle of due process as
an element of the rule of law or as a human rights guarantee. Two UN peace operations
were mandated to implement due process guarantees in the Central African Republic and
Libya. For MINUSCA’s mandate, see UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/
2217 [32 (g) (ii)] & UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [34 (d) (vii)].
For UNSMIL’s mandate, see UNSC Res 2095 (14March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2095 [7
(b)] & UNSC Res 2144 (14March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2144 [6 (b)]. The guarantee of
due process was further included in operative, albeit non-binding provisions in UNSC
Res 419 (24November 1977) UN Doc S/RES/419 [4] (Benin); UNSC Res 1719
(25October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719 [10] (Burundi); UNSC Res 1828 (31 July 2008)
UN Doc S/RES/1828 [18] (Sudan); UNSC Res 1949 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/
RES/1949 [9; 10], UNSC Res 2030 (21December 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2030 [9],
UNSC Res 2103 (22May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2103 [6], UNSC Res 2157 (29May
2014) UN Doc S/RES/2157 [3], UNSC Res 2186 (25November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/
2186 [3], UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203 [6], UNSC Res 2267
(26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [10], UNSC Res 2343 (23 February 2017) UN
Doc S/RES/2343 [13] (Guinea-Bissau); UNSC Res 2000 (27 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/
2000 [11] (Côte d’Ivoire); UN Doc 2040 (12March 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2040 [4],
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issued several resolutions requiring that the independence of the judiciary be re-
established or guaranteed.897
The normative relevance of these references may be said to vary depending
on whether the Council included them in binding or non-binding, operative or
preambular paragraphs. The rule of law element of the separation of powers,
eg, was only invoked in the preambular parts of the said resolutions, whereas
the Council mandated UN peace operations to implement rule of law elements
such as the independence of the judiciary or due process guarantees in national
legal systems. Even though the Council has not come forward with a definition
of the rule of law, the repeated use of clearly identifiable rule of law elements in
its resolutions may – with the passage of time and dependent on a consistent use
of references – result in a consolidation of the contours of a rule of law
understanding of the UN organ. It will be the task of the following chapter to
elaborate in detail on what criteria such a process depends and whether it can
be observed with regard to rule of law criteria pertaining to national judiciaries.
UNSC Res 2095 (14March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2095 [5] (Libya); UNSC Res 2077
(21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077 [20] (Somalia). Several references to the rule
of law guarantee are found in preambular parts of Council resolutions: UNSC Res 1087
(11December 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1087 [preamble, indent 6] (Angola); UNSC Res
1315 (14August 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1315 [preamble, indent 6] (Sierra Leone);
UNSC Res 1608 (22 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1608 [preamble, indent 5], UNSC Res
1743 (15 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1743 [preamble, indent 5], UNSC Res 1780
(15October 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1780 [preamble, indent 6], UNSC Res 1840
(14October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1840 [preamble, indent 9], UNSC Res 1892
(13October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1892 [preamble, indent 9], UNSC Res 1944
(14October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1944 [preamble, indent 12], UNSC Res 2012
(14October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2012 [preamble, indent 18], UNSC Res 2070
(12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [preamble, indent 25], UNSC Res 2119
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [preamble, indent 19], UNSC Res 2180
(14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2180 [preamble, indent 20], UNSC Res 2243
(14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [preamble, indent 26], UNSC Res 2313
(13October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2313 [preamble, indent 33], UNSC Res 2350
(13April 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2350 [preamble, indent 11] (Haiti); UNSC Res 1949
(23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1949 [preamble, indent 3] (Guinea-Bissau); UNSC
Res 2147 (28March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147 [preamble, indent 24] (DRC); UNSC
Res 2272 (11March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2272 [preamble, indent 6] (thematic
resolution on UN peacekeeping operations).
897 On this see subsequent part 3 ch IV E. 1.
IV. Rule of Law Requirements for National Judiciaries
183
IV. Rule of Law Requirements for National Judiciaries
A. Introduction
As was just illustrated, the Council has invoked the rule of law in the context
of the prevention and fight of crime, conflict management and the stabilisation
of crisis-affected states. The Council’s interest in the rule of law, however, was
most evident in the field of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.898 Until the
late 1990s, the majority of peacekeeping operations authorised by the Council
to re-establish or reform national rule of law structures focused on measures
with regard to the local police. Recognising that police reform would only be
sustainable if justice was administered effectively, the Council then started
to mandate UN peace operations to also support or re-establish national
judiciaries.899 A decade later, rule of law support for national judiciaries had
become an integral part of the mandates of UN peace operations as reflected
in a thematic Council resolution which observed that the strengthening of rule
of law institutions by multidimensional peacekeeping missions involved
helping national authorities to address the needs of judicial institutions.900
Accordingly, many Council resolutions of the past twenty years identified
deficits affecting judicial institutions in conflict- and post-conflict states to be
remedied in the name of the rule of law. Requirements for the judicial branch
formulated by the Council relate to its independence and effectiveness,
mandate the strengthening of its capacity, the re-establishment of its authority
or require it to be impartial, fair, transparent and compliant with international
standards.
The Council did not develop its language with regard to national judiciaries
in the abstract with a claim to general application but always in reaction to
specific situations where deficiencies in the rule of law or its absence
contributed to a threat to international peace and security or where it considered
the re-establishment of functioning rule of law institutions and procedures as a
requirement to address a security threat.901 The Council may not act based on
898 Charlesworth and Farrall (n 3) 3.
899 UNDPKO, Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 21; UNDPKO, Handbook on
United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (2003) 94.
900 UNSC Res 2086 (21 January 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2086 [8 (c)].
901 The Security Council clarified this in a thematic resolution on security sector reform
where it highlighted the intimate connection between the rule of law, peace and security.
See UNSC Res 2151 (28April 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2151 [preamble, indent 8 & 15].
The UN Secretary-General too considers the rule of law a crucial condition to ensure
peace and security. See SG Report A/62/659 – S/2008/39 (n 741) [1].
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the sole purpose of reforming a state’s rule of law system if its actions are not
related to a threat to international peace and security.902
The repeated reference to similar or equal requirements for national
judiciaries in reaction to different country situations, however, nonetheless
indicates the possible evolution of general Council standards with regard to the
institutional and procedural set-up of national judiciaries that satisfy rule of law
guarantees pertaining to the judicial branch. Whereas many resolutions clearly
identify requirements for the judiciary as elements of the rule of law, the
wording of Council resolutions is sometimes more ambiguous but still allows
for the inference that the Council considers the requirements for the judiciary
intimately related to the rule of law. Such inferences seem plausible based
on a comparative reading of Council resolutions, which qualify a specific
requirement as a rule of law element, or when Secretary-General reports
issued in relation to the same situation as a Council resolution establish the
connection.
For example, whereas the Council had requested UNAMA in Afghanistan in
an earlier resolution to ‘support the establishment of a fair and transparent
judicial system, and work towards the strengthening of the rule of law’, it later
adapted the wording to request the mission ‘to support (. . .) the establishment of
a fair and transparent justice system (. . .) in order to strengthen the rule of
law’.903 The two resolutions not only illustrate that the Council constantly
adapts the wording of repeatedly used paragraphs in its resolutions but also that
it often uses terms such as ‘judicial system’ and ‘justice system’ synonymously.
Often, thus, Council resolutions must be read in comparison with preceding or
subsequent resolutions on the same agenda item to allow for a clearer
understanding of what exactly the Council was referring to when using certain
terms and phrases.
Council resolution 1493 (2003), eg, urged ‘the Government of National
unity and Transition to ensure that (. . .) the establishment of a State based on
the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest
priorities’.904 The Secretary-General report preceding the resolution discussed
possible support scenarios to the national judiciary under the title ‘Rule of
Law’, allowing for the inference that the Council’s reference to the
902 cf, eg, Nolte (n 480) 320f (‘the Council may only act to counter threats to very important
international values, in particular to the physical integrity of persons, but not, for
example, to protect the proper functioning of a democratic system’).
903 UNSC Res 1536 (26March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1536 [10] and UNSC Res 1589
(24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1589 [9].
904 UNSC Res 1493 (28 July 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1493 [11].
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independence of the judiciary refers to the Secretary-General’s situation report
about the judiciary discussed as a rule of law issue.905
When formulating requirements for the judiciary or identifying how to
address judicial deficits, the Council varied its language whose relation to the
evolution of a Council understanding of the rule of law will be examined in the
following chapter. In order to do so, the chapter attempts to determine the
plausibility of a possible trend towards the legalisation of Council language and
considers legalised Council language as a contribution to the evolution of a rule
of law understanding of the Council. The notion of legalisation applied here
coincides largely with the requirements identified for a possible Council impact
on the emergence of the rule of law as an international norm within international
society, ie precision of language, consistency of its reactions and legitimacy of
the standards it relates to the rule of law.
B. Three Types of Council Language
When analysing Council language which identifies what should be done to
address deficits affecting national judiciaries, three types of language can be
distinguished: Non-technical, legalised and operational Council language.
1. Non-technical Council Language
A first type of Council language identifies a particular characteristic or virtue of
the judiciary whose content – as opposed to legalised language – cannot be
related to established rule of law guarantees as contained in international or
regional (human rights) law. Examples are references to the ‘capacity’ or
‘authority’ of the judiciary. In the DRC, eg, the Council decided that MONUC
should assist the government in strengthening the capacity of the judicial system
and in Côte d’Ivoire, the Council mandated UNOCI to assist the government in
re-establishing the authority of the judiciary.906 The content of these judicial
characteristics or virtues cannot be inferred from a comparison with similar
notions in regional or international (human rights) law. Its determination
requires an analysis of the concrete circumstances preceding the resolutions
referring to them.
905 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Second Special Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’
(2003) UN Doc S/2003/566 [71, 73–75].
906 UNSC Res 1756 (15May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1756 [2 (q)] (on the DRC); UNSC Res
1528 (27 February 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1528 [6 (q)] (on Côte d’Ivoire).
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2. Legalised Council Language
A second type of Council language can be qualified as ‘legalised’.
Legalisation – as understood here – relates to two elements. A first element of
legalisation refers to a linguistic level, meaning that Council language
resonates with or expressly invokes established rule of law institutions or
procedures as guaranteed in regional or international law. Most relevant with
regard to the specific context of national judiciaries is international and
regional human rights law to the extent that it contains rights that establish
concrete requirements for the judiciary such as, eg, the independence and
impartiality of tribunals, the right to a fair and public hearing or the rights to
expeditious proceedings and an effective remedy. From an exclusively
linguistic perspective, of course, many human rights guarantees are not
particularly precise. If their content, however, enjoys a relatively established
meaning in regional and international human rights law due to their
interpretation by the competent human rights bodies, the present thesis
considers Council invocations of such human rights guarantees as ‘precise’ to
the extent that they invoke – more or less – determinate concepts. The element
of precision is central to the concept of legalisation, as it has traditionally been
considered an essential feature of legal rules. This ties back to the writings of
Hayek, Fuller and Raz who focused on law’s capacity to guide human
behaviour and thus, ia, on the specificity of the language of legal rules.907
The concepts used by the Council are more legalised, the more precisely
they invoke rule of law guarantees as contained in regional or international
(human rights) law.908 Eg, if the Council authorises the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
907 See, part 1 ch II A. See also, eg, Gidon Gottlieb, ‘The Nature of International Law:
Toward a Second Concept of Law’ in Cyril Black and Richard Falk (eds), The Future of
the International Legal Order, vol IV (Princeton University Press 1972) 331, 371f
(crucial for the present context of Council resolutions, Gottlieb observes that ‘[h]ere
again there looms a vast unmarcated terrain between the legal and the political – but the
more specific the guidance in a system becomes, the more specific the norms, the policy
goals and their application, the more “legal” this system becomes’) and Friedrich
Kratochwil, ‘Is International Law “Proper” Law?’ (1983) 69 Arch. Rechts-Sozialphilos.
13, 37f (on the ‘specificity of guidance of legal rules when contrasted with “policy”’).
908 Kenneth Abbott and others, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 IO 401, 412–415
(on the role of ‘precision’ for the concept of legalisation which requires obligation,
precision and delegation. The authors also propose that ‘precision and elaboration are
especially significant hallmarks of legalization at the international level’ due to the
absence of a centralised legislature). See also Nollkaemper, ‘Process of Legalisation’
(n 5) 99 (who observes that ‘some of the requirements of the rule of law may themselves
constitute particular rules of law. That holds in particular for human rights, including such
requirements as legality and independence of courts. There is little doubt that in this
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to help reinforce the independence of the judiciary or UNAMA to support the
establishment of a fair and transparent judicial system in Afghanistan, the
reference to an independent judiciary quite precisely invokes the right to an
independent tribunal as guaranteed in regional and international human rights
law, whereas the reference to a fair and transparent judicial system resonates
with fair trial rights but is less conclusive in this regard.909
The idea of legalisation with regard to Council language, thus, relates to the
observation that the Council frames threats to international peace and security
and the related measures to address such threats in ‘legal and rights-oriented
terms’.910
A second element of legalisation relates to the level of application and refers
to the situation that the Council invokes a rule of law guarantee in reaction to
circumstances that are considered encroachments on this particular guarantee
by international or regional human rights bodies.
To the extent that Council action, ie its decisions and recommendations,
consists of its language, a legalisation of its language coincides with a
legalisation of its action.911 Legalisation considered in this context, however,
does not equal legalisation as understood by Abbott, Keohane et al which
further involves ‘obligation’ and ‘delegation’ even though both elements are
regularly fulfilled in the field of Council resolutions reforming national
judiciaries if they issue binding measures and delegate their implementation to,
eg, multidimensional peacekeeping missions.912 The focus of legalisation as
understood here, is on the fact that the Council invokes legal concepts instead
of non-legal concepts to fulfil its task of maintaining international peace and
security. The focus is not on legal effects, ie on the question whether the
language used establishes legal obligations for third parties or not as it must be
assumed that the Council considers also the implementation of the non-binding
respect human rights constitute the cornerstone of the rule of law, at the national level,
that international law supports’).
909 UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)] (on the CAR); UNSC
Res 1536 (26March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1536 [10] (on Afghanistan).
910 Henriette Sinding Aasen and others, ‘Introduction’ in Juridification and Social
Citizenship in the Welfare State (Edward Elgar 2014) 1, 2 referring to Lars Blichner and
Anders Molander, ‘Mapping Juridification’ (2008) 14 ELJ 36, 44 (‘Juridification as
Increased Conflict Solving by Reference to Law’).
911 This can be related to Austin’s concept of performative utterances and his proposition that
saying something may amount to doing something. See, John Austin, How To Do Things
With Words – Lecture VIII (2nd edn, Harvard University Press 1975) 94.
912 Abbott and others (n 908) 401–419 (for whom legalisation ‘refers to a particular set of
characteristics that institutions may (or may not) possess. These characteristics are
defined along three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation’).
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parts of its resolutions as conducive to the maintenance of international peace
and security.
Importantly, the concept of legalisation as understood here, largely satisfies
the proposed requirements for the Council to contribute to the emergence of the
rule of law as an international norm that redefines state identities and interests.
The requirement for the emergence of the rule of law as an international norm
that Council language be precise, coincides with the element of legalisation that
Council rule of law language resonates with or expressly invokes rule of law
guarantees whose content enjoys a relatively established meaning in regional
and international human rights law. The requirement that the Council
consistently invokes rule of law guarantees in reaction to similar circumstances
is satisfied if the element of legalisation is fulfilled that the Council invokes a
rule of law guarantee in reaction to circumstances that are considered
encroachments on this particular guarantee by international and regional human
rights bodies. Further, the requirement that the Council’s understanding of the
rule of law must be considered legitimate in order to turn into an international
norm, is served by both elements of legalisation. The invocation of rule of law
guarantees as contained in regional and international human rights law in
reaction to situations that would be considered interferences with these rights
by regional and international human rights bodies, contributes to procedural
fairness insofar as the Council invokes guarantees in whose elaboration most
states were involved and to substantive legitimacy to the extent that it draws on
universal standards which the Council shall promote and encourage respect for.
It is, thus, claimed here that legalised Council language enjoys the highest
likelihood of contributing to the emergence of the rule of law as an
international norm that affects how states conceive their identities and interests
to the extent that it largely satisfies the requirements proposed here for the
emergence of norms.
3. Operational Council Language
A third type of language used by the Council when determining deficiencies in
the judiciary or issuing measures to address such deficits can be characterised as
operational to the extent that it describes the activities that need to be undertaken
by governments, UN peace operations or other actors involved in rule of law
reform. Such language includes references to a need to ‘(re-)establish’,
‘develop’, ‘reform’, ‘reinforce’, ‘strengthen’ or ‘support’ the judiciary, judicial
system, justice sector or judicial institutions, to ‘develop’, ‘support’ or
‘implement’ justice sector reform or to ‘restore the administration of the
judiciary’. Operational language in Council resolutions is recognised by its
focus on a task or activity rather than a guarantee or quality that needs to be
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safeguarded or achieved. It involves – often relatively abstract – instructions to
an actor but rarely spells out concrete goals or measures that need to be achieved
or undertaken in order to fulfil operational commands such as, eg, judicial
reform.
C. Normative and Political Relevance of Council Language
The following analysis rests on the assumption that Council resolutions reflect
the ‘degree of acceptability and validity of a specific subject matter’ under the
Council’s consideration.913 It is further assumed that the degree of political
consensus within the Council with regard to the importance of a subject matter
is reflected in the legal effects of Council provisions addressing it and thus that
there exists a direct connection between the normative effects of Council
provisions and their political weight. Political consensus as to the importance
of a subject matter is supposed to be highest if it is addressed in binding
Council decisions and lowest if addressed in the preambular part of a
resolution. In the middle field are non-binding provisions, which were issued in
the operative part of resolutions as opposed to the preambular part. The highest
degree of political consensus with regard to the importance of a particular
subject matter seems to exist if the Council mandates its subsidiary organs
to implement concrete measures with regard to it, eg, if it requires a UN
peace mission to re-establish the independence of the judiciary in a given state.
Delegation to Council subsidiary organs ensures a higher degree of involvement
and control on behalf of the Council with regard to implementation than does
delegation to UN member states, thus further underlining the Council’s internal
commitment.914 The legal effect of Council provisions addressing a particular
subject matter is thus understood to not only reflect its normative but also its
political relevance – at least to a certain extent. This interpretation assumes the
913 Månsson (n 11) 79 f.
914 UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 36. The present analysis does not
discuss separately measures with regard to subject matters that shall be implemented by
UN peacekeeping missions authorised to use force for their implementation to the extent
that rule of law measures are typically not enforced with force. Cf Månsson (n 11) 80 (for
the argument that ‘peace operations are of particular relevance’ as an indicator of the
status of international human rights law for Council members and the wider UN
membership ‘since they are deemed, more than any other political instrument, to have
‘shake[n] the foundations of the remit of sovereignty and human rights’. By deploying
peace operations, tasked to implement international political decisions directly within a
domestic context, the Security Council exercises a potential power of human rights
implementation unknown to other international mechanisms.’).
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Council’s awareness of the mechanisms of political precedent even though – of
course – it is not bound by its previous decisions.915
The legal effect of Council provisions, however, does not necessarily
determine the implications of Council language from a social-constructivist
perspective.916 The fact that the Council invokes the rule of law in its
resolutions has been interpreted as to reflect ‘an international consensus among
states that the rule of law should operate in national systems’.917 This claim of
the existence of an international consensus ignores, ia, the Council’s limited
composition, the political character of elections for its non-permanent seats and
the political dominance of its five permanent members. What seems more
realistic from a social-constructivist perspective is the assumption that the
Council’s consistent use of specific terms, which are intimately related to the
rule of law, reflects the existence of certain intersubjective understandings
among Council members with regard to the meaning of these terms.918 The
consistent and repeated inclusion of such rule of law terms in Council
resolutions in reaction to similar circumstances, then, may further result in their
diffusion and thus enhanced reception and acceptance within the international
society and in the emergence of the rule of law as an international norm if such
standards are further perceived legitimate by, primarily, states.919
To summarise: With regard to the normative effects and the degree
of political consensus among Council members regarding the importance
of a particular subject matter, a different analysis of binding, non-binding
but operative and preambular provisions in Council resolutions seems
indispensable. With regard to the diffusion of certain concepts and terms within
the international society, however, their inclusion in preambular, operative or
binding provisions seems less relevant to the extent that language used in any
part of a resolution may contribute to the emergence of common ideas or norms
if used repeatedly in similar contexts and perceived legitimate by members of
the international society.
915 Alvarez (n 7) 194; Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd, ‘Conclusion: Assessing the Council’s
Authority’ in Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds), The UN Security Council and the
Politics of International Authority (Routledge 2008) 199, 203f; Peters, ‘Article 25’
(n 493) para 89; Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘Theorizing Precedent in International Law’ in
Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in International
Law (OUP 2015) 268, 277.
916 True-Frost (n 20) 178–181 (on the non-coercive diffusion of norms).
917 McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of Law: Defying Gravity?’ (n 140) 286.
See also ibid, ‘The Rule of Law Internationally’ (n 398) 58.
918 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 460.
919 Finnemore (n 41) 13, 22 (focusing on how international organisations diffuse norms and
thereby shape the interests and identities of states adopting these norms).
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D. Non-technical Council Language
Non-technical Council language is characterised by references to particular
judicial characteristics or virtues, which do not resonate with established rule of
law guarantees as established in international or regional human rights law. Non-
technical terms used by the Council to identify and address judicial deficits are
the capacity and authority of the judiciary.
1. Capacity of the Judiciary
a. Council Resolutions Invoking the Concept of Judicial Capacity
When addressing rule of law deficits pertaining to the judiciary, several Council
resolutions emphasised a need to build or strengthen the judiciary’s capacity.920
In its most authoritative form, the Council has mandated UN peace operations to
strengthen or re-establish the capacity of the judiciary. It did so for the first time
in reaction to the situation in Timor-Leste in 2006 when deciding that the UN
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) would have the mandate to assist
in building the capacity of state- and government institutions in areas where
specialised expertise was required, such as the justice sector.921 A couple of
months later, the Council mandated MONUC in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo to advise the government in strengthening the capacity of the
judicial system, including the military justice system.922 Similarly in the
Central African Republic, BINUCA was authorised to help strengthen the
capacities of the national judicial system.923 After a transition from the AU-led
International Support Mission (MISCA) to the UN Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission (MINUSCA), the UN peacekeeping mission was tasked to
920 The connection between the rule of law and the concept of judicial capacity is highlighted
in many resolutions. See, eg, UNSC Res 1856 (22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1856
[4 (g)] (deciding ‘that MONUC will also have the mandate (. . .) to support the
strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law and, to that end, to (. . .)
advise the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in strengthening the
capacity of the judicial (. . .) system(s)’). Or, eg, UNSC Res 2149 (10April 2014) UN
Doc S/RES/2149 [30 (f) (ii)] (deciding ‘that the mandate of MINUSCA shall initially
focus on (. . .) support for national and international justice and the rule of law: To help
build the capacities, including through technical assistance, of the national judicial
system’) and UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [33 (a) (i)] and
UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)] (for the same
formulation).
921 UNSC Res 1704 (25August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1704 [4 (f)].
922 UNSC Res 1756 (15May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1756 [2 (q)]; UNSC Res 1856
(22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1856 [4 (g)].
923 UNSC Res 2121 (10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2121 [10 (d)]; UNSC Res 2134
(28 January 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2134 [2 (e)].
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help build the capacities of the national judicial system, including through
technical assistance.924
Further references to a need to strengthen or build the capacity of the
judiciary are found in operative, albeit non-binding paragraphs of Council
resolutions, which are also indicative of what the Council may be invoking
when referring to a lack of judicial capacity. The Council, eg, emphasised a
need for the sustained support by the international community to Timor-Leste
to further build capacities in the justice sector and underlined an ongoing need
to strengthen national capacity in judicial line functions, including training and
specialisation of national lawyers and judges.925
In Somalia, the Council urged states parties to the UNConvention on the Law
of the Sea and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation to fully implement their relevant obligations
under these Conventions and customary international law and cooperate with the
UNODC, IMO, and other states and other international organisations to build
judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.926 It further urged the Somali
authorities to develop the capacity of Somali courts to investigate and prosecute
persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery.927
In Liberia, the Council urged the government to intensify its efforts towards
achieving progress on transition of security responsibilities from UNMIL to the
national authorities, particularly with regard to improving the capacity and
capability of the justice sector, including courts.928
924 UNSC Res 2149 (10April 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2149 [30 (f) (ii)]; UNSC Res 2217
(28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [33 (a) (i)]; UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN
Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)].
925 UNSC Res 1802 (25 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1802 [7]; UNSC Res 1867
(26 February 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1867 [9; 10]; UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010)
UN Doc S/RES/1912 [10]; UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1969
[12]; UNSC Res 2037 (23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037 [11].
926 UNSC Res 1846 (2December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 [15]; UNSC Res 1897
(30November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897 [14]; UNSC Res 1950 (23November 2010)
UN Doc S/RES/1950 [19]; UNSC Res 2020 (22November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020
[23]; UNSC Res 2077 (21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077 [27]; UNSC Res 2125
(18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [24]; UNSC Res 2184 (12November 2014)
UN Doc S/RES/2184 [25]; UNSC Res 2246 (10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246
[27]; UNSC Res 2316 (9November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2316 [27].
927 UNSC Res 2184 (12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [4]; UNSC Res 2246
(10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [4]; UNSC Res 2316 (9November 2016) UN
Doc S/RES/2316 [4].
928 UNSC Res 2190 (15December 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2190 [4]; UNSC Res 2239
(17 September 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2239 [4].
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In its weakest form, albeit still indicative of the Council’s concept of
‘judicial capacity’, it has referred to judicial capacity problems in the preamble
of its resolutions. Eg, with regard to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia, the Council stressed the need to address problems caused by
the limited capacity of the judicial system of Somalia and other states in the
region to effectively prosecute suspected pirates and noted with appreciation
the assistance and funding provided by UNODC, UNDP and other regional and
international organisations and donors to enhance and develop the capacity of
the judicial systems of Somalia, Kenya, Seychelles and other states in the
region to prosecute suspected and imprison convicted pirates consistent with
applicable international human rights law.929 It further welcomed the work of
the Working Group on Capacity Building of the Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia to coordinate judicial capacity-building efforts to enable
regional states to better tackle piracy.930
b. The UN Understanding of Judicial Capacity
Building the capacity of national rule of law institutions is a central element of
UN peacekeeping.931 It aims at the restoration of ‘the ability of national actors
and institutions to assume their responsibilities and to exercise their full
authority, with due respect for internationally accepted norms and standards’
and involves enhancing the capacity of the local judiciary, eg by the provision
of judicial personnel.932 Enhancing the capacity of the judiciary is also an
integral element of the UNODC Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit, which
shall assist UN agencies, government officials or other organisations to assess
criminal justice systems and implement criminal justice reform.933 The Toolkit
prescribes that technical assistance for the judiciary or courts may include
929 UNSC Res 1918 (27April 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1918 [preamble, indents 5 & 6]; UNSC
Res 1976 (11April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1976 [preamble, indents 11 & 12]; UNSC Res
2125 (18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [preamble, indent 28]; UNSC Res 2184
(12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [preamble, indents 26]; UNSC Res 2246
(10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [preamble, indent 29]; UNSC Res 2316
(9November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2316 [preamble, indent 29].
930 UNSC Res 2184 (12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [preamble, indent 10];
UNSC Res 2246 (10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [preamble, indent 11];
UNSC Res 2316 (9November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2316 [preamble, indent 10].
931 OHCHR, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Mapping the Justice Sector (2006)
31 f.
932 UNDPKO, Capstone Doctrine (n 790) 40; UNDPKO, Handbook Multidimensional
Peacekeeping Operations (n 899) 96, 109.
933 ‹https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/justice-and-prison-reform/Criminal-Justice-Toolkit.html›
accessed 14 July 2017.
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enhancing their capacity ‘to train and educate judges and judicial officers’, ‘to
uphold human rights standards and norms in criminal cases’, ‘to develop and
manage planning, research and information management’, to use information
technology, ‘to collect data on caseload and workload’ and to ‘perform case
flow analysis’.934 The UN Rule of Law Indicators connect the concept of
capacity to the availability of human and material resources necessary for
institutions to perform their functions and to their administrative- and
management capacity to deploy these resources effectively.935 Whereas UN
sources do not provide a definition of the concept of judicial capacity, they
clearly establish the contours of the concept when identifying the measures
required to enhance it. The focus of the concept, thus, seems to be on enabling
judicial institutions to function.
c. Situations causing Council References to the Concept of Judicial Capacity
To understand what the Council may be referring to when observing a lack of
capacity in national judiciaries or determining a need to build or strengthen
judicial capacity, one needs to have a comparative look at the situations in
response to which the Council made such observations or enacted such
measures. Background information on the situation of the judiciary in a country
with regard to which the Council has issued resolutions is found in Secretary-
General reports. To the extent that the Council usually tasks the Secretary-
General to report to it, present his observations and recommend measures with
regard to a particular situation, the probability that Council resolutions are a
reaction to these reports or even adopt their language, is high.936
Several Secretary-General reports plainly attest to a lack of capacity of
national judiciaries in the countries concerned. In Timor-Leste, eg, the
Secretary-General observed a vital need to further build capacities in the justice
sector and observed that the capacities of the national judicial institutions were
still insufficient to meet the country’s needs.937 More concretely, he deplored
934 UNODC, Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit 2: Access to Justice – The Independence,
Impartiality and Integrity of the Judiciary (2006) 2; UNODC, Criminal Justice
Assessment Toolkit 2: Access to Justice – The Courts (2006) 2 f.
935 UNDPKO/OHCHR, The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide
and Project Tools (2011) 3 f.
936 Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (n 480) 80; Eitel (n 491) 58;
Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (n 483) 40.
937 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21August 2007 to
7 January 2008)’ (2008) UN Doc S/2008/26 [59]. In an earlier report, the Secretary-
General had observed an insufficient emphasis on the development of institutional
capacity in the court system. See, UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the
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that the capacity of the justice institutions to fairly and effectively detect,
investigate, prosecute and adjudicate criminal offences, in particular those
relating to corruption, violence against children, sexual assault and domestic
violence, remained weak.938 With regard to piracy and armed robbery off the
coast of Somalia, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General assessed that
obstacles to the effective prosecution of piracy suspects and a streamlined
transfer of prisoners to competent judicial authorities were, ia, of a capacity-
related nature and noted Somalia’s limited judicial capacity.939 With regard to
the Central African Republic, an International Commission of Inquiry reported
the absence of a fully functioning judiciary and courts capable of protecting the
population and the Secretary-General observed that a UN multidisciplinary
team had confirmed an almost total lack of capacity of national counterparts, ia
in the area of justice.940 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Secretary-
General assessed that the justice sector lacked operational capacity and the
ability to prosecute crimes and enforce judgements and observed in Liberia that
challenges remained in terms of the capacity of the criminal justice system to
bring cases with regard to serious crimes to trial in a timely manner.941
Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council resolution 1690 (2006)’
(2006) UN Doc S/2006/628 [81].
938 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 24 September 2009 to
20 January 2010)’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/85 [82]. The SG also reported about capacity-
building measures aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Timorese judiciary. Eg,
human rights training components were mainstreamed in all of the legal training
programmes delivered to strengthen the technical skills and capacity of national justice
actors and training courses were held for judges and prosecutors in an effort to further
strengthen the capacity of national legal actors. See ibid [74]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated
Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 20 September 2011 to 6 January 2012)’
(2012) UN Doc S/2012/43 [42].
939 UNSC Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (2011) UN Doc S/2011/30 [44; 116f].
940 UNSC Preliminary Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central
African Republic, submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2127 (2014) UN
Doc S/2014/373 [121]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the situation in the Central African Republic’ (2014) UN Doc S/2014/562
[52].
941 On the DRC see, UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-third report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/156 [35] and UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2008) UN Doc S/
2008/433 [62]. On Liberia see, UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirtieth
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Whereas such general assessments hardly contribute to a clarification of
what exactly judicial capacity amounts to, it is possible to discern a number of
deficiencies that affected national judiciaries in different countries when
comparing situations in reaction to which the Security Council observed a lack
of judicial capacity. Circumstances that were repeatedly reported by the
Secretary-General before the Council identified deficits in judicial capacity
were inadequate or insufficient material resources at the disposal of judicial
institutions, an inability of the judiciary to ensure accountability for human
rights violations and committed crimes, an absence of (qualified) judicial
personnel, insufficient or absent judicial infrastructure, a backlog of court cases
and precarious security conditions for judicial personnel. These circumstances
prevailed in most states in response to which the Council observed a lack of
judicial capacity.
i. Inadequate or Insufficient Material Resources
Secretary-General reports preceding Council resolutions which determined a
lack in judicial capacity or issued measures in this regard often observed that
judicial institutions suffered from inadequate or insufficient material resources.
In Timor-Leste, eg, resource constraints in the justice sector made international
support necessary.942 In Somalia, support measures illustrated the lack in
judicial resources as the UN supported the judiciary with the provision of
logistics, information technology, office equipment and copies of laws.943 In
the Central African Republic, an offensive of Séléka rebels had destroyed much
of the justice system, including court dossiers and prosecutor files, and crucial
judicial institutions such as the Supreme Court of Justice and the Inspectorate-
General of Judicial Services lacked the necessary resources.944 Also with
regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo it was reported that the
military justice system did not have the necessary resources at command to
progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (2015)
UN Doc S/2015/620 [47].
942 SG Report S/2008/26 (n 937) [37]; SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24].
943 SG Report S/2009/590 (n 838) [45]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on Somalia’ (2011) UN Doc S/2011/277 [81; 83]; UNSC Report
of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ (2011) UN Doc
S/2011/549 [78]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on Somalia January 2015’ (2015) UN Doc S/2015/51 [43].
944 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation
in the Central African Republic’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/261 [32]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Special Report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/565 [24].
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ensure accountability for human rights abuses committed by members of the
Congolese armed forces.945
ii. Inability of the Judiciary to ensure Accountability
The inability of the judiciary to ensure accountability for human rights
violations and committed crimes was another circumstance regularly preceding
Council resolutions referring to problems with regard to the capacity of the
judiciary. In Timor-Leste, the Secretary General reported of the widespread
perception that the justice system failed to hold criminal wrongdoers to
account.946 Four years later, deficiencies were still observed regarding efforts to
confront impunity and require accountability and courts were reported to only
slowly address cases of human rights violations by members of the national
police and defence forces.947
In Somalia, UNPOS and UNDP engaged with the military justice system in
southern and central Somalia to promote better accountability for members of
the armed forces and it was reported that the justice system did not address
gender-based violence.948
Also the situation in the Central African Republic was characterised by a
lack of accountability, aggravated by the virtual absence of judicial authority
outside Bangui, rampant impunity and an inability of the justice system to
bring suspects to justice and try serious crimes.949 Accordingly, the Secretary-
General proposed that a UN human rights component should focus on
supporting judicial institutions in swiftly investigating and prosecuting human
rights violations and MINUSCA supported the creation of a national special
criminal court to address serious violations of human rights- and international
humanitarian law and the establishment of a national special investigative cell
945 SG Report S/2007/156 (n 941) [33].
946 SG Report S/2006/628 (n 937) [85].
947 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [73]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the
period from 21 September 2010 to 7 January 2011)’ (2011) UN Doc S/2011/32 [33]; SG
Report S/2012/43 (n 938) [33].
948 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’
(2013) UN Doc S/2013/69 [40]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on Somalia’ (2014) UN Doc S/2014/140 [52].
949 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation
in the Central African Republic’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/470 [30]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic
submitted pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)’ (2014)
UN Doc S/2014/142 [26]; SG Report S/2014/562 (n 940) [16]; SG Report S/2016/565
(n 944) [24].
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to investigate and prosecute serious crimes.950 Problems with regard to the
inability of the judicial system to ensure accountability in the CAR were also
clearly reflected in Council resolutions which, eg, welcomed efforts of the
Transitional Authorities to adopt legislation to establish a Special Criminal
Court (SCC) with jurisdiction over serious violations of human rights and of
international humanitarian law and mandated MINUSCA to provide technical
assistance in order to facilitate the functioning of the SCC.951
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the justice sector was described
to have historically lacked the ability to prosecute crimes and enforce
judgments.952 Members of the FARDC and security forces were not held
accountable for human rights abuses and sexual and gender-based crimes,
military courts managed only few convictions and a pervasive climate of
impunity prevailed.953
Also in Liberia, challenges existed with regard to the capacity of the
criminal justice system to bring cases of serious crimes to trial in a timely
manner.954
iii. Absence of (Qualified) Judicial Personnel
Another circumstance preceding Council resolutions that invoked deficits with
regard to judicial capacity was the absence of (qualified) judicial personnel. In
Somalia, international support measures aimed at the training of judges, court
support staff and prosecutors to enhance their capacity to prosecute and
adjudicate serious criminal cases, including piracy.955
950 SG Report S/2014/142 (n 949) [81]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic’ (2014) UN Doc
S/2014/857 [47f]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the situation in the Central African Republic’ (2015) UN Doc S/2015/227
[49f]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the
situation in the Central African Republic’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/305 [42f]; SG Report
S/2016/565 (n 944) [47].
951 UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [preamble, indent 13; 32 (g) (ii)];
UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [34 (d) (vii)].
952 SG Report S/2007/156 (n 941) [35].
953 ibid [33; 36]; SG Report S/2008/433 (n 941) [62; 68].
954 SG Report S/2015/620 (n 941) [47].
955 SG Report S/2009/590 (n 838) [46]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on Somalia’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/675 [84]; SG Report S/
2011/277 (n 943) [81; 83]; SG Report S/2011/549 (n 943) [76; 80]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ (2012) UN Doc S/
2012/643 [46; 60]; SG Report S/2012/783 (n 843) [47; 52]; SG Report S/2013/623
(n 843) [44; 53]; SG Report S/2014/140 (n 948) [49]; SG Report S/2014/740 (n 843) [23;
46]; SG Report S/2015/776 (n 843) [16]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report
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With regard to Timor-Leste, the Secretary-General observed that the justice
system needed continuous and specialised training to strengthen the skills and
capacity of national justice actors, as it did not have sufficiently qualified
officials to administer justice properly, fairly or effectively. Timorese justice
officials further lacked an understanding of the applicable laws and procedures
for the investigation of crimes.956 Accordingly, support measures in Timor-Leste
had a strong focus on the training of judicial personnel.957
In Somalia, only a small percentage of judges and prosecutors had enjoyed
legal training and those in office were often ignorant of applicable statutory law
and applied customary law, including sharia law, instead.958 Consequently,
programmes to enhance judicial capacity in the region included specialised
courses to professionals of courts in countering piracy and maritime crime.959
In the Central African Republic, court magistrates remained absent from the
interior of the country and magistrates without adequate professional training
heard about 70 per cent of all criminal cases.960 MINUSCA, thus, supported the
deployment of magistrates and provided organised training sessions to court
personnel.961
iv. Insufficient or Absent Judicial Infrastructure
Another factor observed in Secretary-General reports preceding Council
resolutions which determined a lack in judicial capacity or enacted measures to
address such lacking judicial capacity was an insufficient or absent judicial
infrastructure. In Somalia, UN support measures were directed at the
construction, re-establishment and development of court facilities.962
of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea
off the coast of Somalia’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/843 [17].
956 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 73f; 82]; SG Report S/2012/43 (n 938) [42].
957 SG Report S/2006/628 (n 937) [80]; SG Report S/2008/26 (n 937) [37]; UNSC Report of
the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated
Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 July 2008 to 20 January 2009)’ (2009) UN
Doc S/2009/72 [33]; SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [74]; SG Report S/2011/32 (n 947)
[41; 43]; SG Report S/2012/43 (n 938) [42].
958 Report Special Adviser Piracy S/2011/30 (n 939) [44; 116f].
959 SG Report S/2014/740 (n 843) [46].
960 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation
in the Central African Republic’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/787 [51]; SG Report S/2014/142
(n 949) [26]; SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [24].
961 SG Report S/2016/305 (n 950) [44]; SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [23; 39].
962 SG Report S/2009/590 (n 838) [46]; SG Report S/2011/277 (n 943) [81]; SG Report S/
2011/549 (n 943) [78]; SG Report S/2012/643 (n 955) [51]; SG Report S/2012/783
(n 843) [51]; UNSC ‘Letter dated 19April 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to
the President of the Security Council’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/239 [14]; SG Report S/
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In Timor-Leste, access to independent, transparent and effective justice was
impeded, ia, by a lack of adequate physical infrastructure.963
In the Central African Republic, most of the infrastructure that supported the
justice system, including courthouses, appeal courts etc, had been destroyed and
the state suffered from the absence of functioning criminal investigation,
prosecution and judicial institutions which rendered the state largely incapable
of providing basic services and protecting human rights.964 Accordingly,
MINUSCA supported the rehabilitation of courts in the CAR.965
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Secretary-General observed
that fewer than sixty of the required 180 first-instance courts existed and that
judicial facilities were extremely dilapidated.966
v. Backlog of Court Cases
A backlog of court cases was also repeatedly reported prior to the issuance of
Council resolutions that identified capacity problems of the judiciary. In Timor-
Leste, the Secretary-General observed that as a consequence of a highly
centralised court system with little delegated authority or responsibility,
decision-making was often delayed or neglected.967 Two years later, a
continued need of the Timorese justice sector for support by the international
community was observed, given, ia, its backlog of cases and the insufficient
capacity of national judicial institutions to address the substantial case backlog
which resulted, ia, in an impeded access of the people to independent,
transparent and effective justice.968 In Somalia, case management systems were
expanded in the Garoowe and Hargeysa courts to expedite trials and dispose of
the case backlog.969 Also in the Central African Republic, support by
2013/623 (n 843) [44]; SG Report S/2014/740 (n 843) [47]; SG Report S/2015/776
(n 843) [16]; SG Report S/2016/27 (n 853) [49]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General,
‘Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/430 [34]; SG
Report S/2016/843 (n 955) [17].
963 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 82].
964 SG Report S/2013/261 (n 944) [32]; SG Report S/2013/470 (n 949) [30]; UNSC Report
of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African
Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 2121
(2013)’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/677 [8]; SG Report S/2013/787 (n 960) [51]; SG Report
S/2014/142 (n 949) [26]; Report International Commission of Inquiry CAR S/2014/373
(n 940) [35]; SG Report S/2014/562 (n 940) [16; 50]; SG Report S/2014/857 (n 950) [40].
965 SG Report S/2016/305 (n 950) [44].
966 SG Report S/2007/156 (n 941) [35].
967 SG Report S/2006/628 (n 937) [81].
968 SG Report S/2008/26 (n 937) [37; 59]; SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 82].
969 SG Report S/2013/69 (n 948) [40].
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MINUSCA, UNDP and UN-Women was required to support judicial authorities
to address the persistent backlog of cases.970
vi. Precarious Security Conditions for Judicial Personnel
Another circumstance preceding Council resolutions that emphasise a lack in
judicial capacity were precarious security conditions for judicial personnel. In
Timor-Leste, the Secretary-General reported that there was virtually no
courthouse security.971 In the Central African Republic, Séléka soldiers
attacked magistrates and judges and magistrates and their families were
exposed to constant threats.972 In Somalia, the security of judges and
prosecutors constituted a challenge and was identified a top priority.973 And in
the CAR, the Secretary-General observed that programmes needed to help
provide ‘a secure environment to judicial authorities and courts’.974
d. Analysis
i. Relationship of Council Language to a Trend of Legalisation
When trying to assess the plausibility of a possible trend towards a legalisation of
Council language that relates to rule of law institutions such as the judiciary, one
needs to determine whether the circumstances triggering Council resolutions that
invoke a need to strengthen judicial capacity could have also justified references
to legal concepts such as, eg, the independence, impartiality, effectiveness,
transparency or fairness of the judiciary.975 Generally, it can be observed that the
judicial systems of the countries in reaction to which the Council issued
resolutions focusing on judicial capacity were primarily affected by the above-
described capacity-related problems. This seems to be consistent with the fact
that all UN missions tasked to strengthen judicial capacity – BINUCA aside –
were peacekeeping missions and, thus, employed during a volatile security
situation focused on capacity-building rather than during a peacebuilding phase.
In Liberia, the Secretary-General reported exclusively of problems pertaining to
judicial capacity. In Timor-Leste, several Secretary-General reports preceding
Council resolutions invoking a need to strengthen judicial capacity also
970 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation
in the Central African Republic’ (2015) UN Doc S/2015/576 [52].
971 SG Report S/2006/628 (n 937) [81].
972 SG Report S/2013/470 (n 949) [31]; SG Report S/2014/142 (n 949) [26]; SG Report S/
2016/565 (n 944) [24].
973 SG Report S/2014/140 (n 948) [41–43]; SG Report S/2014/740 (n 843) [47].
974 SG Report S/2014/142 (n 949) [81].
975 For a discussion of legal concepts that establish rule of law requirements for national
judiciaries, see subsequently, part 3 ch IV E.
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contained references to problems with regard to the effectiveness or
independence of the judiciary but Council resolutions reflected this
circumstance in that they also referred to a need to respect judicial independence
and enhance judicial effectiveness.976 The samewas the case in the CAR, where a
Secretary-General report observing that legislation did not guarantee the
independence of the judiciary was followed by a Council resolution which not
only required that the capacities of the national judicial system be built but also
that MINUSCA help reinforce the independence of the judiciary.977
Sometimes, however, Secretary-General reports contained references to
problems with regard to judicial independence or fair trial guarantees which
were not reflected in related Council resolutions. Eg in the CAR, the Secretary-
General emphasised that arrests of perpetrators of crimes needed to be
complemented by fair trials but the related Council resolution did not invoke a
need to guarantee fair trial rights in this context.978 With regard to the situation
in Somalia, the Secretary-General and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-
General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia both
identified a need for an independent justice system and judgements rendered by
independent and impartial courts within a reasonable time in order to address
problems in the prosecution of suspected pirates.979 The explicit references to
the independence, impartiality and effectiveness of judicial institutions,
however, were not picked up in subsequent Council resolutions, which focused
entirely on judicial capacity issues. In the DRC, the Secretary-General reported
about interferences in the judicial process through political and military
authorities, a historic lack of judicial independence, low salaries which
compounded corruption and military courts whose jurisdiction was not limited
to the trial of military offences and personnel.980 Council resolutions issued in
response to these reports, however, did only highlight a need to strengthen the
capacity of the judicial system and did not invoke the rule of law principles of
judicial independence and impartiality.981
976 See, eg, SG Report S/2009/72 (n 957) [Annex] and UNSC Res 1867 (26 February 2009)
UN Doc S/RES/1867 [preamble, indent 9; 11]; SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 73; 82]
and UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1912 [preamble, indent 7; 11].
977 SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [24; 63] and UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/
RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)].
978 SG Report S/2015/227 (n 950) [68] and UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/
RES/2217.
979 SG Report S/2009/590 (n 838) [92]; Report Special Adviser Piracy S/2011/30 (n 939)
[10].
980 SG Report S/2007/156 (n 941) [33; 35; 53]; SG Report S/2008/433 (n 941) [45; 62].
981 UNSC Res 1756 (15May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1756 [2 (q)]; UNSC Res 1856
(22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1856 [4 (g)].
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To sum up, these reports illustrate that certain circumstances described by
the Secretary-General could have justified the use of legalised language in
Council resolutions rather than references to the non-technical concept of
‘judicial capacity’. In the prevailing number of cases, however, deficiencies
affecting the judicial systems in reaction to which the Council issued
resolutions invoking a need to enhance judicial capacity were indeed
predominantly of a capacity-related nature. It can, thus, be concluded that
Council references to the concept of judicial capacity usually did not derogate
from a possible trend towards the legalisation of Council language but neither
contributed to it.
ii. Contribution of Council Language to Norm Emergence
With regard to the criteria of norm emergence proposed here, ie precision of
language, consistency in reaction (ie invocation of particular rule of law
vocabulary in reaction to similar circumstances) and legitimacy of standards
related to the rule of law, references to judicial capacity do not contribute
significantly to such a process. As opposed to legalised language where the
Council uses terms that expressly resonate with or invoke a rule of law
guarantee whose content enjoys a relatively established meaning in regional
and international (human rights) law, the Council invokes a concept whose
meaning cannot be inferred from such sources. The language, ie references to
judicial capacity, must be qualified as vague and does not satisfy the criterion
of linguistic precision. With regard to the requirement of consistency of
reaction, the preceding analysis has demonstrated that Council invocations of
the concept of judicial capacity seemed to follow a set of identifiable
circumstances, thus enabling a determination of the Council’s understanding of
the concept’s meaning. To this extent, a consistency of Council invocations of
the concept of judicial capacity can be affirmed which may stimulate a process
of ideation among agents interacting with the Council as to the meaning of the
concept of judicial capacity. The third requirement of norm emergence, the
procedural and material legitimacy of the standards related to the rule of law,
cannot be considered fulfilled by Council invocations of judicial capacity to the
extent that the Council does not relate the concept to any identifiable standards
whose legitimacy within the international society could be assessed. In
summary it can be said, therefore, that two crucial criteria for the emergence of
the rule of law as an international norm are not fulfilled with regard to Council
invocations of the concept of judicial capacity.
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2. Authority of the Judiciary
a. Council Resolutions Invoking the Concept of Judicial Authority
When describing the requirements for the national judiciary in Côte d’Ivoire, the
Council reverted to yet another non-technical term. Based on chapter VII
resolutions, the Council decided that UNOCI, the UN Operation in Côte
d’Ivoire, would assist and later advise the government in re-establishing the
authority of the judiciary.982
b. Judicial Authority as a Legal Concept
The concept of the ‘authority of the judiciary’ is not found in any international
or regional human rights treaty. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, a UN soft law instrument, refer to it as an element of judicial
independence, which requires that the judiciary ‘shall have jurisdiction over all
issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether
an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by
law’.983 The exact same wording was adopted by the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights in its Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a
Fair Trial and Legal Assistance.984 Used this way, the term seems to refer to the
scope and nature of the jurisdiction of the judiciary and to its independence from
the other branches of government in determining whether it is implied.985
Another soft law instrument making use of the term is the Recommendation
Rec(1994)12 of the Committee of Ministers of the European Council which
establishes in its Principle II that ‘[a]ll persons connected with a case, including
state bodies or their representatives, should be subject to the authority of the
982 UNSC Res 1528 (27 February 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1528 [6 (q)]; UNSC Res 1609
(24 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1609 [2 (x)]; UNSC Res 1739 (10 January 2007) UN
Doc S/RES/1739 [2 (m)]; UNSC Res 1880 (30 July 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1880 [27];
UNSC Res 1933 (30 June 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1933 [16 (j)]. In all of these
resolutions, the Council clearly established the connection between the concept of
judicial authority and the rule of law, mandating UNOCI to ‘assist the Government of
National Reconciliation (. . .) in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule
of law throughout Côte d’Ivoire’.
983 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Seventh UN Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (26August – 6 September 1985)
UN Doc A/CONF.121/22Rev.1 (principle 3).
984 AComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance
in Africa (2003) [1.(c)].
985 The preamble of the ECOSOC Resolution 2006/23, Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct (27 July 2006) UN Doc E/RES/2006/23 also uses the term. It does, however,
refer to the importance of the ‘moral authority’ of the judiciary for the public confidence
in the judicial system – an entirely different concept again.
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judge’ and that ‘[j]udges should have sufficient powers and be able to exercise
them in order to carry out their duties and maintain their authority and the
dignity of the court’.986 The explanatory memorandum on the principles
explains that ‘to ensure that the judge enjoys the respect due to him as a judge
and that the proceedings are conducted efficiently and smoothly, all persons
connected with a case (eg parties, witnesses, experts) must be subject to the
authority of the judge in accordance with domestic law’ and adds that ‘state
bodies or their representatives must also submit to the authority of the
judge’.987 It further observes that judges ‘should have available to them the
necessary practical measures and appropriate powers to maintain order in their
courts’. When adding that judges have ‘a responsibility to prevent the
occurrence of situations which call in question their independence’, the
commentary clearly establishes that the authority of the judiciary is a crucial
corollary of its independence.988 Contempt of court procedures and security
guards at hearings to eject persons disturbing public order are given as
examples of measures that promote the authority of judges.989 The principle
was reiterated in a recommendation of the European Committee of Ministers
issued several years later.990 Interpreted this way, it seems the term can be
understood as referring to the powers transferred to the judiciary, ie the scope
of its jurisdiction, as well as to its independence from the other branches of
government and from the parties and to the effective implementation of its
decisions. The references to the availability of ‘necessary practical measures’
and to the ‘appropriate powers to maintain order’ in courts seem to also imply
the necessity of sufficient judicial capacity. The term, not being clearly defined
in any binding or non-binding legal document, appears ambiguous enough,
though, as to encompass a number of different qualities of the judiciary.
986 European Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No R (94) 12 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges (13October
1994) [principle II – The authority of judges].
987 European Committee of Ministers, Explanatory Memorandum Recommendation Rec
(1994)12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Independence, Efficiency
and Role of Judges [principle II (The authority of judges)] para 22.
988 ibid [principle II (The authority of judges)] para 23.
989 ibid [principle II (The authority of judges)] para 24.
990 European Committee of Ministers, Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of
the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Judges: Independence, Efficiency and
Responsibilities, para 6.
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c. The UN Understanding of Judicial Authority
What is exactly understood by the concept of the ‘authority of the judiciary’
does not emerge clearly from UN sources. The UNDPKO Handbook for
Judicial Affairs Officers in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
determines that the authority of justice institutions needs to be assessed when
creating profiles of state institutions in order to map the justice system of a host
country for UN justice assistance.991 For the assessment of the legal framework
and structure of the judiciary, the UNODC Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit
inquires whether ‘the government established ad hoc courts or tribunals that
bypass the normal courts and the authority of the judiciary’.992 It further refers
to the sources on which the authority of the judiciary is based and which define
it, such as the Constitution, enabling statutes, court rules, judicial rulings or
opinions and connects the term closely to the independence of the judiciary
from other branches of government and its integrity.993 The UN understanding
of the ‘authority’ of the judiciary, thus, seems to refer primarily to the scope of
its jurisdiction as well as to its independence from the executive and legislative
branches of government.
d. Situations causing Council References to the Concept of Judicial Authority
When analysing the circumstances in reaction to which the Council called for
the re-establishment of the authority of the judiciary in Côte d’Ivoire, it
becomes evident that they are comparable to situations where the Council
called for the strengthening of judicial capacity. The circumstances were
similar to situations where the Council called for the re-establishment of
judicial capacity insofar as the Secretary-General observed that judicial
structures were not functioning in the territory controlled by the Forces
nouvelles and not fully functional in other parts of the country.994 Additionally,
991 UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 106.
992 UNODC, The Independence, Impartiality and Integrity of the Judiciary (n 934) 6.
993 ibid 5.
994 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1514
(2003) of 13November 2003’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/3 [31]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in
Côte d’Ivoire submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1514 (2003) of
13November 2003’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/3/Add.1 [7]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2005) UN Doc S/2005/186 [40; 42]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2006) UN Doc S/2006/821 [32]; UNSC Report of
the Secretary-General, ‘Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United
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the judicial system did not manage to ensure accountability for human rights
violations, judicial personnel was lacking and court security and judicial
resources were inadequate.995
Additionally, the Secretary-General reported that the Government of
National Reconciliation was to implement a programme that included
important elements related to the strengthening of the independence of the
judiciary and recommended the establishment of a judicial unit to support and
advise judicial authorities ‘on the re-establishment of an effective and impartial
judicial system’ in areas where the administration of justice had collapsed and to
‘encourage efforts throughout the country to increase the transparency of the
justice system and the impartial, efficient and independent administration of
justice’.996 He further observed that the judiciary lacked independence from
political forces, suffered from corruption and acts of intimidation and displayed
a lack of will to ensure accountability for human rights violations.997 The
parallel judicial system established by the Forces nouvelles was marked by a
total absence of impartiality, abuse of power and the arbitrary dispense of
justice.998 Additionally, irregularities with regard to the appointment of judges
by the incumbent President occurred.999
e. Analysis
i. Relationship of Council Language to a Trend of Legalisation
The circumstances described in Secretary-General reports preceding Council
resolutions calling for the re-establishment of the authority of the judiciary
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2006) UN Doc S/2006/939 [26]; UNSC Report of
the Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/245 [26].
995 SG Report S/2004/3 (n 994) [79]; SG Report S/2004/3/Add.1 (n 994) [7]; SG Report S/
2005/186 (n 994) [42]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Fifth progress report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2005) UN Doc
S/2005/398 [46]; SG Report S/2006/821 (n 994) [32]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Twentieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/196 [10]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-first progress report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/344 [10]; UNSC Report of
the Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/15 [22]; SG Report
S/2010/245 (n 994) [26].
996 SG Report S/2004/3/Add.1 (n 994) [13f].
997 SG Report S/2005/186 (n 994) [41f]; SG Report S/2009/196 (n 995) [26].
998 SG Report S/2005/186 (n 994) [42]; SG Report S/2005/398 (n 995) [46].
999 SG Report S/2006/821 (n 994) [44].
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
208
clearly invoke deficiencies with regard to the capacity, transparency,
effectiveness, independence and impartiality of the judiciary, as underlined by
the explicit references to these judicial qualities in Secretary-General reports
and the tasks proposed for the judicial unit. In reaction to these circumstances,
the Council could, thus, have also determined a need to re-establish the
independence, impartiality, effectiveness or transparency of the judiciary
but it did not. In comparable situations, the Council had in other resolutions
invoked a need to guarantee the independence, effectiveness, impartiality or
transparency of the judiciary or to strengthen its capacity.1000 References to
such judicial qualities, however, are found in Council resolutions on Côte
d’Ivoire only several years later when the Council called on the government to
ensure that the work of the Ivorian judicial system be impartial, transparent and
consistent with internationally agreed standards.1001
It is not entirely clear, thus, based on what criteria the Council makes use of
one concept or another. If Secretary-General reports are used to assist an
interpretation of how the Council uses the term, it can be inferred that it
invokes the concept of judicial authority in reaction to situations in which the
capacity, impartiality, independence, transparency and effectiveness of the
judiciary are affected. This seems to correspond with the use of the term in the
CoE Committee of Ministers’ recommendation with regard to the independence,
efficiency and role of judges. The fact that the Council decided to revert to the
legally indeterminate concept of judicial authority, instead of invoking the
legally more clearly defined concepts of judicial transparency or judicial
effectiveness or the established rule of law guarantees of judicial independence
and impartiality, derogates from a possible trend towards a legalisation of
Council language.
ii. Contribution of Council Language to Norm Emergence
As can be derived from this concluding assessment, the criteria of norm
emergence, ie precision of Council language, consistency of its reactions (ie
invocations of particular rule of law guarantees in response to comparable
situations) and legitimacy of the standards related to the rule of law, are not
fulfilled by Council invocations of the concept of judicial authority for the
same reasons that applied to Council invocations of the concept of judicial
1000 With regard to the circumstances preceding Council resolutions invoking the capacity of
the judiciary, see part 3 ch IV D. 1.; with regard to judicial independence, effectiveness,
transparency and impartiality see part 3 ch IV E.
1001 UNSC Res 2112 (30 July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2112 [16]; UNSC Res 2162 (25 June
2014) UN Doc S/RES/2162 [13]; UNSC Res 2226 (25 June 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2226
[13]; UNSC Res 2284 (28April 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2284 [9].
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capacity. In contrast to Council references to judicial capacity, however, Council
invocations of the concept of judicial authority cannot even be described as
consistent, ie as being made in reaction to clearly discernable and comparable
circumstances.
The use of non-technical language, ie references to judicial capacity and
authority, to describe rule of law deficits of national judiciaries does, thus, not
contribute to the emergence of the rule of law as an international norm that
shapes state identities and interests.
E. Legalised Council Language
In several resolutions, the Council reverts to a type of language which is here
described as “legalised” to the extent that it expressly invokes or resonates with
established rule of law guarantees as contained in regional or international
(human rights) law. Council language expressly invoking established rule of
law guarantees includes references to the independence of the judiciary, while
references to the effectiveness, impartiality, fairness and transparency of the
judicial system only resonate with certain rule of law guarantees such as the
right to an effective remedy, an impartial tribunal or particular fair trial rights.
To illustrate to what extent Council language expressly invokes or resonates
with established rule of law elements as guaranteed in regional and international
(human rights) law and to determine whether the Council invokes these
guarantees in reaction to circumstances that are considered encroachments
upon them by international or regional human rights bodies, the following
chapter will present the scope of the implied rule of law guarantees in
international and regional human rights law.
1. Judicial Independence
a. Council Resolutions Invoking the Concept of Judicial Independence
Several UN peace missions were mandated by the Council to assist or support
host governments in guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary.1002 In late
1002 Most Council resolutions referring to the independence of the judiciary establish a clear
connection between the guarantee and the rule of law. See, eg, UNSC Res 1493 (28 July
2003) UN Doc S/RES/1493 [11] (in which the Council ‘urges the Government of
National unity and Transition to ensure that (. . .) the establishment of a State based on
the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities’). See
also, eg, UNSC Res 1590 (24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590 [4 (a) (viii)] (deciding
that ‘the mandate of UNMIS shall be (. . .) to assist the parties to the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary’),
UNSC Res 1923 (25May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1923 [8 (vii)] (deciding ‘that
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2004, the Council mandated the first UN peace mission to address rule of law
problems pertaining to the independence of the judiciary. The UN
Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS) was tasked to
support efforts towards the strengthening of state institutions and structures to
enable them to uphold the independent functioning of the judicial branch of
government.1003 The second UN peace operation with a corresponding mandate
was UNMIS in Sudan, which was to assist the parties to the Comprehensive-
and Darfur Peace Agreements in promoting an independent judiciary.1004
Mandates of peace missions in Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Central African
Republic and Chad, Libya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo followed.
In Sierra Leone, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish
UNIOSIL, the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, with the key task to assist
the government in developing the independence of the justice system.1005 In
Burundi, the Council mandated BINUB to support the government in
consolidating the rule of law, in particular by strengthening the independence of
the judiciary.1006 The human rights- and rule of law-mandate of the UN Mission
in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was to assist the
governments of Chad and the Central African Republic in promoting the rule of
law, including through support for an independent judiciary.1007 In Libya,
UNSMIL was mandated to assist the Libyan government in reforming and
building an independent judiciary.1008 MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo was authorised by the Council to provide good offices, advice and
MINURCAT shall have the following mandate (. . .) to assist the Government of Chad in
the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary’)
or UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)] (authorising
MINUSCA to support national and international justice and the rule of law and therefore
to ‘help reinforce the independence of the judiciary’).
1003 UNSC Res 1580 (22December 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1580 [2 (h)]. Remarkably, it took
twenty years for the principle of judicial independence to be included in a binding
Council decision. The principle appeared in a Council resolution for the first time in
1994 in a resolution on Somalia, where the Council welcomed a declaration of the
leaders of the Somali Political Organization, which committed the Somali parties to
establish an independent judiciary. See, UNSC Res 923 (31May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/
923 [preamble, indent 6].
1004 UNSC Res 1590 (24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590 [4 (a) (viii)]; UNSC Res 1706
(31August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706 [8 (k)].
1005 UNSC Res 1620 (31August 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1620 [1 (a) (v)].
1006 UNSC Res 1719 (25October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719 [2 (d)].
1007 UNSC Res 1778 (25 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1778 [2 (g)]; UNSC Res 1861
(14 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1861 [6 (h)]; UNSC Res 1923 (25May 2010) UN
Doc S/RES/1923 [8 (vii)].
1008 UNSC Res 2144 (14March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2144 [6 (b)].
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support to the government for the development and implementation of a multi-
year joint UN justice support programme in order to develop independent
criminal justice institutions and processes and the judiciary.1009 And in the
Central African Republic, MINUSCA was mandated to help reinforce the
independence of the judiciary.1010
To the present day, the Council has thusmandated four peacekeepingmissions
and four political- and peacebuilding offices, respectively, to support national
governments in the development or strengthening of the independence of the
judiciary.1011 The Council did not only task peacebuilding or political missions to
support the establishment of an independent judiciary but also UN missions that
were deployed during the so-called peacekeeping phase. This seems remarkable
considering that peacekeeping usually takes place during more fragile
and volatile situations, ie closer to a crisis or conflict time-wise, than
peacebuilding.1012 One would expect that peacekeeping focused primarily on the
re-restablishment of institutions, whereas the peacebuilding phase would address
enhancing institutional qualities such as, eg, the independence of the judiciary.
It is notable too that the Council has not yet issued a binding decision
against a UN member state to reform or establish an independent judiciary but
only encouraged or urged national governments and authorities to do so,
reverting to exhortatory language only. With regard to the situation in Sierra
Leone, the Council emphasised that the development of an independent
judiciary was essential to long-term peace and development and urged the
government to intensify its efforts to develop an independent judiciary so that it
could take over from UNAMSIL full responsibility for maintaining law and
order and later encouraged donors and UNAMSIL to assist the government in
this regard.1013 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council urged the
government of National unity and Transition to ensure that the establishment of
1009 UNSC Res 2147 (28March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147 [5 (j)].
1010 UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)].
1011 UNMIS, MINURCAT, MONUSCO and MINUSCA are peacekeeping operations, while
UNOGBIS, UNIOSIL, BINUB and UNSMIL are political or peacebuilding offices,
respectively.
1012 Brahimi Report A/55/305-S/2000/809 (n 772) [12f]. The Brahimi report defines
peacekeeping as a concept that evolved from a primarily military model of observing
ceasefires and force separations after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of
military and civilian elements that work together to build peace in the aftermath of civil
wars. Peacebuilding is described as encompassing activities undertaken on the far side of
conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for building on those
foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.
1013 UNSC Res 1436 (24 September 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1436 [7]; UNSC Res 1470
(28March 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1470 [7]; UNSC Res 1508 (19 September 2003) UN
Doc S/RES/1508 [4]; UNSC Res 1537 (30March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1537 [3];
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an independent judiciary was among its highest priorities.1014 In Guinea-Bissau,
the Council urged political leaders to refrain from involving the judiciary in
politics, invoking a particular aspect of the guarantee of an independent
judiciary, namely ‘the actual independence of the judiciary from political
interference by the executive branch and legislature’.1015 Also in Haiti, the
Council encouraged the authorities to provide ongoing support to the Superior
Council of the Judiciary to ensure the independence of judicial institutions.1016
The Council, thus, kept a firm grip on the implementation of the guarantee in
the respective countries to the extent that it commissioned its subsidiaries
organs to translate it into concrete measures rather than entrusting this task to
the concerned states.
In its least authoritative form, the Council expressed its interest in the
establishment of an independent judiciary in the preamble of its resolutions. In
Somalia, the Council welcomed the Declaration of the Leaders of the Somali
Political Organizations, which, ia, committed Somali parties to establish an
independent judiciary.1017 In Liberia, the Council urged the transitional
government to ensure that the establishment of an independent judiciary be
among its highest priorities and used the exact same wording in a resolution
addressed at the Haitian transitional government.1018 In Haiti, it further
recognised the steps taken by the Superior Council of the Judiciary to carry out
its mandate and promote the strengthening of judicial independence.1019 In
Timor-Leste, the Council reaffirmed the need of respect for the independence
of the judiciary and its responsibility and in the Democratic Republic of the
UNSC Res 1562 (17 September 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1562 [6]; UNSC Res 1610
(30 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1610 [6].
1014 UNSC Res 1493 (28 July 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1493 [11].
1015 UNSC Res 1949 (23November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1949 [6]; UNSC Res 2030
(21December 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2030 [5]; UNHRCee, General Comment No 32:
Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial (23August
2007) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 [19].
1016 UNSC Res 2070 (12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [11]; UNSC Res 2119
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [14]; UNSC Res 2180 (14October 2014) UN
Doc S/RES/2180 [16]; UNSC Res 2243 (14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [20];
UNSC Res 2313 (13October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2313 [22].
1017 UNSC Res 923 (31May 1994) UN Doc S/RES/923 [preamble, indent 6].
1018 On Liberia see UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509 [preamble,
indent 7]. On Haiti see UNSC Res 1542 (30April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1542
[preamble, indent 4].
1019 UNSC Res 2119 (10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC
Res 2180 (14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2180 [preamble, indent 11]; UNSC Res
2243 (14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [preamble, indent 13].
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Congo, it noted with concern reports of the instrumentalisation of judicial
institutions for political purposes.1020
b. Judicial Independence as a Legal Concept
i. International Human Rights Law
The guarantee of judicial independence is a core element of a state based on the
rule of law.1021 According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers, the independence of the justice system figures as the
‘institutional guardian of the enforcement of the rule of law’ and ‘[g]iven that
the judicial system serves to check other public institutions, a judiciary that is
independent and not corruptible is fundamental in upholding the rule of
law’.1022 International treaty law guarantees the independence of the judiciary
in arts 10 UDHR and 14 (1) ICCPR or – with a focus on preventing judicial
corruption – in art 11 of the UN Convention Against Corruption as well as in
several other UN human rights treaties and humanitarian law instruments.1023
The guarantee is also firmly established in regional human rights treaties
such as arts 6 (1) ECHR, 8 (1) ACHR and 26 ACHPR and in most modern
constitutions. The UN Special Rapporteur even qualified the ‘principle of the
1020 On Timor-Leste, see UNSC Res 1745 (22 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1745
[preamble, indent 5]; UNSC Res 1802 (25 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1802
[preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 1867 (26 February 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1867
[preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1912
[preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1969
[preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2037 (23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037
[preamble, indent 7]. On the DRC, see UNSC Res 2277 (30March 2016) UN Doc S/
RES/2277 [preamble, indent 16].
1021 Stephan Gass, Regina Kiener and Thomas Stadelmann (eds), Standards on Judicial
Independence (Editions Weblaw 2012) III. See also ECOSOC, Bangalore Principles of
Judicial Conduct (n 985) [value 1].
1022 UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers
(11August 2014) UN Doc A/69/294 [28, 40]. See also UNHRC, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (9April 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/
14/26 [17] (where the Special Rapporteur held that the independence of the judiciary is ‘a
core component of (. . .) the rule of law’).
1023 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10December 1948 UNGA Res 217
A(III) (UDHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted
16December 1966, entered into force 23March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). Art 11
of the UN Convention Against Corruption requires State Parties to ‘take measures to
strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the
judiciary’. See, United Nations Convention Against Corruption (adopted 31October
2003, entered into force 14December 2005) 2349 UNTS 41. For an overview of binding
treaty law guaranteeing judicial independence, see Gass, Kiener and Stadelmann (n 1021)
1-28.
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independence of judges and lawyers’ as an ‘international custom and general
principle of law recognized by the international community (. . .) in the sense of
article 38 (1) (b) and (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’.1024
Several soft law sources further flesh out what is implied by the principle of
judicial independence such as, eg, the Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary or the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.1025
Regarding the content of the principle, art 14 (1) ICCPR contains the right to
a hearing by an independent tribunal and constitutes an institutional guarantee,
which primarily relates to the independence of the judiciary from the executive
and, to a lesser degree, the legislative branch.1026 In its General Comment on art
14 ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee qualified the independence of a
tribunal as an ‘absolute right that is not subject to any exception’.1027 Access to
an independent tribunal is guaranteed in the determination of criminal charges
or of rights and obligations in a suit at law.1028 The scope of protection of the
guarantee involves a clear demarcation of the competences of the judiciary
from the other branches of government, the immovability of judges, their safety
and legal qualification, the conditions of their appointment, removal and
dismissal, the human and material resources provided to the judiciary as well as
its ‘actual independence’ from political interference by other governmental
branches.1029 The ‘provisions of article 14 apply to all courts and tribunals
1024 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers
(24March 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/41 [14].
1025 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (n 983); ECOSOC, Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conduct (n 985).
1026 Manfred Nowak, ‘Article 14: Procedural Guarantees in Civil and Criminal Trials’ in U.N.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, N.P. Engel 2005)
paras 23, 25.
1027 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [19].
1028 For a discussion of what is understood by ‘criminal charge’ or ‘rights and obligations in a
suit at law’, see UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [15 ff] or, eg, Nowak
(n 1026) paras 16–22; Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, ‘Protection of Persons Deprived of
their Liberty and Fair Trial Guarantees’ in The Law of International Human Rights
Protection (OUP 2009) 440–443; Sangeeta Shah, ‘Detention and Trial’ in Daniel
Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, OUP 2014) 259,
271 f.
1029 On the demarcation of competences between the judiciary and the other branches of
government, see UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee
on Romania (28 July 1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.111 [10] (interference by the
executive, powers exercised by Ministry of Justice with regard to judicial matters,
including appeal process and its inspection powers of the courts). On the immovability
of judges, see UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on
Algeria (18August 1998) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.95 [14] (decree regulating
nomination, promotion and dismissal of judges compromising judicial independence and
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immovability only after 10 years of work). On the safety of judges, see UNHRCee,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Brazil (24 July 1996) UN
Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.66 [11] (threats against members of the judiciary). On the legal
qualification of judges, see UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee on Georgia (15November 2007) UN Doc CCPR/C/GEO/CO/3 [14]
(inadequate education of judges and lack of general training in international human
rights law); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on
the Republic of the Congo (25April 2000) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.118 [14] (the
Committee observed that ‘particular attention should be given to the training of judges’);
UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Sudan
(19November 1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.85 [21] (judges not selected based on
their legal qualification); UNHRCee, Comments of the Human Rights Committee on
the United States of America (7April 1995) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.50 [23]
(administration of justice by unqualified and untrained persons). On the requirements for
judicial appointments, see UNHRCee, Preliminary Observations of the Human Rights
Committee on Peru (25 July 1996) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.67 [14] (seven-year tenure
of judges with requirement of recertification for reappointment); UNHRCee, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Turkmenistan (19April 2012) UN Doc
CCPR/C/TKM/CO/1 [13] (judges appointed by the President for renewable terms of five
years); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on
Uzbekistan (25April 2005) UN Doc CCPR/CO/83/UZB [16] (appointment of judges
reviewed by executive every five years); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee on the Republic of Moldova (5August 2002) UN Doc CCPR/
CO/75/MDA [12] (‘short initial appointments for judges, beyond which they must satisfy
certain criteria in order to gain an extension of their term’); UNHRCee, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Armenia (19November 1998) UN
Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.100 [8] (election of judges by popular vote for a fixed maximum
term of six years); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee on Liechtenstein (12August 2004) UN Doc CCPR/CO/81/LIE [12] (criteria
of appointment of members to the selecting body, the casting vote of the Princely House
and the limited nature of tenure). On the removal of judges, see UNHRCee, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Zambia (3April 1996) UN Doc CCPR/
C/79Add.62 [16] (appointment and removal of Supreme Court judges by President,
subject only to ratification by National Assembly without any safeguard or inquiry by an
independent judicial tribunal); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee on Namibia (August 2004) UN Doc CCPR/CO/81/NAM [18]
(absence of mechanism or procedure for removal of judges for misconduct); UNHRCee,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Vietnam (5August 2002)
UN Doc CCPR/CO/75/VNM [10] (taking of disciplinary measures against judges
because of errors in judicial decisions). On the dismissal of judges, see UNHRCee,
Busyo et al v Democratic Republic of the Congo (Com No 933/00) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/
D/933/2000 (31 July 2003) [5.2] (dismissal of judges through presidential degree;
established procedures and safeguards for dismissal of judge not respected); UNHRCee,
Pastukhov v Belarus (Com No 814/98) UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/814/1998 (5August
2003) [7.3] (dismissal of judge of constitutional court by presidential decree before
expiry of term on the ground that a new constitution had entered into force; absence of
effective judicial protections to contest dismissal); UNHRCee, Bandaranayake v Sri
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
216
within the scope of that article whether ordinary or specialized, civilian or
military’.1030 Article 14 (1) ICCPR not only requires states to abstain from
unjustified interferences with the right but also to take positive measures in
their statutory or constitutional law to guarantee the independence of the
judiciary.1031 Beyond its focus on the separation of powers, art 14 (1) ICCPR
also seeks to guarantee the independence of the judiciary from powerful social
actors, which may include the media, industry or political parties.1032
ii. Regional Human Rights Law
The scope of protection of art 6 (1) ECHR equals that of art 14 (1) ICCPR.1033
Similarly to art 14 (1) ICCPR, art 6 (1) ECHR grants the right of access to an
independent tribunal in the determination of civil rights and obligations or
criminal charges.1034 When assessing whether a judicial body can be considered
independent from the executive and the parties to the respective case, the
European Court of Human Rights takes into account the ‘manner of
appointment of its members’, the ‘duration of their term’, ‘the existence of
guarantees against outside pressures’ and ‘whether the body presents an
appearance of independence’. Additionally, the court requires that the tribunal
Lanka (Com No 1376/05) UN Doc CCPR/C/93/D/1376/2005 (24 July 2008) [7.3]. On
the human and material resources provided to the judiciary, see UNHRCee, Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Vietnam (5August 2002) UN Doc
CCPR/CO/75/VNM [9] (‘judicial system remains weak owing to the (. . .) lack of
resources for the judiciary’); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee on Kenya (29April 2005) UN Doc CCPR/CO/83/KEN [20] (‘serious
dysfunctions in the administration of justice, owing primarily to the lack of human and
material resources’). On the actual independence of the judiciary from political
interferences by the other branches of government, see UNHRCee, General Comment
No 32 (n 1015) [19]; UNHRCee, Oló Bahamonde v Equatorial Guinea (Com
No 468/91) UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 (20October 1993) [9.4] (‘a situation
where the functions and competences of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly
distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or direct the former is incompatible
with the notion of an independent and impartial tribunal’).
1030 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [22].
1031 ibid [19].
1032 Nowak (n 1026) para 26.
1033 For an overview of the case law, see Anne Peters and Tilmann Altwicker, Europäische
Menschenrechtskonvention (2nd edn, C.H. Beck 2012) § 19 paras 23f; Christoph
Grabenwarter and Katharina Pabel, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (6th edn, C.
H. Beck 2016) § 24 paras 34–40.
1034 For a discussion of what is understood by the notions of ‘civil rights and obligations’ and
‘criminal charge’, see David Harris and others (eds), Law of the European Convention on
Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 373–398.
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‘must have jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the
dispute before it’.1035
Article 8 ACHR, the right to a fair trial, was also inspired by art 14
ICCPR.1036 In the development of the right to an independent tribunal as
established in art 8 (1) ACHR, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was
guided by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and by UN soft
law, in particular the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.1037
When assessing whether the guarantee of judicial independence has been
interfered with, the Inter-American Court focuses on the independence of the
judiciary from the other governmental branches and takes into account the
conditions of selection, appointment, promotion, removal, security of tenure,
transfer, dismissal, terms of office and remuneration of the members of the
judiciary and inquires whether outside pressure has been exerted on them.1038
1035 ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v Great Britain (App No 7819/77, 7878/77) 28 June 1984
[78]; ECtHR, Bryan v United Kingdom (App No 19178/91) 22November 1995 [37];
ECtHR, Findlay v United Kingdom (App No 22107/93) 25 February 1997 [73]; ECtHR,
Olujic´ v. Croatia (App No 22330/05) 5 February 2009 [38]. See also ECtHR, Neumeister
v Austria (App No 1936/63) 27 June 1968 [24] (independence from the executive and the
parties to the case); ECtHR, Ringeisen v Austria (App No 2614/65) 16 July 1971 [95]
(independence from the executive and the parties to the case); ECtHR, Sramek v Austria
(App No 8790/79) 22October 1984 [38] (length of the term of office, possibility of
removal and body appointing members of regional authority); ECtHR, Lithgow ao v
Great Britain (App No 9006/80) 8 July 1986 [202] (appointment of members of an
arbitration tribunal by the executive); ECtHR, Beaumartin v France (App No 15287/89)
24November 1994 [38] (independence from instructions of the executive); ECtHR,
Lauko v Slovakia (App No 26138/95) 2 September 1998 [64] (appointment by executive,
lack of guarantees against outside pressures and appearance of independence); ECtHR,
Kadubec v Slovakia (App No 27061/95) 2 September 1998 [57] (appointment by
executive, lack of guarantees against outside pressures and appearance of independence);
ECtHR, Luka v Romania (App No 34197/02) 21 July 2009 [44] (conditions of removal
from office); ECtHR, Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v Poland (App No 23614/08)
20November 2010 [53] (conditions of removal from office).
1036 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) paras 25.26 & 25.28.
1037 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.20 referring
to IACtHR, Constitutional Court v Peru (n 737) [73–75]; Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737)
191 referring to IACtHR, Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al) v Ecuador
(Judgment of 28August 2013; Series C No 268) (Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs) [188].
1038 See Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.20 citing
IACtHR, Constitutional Court v Peru (n 737) [75]; IACtHR, Castillo Petruzzi v Peru
(Judgment of 30May 1999; Series C No 52) (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) [130–
132]; IACtHR, Cantoral Benavides v Peru (Judgment of 18August 2000; Series C
No 69) (Merits) [114f]; IACtHR, Berenson Mejía v Peru (Judgment of 25November
2004; Series C No 119) (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) [193]; IACtHR, Apitz Barbera
et al v Venezuela (Judgment of 5August 2008; Series C No 182) (Preliminary Objection,
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Article 26 ACHPR requires states parties to the African Charter to guarantee
the independence of the courts. Whereas ‘Article 7 focuses on the individual’s
right to be heard, Article 26 speaks of the institutions which are essential to
give meaning and content to that right’.1039 In its interpretation of the guarantee,
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a quasi-judicial body
with exclusively advisory competences, is guided, ia, by the Basic Principles on
the Independence of the Judiciary, art 30 of the International Bar Association’s
Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, its own resolutions and
international precedent on similar provisions in other human rights
instruments.1040 Accordingly, it interprets the right to independent courts to
pertain to the office terms of judges, their appointment, security, removal and
suspension and requires the absence of executive control as well as the
guarantee of judicial independence in constitutional or statutory law.1041 In its
Merits, Reparations and Costs); IACtHR, Reverrón Trujillo v Venezuela (Judgment of
30 June 2009; Series C No 197) (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs); IACtHR, Usón Ramírez v Venezuela (Judgment 20November 2009; Series C
No 207) (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs). See also Cecilia
Medina, ‘Right to Due Process’ in The American Convention on Human Rights
(Intersentia 2014) para 35 and Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 191 citing IACtHR,
Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al) v Ecuador (n 1037); IACtHR, Supreme
Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al) v Ecuador (Judgment of 23August 2013; Series
C No 266) (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs).
1039 AComHPR, Civil Liberties v Nigeria, Com No 129/94 (1995) [15].
1040 Manby (n 737) 171, 206, 212.
1041 AComHPR, Wetsh’okonda Koso ao v Congopara, Com No 281/03 (2008) [79] (‘the
independence of a court refers to the independence of the court vis-à-vis the Executive.
This implies the consideration of the mode of designation of its members, the duration of
their mandate, the existence of protection against external pressures and the issue of real
or perceived independence: as the saying goes “justice must not only be done: it must be
seen to be done”’). See also AComHPR, International Pen ao v Nigeria, Com Nos
137/94, 139/94, 154/96, 161/97 (1998) (military control over special tribunal, ousting of
possibility to appeal to ordinary courts); AComHPR, Amnesty International ao v Sudan,
Com Nos 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 (1999) [68f] (dismissal of judges which were
opposed to establishment of special courts and military tribunals by executive);
AComHPR, Media Rights Agenda a.o. v Nigeria, Com Nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94,
152/96 (1999) [61f] (independence of courts requires that their judgments are
implemented); AComHPR, Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (n 737) [66] (trial and
conviction of civilian by special military tribunal presided over by serving military
officer); AComHPR, Dawda Jawara v The Gambia, Com Nos 147/95, 149/96 (2000)
[74] (ousting of competence of ordinary courts and ignoring of court judgments by
military government); AComHPR, Lawyers of Human Rights v Swaziland, Com
No 251/02 (2005) [55–57] (dismissal of judges, jurisdiction of courts ousted, judicial
powers exercised by executive); AComHPR, Mgwanga Gunme a.o. v Cameroon, Com
No 266/03 (2009) [209–211] (excessive executive control over judiciary through
appointments, promotions and transfer policy etc of judges; President and Minister of
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Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance,
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights elaborates in detail
on the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, the question of military and special
tribunals, appointment- and removal procedures, security of tenure, adequate
remuneration, disciplinary and administrative procedures against judicial
officers and the freedom of expression and association of judicial officers as
preconditions of an independent tribunal.1042
As can be inferred from this comparative analysis, regional and international
human rights law has developed a comparable notion of the material scope of
the guarantee of an independent tribunal which also depends on the reliance of
human rights bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights, the general comments, concluding
observations and jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee as well as
on pertinent international soft law sources. Besides its inclusion in the UDHR
and the ICCPR, this process of cross-fertilisation among different human rights
regimes may be said to have further contributed to the guarantee approaching
universality.1043
c. The UN Understanding of Judicial Independence
A number of UN documents that focus on the re-establishment of rule of law
structures in conflict-, post-conflict- or developing countries emphasise the
relevance of the principle of judicial independence in this particular context.1044
The Secretary-General prominently invoked the principle in his definition of the
rule of law.1045 He held that the rule of law ‘refers to a principle of governance in
which all persons, institutions and entities (. . .) are accountable to laws that are
(. . .) independently adjudicated’.1046 In the same report he also observed that ‘at
Justice preside over Higher Judicial Council); AComHPR, Kenneth Good v Republic of
Botswana, Com No 313/95 (2010) [180] (law prohibiting judicial review of presidential
acts).
1042 AComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance
in Africa (2003).
1043 Nollkaemper, ‘Universality’ (n 706) para 1 (‘In its traditional meaning, the universality of
international law refers to international law as a global system of law, which is of
worldwide validity and is binding on all States.’).
1044 UNDPKO, Handbook Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (n 899) 94; OHCHR,
Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-conflict States: Monitoring Legal Systems (2006) 2; UNSG,
Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: UNApproach to Rule of Law Assistance (2008)
6; UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 172.
1045 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [5].
1046 ibid [6].
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
220
the institutional core of systems based on the rule of law is a strong judiciary,
which is independent and adequately empowered, financed, equipped and
trained to uphold human rights in the administration of justice’ and
recommended that peace agreements and Security Council resolutions and
mandates should ‘require that all judicial processes, courts and prosecutions be
(. . .) consistent with established international standards for the independence
and impartiality of the judiciary’.1047 These invocations of the principle of
judicial independence, however, do not amount to a definition.
The same applies to other UN sources, which neither provide a definition of
the principle. If they invoke the guarantee, they usually offer only superficial
references to its content such as, eg, the UNDPKO Handbook on United
Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, which held that judicial
independence requires that the judiciary be impartial and free from interference
and that its decisions be respected.1048 Some UN sources, however, describe
what constitutes an encroachment upon the guarantee of judicial independence,
invoking undue interferences by the executive branch or other powerful social
actors, low or unpaid wages, corruption and bribery or unsatisfactory
disciplinary procedures.1049 Or they identify what is required to guarantee
judicial independence such as, eg, freedom from coercion, pressure or
influence from the executive or other actors, the strengthening of constitutional
or legislative guarantees of judicial independence, support for judicial bodies to
address separation of power issues, enhancing judicial control over
administrative- and budgetary issues, improving conditions of service (eg
salaries) or addressing matters related to appointment, tenure, discipline, bribes
and the conduct of judicial trials.1050
Even though these observations do not amount to a definition, one can
clearly see that UN documents take their inspiration from the legal concept of
an independent tribunal in international human rights law, which is in line with
the principle that UN rule of law assistance should be based on international
1047 ibid [35; 64].
1048 UNDPKO, Handbook Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (n 899) 94.
1049 UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components in Multidimensional Peace Operations:
Strengthening the Rule of Law (2006) 4; OHCHR, Monitoring Legal Systems (n 1044)
24; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on Justice Components in United Nations Peace Operations
(2009) 7; UNDPKO/OHCHR, United Nations Rule of Law Indicators (n 935) 51;
UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 172.
1050 UNDPKO, Handbook Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (n 899) 96;
UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 32f; SG Guidance Note UN Rule of
Law Assistance (n 1044) 5f; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on Justice Components (n 1049) 7;
UNDPKO/OHCHR, United Nations Rule of Law Indicators (n 935) 73; UNDPKO,
Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 172.
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norms and standards.1051 UN documents do, thus, not suggest the existence of
an autonomous UN understanding of the concept of judicial independence,
which could then serve as an alternative point of reference for Council
resolutions referring to the principle.
d. Situations causing Council References to the Concept of
Judicial Independence
To determine whether the Council developed an understanding of what the
guarantee of judicial independence implies and when it is affected, one has to
have a closer look at the circumstances that motivated the Council to invoke the
guarantee. Conflict- and post-conflict scenarios in response to which the
Council issued the majority of its resolutions referring to the principle of
judicial independence, are particularly prone to threats to the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary. The executive, powerful social actors or persons
involved in organised crime may try to influence judges and prosecutors, low
or unpaid wages often contribute to corruption and bribery, the justice system
may suffer from ethnic, religious or political bias and disciplinary or oversight
mechanisms for judicial actors may be absent.1052 The accumulation of Council
resolutions requiring the establishment of an independent judiciary in conflict-
and post-conflict societies suggests that the Council considers the guarantee as
a crucial element of rule of law systems that foster peace and security. Secretary-
General reports preceding Council resolutions that refer to the guarantee of
judicial independence provide useful background information when trying to
determine under what circumstances the Council considers the guarantee of
judicial independence affected or in need of reform. Knowing under what
circumstances the Council views the guarantee implied may provide an idea of
the Council’s understanding of the content of the rule of law principle of judicial
independence.
In several reports, the Secretary-General considered the independence of the
judiciary as affected or undermined such as in Timor-Leste, Haiti, Guinea-
Bissau, Burundi, Libya or the Central African Republic.1053 Often, the
1051 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [9f].
1052 UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 18.
1053 On Timor-Leste, see SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [73]. On Haiti, see UNSC Report of
the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti’ (2004) UN Doc S/
2004/300 [35] and UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2015) UN Doc S/
2015/667 [27]. On Guinea-Bissau, see UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report
of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau’ (2015) UN Doc S/
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Secretary-General also advised the Security Council to mandate UN peace
operations to assist national governments in the re-establishment of an
independent judiciary. He did so in Sudan, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Chad.1054
The Council usually followed the Secretary-General’s recommendations in this
respect.1055 There were, however, also instances where the Council issued
measures with regard to the guarantee of judicial independence, when the
Secretary-General did not propose such action. In such cases, the Council was
more proactive and invoked the guarantee of judicial independence where the
Secretary-General did indeed report problems in that regard but did not invite
the Council to issue measures addressing them. This can be observed with
respect to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Libya.1056 In some cases, the Council
2015/37 [53]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General
on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated
Peacebuilding Office in that country’ (2011) UN Doc S/2011/655 [39]. On Burundi, see
UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Burundi’ (2006) UN Doc S/2006/429 [41]. On Libya, see
UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Support Mission in Libya’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/516 [96]. On the CAR, see
SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [63].
1054 On Sudan, see UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General
on the Sudan’ (2005) UN Doc S/2005/57 [56f]. On Sierra Leone, see UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone’ (2005) UN Doc S/2005/273/Add.2 [6]. On Burundi, see UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Operation in Burundi’ (2006) UN Doc S/2006/429/Add.1 [4]. On Chad, see
UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and
the Central African Republic’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/488 [36].
1055 On Sudan, see UNSC Res 1590 (24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1590 [4 (a) (viii)]. On
Sierra Leone, see UNSC Res 1620 (31August 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1620 [1 (a) (v)]. On
Burundi, see UNSC Res 1719 (25October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719 [2 (d)]. On Chad,
the Central African Republic and the subregion see UNSC Res 1778 (25 September 2007)
UN Doc S/RES/1778 [2 (g)].
1056 On Liberia, compare UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council on Liberia’ (2003) UN Doc S/2003/875 [50] with
UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509 [preamble, indent 7] (in this
case, however, the Council reacted in the weakest form possible, urging the government
in the preamble of the resolution to ensure that the establishment of an independent
judiciary be among its highest priorities). On Sierra Leone, compare UNSC Report of
the Secretary-General, ‘Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone’ (2002) UN Doc S/2002/679 [24], UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone’ (2002) UN Doc S/2002/987 [45] with UNSC Res 1436
(24 September 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1436 [7]. On Haiti, compare SG Report S/
2004/300 (n 1053) [38] with UNSC Res 1542 (30April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1542
[preamble, indent 4] (in this resolution again, the Council only urged the government in
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even addressed deficiencies with regard to the independence of the judiciary
although preceding Secretary-General reports did not refer to problems in that
regard at all. Such was the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.1057
A comparative look at the situations in response to which the Council
invoked the guarantee of judicial independence reveals striking similarities with
the circumstances that are considered encroachments upon the guarantee of an
‘independent tribunal’ according to art 14 (1) ICCPR by the UN Human Rights
Committee and with the requirements advanced by the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. To the extent that regional human
rights law corresponds widely with international human rights law in its
interpretation of the respective guarantee, Council invocations of the principle
also coincide largely with a regional understanding of its scope. The following
section will depict the circumstances that preceded Council references to the
principle of judicial independence and that are also considered encroachments
on the guarantee of an independent tribunal by international and regional
human rights bodies.
i. Actual Independence from Political Interference
The UN Human Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteur both consider
the ‘actual independence’ from political interference by the other branches of
government a crucial element of the guarantee of judicial independence.1058
the preamble to ensure that the establishment of an independent judiciary be among its
highest priorities). On Libya, compare SG Report S/2013/516 (n 1053) [46] with UNSC
Res 2144 (14March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2144 [6 (b)].
1057 On the DRC, see UNSC Res 1493 (28 July 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1493 [11]; UNSC Res
2147 (28March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147 [5 (j)]. On Sierra Leone, see UNSC Res
1537 (30March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1537 [3]; UNSC Res 1562 (17 September 2004)
UN Doc S/RES/1562 [6]. On Guinea-Bissau, see UNSC Res 1580 (22December 2004)
UN Doc S/RES/1580 [2 (h)] and UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United
Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/969 [26;
33] (even though the Secretary-General issued observations and recommendations with
regard to the judiciary, he did not specifically refer to problems with regard to its
independence).
1058 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [19]; UNHRCee, Oló Bahamonde v
Equatorial Guinea (n 1029) [9.4] (‘a situation where the functions and competences of
the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or where the latter is able
to control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion of an independent and
impartial tribunal’); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Zambia (n 1029) [16]
(appointment and removal of Supreme Court judges by President, subject only to
ratification by National Assembly without any safeguard or inquiry by an independent
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The Council invoked the guarantee of judicial independence repeatedly when the
Secretary-General reported interferences of this kind. In Liberia, eg, the
Secretary-General observed that the judiciary ‘suffered from political
interference’.1059 Similarly, he reported about interferences of ‘administrative
and security authorities in judicial matters’ in Chad.1060 In the Central African
Republic he observed a lack of guarantees that national magistrates could render
justice without fear of political interference.1061 In Sudan, the internal conflict
had ‘manipulated and politicised the judiciary’ and in Guinea-Bissau, the
politico-military elite had monopolised the state and effectively abolished the
separation of powers during decades of instability.1062 At times, preceding
problems with regard to the actual independence of the judiciary also surfaced in
the form of positive observations such as in Timor-Leste, where the Secretary-
General considered it encouraging that all political leaders, including the Prime
Minister, emphasised a need to respect judicial processes with regard to trials of
the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.1063 Equally in
Haiti, the Secretary-General observed approvingly that the Superior Council of
the Judiciary had taken steps to consolidate its authority over the judiciary in an
effort to significantly reduce political interference in judicial affairs.1064
ii. Threats to the Safety of Judges and Judicial Personnel
Threats to the safety of judges and judicial personnel are considered an
interference with the guarantee of an independent tribunal according to art 14
(1) ICCPR by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Special Rapporteur on
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers.1065 Secretary-General reports
preceding Council resolutions which invoke the guarantee of judicial
independence regularly observed interferences of this type.
judicial tribunal); Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/11/41 (n 1024) [18f]. See also Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (n 983) [principles 2 & 4].
1059 SG Report S/2003/875 (n 1056) [24].
1060 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/217
[23].
1061 SG Report S/2014/562 (n 940) [52].
1062 On Sudan, see UNSC ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to
the Secretary-General’ (2005) UN Doc S/2005/60 [432]. On Guinea-Bissau, see SG
Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [49].
1063 SG Report S/2011/32 (n 947) [14].
1064 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/493 [34].
1065 UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Brazil (n 1029) [11] (threats against members of
the judiciary); Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/11/41 (n 1024) [78f]. See also Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (n 983) [principle 2].
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In Sudan, eg, judges that disagreed with the government were reported
to suffer harassment.1066 In Eastern Chad, the Secretary-General noted
problematic security conditions for magistrates, while the judicial process in
Guinea-Bissau regarding the political assassination of a former President and
Chief of General Staff faced security constraints.1067 In Libya, the safety of
judicial personnel was seriously compromised by assassinations of and death
threats against prosecutors and judges as well as by attacks on courthouses.1068
In the Central African Republic, the Secretary-General observed that there were
no guarantees in place that national magistrates could render justice in an
impartial manner without fear of physical violence and reported threats to
magistrates and their families.1069
iii. Judicial Corruption
Judicial corruption is incompatible with the guarantee of an independent
tribunal according to art 14 (1) ICCPR as interpreted by the UN Human Rights
Committee and the Special Rapporteur.1070 Incidents of judicial corruption were
reported repeatedly by the Secretary-General prior to the issuance of Council
resolutions that invoked the guarantee of judicial independence. In Liberia, eg,
the Secretary-General reported that the judiciary suffered from corrupt practices
under the Taylor government.1071 Equally in Haiti, he observed that the judicial
1066 Report International Commission of Inquiry Darfur S/2005/60 (n 1062) [432].
1067 On Eastern Chad, see SG Report S/2010/217 (n 1060) [23]. On Guinea-Bissau, see
UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated
Peacebuilding Office in that country’ (2011) UN Doc S/2011/370 [33].
1068 SG Report S/2013/516 (n 1053) [38]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’ (2014) UN Doc
S/2014/131 [20; 40f]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’ (2014) UN Doc S/2014/653
[53].
1069 SG Report S/2014/562 (n 940) [52]; SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [24]. In UNSC Res
2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [34 (d) (vii)], the Council further reacted to
this particular circumstance by mandating MINUSCA to provide security for magistrates.
1070 UNHRCee, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Kyrgyzstan
(23April 2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/KGZ/CO/2 [19]. See also the special report on
judicial corruption, UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers (13August 2012) UN Doc A/67/305 and Report Special Rapporteur
A/69/294 (n 1022) [40–42]. See also, UNHRC, Final Report of the Human Rights
Council Advisory Committee on the Issue of the Negative Impact of Corruption on the
Enjoyment of Human Rights (5 January 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/73 [19].
1071 SG Report S/2003/875 (n 1056) [24].
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
226
sector suffered from endemic corruption.1072 In Timor-Leste, the Secretary-
General determined that checks and balances provided by effective and
transparent oversight- and accountability mechanisms were essential to
combat corruption and improper practices among justice officials.1073 Also in
Guinea-Bissau, the Secretary-General observed that the judiciary was highly
susceptible to corruption and bribery.1074
iv. Insufficiently Qualified Judicial Personnel
Secretary-General reports preceding Council resolutions that invoked the
guarantee of judicial independence also observed problems with regard to the
legal qualification and professional training of judicial personnel. Deficiencies
in this regard are considered potential curtailments of the guarantee of an
independent tribunal according to art 14 (1) ICCPR by the UN Human Rights
Committee and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers.1075 In Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General observed that judicial
structures suffered from a lack of qualified personnel.1076 In Burundi he held
that critically needed reforms involved the development of a cadre of qualified
judicial workers.1077 In Timor-Leste, a need for continuous and specialised
training was noted and the justice system was in need of sufficiently qualified
officials as they, ia, lacked an understanding of the applicable laws.1078 In
1072 SG Report S/2004/300 (n 1053) [35]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2016) UN
Doc S/2016/753 [62].
1073 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [83].
1074 SG Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [49].
1075 UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Georgia (n 1029) [14] (absence of adequate
education of judges and general training in international human rights law); UNHRCee,
Concluding Observations Vietnam (n 1029) [9] (‘judicial system remains weak owing to
the scarcity of qualified, professionally trained lawyers’); UNHRCee, Concluding
Observations Republic of the Congo (n 1029) [14] (the Committee observed that
‘particular attention should be given to the training of judges’); UNHRCee, Concluding
Observations Sudan (n 1029) [21] (judges not selected based on their legal qualification);
UNHRCee, Comments on United States of America (n 1029) [23] (administration of
justice by unqualified and untrained persons); Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/11/41
(n 1024) [80–84]. See also, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
(n 983) [principles 10 & 13] (holding that ‘[p]ersons selected for judicial office shall be
individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law’ and
that the ‘[p]romotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on
objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience’).
1076 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/228 [24].
1077 SG Report S/2006/429 (n 1053) [41].
1078 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 82].
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Eastern Chad, persistent problems concerned the inadequacy or absence of
training of judicial personnel, while it was estimated in the Central African
Republic that 70 per cent of all criminal cases were heard by magistrates
without adequate professional training, owing in part to a lack of a training
curricula and skilled trainers at the National School of Administration and
Judicial Studies.1079
v. Lack of Human and Material Resources
A lack of human and material resources, a serious restraint of the guarantee of
an independent tribunal according to the UN Human Rights Committee and the
Special Rapporteur, was identified repeatedly by Secretary-General reports prior
to the issuance of Council resolutions proposing measures with regard to the
independence of the judiciary.1080 Sierra Leone’s judicial system suffered from
severe constraints with regard to judges, magistrates and justices of the peace,
adequate logistics and infrastructure as well as from a lack of access to current
legislation and jurisprudence in codified form.1081 In Timor-Leste, the Secretary-
General assessed that access to justice had been hampered, ia, by a lack
of adequate infrastructure and human resources.1082 In Eastern Chad, the
Secretary-General determined that the financial and human resources allocated
to the justice sector were inadequate and in Libya, a shortage of judges was
observed to place an additional strain on judicial institutions that were already
facing major challenges.1083
1079 On Eastern Chad, see SG Report S/2010/217 (n 1060) [23f]. On the CAR, see SG Report
S/2016/565 (n 944) [24].
1080 UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Vietnam (n 1029) [9] (‘judicial system remains
weak owing to the (. . .) lack of resources for the judiciary’); UNHRCee, Concluding
Observations Kenya (n 1029) [20] (‘serious dysfunctions in the administration of justice,
owing primarily to the lack of human and material resources’); Report Special Rapporteur
A/HRC/11/41 (n 1024) [76f]. See also Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary (n 983) [principle 7] (holding that ‘it is the duty of each Member State to
provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions’).
1081 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’ (2003) UN Doc S/2003/321 [39]; SG Report
S/2004/228 (n 1076) [24]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-third report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’ (2004) UN Doc
S/2004/724 [31].
1082 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 82].
1083 On Eastern Chad, see SG Report S/2010/217 (n 1060) [23]. On Libya, see SG Report S/
2014/131 (n 1068) [45].
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
228
vi. Guarantee of Judicial Independence in Statutory- and Constitutional Law
Both the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Special Rapporteur expect
states to take positive measures and to guarantee judicial independence in their
statutory or constitutional law.1084 Similarly to the Special Rapporteur in his
country mission reports, the Secretary-General did not only report about
lacking legal guarantees but also noted when Constitutions did guarantee the
independence of the judiciary.1085 With regard to Sudan, the Secretary-General
observed that although the 1998 Sudanese Constitution guaranteed the
independence of the judiciary, the internal conflict of the country had
manipulated and politicised the judiciary.1086 In Libya, the Secretary-General
reported the amendment of the law on the status of the judiciary, which was
meant to enhance the independence of the judiciary by allowing for the election
of the Supreme Judicial Council by their peers.1087 In Haiti, the Secretary-
General observed that the slow progress in renewing the terms of judges
highlighted a structural weakness of the system, rooted in the Constitution and
in the law on the status of the judges, which could translate into biased
appointments and inefficient career-management processes.1088 Finally, in the
Central African Republic, the Secretary-General criticised that relevant
legislation did not guarantee the independence of the judiciary.1089
vii. Oversight- and Disciplinary Mechanisms for Judicial Personnel
Another concern with regard to the guarantee of judicial independence as
interpreted by the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Special
Rapporteur are lacking or insufficient oversight- and disciplinary mechanisms
for judicial personnel.1090 With regard to Eastern Chad, the Secretary-General
reported of MINURCAT’s support activities for the Chadian government in
1084 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [19]; Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/
11/41 (n 1024) [20–22]. See also Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
(n 983) [principle 1] (holding that ‘[t]he independence of the judiciary shall be
guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country’).
1085 Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/11/41 (n 1024) [21].
1086 Report International Commission of Inquiry Darfur S/2005/60 (n 1062) [432].
1087 SG Report S/2013/516 (n 1053) [46].
1088 SG Report S/2015/667 (n 1053) [21].
1089 SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [24].
1090 UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Republic of the Congo (n 1029) [14] (judicial
independence limited owing to the lack of independent mechanism for the discipline of
judges); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Namibia (n 1029) [18] (‘The State party
should establish an effective and independent mechanism and provide for a proper
procedure for the impeachment and removal of judges found guilty of misconduct’);
UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers
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addressing the ineffectiveness of disciplinary oversight mechanisms for the
judiciary.1091 In Timor-Leste, the Secretary-General observed that Superior
Councils responsible for maintaining standards and professional discipline
within the judiciary and codes of ethics for the judiciary needed to be further
strengthened in order to exert effective disciplinary control over judges in
accordance with international standards.1092 In Haiti, after the irregular acquittal
of two defendants, the Secretary-General held that it was of utmost importance
that the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Superior Council of the
Judiciary determined the circumstances that had led to these irregularities and
commended that in several cases of irregularities involving magistrates,
the Ministry and the Council had taken disciplinary measures against the
magistrates concerned.1093 A few months later, however, the vetting process of
magistrates stagnated, the Superior Council of the Judiciary had not approved
the rules for the evaluation of judges and the ad hoc joint vetting commission
lacked the funding to complete its work on the certification of judges, resulting
in an insufficient disciplinary oversight of judicial personnel.1094
viii. Inadequate Judicial Salaries
Inadequate judicial salaries or significant delays in the payment of judicial
wages may negatively affect the independence of the judiciary as interpreted by
the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Special Rapporteur.1095 Secretary-
General reports preceding Council resolutions referring to the independence of
the judiciary also contained references to low judicial salaries. In Guinea-
Bissau, the Secretary-General observed that the judiciary was highly
susceptible to corruption and bribery owing to low wages and frequent delays
in the payment of salaries.1096 In Timor-Leste, problems with regard to judicial
(28April 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/32 (on the connection between judicial
independence and accountability).
1091 SG Report S/2010/217 (n 1060) [23f].
1092 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [83; 90].
1093 SG Report S/2015/667 (n 1053) [27].
1094 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/225 [Annex I, para 16];
SG Report S/2016/753 (n 1072) [27; Annex, para 11].
1095 UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Georgia
(19April 2002) UN Doc CCPR/CO/74/GEO [12]; UNHRCee, Concluding Observations
of the Human Rights Committee on Tajikistan (18 July 2005) UN Doc CCPR/CO/84/TJK
[17] (‘The State party should guarantee the full independence and impartiality of the
judiciary by (. . .) remunerating judges with due regard for the responsibilities’); Report
Special Rapporteur A/HRC/11/41 (n 1024) [73–75].
1096 SG Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [49].
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salaries were evidenced by positive measures taken against them. The Secretary-
General reported the enactment of a new law, which increased the salaries of
judges, prosecutors and public defenders.1097
ix. Appointment, Dismissal and Security of Tenure
The UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Special Rapporteur both
consider adequate conditions of appointment and dismissal and security of
tenure for judges as core components of the guarantee of an independent
tribunal.1098 Council resolutions referring to problems with regard to the
independence of the judiciary were preceded by reports of the Secretary-
General of irregularities with regard to the appointment or dismissal of judges.
In Sudan, the Secretary-General observed that judges that disagreed with the
1097 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [74].
1098 UNHRCee, Preliminary Observations Peru (n 1029) [14] (seven-year tenure of judges
with requirement of recertification for reappointment); UNHRCee, Concluding
Observations Turkmenistan (n 1029) [13] (judges appointed by the President for
renewable terms of five years); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Uzbekistan
(n 1029) [16] (appointment of judges reviewed by executive every five years);
UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Republic of Moldova (n 1029) [12] (‘short initial
appointments for judges, beyond which they must satisfy certain criteria in order to gain
an extension of their term’); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Armenia (n 1029) [8]
(election of judges by popular vote for a fixed maximum term of six years); UNHRCee,
Concluding Observations Liechtenstein (n 1029) [12] (criteria of appointment of
members to the selecting body, the casting vote of the Princely House and the limited
nature of tenure); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Algeria (n 1029) [14]
(immovability of judges only after 10 years); UNHRCee, Concluding Observations
Armenia (n 1029) [8] (election of judges by popular vote for six years); UNHRCee,
Busyo et al v Democratic Republic of the Congo (n 1029) [5.2] (established procedures
and safeguards for dismissal of judge not respected); UNHRCee, Pastukhov v Belarus
(n 1029) [7.3] (dismissal of judge of constitutional court by presidential decree before
expiry of term on the ground that a new constitution had entered into force; absence of
effective judicial protections to contest dismissal); UNHRCee, Bandaranayake v Sri
Lanka (n 1029) [7.3] (dismissal of a senior judge); Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/
11/41 (n 1024) [23–34; 53–64]. See also Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary (n 983) [principles 10, 11 & 12] (holding that ‘[a]ny method of judicial
selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the
selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of
race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a
national of the country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory’ and that ‘[t]he
term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions
of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law’ and that
‘[j]udges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory
retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists’).
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government were dismissed and that a law was enacted which authorised the
President to appoint all judges in violation of the Interim National Constitution
and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan.1099 In Haiti, the Secretary-
General was concerned about appointments of judges, which did not follow
legal requirements and observed that the slow progress in the renewal of
judicial terms highlighted structural weaknesses of the system rooted in the
Constitution and in the law on the status of judges, which could translate into
biased appointments.1100
x. Military- and Special Courts
Trials of civilians in military- or special courts may cause problems with regard
to the independent administration of justice and compromise the guarantee in art
14 (1) ICCPR as interpreted by the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN
Special Rapporteur. Such trials have to be in full conformity with the
requirements of art 14 ICCPR and should remain exceptional.1101 The report of
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, preceding Council
resolutions that referred to problems with regard to judicial independence,
criticised, ia, the existence of extraordinary courts in Sudan which were under
the control of the President and applied principally to the Darfur States and
Kordofan rather than to the whole of Sudan.1102 In Libya, preceding problems
with regard to military courts became evident by the report of the Secretary-
General that the General National Congress had adopted a law abolishing the
jurisdiction of military courts over civilians.1103
1099 Report International Commission of Inquiry Darfur S/2005/60 (n 1062) [432]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’ (2006)
UN Doc S/2006/160 [54].
1100 SG Report S/2013/493 (n 1064) [34]; SG Report S/2015/667 (n 1053) [21].
1101 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [22]; Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/
11/41 (n 1024) [35f]. For case law of the UNHRCee on trials of civilians in military
courts see, eg, UNHRCee, Fals Borda et al v Colombia (Com No 46/79) UN Doc
CCPR/C/16/D/46/1979 (27 July 1982) [13.3]; UNHRCee, Kurbanov v Tajikistan (Com
No 1096/02) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/D/1096/2002 (6November 2003) [7.6]; UNHRCee,
Musaev v Uzbekistan (Com Nos 1914, 1915 and 1916/09) UN Doc CCPR/C/104/D/
1914,1915&1916/2009 (21March 2012) [2–4].
1102 Report International Commission of Inquiry Darfur S/2005/60 (n 1062) [439–449].
1103 SG Report S/2013/516 (n 1053) [45].
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e. Analysis
i. Relationship of Council Language to a Trend of Legalisation
If one tries to assess the plausibility of a trend towards the legalisation of
Council action with regard to the two elements proposed above – legalisation
on a linguistic as well as on an interpretive level – one can observe such a
process with regard to how the Council invokes the principle of judicial
independence. On a linguistic level, the Council uses precise terms that
expressly invoke a rule of law guarantee whose content enjoys a relatively
established meaning in regional and international human rights law: the
guarantee of an independent tribunal. On a level of application, the Council
seems to refer to the principle in reaction to circumstances that are considered
interferences with the guarantee of an independent tribunal by international and
regional human rights bodies. With regard to the questions as to how (the
language used) and when (in reaction to which circumstances) the Council
refers to the principle of judicial independence, a process of legalisation of
Council action – as understood here – may thus be confirmed.
ii. Contribution of Council Language to Norm Emergence
As outlined above, the concept of legalisation corresponds largely with the
requirements proposed for the contribution of Council resolutions to the
emergence of the rule of law as an international norm that shapes state
identities and interests. If the Council uses language that clearly invokes a rule
of law guarantee established in regional and international human rights law in
reaction to circumstances that are considered encroachments upon this
guarantee by regional and international human rights bodies responsible for the
interpretation of such a guarantee, it also satisfies the requirements for the
emergence of norms, ie sufficient linguistic precision, consistent invocation and
legitimacy of the standards applied. It is suggested here that these elements
determine the potential of Council resolutions to contribute to the diffusion of
an understanding of the meaning of the rule of law and its sub-guarantees, ie in
this case of the principle of judicial independence as an essential element of the
rule of law. To the extent that the criteria of legalisation are widely satisfied with
regard to Council invocations of the rule of law guarantee of an independent
judiciary, the requirements of norm emergence are also considered fulfilled.
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2. Judicial Effectiveness
a. Council Resolutions Invoking the Concept of Judicial Effectiveness
In response to several different country situations, the Council considered it
necessary that the effectiveness of judicial institutions or the judiciary system
be enhanced, strengthened or ensured.1104 In a thematic resolution on the role
of policing in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, the Council
reiterated that, ia, effective judicial institutions were necessary to lay the
foundation for sustainable peace and national development.1105 This thematic
resolution is one of the rare occasions where the Council identifies in a generic
way what purpose a judiciary that satisfies certain requirements serves. The
identified purpose corresponds with the mandate of the Council – the
maintenance of international peace – but is too imprecise to serve as a
guideline for concrete reform measures. The Council rather reminds of the
concrete context of its actions and calls attention to the fact that its institution-
building recommendations and decisions are an integral part of its peace
maintenance activities.
Most authoritatively, the Council invoked the effectiveness of the judiciary
in resolutions concerning Timor-Leste in which it mandated UNMIT to
enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary system.1106 Similarly in the Central
African Republic, the Council tasked MINUSCA to help enhance the
effectiveness of the national judicial system.1107
1104 Most Council resolutions did not clearly establish a connection between the concept of
judicial effectiveness and the rule of law. Almost all resolutions invoking a need to
enhance judicial effectiveness, however, also emphasised a need to strengthen the rule of
law. In those cases, the connection may be inferred based on a comparative reading of
Council resolutions and Secretary-General reports. UNSC Res 1867 (26 February 2009)
UN Doc S/RES/1867 [11], eg, ‘requests UNMIT to continue its efforts (. . .) to enhance
the effectiveness of the judiciary’ but does not invoke the rule of law in the same
paragraph. The Secretary-General report preceding the said resolution, however,
discussed the creation of an effective judicial system as one of the objectives under the
heading of the rule of law. See, SG Report S/2009/72 (n 957) [Annex]. Eventually, in
resolution 2301, the Council clearly established the connection between judicial
effectiveness and the rule of law when it authorised ‘MINUSCA to use its capacities to
(. . .) support for national and international justice and the rule of law: To help (. . .)
enhance the effectiveness of the national judicial (. . .) system’. See, UNSC Res 2301
(26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)].
1105 UNSC Res 2185 (20November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2185 [preamble, indent 9].
1106 UNSC Res 1802 (25 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1802 [8]; UNSC Res 1867
(26 February 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1867 [11]; UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010) UN
Doc S/RES/1912 [11]; UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1969 [13];
UNSC Res 2037 (23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037 [12].
1107 UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)].
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Non-bindingly but in the operative part of the concerned resolutions, the
Council encouraged the Haitian authorities to continue to implement justice
reform by taking the necessary steps, including through ongoing support to the
Superior Council of the Judiciary, to ensure the effectiveness of judicial
institutions.1108
Least authoritatively as only referred to in the preambular part of its
resolutions, the Council noted difficulties in Timor-Leste with a negative
impact on the effectiveness of the judicial system and called on all relevant
parties to work towards progress in this area.1109 In Haiti, the Council
recognised that the government bore particular responsibility for the further
strengthening and effective functioning of the justice system and in Liberia it
urged the government to demonstrate substantive progress in the effective
functioning of the justice sector.1110
b. Judicial Effectiveness as a Legal Concept
i. Expeditious Proceedings
(i) International Human Rights Law
If one tries to relate the notion of an effective judiciary to legal guarantees
provided for in international and regional human rights law, the right to be tried
without undue delay comes to mind. The guarantee is an element of the right to
a fair hearing in paragraph 1 of art 14 ICCPR for civil trials and provided for in
paragraph 3 (c) of the same article for criminal proceedings specifically.1111
Regarding the right of pre-trial detainees to be tried ‘within a reasonable time’,
art 14 (3) (c) ICCPR overlaps with art 9 (3) ICCPR.1112 In contrast to art 9 (3)
ICCPR, however, art 14 (3) (c) ICCPR concerns the time between arrest and
1108 UNSC Res 2070 (12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [11]; UNSC Res 2119
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [14]; UNSC Res 2180 (14October 2014) UN
Doc S/RES/2180 [16]; UNSC Res 2243 (14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [20];
UNSC Res 2313 (13October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2313 [22].
1109 UNSC Res 1410 (17May 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1410 [preamble, indent 7].
1110 On Haiti, see UNSC Res 1277 (30November 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1277 [preamble,
indent 5]. On Liberia, see UNSC Res 2190 (15December 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2190
[preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 2239 (17 September 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2239
[preamble, indent 4].
1111 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [27]. See also UNHRCee, Muñoz
Hermoza v Peru (Com No) UN Doc CCPR/C/34/D/203/1986 (4November 1988) [11.3]
(breach of art 14(1) ICCPR).
1112 Nowak (n 1026) para 52.
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trial irrespective of detention.1113 The right to expeditious proceedings applies to
the time between the moment an individual is informed of a criminal charge
against it or the initiation of civil proceedings and the issuance of a final
decision by an (if existent) appeal court.1114 Importantly, the guarantee imposes
requirements on states regarding the efficient organisation of their judicial
systems.1115 On that note, the UN Human Rights Committee advised the
Croatian government to reform its judicial system, ia by simplifying its judicial
procedures and by training its judges and court staff in efficient case
management techniques in order to address a heavy backlog of court cases.1116
This manifestation of the guarantee relates closely to the context in which the
Council issues resolutions invoking the effectiveness of the judiciary.
The concrete evaluation of whether a delay was undue or whether
proceedings took place within a reasonable time depends on the circumstances
of the particular case.1117 To assess whether a delay in the proceedings was
undue, several criteria are taken into account such as the complexity of the
legal matter, the length of all stages of the proceedings, the effects of the delay
on the individual, the existence of remedies to accelerate the proceedings and
the outcome of appeal proceedings.1118
(ii) Regional Human Rights Law
Article 6 (1) ECHR provides for a similar right as art 14 ICCPR, ie a hearing
and judgment within a reasonable time.1119 It guarantees the effectiveness of
judicial decisions, which relates to their effective and prompt execution.1120 As
1113 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, ‘Right to a Fair Trial – Article 14’ in The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2013) para 14.86.
1114 Louise Doswald-Beck and Robert Kolb, Judicial Process and Human Rights (NP Engel
Publisher 2004) 212; Shah (n 1028) 277.
1115 Shah (n 1028) 277.
1116 UNHRCee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Croatia
(30April 2001) UN Doc CCPR/CO/71/HRV [16]. See also UNHRCee, Lumanog and
Santos v Philippines (Com No 1466/06) UN Doc CCPR/C/92/D/1466/2006 (21April
2008) [8.5] (‘State parties have an obligation to organize their system of administration
of justice in such a manner as to ensure an effective and expeditious disposal of the
cases.’).
1117 Nowak (n 1026) para 53.
1118 Shah (n 1028) 277 citing UNHRCee, Deisl v Austria (Com No 1060/02) UN Doc CCPR/
C/81/D/1060/2002 (23August 2004) [11.6]. See also, eg, UNHRCee, Wolf v Panama
(Com No 289/88) UN Doc CCPR/C/44/D/289/1988 (26March 1992) [6.4].
1119 Nowak (n 1026) para 52.
1120 See, Venice Commission, ‘Rule of Law Checklist’ (11–12March 2016) 27 (with
references to the relevant case law of the ECtHR on the effectiveness of judicial
decisions).
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art 14 (1) ICCPR, art 6 (1) ECHR requires that a state organise its judicial
system in a way that enables judicial proceedings to take place within a
reasonable time.1121 This involves, similarly to art 14 (1) ICCPR, the duty of
the state to organise its judicial system in a manner to avoid, eg, a backlog in
court cases of a dimension that affects the right in art 6 (1) ECHR.1122 When
assessing whether a state complies with its fair trial obligations under the
ECHR, the Venice Commission inquires whether proceedings are started and
judicial decisions made without undue delay as required by art 6 (1) ECHR,
whether there is a remedy against an undue length of judicial proceedings as
required by art 13 read in conjunction with art 6 (1) ECHR and whether the
right to timely access court documents and files is ensured for litigants as
required by art 6 (3) (c) ECHR in criminal matters.1123 The period of time
assessed under art 6 (1) ECHR starts with the initiation of civil proceedings or
the moment when a person is charged in criminal proceedings.1124 Similarly to
the UN Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights
considers ‘the circumstances of the case’ and has ‘regard to the complexity of
the case, the conduct of the parties and of the authorities, and the importance of
what is at stake for the applicant in the litigation’ when determining whether the
delay of judicial proceedings has been unreasonable.1125
Also the ACHR in its art 8 (1) contains the right to a trial within a reasonable
time. The relevant time encompasses the entire proceedings until a ‘final and
firm judgment is delivered and the jurisdiction thereby ceases’.1126 Comparable
1121 Grabenwarter and Pabel (n 1033) § 24 para 84 citing, ia, ECtHR, Philis (No 2) v Greece
(App No 19773/92) 27 June 1997 [40]; ECtHR, Podbielski v Poland (App No 27916/95)
30October 1998 [38]; ECtHR, Rawa v Poland (App No 38804/97) 14 January 2003 [53];
ECtHR, Hennig v Austria (App No 41444/98) 2October 2003 [38]; ECtHR, Sürmeli v
Germany (App No 75529/01) 8 June 2006 [129]; ECtHR, Svinarenko u Slyadnev v
Russia (App Nos 32541/08 & 43441/08) 17 July 2014 [143f].
1122 See, eg, ECtHR, Zimmermann and Steiner v Switzerland (App No 8737/79) 13 July 1983
[27–32]; ECtHR, Muti v Italy (App No 14146/88) 23March 1994 [15] or ECtHR,
Süssmann v Germany (App No 20024/92) 16 September 1996 [55].
1123 Venice Commission, ‘Rule of Law Checklist’ (n 1120) 26.
1124 Grabenwarter and Pabel (n 1033) § 24 para 81.
1125 See, eg, ECtHR, Klein v Germany (App No 33379/96) 27 July 2000 [36]. See
Grabenwarter and Pabel (n 1033) § 24 para 82 for a summary of the case law of the
ECtHR on these criteria.
1126 Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 183 citing IACtHR, Tarazona Arrieta and others v Peru
(Judgment of 15October 2014; Series C No 286) (Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs) [98] and IACtHR, López Álvarez v Honduras (Judgment of
1 February 2006; Series C No 141) (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) [129] (on the
beginning of the relevant time with respect to criminal processes) and IACtHR, Tibi v
Ecuador (Judgment of 7 September 2004; Series No 114) (Preliminary Objections,
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to the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights observed that ‘a reasonable
length of time for the proceedings as allowed by Article 8 should be measured
according to a series of factors such as the complexity of the case, the behavior
of the accused, and the diligence of the competent authorities in their conduct of
the proceedings’.1127 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights made clear
that the concept of ‘reasonable time’ is closely inspired by the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights and that art 8 (1) ACHR is ‘equivalent in
principle to Article 6’ of the ECHR.1128 In Valle Jaramillo v Colombia, the court
further added a fourth determining factor, ie the ‘adverse effect of the duration
of the proceedings on the judicial situation of the person involved in it’.1129
Article 7 (5) ACHR which requires that a detained person ‘be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released
without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings’ is inspired by the
same principle as art 8 (1) ACHR. Article 7 (5) ACHR, however, sets a stricter
standard with regard to what constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ as it applies to ‘the
deprivation of liberty for the accused’ and thus justifies priority treatment.1130
Article 7 (1) (d) of the ACHPR also guarantees a trial within a reasonable
time. The guarantee is reinforced by the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights’ Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial which
guarantees that ‘persons arrested or detained shall be brought promptly before a
judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released’ and that ‘in the
determination of charges against individuals, the individual shall be entitled in
particular to be tried within a reasonable time’.1131 What exactly constitutes a
reasonable time is determined with regard to the concrete circumstances of the
case but indefinite or extended detention without charge or trial clearly violates
the guarantee.1132 In determining what constitutes a reasonable time, the
Merits, Reparations, and Costs) [168] (with regard to the beginning of the relevant time of
administrative procedures).
1127 IACHR, Giménez v Argentina (Case No 11.245, Report No 12/96) (1March 1996) [111].
For references to the relevant case law of the IACtHR on the notion of ‘complexity of the
matter’, see Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 184 f.
1128 IACtHR, Genie Lacayo v Nicaragua (Judgment of 29 January 1997) (n 737) [77].
1129 IACtHR, Valle Jaramillo and others v Colombia (Judgment of 27November 2008; Series
C No 192) (Merits, Reparations and Costs) [155].
1130 IACHR, Giménez v Argentina (n 1127) [110].
1131 AComHPR, Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992) [2(c) & (e)(ii)].
1132 Manby (n 737) 171, 204 citing AComHPR, Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria, Com
No 153/96 (1999) [20] (failure to bring charges within two years of detention on
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Commission is guided by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
It closely follows the European court with regard to the criteria that determine
whether a delay was unreasonable and in the position that a backlog in court
cases cannot justify an encroachment upon the provision but rather constitutes
an encroachment itself.1133
ii. Right to an Effective Remedy
(i) International Human Rights Law
When approaching the terms of an effective judicial- or judiciary system or
judicial institutions from a legal perspective, the right to an effective remedy as
provided for in international and regional human rights law further comes to
mind. Universally, art 8 UDHR provides the right of everyone to ‘an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law’. The right is also enshrined in
art 2 (3) ICCPR and grants right holders ‘accessible and effective remedies’ in
national law to vindicate the rights granted to them in the Covenant.1134 As
such, the provision presupposes the violation of a Covenant right and is, thus,
not a stand-alone right.1135 The guarantee, of course, entails particular
requirements for the judiciary. States parties need to establish, ia, ‘appropriate
judicial (. . .) mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under
suspicion of serious crime violated art 7 (1) (d) ACHPR); AComHPR, Annette Pagnoulle
(on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon, Com No 39/90 (1997) [19] (two years’
delay affected complainant’s ability to work in his profession and violated art 7 (1) (d)
ACHPR); AComHPR, Mouvement Burkinabé des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples v
Burkina Faso, Com No 204/97 (2001) [40] (fifteen years without action being taken in
case of suspension, discharge and removal of magistrates violated art 7 (1) (d) ACHPR).
See also AComHPR, Alhassan Abubakar v Ghana, Com No 103/93 (1996) [12] (seven
years’ detention without trial violated art 7 (1) (d) ACHPR); AComHPR, Zimbabwe
Lawyers for Human Rights and another v Zimbabwe, Com No 293/04 (2008) [134] (no
violation of art 7 (1) (d) ACHPR as complainants had failed to file processes
expeditiously and/or failed to file their heads of arguments as required by the court);
AComHPR, Huri-Laws v Nigeria, Com No 225/98 (2000) (refusal and/or negligence on
part of the respondent state to bring complainant promptly before a judge or other judicial
officer for trial violated art 7 (1) ACHPR); AComHPR, Odjouoriby v Benin, Com
No 199/97 (2004) (proceedings pending before appeal court were unduly prolonged and
violated art 7 (1) (d) ACHPR).
1133 AComHPR, Article 19 v Eritrea (n 737) [97, 99].
1134 UNHRCee, General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant (26March 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add. 13 [15].
1135 Joseph and Castan (n 1113) para 25.07 ff.
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domestic law’.1136 According to the UN Human Rights Committee, ‘the
enjoyment of the rights recognized under the Covenant can be effectively
assured by the judiciary in many different ways, including direct applicability
of the Covenant, application of comparable constitutional or other provisions of
law, or the interpretive effect of the Covenant in the application of national
law’.1137 For a remedy to be effective, allegations of human rights violations
need to be investigated ‘promptly, thoroughly and effectively through
independent and impartial bodies’.1138 The notion of effectiveness in this
context is thus closely tied to other institutional guarantees of the Covenant
such as, eg, the impartiality and independence of judicial bodies. Measures
required to address violations of Covenant rights involve ‘restitution,
rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public
memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and
practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights
violations’, ‘measures to prevent a recurrence of a violation’ or ‘provisional or
interim measures to avoid continuing violations’.1139 In its focus on the duty to
provide and enforce remedies, the guarantee is, ia, directed at fighting
impunity – a central concern of UN peace interventions in conflict- and post-
conflict states.1140
The right to an effective remedy as enshrined in art 2 (3) ICCPR does not,
however, apply to violations of human rights obligations flowing from other
national, regional or international legal instruments that are not covered by the
Covenant. Nonetheless, the use of the term ‘effective’ in conjunction with
judicial institutions or systems by the Security Council may resonate with the
concept of an effective remedy as applied – analogously – to the vindication of
national human rights. That the notion of an effective judicial system – as used
by the Council – additionally implies the effective implementation of
international human rights law, seems likely taking into account that the
normative foundations of UN initiatives in advancing the rule of law involve
the UN Charter as well as international human rights-, humanitarian-, criminal-
and refugee law.1141 One may, thus, assume that the Council’s understanding of
effectiveness as applied to national judicial systems, includes the effective
implementation of the rights enshrined in the UDHR and ICCPR.
1136 UNHRCee, General Comment No 31 (n 1134) [15].
1137 ibid.
1138 ibid.
1139 UNHRCee, General Comment No 31 (n 1134) [16f, 19].
1140 ibid [18].
1141 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [9].
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As regards international soft law, the right to an effective remedy was also
included in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
adopted as a General Assembly resolution and requiring states to ‘ensure that
their domestic law is consistent with their international legal obligations by
making available adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate remedies,
including reparation’ which involves that they ‘investigate violations
effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially and, where appropriate, take
action against those allegedly responsible in accordance with domestic and
international law’.1142
(ii) Regional Human Rights Law
Similarly to art 2 (3) ICCPR, art 13 ECHR grants the right to an effective
national remedy if Convention rights and freedoms have allegedly been
violated.1143 This means that art 13 ECHR requires ‘a domestic remedy to deal
with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to
grant appropriate relief’.1144 For the remedy to be ‘effective’, it must be
‘available in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise
must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of
the respondent State’.1145 It must either prevent the alleged violation or remedy
the impugned state of affairs or provide adequate redress for any violation that
has already occurred.1146 The right to an effective remedy ‘requires the provision
of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal
with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant
appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as
to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this
provision’.1147 What ‘effectiveness’ means concretely, depends on the violated
Convention right and may require particularly ‘close scrutiny’ in cases of
alleged violations of an important right such as, eg, the prohibition of torture in
art 3 ECHR.1148 Substantively, art 13 ECHR may overlap with the right to a
1142 UNGA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law (21March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/147 [2(c); 3(b)].
1143 ECtHR, Rumpf v Germany (App No 46344/06) 2December 2010 [50].
1144 ECtHR, Kudla v Poland (App No 30210/96) 26October 2000 [157].
1145 Peters and Altwicker (n 1033) § 22 para 7 citing ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece
(App No 30696/09) 21 January 2011 [290].
1146 Peters and Altwicker (n 1033) § 22 para 14 citing ECtHR, Petkov ao v Bulgaria (App Nos
77568/01, 178/02 and 505/02) 11 September 2009 [74].
1147 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (n 1145) [291].
1148 Peters and Altwicker (n 1033) § 22 para 12 citing ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece
(n 1145) [293].
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hearing within a reasonable time under art 6 (1) ECHR in cases where national
law does not provide an effective remedy against excessively lengthy judicial
proceedings.1149
For the Inter-American human rights system, art 25 ACHR establishes that
everyone should have ‘the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts
that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the
state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have
been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties’.1150 The
terms ‘simple’, ‘prompt’ and ‘effective’ are usually read together by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, which requires that all three elements be
fulfilled.1151 The court has hardly interpreted the term ‘simple’, whereas the
‘promptness’ criterion of art 25 ACHR is not differentiated from the
requirement of ‘reasonable time’ in art 8 (1) ACHR and assessed by the court
against the same four criteria.1152 Article 25 ACHR requires states to ‘not only
draft and enact an effective remedy, but to also ensure the due application of
this remedy by its judicial authorities’, including the implementation of the
related judgment.1153
As opposed to art 13 ECHR, the remedy under the ACHR is autonomous, ie
it does not require another substantive Convention right to be violated.1154
Article 25 (1) ACHR is also broader than arts 2 (3) ICCPR and 13 ECHR
insofar as it grants a remedy not only in cases of alleged breaches of
Convention rights but in all cases where fundamental rights recognised by the
constitution or laws of the state concerned have allegedly been violated.1155 It
also differs from the concepts of an effective remedy as contained in arts 2 (3)
ICCPR and 13 ECHR to the extent that it requires the remedy to be judicial.1156
1149 Peters and Altwicker (n 1033) § 22 para 7 citing ECtHR, Makedonski v Bulgaria (App
No 36036/04) 20April 2011 [59f].
1150 Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 220 referring to IACtHR, Argüelles et al v Argentina
(Judgment of 20November 2014; Series C No 288) (Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs) [145].
1151 Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 218.
1152 Laurence Burgogue-Larsen and Amaya Úbeda de Torres, ‘The Right to an Effective
Remedy’ in The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (OUP 2011) paras 26.18 &
26.21; Cecilia Medina, ‘Right to Judicial Protection’ in The American Convention on
Human Rights (Intersentia 2014) para 14; Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 219.
1153 Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 221 citing IACtHR, Liakat Ali Alibux v Suriname
(Judgment of 30 January 2014; Series C No 276) (Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs) [33].
1154 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to an Effective Remedy’ (n 1152) para 26.10.
1155 ibid para 26.11.
1156 Medina, ‘Right to Judicial Protection’ (n 1152) para 10.
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To be considered effective by the court, a remedy must be ‘capable of
producing the result for which it was designed’.1157 The court further held that it
was not sufficient that a remedy ‘be provided for by the Constitution or by law or
that it be formally recognized, but rather it must be truly effective in establishing
whether there has been a violation of human rights and in providing redress’.1158
A remedy is not effective in practice when the judiciary ‘lacks the necessary
independence to render impartial decisions or the means to carry out its
judgments; or in an other situation that constitutes a denial of justice, as when
there is an unjustified delay in the decision; or when, for any reason, the alleged
victim is denied access to a judicial remedy’.1159 The requirements of judicial
independence and impartiality can thus be interpreted as elements of the right to
an effective remedy.1160 Importantly for the context in which the Security Council
often operates, the court observed that a remedy might prove ‘illusory because of
the general conditions prevailing in the country’.1161 Such conditions may relate
to internal armed conflicts, systematic forced disappearances or extrajudicial
executions – all circumstances that may be characteristic of the situation in a
conflict- or post-conflict state in reaction to which the Council issues its
recommendations or decisions regarding judicial reform.1162
The ACHPR does not contain a provision comparable to arts 2 (3) ICCPR,
13 ECHR and 25 ACHR.1163 Article 1 ACHPR does hold in general terms that
1157 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to an Effective Remedy’ (n 1152) para 26.27
citing IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment of 29 July 1988; Series C
No 4) (Merits) [66].
1158 Medina, ‘Right to Judicial Protection’ (n 1152) para 16 citing IACtHR, Advisory Opinion
OC-9/87 ‘Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American
Convention on Human Rights’ (6October 1987) [24].
1159 ibid para 16 citing IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 (n 1158) [24].
1160 Medina, ‘Right to Judicial Protection’ (n 1152) [17] citing IACtHR, Ivcher-Bronstein v
Peru (Judgment of 6 February 2001; Series C No 74) (Merits, Reparations and Costs)
[139] and IACtHR, Durand and Ugarte v Peru (Judgment of 16August 2000; Series C
No 68) (Merits) [125, 131]; Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 221 referring to IACtHR,
Usón Ramírez v Venezuela (n 1038) [130].
1161 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 (n 1158) [24].
1162 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to an Effective Remedy’ (n 1152) para 26.31
citing IACtHR, La Rochela Massacre v Colombia (Judgment of 11May 2007; Series C
No 163 (Merits, Reparations and Costs); IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras
(n 1157) [99]; IACtHR, Juan Humberto Sánchez v Honduras (Judgment of 7 June 2003;
Series C No 99) (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) [123 ff];
IACtHR, Villagrán Morales et al (Street Children) v Guatemala (Judgment of
19November 1999; Series C No 63) (Merits) [123 ff]; IACtHR, Goiburú v Paraguay
(Judgment of 22 September 2006; Series C No 153) (Merits, Reparations and Costs).
1163 Godfrey Musila, ‘The Right to an Effective Remedy under the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights’ (2006) 6 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 441, 447.
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the member states of the Charter shall undertake to adopt legislative or other
measures to give effect to the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in it.
Article 7 (1) (a) ACHPR in particular stipulates that every individual shall have
‘the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws,
regulations and customs in force’. The right to be heard has been interpreted by
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as to comprise the right
to an effective remedy in its Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial
where it elaborated that art 7 ACHPR ‘considers that every person whose rights
or freedoms are violated is entitled to have an effective remedy’.1164 In its case
law, the Commission observed that ‘the remedy must be available, effective and
sufficient’ and that it ‘is considered available if the petitioner can pursue it
without impediment, it is deemed effective if it offers a prospect of success,
and it is found sufficient if it is capable of redressing the complaint’.1165
These requirements should be understood as ‘constitutive of a remedy that is
“effective” in cases of human rights violations under the African Charter’.1166
They were, however, identified by the Commission when determining whether
the obligation of exhaustion of local remedies should be lifted and not in
defining the contours of a right to an effective remedy. In its Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, the
African Commission determined that the right to an effective remedy includes
access to justice, reparation for the harm suffered and access to the factual
information concerning the violations and further held that ‘every State has an
obligation to ensure that any person whose rights have been violated, including
by persons acting in an official capacity, has an effective remedy by a competent
judicial body’.1167 Here again, the effectiveness of a remedy also relates closely
to other requirements such as, eg, the impartiality of a court.1168
As has been illustrated, regional and international human rights law does
contain several guarantees pertaining to the effectiveness of the judiciary such
as the right to be tried within a reasonable time and to the timely issuance of
judgments or the right to an effective remedy. Although the guarantees
provided for by the discussed human rights regimes differ in detail, eg that the
1164 AComHPR, Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992) [1].
1165 See Musila (n 1163) 446 citing AComHPR, Jawara v Gambia (n 1041) [31f]. See also
AComHPR, Ilesanmi v Nigeria, Com No 268/03 (2005) [45].
1166 Musila (n 1163) 446.
1167 AComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance
in Africa (2003) part c.
1168 See, eg, AComHPR, Malawi African Association et al v Mauritania, Com Nos 54/91-
61/91–96/93-98/93-164/97_196/97-210/98 (2000) [94].
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ACHR requires a judicial remedy under art 25 as opposed to arts 2 (3) ICCPR
and 13 ECHR, they all try to ensure the efficiency of judicial systems with the
aim of vindicating human rights. In this regard, regional and international
human rights law provides fertile ground to legitimate Council references to the
effectiveness of the judiciary if the Council invokes the notion in reaction to
circumstances that have been identified as interferences with the discussed
rights.
c. The UN Understanding of Judicial Effectiveness
Enhancing judicial effectiveness is a central element of UN rule of law efforts in
conflict- and post-conflict societies.1169 If one analyses the use of the term
‘effectiveness’ in connection with national judiciaries or judicial systems in
UN documents, the term effectiveness seems to relate primarily to the
effective functioning of the judiciary which is identified as a prerequisite of
sustainable peace and security. The UNDPKO Handbook on United Nations
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, eg, observed that ‘the absence of a
fair and effective judiciary and perceptions of a failure of the justice system in a
post-conflict environment can impede peacebuilding efforts’ and that ‘[i]n this
regard, the satisfactory functioning of the judicial sector is essential to keeping
and building a sustainable peace’.1170 The UNODC Criminal Justice Assessment
Toolkit, a set of tools for UN agencies or government officials engaged in
criminal justice reform, also emphasises the necessity of a functioning court
system and the efficient and effective management of courts for a functioning
criminal justice system.1171 OHCHR’s Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-conflict
States points to the necessity of improved infrastructure, telecommunications,
capable personnel and material resources to ensure the effectiveness of the
justice system.1172 Several UN sources emphasise the need to ensure that cases
go to trial within a reasonable time and connect the notion of effectiveness to
problems with regard to undue delays of judicial proceedings.1173 Although
these UN sources do not define ‘effectiveness’ in connection with the judiciary,
they clearly emphasise its connection with the successful functioning of
judicial institutions. Only the OHCHR provides something that approximates
a definition when observing that the ‘right to a fair legal process, access to
justice and fair treatment, the independence of the judiciary, and the proper
1169 UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 1, 15 f.
1170 UNDPKO, Handbook Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (n 899) 94.
1171 UNODC, The Courts (n 934) 1.
1172 OHCHR, Monitoring Legal Systems (n 1044) 6.
1173 ibid 6; UNDPKO/OHCHR, United Nations Rule of Law Indicators (n 935) 7, 50.
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administration of justice lie at the heart of a fair and effective justice system’.1174
From this statement, however, it cannot be determined which elements relate
primarily to the fairness and which to the effectiveness of the justice system.
The simple explanation provided by the UN Rule of Law Indicators that
effectiveness and efficiency relate to a judicial system which meets its
responsibilities in an efficient and timely manner, seems more straightforward
in this regard but is also exceedingly abstract.1175
Here again, however, the conveyed understanding of judicial effectiveness in
pertinent UN documents seems to relate closely to the interpretation of guarantees
in regional and international human rights law that pertain to the effectiveness of
the judiciary or judicial systems. Recourse to UN sources does, thus, not suggest a
UN understanding of judicial effectiveness that deviates substantially from its
interpretation in international and regional human rights law, which could
alternatively inform Council references to judicial effectiveness.
d. Situations causing Council References to the Concept of Judicial
Effectiveness
With regard to countries where the Council considered it necessary to enhance
the effectiveness of the judicial system, Secretary-General reports described
conditions that equalled circumstances preceding Council resolutions that
invoked a need to enhance the capacity of the judiciary.1176 In the Central
African Republic, eg, a lack of accountability was a serious concern as it
remained difficult for national authorities to investigate and prosecute serious
crimes due to inadequately trained judicial personnel and the fact that judicial
institutions such as the Supreme Court of Justice and the Inspectorate General
of Judicial Services lacked the necessary resources.1177 In Timor-Leste, the
Secretary-General repeatedly observed a lack in capacity of the judicial system
and reported of capacity support measures.1178 Concretely, the judicial system
was characterised by a lack in infrastructure, resources and qualified personnel
and a backlog of court cases.1179 Progress in trials was slow owing to an
1174 OHCHR, Monitoring Legal Systems (n 1044) 2.
1175 UNDPKO/OHCHR, United Nations Rule of Law Indicators (n 935) 50.
1176 On the circumstances characterising a lack in judicial capacity, see part 3 ch IV D. 1. c.
1177 SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [24].
1178 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor’ (2002) UN Doc S/2002/432 [78]; SG
Report S/2008/26 (n 937) [37; 59]; SG Report S/2009/72 (n 957) [51; 55]; SG Report S/
2010/85 (n 938) [74; 82].
1179 SG Report S/2002/432 (n 1178) [17f; 19]; SG Report S/2008/26 (n 937) [30; 36f]; SG
Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 82]; SG Report S/2012/43 (n 938) [42].
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overburdened justice system, accountability for crimes was not guaranteed and
several judicial- and quasi-judicial institutions prescribed in the Constitution
needed to be established.1180 In Liberia, the Secretary-General only observed
that challenges remained in terms of the capacity of the criminal justice system
to bring cases of serious crimes to trial in a timely manner.1181 In Haiti, the
courts were in need of capacity-building measures by the UN country team and
MINUSTAH.1182 Deficiencies in the judicial system affected the right to a fair
trial within a reasonable time despite the implementation of an on-call duty
system for judges, the infrastructure and material resources of the courts were
insufficient, half of the seats of the Supreme Court remained vacant and
judicial institutions did not manage to ensure accountability for human rights
violations and the unlawful use of force by the national police.1183
The situations in reaction to which the Council identified a need to enhance
the effectiveness of the judiciary also shared similarities with situations
where the Council had invoked a need to re-establish or guarantee judicial
independence. In the Central African Republic, eg, the Secretary-General
observed that relevant legislation did not guarantee the independence of the
judiciary and that magistrates and their families were subjected to threats.1184
He also explicitly urged the government to call upon national authorities to
implement the reforms necessary to establish an independent judiciary.1185 In
Timor-Leste, the Secretary-General noted that efforts to ensure that people have
access to independent justice had been hampered and the Superior Councils
responsible for maintaining standards and professional discipline in the
judiciary and prosecution service needed to be strengthened to ensure
disciplinary control of judges and prosecutors in line with international
standards.1186 The emphasis in both countries, however, was clearly on deficits
in judicial capacity rather than in independence.
In Haiti, the Secretary-General reported that the Superior Council of the
Judiciary had taken steps to consolidate its authority over the judiciary in an
effort to significantly reduce political interference in judicial affairs and had
taken an interest in vetting judges before they were appointed.1187 Nonetheless,
1180 SG Report S/2002/432 (n 1178) [35; 60; 78]; SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [73]; SG
Report S/2011/32 (n 947) [33]; SG Report S/2012/43 (n 938) [33].
1181 SG Report S/2015/620 (n 941) [47].
1182 SG Report S/2016/225 (n 1094) [23]; SG Report S/2016/753 (n 1072) [25].
1183 SG Report S/2016/225 (n 1094) [33; 38; 65]; SG Report S/2016/753 (n 1072) [25; 27; 31;
Annex, para 11].
1184 SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [24].
1185 SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [63].
1186 SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 83].
1187 SG Report S/2013/493 (n 1064) [34].
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judges of the peace were appointed without following legal requirements and
the slow progress in the renewal of terms of judges highlighted a structural
weakness of the system, rooted in the Constitution and the law on the status of
the judges, which could translate into biased appointments and inefficient
career-management processes.1188 A trial in which two defendants were swiftly
tried and acquitted without following established procedures called into
question the independence of the judiciary.1189 Additionally, processes to vet
magistrates and evaluate judges stagnated as the vetting commission lacked the
necessary funding and the Superior Council of the Judiciary did not approve the
evaluation rules.1190
The fact that the country situations based on which the Council invoked a
need to enhance judicial effectiveness exhibit similar features as situations in
which it invoked a need to address deficiencies in judicial capacity or
independence, is also reflected in Council resolutions. In Timor-Leste, the
Council also referred to problems with regard to judicial capacity and
independence during this period, thus making it difficult to determine what
exactly the Council understands by judicial effectiveness and whether it
attributes a meaning to the term that can be distinguished from the concepts of
judicial capacity and independence.1191 Similarly in the Central African
Republic, the Council did not only authorise MINUSCA to enhance the
effectiveness of the national judicial system but also to build its capacities and
reinforce the independence of the judiciary.1192 The emphasis in the Secretary-
General report on judicial capacity- and independence problems is thus directly
mirrored in the Council resolution which makes it difficult to conclude what
facts exactly caused the Council’s reference to judicial effectiveness. In the
same resolution, however, the Council also repeatedly noted a need to restore
the judiciary which may back the conclusion that the Council invokes a need
for enhanced effectiveness of the judiciary if it suffers from capacity problems,
anchoring the notion more in the field of measures that focus on the functioning
rather than quality of judicial institutions – a thin and at times ambiguous line,
of course.1193
1188 ibid [34]; SG Report S/2015/667 (n 1053) [21].
1189 SG Report S/2015/667 (n 1053) [27].
1190 SG Report S/2016/225 (n 1094) [Annex I, para 16]; SG Report S/2016/753 (n 1072) [27].
1191 UNSC Res 1802 (25 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1802 [preamble, indent 8; 7];
UNSC Res 1867 (26 February 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1867 [preamble, indent 9; 9; 10];
UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1912 [preamble, indent 7; 10];
UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1969 [preamble, indent 7; 12];
UNSC Res 2037 (23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037 [preamble, indent 7; 11].
1192 UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)].
1193 UNSC Res 2301 (26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [10; 13].
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In Haiti, the emphasis during the discussed period of time seemed to be on
problems with regard to the independence of the judiciary, even though
Secretary-General reports also noted some deficits in judicial capacity. This
circumstance was also reflected in Council resolutions to the extent that the
Council did not only consider it necessary to ensure the effectiveness of
judicial institutions but also their independence.1194 Secretary-General reports
seemed to suggest that problems with regard to judicial independence also had
a bearing on the effectiveness of the judiciary when observing that problems
with regard to the appointment of judges – a classical judicial independence
issue – remained a serious challenge for the efficiency of the judiciary.1195
Concerning Haiti, it is thus not possible to come to a similar conclusion as with
regard to the Central African Republic to the extent that in the latter case the
focus seemed to be on capacity problems, whereas in Haiti the focus seemed to
be on independence problems and the reference to judicial effectiveness must be
read in this light or understood as an additional stand-alone requirement of
indeterminate meaning.
e. Analysis
i. Relationship of Council Language to a Trend of Legalisation
If one attempts to identify a trend towards the legalisation of Council language,
the use of the term ‘effectiveness’ in connection with judicial institutions is
certainly of more normative relevance than references to ‘judicial capacity’ to
the extent that the notion of ‘judicial effectiveness’ may be construed with
reference to rule of law guarantees as enshrined in international and regional
human rights law. If interpreted with reference to rule of law guarantees that
can be related to the concept of an effective judicial system, several of the
circumstances that may be described as capacity deficits could also result in
encroachments on the right to expeditious proceedings or the right to an
effective remedy. A backlog in court cases and slow progress in trials as
observed in Timor-Leste or challenges to bring cases of serious crimes to trial
in a timely manner as in Liberia, may result in an interference with the right to
an expeditious trial as well as with the right to an effective remedy. As can be
deduced from the UN Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of the right to
1194 UNSC Res 2070 (12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [11]; UNSC Res 2119
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [preamble, indent 9; 14]; UNSC Res 2180
(14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2180 [preamble, indent 11; 16]; UNSC Res 2243
(14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [preamble, indent 13; 20]; UNSC Res 2313
(13October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2313 [22].
1195 SG Report S/2015/667 (n 1053) [21].
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expeditious proceedings, the insufficient training of judicial personnel may also
constitute an encroachment on the guarantee if it results in an undue delay of
judicial proceedings.1196 This seems relevant with regard to the situation in the
Central African Republic, where a lack in adequately trained judicial personnel
added to difficulties in the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes.
Insufficient court infrastructure and resources – as prevailing in Timor-Leste –
can always affect the ability of the judiciary to administer justice effectively
and thus have a bearing on the right to expeditious proceedings as well as on
the right to an effective remedy. With an eye to a possible trend towards the
legalisation of Council language, it is thus desirable that the Council invokes
the notion of judicial effectiveness rather than that of judicial capacity if trying
to address the circumstances described.
The fact, however, that the Council varies its use of terms in reaction to
comparable situations or – as in the present cases – even refers to several
concepts at once, makes it almost impossible to discern which meaning exactly
the Council ascribes to the different concepts. Based on the sources at hand, it is
thus difficult to identify clearly what the Council may be referring to when
invoking the concept of judicial effectiveness. Although one can have the
impression that the focus of effectiveness problems is on weaknesses in judicial
capacity – as supported by the case studies of Timor-Leste and the Central
African Republic –, the situation in Haiti suggests that the concept is also
invoked when the judiciary suffers primarily from independence problems. If
the Council ascribes to the concept a meaning independent from the other
terms used, it is not clearly discernable from its resolutions or the way the
Council reacts to the input provided by the Secretary-General. To the extent
that a legal notion of judicial effectiveness may encompass the requirement of
an independent judiciary – as illustrated when discussing the right to an
effective remedy – it might not be surprising to have the Council invoke both
principles. Being no judicial body, the Council may display more nonchalance
when referring to terms that may be understood and interpreted with reference
to legal guarantees and rather opt for the use of multiple terms to ensure that it
describes a situation comprehensively and allows sufficient room for various
judicial reform measures.
With regard to a possible trend of legalisation of Council action, Council
references to the effectiveness of the judicial system may be interpreted as to
contribute to such a trend on a linguistic level. They do so to the extent that the
notion of the effectiveness of the judicial system resonates with established rule
of law guarantees such as the rights to expeditious proceedings and an effective
1196 See UNHRCee, Concluding Observations Croatia (n 1116) [16].
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remedy which enjoy a relatively established meaning in regional and
international (human rights) law. The connection between the language used
and the relatable rule of law guarantees, however, is not as precise as it is in
cases where the Council invoked the independence of the judiciary. On a level
of application, the references to the effectiveness of the judicial system cannot
be considered as a contribution to a legalisation of Council action as a
comparative reading of Secretary-General reports and Council resolutions does
not allow for a clear determination of the Council’s understanding of the
concept of judicial effectiveness in contrast to concepts such as judicial
capacity or independence. As a consequence, it is impossible to determine
whether the Council invokes the notion of judicial effectiveness in reaction to
circumstances that are considered encroachments upon the rights to an
expeditious hearing and an effective remedy by regional and international
human rights bodies and to assess whether a legalisation of Council action on a
level of application can be observed.
ii. Contribution of Council Language to Norm Emergence
Regarding the requirements of norm emergence, ie the use of precise language,
the consistent invocation of such language in reaction to similar circumstances
and the legitimacy of the standards related to the rule of law, Council
invocations of judicial effectiveness fulfil the first criterion. The Council uses
language that can be related to rule of law guarantees whose content enjoys a
relatively established meaning in regional and international (human rights) law,
ie the rights to expeditious hearings and an effective remedy. The consistency of
such invocations, however, cannot be confirmed as the Council often also
invoked other concepts with regard to the judiciary in resolutions that identified
a need to enhance judicial effectiveness. It is, thus, virtually impossible to
clearly determine which of the concepts invoked by the Council are reactions to
particular judicial deficits reported by the Secretary-General and accordingly to
assess the consistency of such references. The requirement of legitimacy of the
standards the Council relates to the rule of law may be considered fulfilled to the
extent that the Council uses language that resonates with universal human rights.
As the Council does not consistently use such language, however, it cannot be
assessed whether it reacts to circumstances that are considered encroachments
upon such human rights guarantees by the competent interpreting bodies. It,
thus, cannot be considered to really implement such standards via resolutions
invoking the concept of judicial effectiveness. In conclusion it must, thus, be
said that Council references to the concept of judicial effectiveness do mostly
not fulfil the criteria proposed here for the emergence of the rule of law as an
international norm.
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3. Impartiality, Fairness, Transparency and Compliance with
Internationally Agreed Standards of Judicial Systems
a. Council Resolutions Invoking the Concept of an Impartial, Fair and
Transparent Judicial System, consistent with Internationally Agreed
Standards
Several Council resolutions required judicial institutions or systems to be
impartial, fair, and transparent or consistent with internationally agreed
standards. The Council used such language in reaction to the situations in
Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau.
In Afghanistan, the Council requested UNAMA to support the
establishment of a fair and transparent judicial system in order to strengthen the
rule of law throughout the country.1197 It later repeatedly invoked the
requirement of a fair and transparent justice system in non-binding provisions,
albeit then addressing Afghan state institutions.1198 A small number of Council
resolutions that explicitly invoked fair trial guarantees are not discussed in the
present thesis as their number is too insignificant to allow for a fruitful
comparative analysis and as only one resolution seems to relate fair trial
guarantees to the rule of law and only vaguely at that.1199
In Guinea-Bissau, the Council mandated the UN Integrated Peacebuilding
Office to provide strategic and technical advice and support to national
1197 UNSC Res 1536 (26March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1536 [10]; UNSC Res 1589 (24March
2005) UN Doc S/RES/1589 [9].
1198 UNSC Res 2112 (30 July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2112 [16]; UNSC Res 2162 (25 June
2014) UN Doc S/RES/2162 [13]; UNSC Res 2226 (25 June 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2226
[13]; UNSC Res 2284 (28April 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2284 [9]; UNSC Res 2344
(17March 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2344 [28].
1199 The Council invoked fair trial guarantees without establishing a connection to the rule of
law in UNSC Res 615 (17 June 1988) UN Doc S/RES/615 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC
Res 1757 (30May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1757 [Attachment Statute of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon arts 16 (2), 17, 18 (2), 21 (2), 28 (2)]; UNSC Res 1966
(22December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1966 [4]; UNSC Res 2000 (27 July 2011) UN Doc
S/RES/2000 [11]; UNSC Res 2322 (12December 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2322 [15].
UNSC Res 1888 (30 September 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1888 [8] invoked fair trial
standards and the rule of law in the same paragraph but enumerated them separately
rather then portraying them as connected. UNSC Res 2313 (13October 2016) UN Doc
S/RES/2313 [preamble, indent 32] is the only resolution which could be construed to
imply that fair trial guarantees are considered an element of the rule of law by the
Council to the extent that it noted ‘with concern the slow progress towards consolidating
the rule of law’ and called ‘on the Haitian Government to address the (. . .) denial of
human rights including fair trial guarantees’. Addressing the denial of fair trial
guarantees could, thus, be interpreted as a measure to consolidate the rule of law.
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authorities and relevant stakeholders in developing civilian and military justice
systems that are compliant with international standards.1200
Non-bindingly but in the operative part of its resolutions, the Council called
on the government in Côte d’Ivoire to ensure that the work of the Ivorian
judicial system be impartial, transparent and consistent with internationally
agreed standards in order to strengthen the rule of law.1201
The terms used by the Council when describing the necessary qualities of
the judicial systems in Afghanistan and Côte d’Ivoire resonate with the right to
a fair and public hearing by an impartial tribunal as guaranteed in several
international and regional human rights treaties, eg, in arts 10 UDHR, 14 (1)
ICCPR, 6 (1) ECHR, 8 (1) ACHR and 7 (1) ACHPR.
b. Impartiality of Judicial System as a Legal Concept
i. International Human Rights Law
The call on the Ivorian government in Council resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire to
ensure that the work of the judicial system be impartial, resonates with the right
to an impartial tribunal whose content has been established in regional and
international human rights law. In international treaty law, the right to an
impartial tribunal is guaranteed in arts 10 UDHR and 14 (1) ICCPR. According
to the UN Human Rights Committee, the requirement of impartiality has two
aspects. First, judges should not be ‘influenced by personal bias or prejudice’,
nor should they ‘harbour preconceptions about the particular case before them,
nor act in ways that improperly promote the interests of one of the parties to the
detriment of the other’. Additionally, the tribunal must appear impartial to a
1200 UNSC Res 2103 (22May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2103 [1 (e)]; UNSC Res 2157 (29May
2014) UN Doc S/RES/2157 [1 (d)]; UNSC Res 2186 (25November 2014) UN Doc S/
RES/2186 [1 (d)]; UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203 [2 (b)];
UNSC Res 2267 (26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [2 (b)]; UNSC Res 2343
(23 February 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2343 [2 (c)]. In the same breath, all resolutions
invoked UNIOGBIS’ mandate to implement rule of law strategies. The connection here
is not unequivocal but sufficiently plausible to allow for the inference that the Council
considers the rule of law connected with the compliance of justice systems with
international standards.
1201 UNSC Res 2112 (30 July 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2112 [16]; UNSC Res 2162 (25 June
2014) UN Doc S/RES/2162 [13]; UNSC Res 2226 (25 June 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2226
[13]; UNSC Res 2284 (28April 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2284 [9]. The present study
deliberately forgoes an analysis of the term of ‘credibility’ in this context as that term
seems to fit best into the category of non-technical Council language but has been
inserted into legalised language in this case, making a separate analysis difficult.
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reasonable observer.1202 The guarantee is circumscribed similarly in the Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and a central goal of the
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.1203
ii. Regional Human Rights Law
The interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights of the right to an
impartial tribunal in art 6 (1) ECHR advances a similar conception of
impartiality as the one proposed by the UN Human Rights Committee. The
general focus of the guarantee is on the ‘confidence which the courts must
inspire in the public in a democratic society’.1204 Therefor, the court requires
the absence of prejudice or bias and undertakes a two-pronged test of the
subjective and objective impartiality of judges. The subjective approach tries to
determine the personal conviction of a judge in a given case, whereas the
objective approach focuses on whether the judge offered sufficient guarantees
to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.1205 When applying the
subjective test, the court assumes the personal impartiality of a judge until it
obtains evidence refuting this presumption. Evidence that has caused the court
to rule out this presumption involved judges displaying hostility or ill will or
arranging to have a case assigned to themselves for personal reasons.1206 The
court has developed a rich case law on the issue of judicial impartiality,
focusing, ia, on the compatibility of different functions of judges in judicial
proceedings.1207
1202 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [21]. See also UNHRCee, Karttunen v
Finland (Com No 387/89) UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989 (23October 1992) [7.2].
1203 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (n 983) [principle 2]; ECOSOC,
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (n 985).
1204 ECtHR, Piersack v Belgium (App No 8692/79) 1October 1982 [30] (conflict between
roles in prosecutor’s office and in the court dealing with the same case).
1205 ibid.
1206 ECtHR, Kyprianou v Cyprus (App No 73797/01) 15December 2005 [119].
1207 ECtHR, De Cubber v Belgium (App No 9186/80) 26October 1984 [26–30] (conflict
between office in public prosecutor’s department and as investigating judge); ECtHR,
Pfeifer v Austria (App No 10802/84) 25 February 1992 [36] (conflict between role of
investigative and trial judge); ECtHR, Hauschildt v Denmark (App No 10486/83)
24May 1989 [48–52] (jugdes having participated in both the trial judgment and in prior
decisions concerning pre-trial detention); ECtHR, Demicoli v Malta (App No 13057/87)
27August 1991 [40–42] (conflict between quasi-judicial function and role of victims of
two members of parliament); ECtHR, Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland (App
No 13778/88) 25 June 1992 [49–51] (prosecution represented by the trial judge in the
absence of the prosecutor); ECtHR, Padovani v Italy (App No 13396/87) 26 February
1993 [28] (trial judge having already made decisions relating to the case before the trial);
ECtHR, Nortier v Netherlands (App No 13924/88) 24August 1993 [35–37] (overlap
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court both refer to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights when
interpreting the scope of the right to an impartial tribunal guaranteed in art 8 (1)
ACHR.1208 For the Inter-American court, the principle of impartiality requires
that the members of a court ‘have no direct interest in, a pre-established
viewpoint on, or a preference for one of the parties, and that they are not
involved in the controversy’.1209 The court has followed the ‘theory of
appearances’ as developed by the European Court of Human Rights and
adopted the two-pronged test of subjective and objective impartiality which
focuses on the personal conduct of judges and whether it displays prejudice, ill-
will, hostility or bias and on objective facts which may compromise their
impartiality.1210 It developed the overall thrust of its case law with regard to the
independence and impartiality of military courts, which figured prominently in
Latin American political history and were often subordinate to the executive and
between investigative and judicial roles); ECtHR, Holm v Sweden (App No 14191/88)
25November 1993 [30–33] (partiality of the jury); ECtHR, Saraiva de Carvalho v
Portugal (App No 15651/89) 22April 1994 [35–40] (preliminary assessment of
available evidence by judge); ECtHR, Procola v Luxembourg (App No 14570/89)
28 September 1995 [45] (combination of advisory and judicial function of members of
judicial committee); ECtHR, Bulut v Austria (App No 17358/90) 22 February 1996
[32–34] (trial judge had questioned witnesses during preliminary investigation); ECtHR,
Remli v France (App No 16839/90) 23April 1996 [46–48] (juror identified himself as
racist in case about defendants of North African origin); ECtHR, Tierce et al v San
Marino (App Nos 24954/94, 24971/94, 24972/94) 25 July 2000 [76–83] (judge acting
in combination of functions on two courts, as investigating and trial judge at first
instance and subsequently also preparing the file for the appeal hearing).
1208 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.21 (‘very
early on it [the IACtHR] based its analyses on the definition of impartiality given by the
European Court, with particular reference to the famous “theory of appearances”’). For
references to the case law of the ECtHR in the case law of the IACHR see, eg, IACHR,
Garcia v Peru (n 737); IACHR, Raquel Martín de Mejía v Peru (n 737); IACHR, Andrews
v the United States of America (n 737) [159 ff].
1209 IACtHR, Palamara Iribarne v Chile (Judgment of 22November 2005; Series C No 135)
(Merits, Reparations, Costs) [146]. For a more recent judgment, see IACtHR, Argüelles et
al v Argentina (n 1150) [168].
1210 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.21 citing
IACtHR, Herrera Ulloa v Costa Rica (Judgment of 2 July 2004; Series C No 107)
(Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) [170] and IACtHR, Apitz
Barbera et al v Venezuela (n 1038) [63–65]. See also Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 192
citing, eg, IACtHR, Atala Riffo and Daughters v Chile (Judgment of 24 February 2012;
Series C No 239) (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) [234] and IACtHR, Usón Ramírez v
Venezuela (n 1038).
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thus ‘inhibited, if not prevented (. . .) from making objective and impartial
judgments’.1211
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also developed
a rich case law on the right to be tried by an impartial court or tribunal as
provided for in art 7 (1) (d) ACHPR.1212 The Commission interprets the
guarantee with an eye to the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights
Committee.1213 It also endorsed the analysis of the European Court of Human
Rights with regard to the objective and subjective elements of the impartiality
test.1214 In its Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal
Assistance in Africa, the Commission further fleshed out under what conditions
a judicial officer would be considered partial and required to step down,
referring, ia, to the incompatibility of certain judicial functions or judges’
connections to the case or the parties concerned.1215 Comparable to the
situation in the Inter-American human rights system, particular emphasis of
the Commission’s case law has been on trials by military- or special tribunals
which the Commission commonly considers as incompatible with art 7 (1) (d)
ACHPR.1216
1211 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.17 citing
IACtHR, La Cantuta v Peru (Judgment of 29November 2006; Series C No 162) (Merits,
Reparations and Costs) [141]. See also Medina, ‘Right to Due Process’ (n 1038) para 38
citing IACtHR, Genie Lacayo v Nicaragua (Judgment of 13 September 1997; Series C
No 45) (Application for Judicial Review of the Judgment of Merits, Reparations and
Costs) [86f] and IACtHR, Castillo Petruzzi et al v Peru (Judgment of 4 September 1998;
Series C No 41) (Preliminary Objections) [130 ff].
1212 See, eg, AComHPR, Malawi African Association et al v Mauritania (n 1168) [98]
(conferral of criminal procedure to special tribunal made up of military judges
compromises impartiality of courts); AComHPR, Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria
(in respect of Wahib Akamu, G. Adega et al), Com No 60/91 (1995) [14] (special tribunal
chiefly composed of members of the executive creates appearance, if not actual lack, of
impartiality).
1213 Manby (n 737) 171, 199 (additionally, the AComHPR’s Resolution on the Right to
Recourse and Fair Trial (1992) and the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair
Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2003) provide guidance for the interpretation of the
ACHPR).
1214 See, eg, AComHPR, Wetsh’okonda Koso ao v Congopara (n 1041) [80] (‘Impartiality
may be perceived in a subjective and objective manner. In a subjective manner, the
impartiality of a judge is gauged by his internal inclinations. Since it is impossible to
infer from this inclination objectively, it was simpler to conclude that subjective
impartiality be assumed until proven otherwise.’).
1215 AComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance
in Africa (2003) para 5.
1216 Manby (n 737) 171, 205 (citing the respective case law). See also AComHPR, Amnesty
International ao v Sudan (n 1041) [68] (special tribunals under control of executive);
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As can be inferred from the preceding discussion, the right to an impartial
tribunal is firmly established in international and regional human rights treaty
law and was construed similarly by the various bodies responsible for their
interpretation, suggesting a broad international consensus with regard to its
content. The case law developed by the international, European, Inter-
American and African human rights bodies would, thus, provide a broad basis
for the Council to back up and legitimise its references to an impartial judicial
system.
c. The UN Understanding of an Impartial Judicial System
Several UN sources identify ensuring the impartiality of the judiciary as an
integral part of UN rule of law assistance.1217 In his report on the rule of law
and transitional justice in conflict- and post-conflict societies, the Secretary-
General recommended that peace agreements and Security Council resolutions
and mandates should ‘require that all judicial processes, courts and
prosecutions be (. . .) consistent with established international standards for the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary’.1218
Only rarely, however, does one encounter attempts of a definition as to what
judicial impartiality implies concretely. It has been related to ‘the treatment of
all rivals and disputants equally’ and the question of ‘whether the courts are
perceived by the population to be treating people fairly and impartially
regardless of their income, race, national or social origin, gender or
religion’.1219 Some UN sources provide clarity primarily by identifying what
compromises judicial impartiality such as ethnic, religious, political, gender or
other bias.1220 Even though UN sources do not provide an in-depth analysis of
the principle of judicial impartiality, they still exhibit an obvious – if vague –
resemblance with the legal concept of an impartial tribunal. UN documents do,
thus, not suggest the existence of a UN understanding of the principle of judicial
impartiality, which could serve as an alternative reference point for Council
resolutions invoking the impartiality of judicial systems.
AComHPR, Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (n 737) [64] (trial of civilian by military
tribunal).
1217 UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 26, 39; SG Guidance Note UN Rule
of Law Assistance (n 1044) 6; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on Justice Components (n 1049) 8.
1218 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [64 (e)].
1219 UNDPKO/OHCHR, United Nations Rule of Law Indicators (n 935) 49; UNDPKO,
Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 173.
1220 UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 4; UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial
Affairs Officers (n 440) 17 f.
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d. Transparent Judicial System as a Legal Concept
The phrases used in Afghanistan and Côte d’Ivoire that UNAMA and Afghan
state institutions should aim to establish a transparent judicial system and that
the Ivorian government should ensure that the work of the Ivorian judicial
system be transparent, may be related to certain human rights guarantees
geared towards ensuring the transparency of judicial proceedings. If interpreted
with reference to regional and international human rights law, invocations of
the transparency of judicial systems could be read to resonate with the right
to a public hearing and judgment and the right to freedom of (judicial)
information.1221
i. The Right to a Public Hearing and Judgment
(i) International Human Rights Law
The right to a public hearing and judgment is a crucial element of the guarantee
of a fair trial and aims, ia, at ensuring the transparency of the administration of
justice.1222 International treaty law provides for the right in arts 10 UDHR and
14 (1) ICCPR. Article 14 (1) ICCPR requires courts to ‘make information
regarding the time and venue of the oral hearings available to the public’ and to
‘provide for adequate facilities for the attendance of interested members of the
public’.1223 The public can be excluded from trials for reasons of a procedural
nature or for substantive reasons of ‘morals, public order (ordre public) or
national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private
lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would be prejudicial to the
interests of justice’.1224 If none of these circumstances prevail, hearings ‘must be
open to the general public, including members of the media, and must not, for
1221 UNODC, Resource Guide on Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity (2011) 85.
1222 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [28]; Kälin and Künzli (n 1028) 455f;
Medina, ‘Right to Due Process’ (n 1038) para 77; Harris and others (n 1034) 433.
1223 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [28]. See also UNHRCee, Van Meurs v
The Netherlands (Com No 215/86) UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/215/1986 (13 July 1990)
[6.2]; UNHRCee, Tourón v Uruguay (Com No 32/78) UN Doc CCPR/C/12/D/32/1978
(31March 1984) [8; 12] (no public hearing and judgement not delivered in public);
UNHRCee, Ngalula Mpandanjila et al v Zaire (Com No 138/83) UN Doc CCPR/C/27/
D/138/1983 (26March 1986) [82] (trial was not held in public); UNHRCee, Rodríguez
Orejuela v Colombia (Com No 848/99) UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/848/1999 (23 July 2002)
[7.3] (no public hearing).
1224 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [29]. On procedural reasons for exclusion
see, eg, UNHRCee, RM v Finland (Com No 201/88) UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/301/1988
(23March 1989) [6.4] (absence of oral hearings in the appellate proceedings raises no
issue under art 14 ICCPR) and UNHRCee, Kavanagh v Ireland (Com No 819/98) UN
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instance, be limited to a particular category of persons’.1225 If the public is
exceptionally excluded from a trial, the ‘judgment, including the essential
findings, evidence and legal reasoning must be made public, except where the
interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires, or the proceedings concern
matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children’.1226
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers
promotes an even broader concept of publicity which encompasses the
‘creation of a judiciary website and the use of social media and television
programmes to explain important judicial decisions’.1227 More generally, the
UN Convention against Corruption requires states to take measures to enhance
the transparency of decision-making processes and to ensure that the public
has effective access to information in order to confront corruption.1228 The
connection between judicial transparency and corruption was also underlined
by the UN Special Rapporteur, who emphasised that ‘transparency in the
judiciary must be guaranteed so as to avoid corrupt practices that undermine
judicial independence and public confidence in the justice system’.1229
(ii) Regional Human Rights Law
Article 6 (1) ECHR guarantees an oral and public hearing and requires that
judgments be made public. The guarantee applies to criminal- and non-criminal
cases and serves the public scrutiny and legitimacy of the administration of
justice and the maintenance of confidence in the courts.1230 According to the
European Court of Human Rights, ‘a trial complies with the requirement of
publicity only if the general public is able to obtain information about its date
and place and if this place is easily accessible to them’.1231 The right also
entitles the media.1232
Doc CCPR/C/71/D/819/1998 (4April 2001) [10.4] (right to public hearing applies to the
trial, it does not apply to pre-trial decisions made by prosecutors and public authorities).
1225 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [29]. See also, eg, UNHRCee,
Khoroshenko v Russian Federation (Com No 1304/04) UN Doc CCPR/C/101/D/
1304/2004 (29March 2011) [9.11] (relatives of accused excluded from trial).
1226 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [29].
1227 Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/26/32 (n 1090) [73].
1228 art 13 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (n 1023).
1229 Report Special Rapporteur A/HRC/26/32 (n 1090) [39].
1230 Harris and others (n 1034) 433. ECtHR, Chaushev a.o. v Russia (App Nos 37037/03,
39053/03 and 2469/04) 25 January 2017 [22]; ECtHR, Stefanelli v San Marino (App
No 35396/97) 8May 2000 [19].
1231 ECtHR, Hummatov v Azerbaijan (App Nos 9852/03 and 13413/04) 29 February 2008
[144].
1232 Peters and Altwicker (n 1033) § 19 para 46.
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If a trial takes place outside a regular courtroom and at places where the
general public has principally no access, the state needs to ‘take compensatory
measures in order to ensure that the public and the media are duly informed
about the place of the hearing and are granted effective access’.1233 As art 14
(1) ICCPR, art 6 (1) ECHR does not necessarily require publicity of the
proceedings if the hearing at first instance had been public and the hearings at a
second or third instance are proceedings for leave to appeal or involve only
questions of law and not of facts.1234 Substantive exceptions are enumerated in
art 6 (1) ECHR and include morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, the interests of juveniles, the protection of the private life of
the parties and the interests of justice. With regard to the publicity of judgments,
the ECHR does not provide for exceptions in contrast to art 14 (1) ICCPR.1235
The court has, however, granted states some leeway in implementing the right
as long as it considered the purpose of art 6 (1) ECHR – ensuring scrutiny of
the judiciary by the public with a view to safeguarding the right to a fair trial –
to be served.1236
Article 8 (5) ACHR provides that ‘criminal proceedings shall be public,
except insofar as may be necessary to protect the interests of justice’. In
interpreting the right, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been
influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.1237
The provision is directed against the ‘secret administration of justice’ and thus
enables ‘the scrutiny of the parties and of the public’.1238 The requirement that
proceedings be public is understood to apply to all, not only to criminal judicial
proceedings.1239 Article 8 (5) ACHR requires that states make it ‘possible in fact
and law for the public to have access to the trial’.1240 Like the ICCPR and the
1233 ECtHR, Hummatov v Azerbaijan (n 1231) [144].
1234 Peters and Altwicker (n 1033) § 19 para 46 citing ECtHR, Bulut v Austria (n 1207) [41].
1235 Nowak (n 1026) para 40.
1236 ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v the United Kingdom (n 1035) [91] (‘The Court has said in
other cases that it does not feel bound to adopt a literal interpretation of the words
“pronounced publicly”: in each case the form of publication given to the “judgment”
under the domestic law of the respondent State must be assessed in the light of the
special features of the proceedings in question and by reference to the object pursued by
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6–1) in this context, namely to ensure scrutiny of the judiciary by
the public with a view to safeguarding the right to a fair trial’); ECtHR, Axen v Germany
(App No 8273/78) 8December 1983 [31f].
1237 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.27.
1238 Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) referring to IACtHR, J v Peru (Judgment of 27November
2013; Case No 275) (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) [217] and
IACtHR, Palamara Iribarne v Chile (n 1209) [168].
1239 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.27.
1240 Medina, ‘Right to Due Process’ (n 1038) para 77.
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ECHR, the ACHR in its art 8 (5) also allows for exceptions to the principle of
publicity in the ‘interest of justice’. The broad concept effectively leaves the
determination of exceptions to the discretion of the judges.1241 In contrast to
arts 14 (1) ICCPR and 6 (1) ECHR, art 8 (5) ACHR does not provide for the
right to the publication of judgments. The majority of the cases on art 8 (5)
ACHR was issued in reaction to trials by anonymous tribunals.1242
The ACHPR and the African Commission’s Resolution on the Right to
Recourse and Fair Trial do not provide for the right to a public trial. The
Commission, however, reverted to arts 60 and 61 ACHPR which empower it
‘to draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights’ and
relied on the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 13 on the
right to a fair trial in order to interpret the right to the publicity of hearings into
art 7 ACHPR, including the exceptions provided for by art 14 (1) ICCPR.1243
The Commission continued this ‘borrowing practice’ and took further guidance
from the case law developed by the ECtHR based on art 6 (1) ECHR.1244 In its
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance, it
held that everyone should be entitled to a public hearing in the determination of
criminal charges or of rights and obligations. The requirement of publicity is
interpreted to comprise information about the sittings of judicial bodies or the
permanent venue for judicial proceedings and requires that adequate facilities
be made available for the attendance of the public. The Principles and
Guidelines further clarify that the right applies to civil and criminal legal
proceedings and encompasses the ‘public and the media’ and enlists the
legitimate exceptions to the right such as the interest of justice for the
protection of children, witnesses or victims of sexual violence, public order and
national security.1245 The interpretation of the right by the African Commission
is, thus, clearly inspired by the legal text of arts 14 (1) ICCPR and 6 (1) ECHR
and the jurisprudence based on them. Neither the ACHPR, nor the resolutions of
the Commission, however, say anything about the publication of judgments.
1241 Medina, ‘Right to Due Process’ (n 1038) para 78.
1242 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.27 citing
IACtHR, Castillo Petruzzi v Peru (Judgment of 30May 1999) (n 1038) [172f]; IACtHR,
Cantoral Benavides v Peru (n 1038) [141–149]; IACtHR, Palamara Iribarne v Chile
(n 1209) [167f]; IACtHR, Berenson Mejía v Peru (n 1038) [198f].
1243 AComHPR, Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (n 737) [51f].
1244 AComHPR, Civil Liberties Organisation et al v Nigeria (n 737) [35 ff].
1245 AComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance
in Africa (2003).
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ii. The Right to Freedom of Information
Another right, which may be considered relevant for the notion of judicial
transparency, is the right to judicial information.1246 The right to freedom of
information is guaranteed in arts 19 UDHR, 19 (2) ICCPR, 10 (1) ECHR, 13
(1) ACHR and 9 (1) ACHPR. All regimes contain the right to receive
information. Unlike the other guarantees, arts 10 (1) ECHR and 9 (1)
ACHPR do not explicitly mention the right to actively ‘seek information’,
albeit are interpreted to cover this right too.1247 All guarantees apply – at a
minimum – to ‘generally accessible information’.1248 Article 19 (2) ICCPR
applies to ‘records held by a public body, regardless of the form in which
the information is stored, its source and the date of production’ and
subsumes the judicial branch under its notion of a ‘public body’.1249 The
right ‘encompasses both the general right of the public to have access to
information of public interest from a variety of sources and the right of the
media to access information, in addition to the right of individuals to request
and receive information of public interest and information concerning
themselves that may affect their individual rights’.1250
The right to access information also applies to information held by the
judiciary. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression referred to information held by
courts when observing that the UNGA Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders provides for the right to access information as to how human rights
1246 On the relationship between transparency and the right to access of information see, eg,
Jonathan Klaaren, ‘The Human Right to Information and Transparency’ in Andrea
Bianchi and Anne Peters (eds), Transparency in International Law (CUP 2013)
223–238. See also UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (4 September 2013) UN
Doc A/68/362 [20] (observing that ‘public authorities act as representatives of the
public, fulfilling a public good; therefore, in principle, their decisions and actions should
be transparent’).
1247 Nowak (n 1026) para 17; Manby (n 737) 171, 220; Klaaren (n 1246) 232; Grabenwarter
and Pabel (n 1033) § 23 para 6.
1248 Manfred Nowak, ‘Article 19: Freedom of Opinion, Expression and Information’ in U.N.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, N.P. Engel 2005)
para 18; Peters and Altwicker (n 1033) § 12 para 3; Grabenwarter and Pabel (n 1033) § 23
para 7; Laurence Burgogue-Larsen and Amaya Úbeda de Torres, ‘The Right to the
Freedom of Thought and Expression’ in The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(OUP 2011) para 21.14.
1249 UNHRCee, General Comment No 34: Article 19: Freedom of Opinion and Expression
(12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [7; 18].
1250 Report Special Rapporteur A/68/362 (n 1246) [19].
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
262
and freedoms are given effect in judicial systems.1251 The Társaság a
Szabadságjogokért v Hungary judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights also concerned information held by a court, which denied an NGO
access to a constitutional complaint of a Hungarian member of parliament. The
court considered the denial by the Hungarian court incompatible with art 10 (1)
ECHR in light of the fact that the issue was of public interest, the government
had an ‘information monopoly’ in the case and the information sought was
‘ready and available’.1252 In most human rights regimes, however, the guarantee
has been developed with a focus on information held by the executive- or
legislative branch of government, while its dimension with regard to ‘judicial
records or information about the judiciary’ has been given less attention.1253 To
the extent that the right has predominantly been interpreted with an eye to the
executive- or legislative branch of government, it seems less relevant in the
present context that concerns judicial transparency.
To sum up, regional and international human rights law offers clear standards
with regard to the transparent administration of justice that could figure as a point
of reference for the Council and legitimise its observations, recommendations or
decisions regarding the improvement of judicial transparency in states addressed
by its resolutions.
e. The UN Understanding of a Transparent Judicial System
The concept of transparency with regard to the judiciary in UN documents
focusing on the re-establishment of the rule of law in conflict- and post-conflict
1251 ibid [22]. In ECOSOC, Report of the Special Rapporteur: The Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression (17December 2004) UN Doc E/CN. 4/2005/64 [39] the Special
Rapporteur stated that ‘all information held by public bodies shall be publicly available
unless it is subject to a legitimate exemption, and all bodies performing public functions,
including governmental, legislative and judicial bodies, should be obliged to respond to
requests for information’ (emphasis added).
1252 ECtHR, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary (App No 37374/05) 14 July 2009
[36].
1253 Open Society Justice Initiative, Report on Access to Judicial Information (2009) [if]
(according to which information about the adjudicative work of the courts covers
‘transcripts, documents filed with the court (pre- and post-trial), trial exhibits,
recordings, settlements, opinions, and dockets’, while administrative information
encompasses ‘court budgets; personnel and human resources; contracts between the
court and third parties for construction, maintenance, office supplies, or the like; and
organizational matters’ and information about judges ‘information about salaries,
personal finances (such as debts and investments), vacancies, disciplinary matters, and
selection of judges’). See also Burgogue-Larsen and Úbeda de Torres, ‘The Right to the
Freedom of Thought and Expression’ (n 1248) para 21.17 (on whether the legislature and
judiciary should also be considered passive subjects of the right).
IV. Rule of Law Requirements for National Judiciaries
263
states is usually invoked in conjunction with other concepts such as judicial
professionalism, accountability or integrity.1254 These documents do, thus, not
allow for a clear delineation as to which observations and recommendations are
related only to the concept of judicial transparency. Neither do UN documents
provide a definition of judicial transparency. The UNDPKO Handbook for
Judicial Affairs Officers in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations refers to
the definition of the Oxford English Dictionary, according to which
‘transparency’ may refer to ‘the condition of being open to public scrutiny’.1255
Usually, however, UN documents only clarify what may be understood by the
term ‘transparency’ based on the requirements they connect to it. Regularly, eg,
judicial transparency is related to the need to address judicial corruption or
enhance the judiciary’s capacity to adjudicate criminal accountability for
corruption, to the transparent selection and appointment of judges, to court
administration and management and the discipline and removal of judges
responsible for misconduct or human rights violations.1256 Crucially, it is
always connected to the concept of publicity. As such it requires that
information about judicial conduct, decision-making processes, caseloads,
collection of court fees, clearance rates and use of budgetary allocations by the
courts be made available to the public and that judicial decisions be
published.1257 In this regard, UN sources clearly seem to draw their inspiration
from legal guarantees on the transparent administration of justice but
conceptualise it even more broadly, including elements which, eg, are
guaranteed by the right to an independent tribunal. Council references to the
transparency of the judicial system could, thus, theoretically be informed by the
more encompassing and less principled conception of judicial transparency as
advanced by UN sources.
f. Fair Judicial System as a Legal Concept
The phrase used in Council resolutions on Afghanistan that UNAMA and
Afghan state institutions should aim to establish a fair judicial system,
resonates – in legal terms – with the right to a fair trial, which is guaranteed in
1254 UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 33; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on
Justice Components (n 1049) 7.
1255 UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 173.
1256 UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 33f, 36; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on
Justice Components (n 1049) 7f; UNDPKO/OHCHR, United Nations Rule of Law
Indicators (n 935) 8; UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 177.
1257 UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 33, 36; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on
Justice Components (n 1049) 7; UNDPKO/OHCHR, United Nations Rule of Law
Indicators (n 935) 8; UNODC, Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity (n 1221) 85.
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most international and regional human rights treaties. Articles 10 UDHR, 14 (1)
ICCPR, 6 ECHR, 8 ACHR and 7 ACHPR establish the right to a fair trial which
is also found in most UN human rights conventions.1258 Several fair trial
guarantees are also applicable during armed conflict as they form part of
international humanitarian law.1259 Additionally, the denial of fair trial rights
may amount to a war crime under the Rome Statute.1260 The UN Human Rights
Committee even subsumes the ‘fundamental principles of fair trial, including
the presumption of innocence’ and all elements of the right to a fair trial that
‘are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during armed
conflict’ under its notion of peremptory international law from which states
cannot derogate under art 4 ICCPR.1261 In addition to being guaranteed by
international peremptory- and treaty law, there are several soft law instruments
such as the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary or the Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers, which provide for specific fair trial rights.1262
i. International Human Rights Law
The right to a fair trial as provided for in art 14 (1) ICCPR applies to the
determination of criminal charges or rights and obligations in a suit at law. Its
purpose is to serve ‘as a procedural means to safeguard the rule of law’ and to
ensure ‘the proper administration of justice’.1263 The provision is an umbrella
guarantee which encompasses a wide array of specific rights such as the
principle of equality of arms between plaintiff and respondent or prosecutor
and defendant, the independence and impartiality of judges, the publicity of
1258 Shah (n 1028) 270 f.
1259 Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, ‘Guaranteeing Fair Trials’ in International Human
Rights (OUP 2013) 466 referring to arts 3 (1) (d) of the Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
(Geneva, 12August 1949), the Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva, 12August
1949) and the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (Geneva, 12August 1949) and to art 5 of the Convention (IV) relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. (Geneva, 12August 1949) and art 75
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I, 8 June 1977).
1260 art 8 (2) (a) (vi) ICC Rome Statute.
1261 UNHRCee, General Comment No 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of
Emergency (31August 2001) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 [11; 16].
1262 UNGA, Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, UNGA Res 40/32 (29November 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/32 [Annex] and
UNGA, Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency
Situations, UNGA Res 45/100 (14December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/100 [Annex].
1263 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [2].
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proceedings, respect for the principle of adversary proceedings, preclusion of ex
officio reformatio in pejus, an expeditious procedure or a system of appeals.1264
Article 14 (1) ICCPR requires ‘the absence of any direct or indirect influence,
pressure or intimidation or intrusion from whatever side and for whatever
motive’ during judicial proceedings.1265 It thus precludes, eg, a hostile attitude
towards a defendant in criminal proceedings or support of or racial bias against
one of the parties in judicial proceedings.1266 Importantly, art 14 (1) ICCPR does
not guarantee a substantively fair result of judicial proceedings but only the
observance of fair procedures.1267 In criminal proceedings, art 14 ICCPR
provides for additional fair trial rights such as the presumption of innocence,
the right to be informed of the charge, the right to an adequate defence, the
right to a trial without undue delay, the right to a trial in one’s own presence,
the right to defend oneself in person or through legal counsel of one’s own
choosing and to be informed of this right, the right to free legal assistance,
rights regarding witness attendance and examination, the right to free assistance
of an interpreter if needed, the freedom from self-incrimination, the right to an
appeal and the principle of ne bis in idem.1268 As can be derived from this, the
1264 UNHRCee, Karttunen v Finland (n 1202) [7.2]; UNHRCee, Espinoza de Polay Campos v
Peru (Com No 577/94) UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 (6November 1997) [8.8];
UNHRCee, Lloydell Richards v Jamaica (Com No 535/93) UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/
535/1993 (31March 1997) (Dissenting Opinion Nisuke Ando). See also Kälin and
Künzli (n 1028) 453; Joseph and Castan (n 1113) para 14.67; Shah (n 1028) 276 f.
1265 UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [25].
1266 ibid [25f].
1267 ibid [26].
1268 On the the presumption of innocence, see art 14 (2) ICCPR and UNHRCee, General
Comment No 32 (n 1015) [30]; UNHRCee, General Comment No 29 (n 1261) [11];
UNHRCee, Gridin v Russian Federation (Com No 770/97) UN Doc CCPR/C/69/D/
770/1997 (20 July 2000) [8.3]; UNHRCee, Cagas, Butin and Astillero v Philippines
(Com No 788/97) UN Doc CCPR/C/73/D/788/1997 (23October 2001) [7.3]. On the
right to be informed of the charge, see art 14 (3) (a) ICCPR and UNHRCee, General
Comment No 32 (n 1015) [31]. On the right to an adequate defence, see art 14 (3) (b)
ICCPR and UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [32]. This right involves, eg,
the right of the defendant to communicate with his or her counsel, to be provided with all
materials that the prosecution will use in court or any exculpatory materials, the right that
the materials be presented in a manner comprehensible by the defendant or his and her
counsel, the right to choose whether to defend oneself personally or by a counsel, the
right to free legal aid if the interests of justice so require, the right to an interpreter and
the right to the attendance and examination of witnesses. See also Shah (n 1028) 280 ff.
On the right to a trial without undue delay, see art 14 (3) (c) ICCPR and UNHRCee,
General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [35]; UNHRCee, Hill and Hill v Spain (Com
No 526/93) UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993 (2April 1997) [12.4]; UNHRCee, Sextus v
Trinidad and Tobago (Com No 818/98) UN Doc CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998 (16 July 2001)
[7.2]. On the right to a trial in one’s own presence, see art 14 (3) (d) ICCPR and
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scope of application of the fair trial guarantees of the ICCPR is rather broad.
Regional human rights law, however, provides equally comprehensive fair trial
rights.
ii. Regional Human Rights Law
Article 6 (1) ECHR establishes the right to a fair trial in the determination of
civil rights and obligations or of criminal charges. Paragraph (1) of art 6 ECHR
constitutes the civil limb of the right to a fair trial, while paragraph (3) figures as
its criminal limb.1269 Whereas paragraph (3) applies to criminal proceedings
UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [36]; UNHRCee, Mbenge v Zaire (Com
No 16/77) UN Doc CCPR/C/18/D/16/1977 (25March 1983) [14.1]; UNHRCee,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Finland (8April 1998)
UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.91 [15]. On the right to defend oneself in person or through
legal counsel of one’s own choosing and to be informed of this right, see art 14 (3) (d)
ICCPR and UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [37]; UNHRCee, Pinto v
Trinidad and Tobago (Com No 232/87) UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/232/1987 (20 July 1990)
[12.5]; UNHRCee, Hill and Hill v Spain (Com No 526/93) UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/
526/1993 (2April 1997) [14.2]. On the right to free legal assistance, see art 14 (3) (d)
ICCPR and UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [38]; UNHRCee, Borisenko v
Hungary (Com No 852/99) UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/852/1999 (14October 2002) [7.5];
UNHRCee, OF v Norway (Com No 158/83) UN Doc CCPR/C/23/D/158/1983
(26October 1984) [3.4]. On rights regarding witness attendance and examination, see art
14 (3) (e) ICCPR and UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [39]; UNHRCee,
Grant v Jamaica (Com No 353/88) UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/353/1988 (31March 1994)
[8.5]; UNHRCee, Peart and Peart v Jamaica (Com Nos 464/91 & 482/91) UN Doc
CCPR/C/54/D/464/1991 & 482/1991 (24 July 1995) [11.4f]; UNHRCee, Fuenzalida v
Ecuador (Com No 480/91) UN Doc CCPR/C/57/D/480/1991 (12 July 1996) [9.5]. On
the right to free assistance of an interpreter if needed, see art 14 (3) (f) ICCPR and
UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [40]; UNHRCee, Guesdon v France
(Com No 219/86) UN Doc CCPR/C/39/D/219/1986 (25 July 1990) [10.2]. On the
freedom from self-incrimination, see art 14 (3) (g) ICCPR and UNHRCee, General
Comment No 32 (n 1015) [41]; UNHRCee, Sánchez López v Spain (Com No 777/97)
UN Doc CCPR/C/67/D/777/1997 (18October 1999) [6.4]. For the right to an appeal, see
art 14 (5) ICCPR and UNHRCee, General Comment No 32 (n 1015) [45–51];
UNHRCee, Salgar de Montejo v Colombia (Com No 64/79) UN Doc CCPR/C/15/D/
64/1979 (24March 1982) [10.4]; UNHRCee, Reid v Jamaica (Com No 355/89) UN Doc
CCPR/C/51/D/355/1989 (8 July 1994) [14.3]; UNHRCee, Perera v Australia (Com
No 536/93) UN Doc CCPR/C/53/D/536/1993 (28March 1995) [6.4]; UNHRCee, Gómez
Vazquez v Spain (Com No 701/96) UN Doc CCPR/C/69/D/701/1996 (20 July 2000)
[11.1]. For the principle of ne bis in idem, see art 14 (7) ICCPR and UNHRCee, General
Comment No 32 (n 1015) [54–57]; UNHRCee, AP v Italy (Com No 204/86) UN Doc
CCPR/C/31/D/204/1986 (2November 1987) [7.3].
1269 See CoE, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a
Fair Trial (Civil Limb) (2013) and CoE, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights: Right to a Fair Trial (Criminal Limb) (2014).
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only, several analogous guarantees for civil proceedings are interpreted into
paragraph (1).1270 Likewise, the general guarantee of a ‘fair hearing’ in art 6 (1)
ECHR often supplements the specific guarantees in arts 6 (2) and (3) ECHR.1271
The right to a fair hearing in art 6 (1) ECHR covers several specific rights,
which aim to guarantee equal chances to the parties in judicial proceedings.1272
These include the principle of equality of arms in criminal and civil cases, the
right to be heard before a court, rules governing the legitimate use of
entrapment, the right to freedom from self-incrimination in criminal cases, the
right to have one’s case properly examined, the right to a reasoned judicial
decision, the principle of res judicata, rules related to the administration of
evidence, the right to adversarial proceedings in civil- and criminal cases, the
presumption of innocence in cases where art 6 (2) does not apply and the right
to a hearing in one’s own presence.1273 Moreover, art 6 ECHR establishes
1270 Peters and Altwicker (n 1033) § 20 para 1; Harris and others (n 1034) 409.
1271 Harris and others (n 1034) 409.
1272 See, eg, Harris and others (n 1034) 410–432; Grabenwarter and Pabel (n 1033) § 24 paras
67–77.
1273 On the principle of equality of arms in criminal and civil cases, see, eg, ECtHR, Niederöst
Huber v Switzerland (App No 18990/91) 18 February 1997 [19 ff]; ECtHR, Mantovanelli
v France (App No 21497/93) 18March 1997 [33–36]; ECtHR, Kress v France (App
No 39594/98) 7 July 2001 [72f]; ECtHR, Stankiewicz v Poland (App No 46917/99)
6April 2009 [68f]; ECtHR, Massmann v Germany (App No 11603/06) 4May 2010. On
the right to be heard before a court, see, eg, ECtHR, Ressegatti v Switzerland (App
No 17671/02) 13 July 2006 [31f]; ECtHR, Kari-Pekka Pietiläinen v Finland (App
No 13566/06) 18November 2009 [33]. On rules governing the legitimate use of
entrapment see, eg, ECtHR, Khudobin v Russia (App No 59696/00) 26 January 2007
[128]; ECtHR, Ramanauskas v Lithuania (App No 74420/01) 5 February 2008 [55];
ECtHR, Bannikova v Russia (App No 18757/06) 4 February 2011 [36–50]; ECtHR,
Veselov ao v Russia (App Nos 23200/10, 24009/07, 556/10) 2 January 2013 [90]. On the
right to freedom from self-incrimination in criminal cases see, eg, ECtHR, Murray v the
United Kingdom (App No 18731/91) 8 February 1996 [45–50]; ECtHR, Saunders v UK
(App No 19187/91) 17December 1996 [68]; ECtHR, Funke v France (App No 10828/84)
25 February 1993 [44]; ECtHR, Jalloh v Germany (App No 54810/00) 11 July 2006
[111]. On the right to have one’s case properly examined see, eg, ECtHR, Dulaurans v
France (App No 34553/97) 21March 2000 [33]. On the right to a reasoned judicial
decision see, eg, ECtHR, H v Belgium (App No 8950/80) 30November 1987 [53];
ECtHR, Hirvisaari v Finland (App No 49684/99) 25December 2001 [30]; ECtHR,
Gorou v Greece (Nr. 2) (App No 12686/03) 20March 2009 [37]; ECtHR, Ilyadi v Russia
(App No 6642/05) 5May 2011 [39]; ECtHR, Ajdaric´ v. Croatia (App No 20883/09)
4 June 2012 [46–52]. On the the principle of res judicata see, eg, ECtHR, Bruma˘rescu v.
Romania (App No 28342/95) 28October 1999 [61]; ECtHR, Driza v Albania (App
No 33771/02) 13November 2007 [64]. On rules related to the administration of evidence
see, eg, ECtHR,Mantovanelli v France (App No 21497/93) 18March 1997 [34]; ECtHR,
Elsholz v Germany (App No 25735/94) 13 July 2000 [66]; ECtHR, Blücher v the Czech
Republic (App No 58580/00) 11April 2005 [65]; ECtHR, Jalloh v Germany (App
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several additional fair trial rights that take effect in criminal cases. They include
the presumption of innocence, the right to be informed of a charge, the right to
prepare the defence, the right to defend oneself in person or through legal
assistance of one’s own choosing, the right to free legal aid if required, the right
to the attendance and examination of witnesses and the right to free assistance of
an interpreter if the accused does not understand or speak the language used in
court.1274 Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR contains the principle of ne bis
in idem.1275
No 54810/00) 11 July 2006 [97]; ECtHR, Bykov v Russia (App No 4378/02) 10March
2009 [89]. On the right to adversarial proceedings in civil and criminal cases see, eg,
ECtHR, Werner v Austria (App No 21835/93) 24November 1997 [65f]; ECtHR, Ruiz-
Mateos v Spain (App No 12952/87) 23 June 1993 [63]; ECtHR, McMichael v the United
Kingdom (App No 16424/90) 24 February 1995 [80]; ECtHR, Vermeulen v Belgium (App
No 19075/91) 20 February 1996 [33]. On the presumption of innocence in cases where art
6 (2) ECHR does not apply see, eg, ECtHR, Phillips v the United Kingdom (App
No 41087/98) 5 July 2001 [39]. On the right to a hearing in one’s own presence see, eg,
ECtHR, Colozza v Italy (App No 9024/80) 12 February 1985 [27 ff].
1274 On the presumption of innocence, see art 6 (2) ECHR and, eg, ECtHR, Barberà,
Messegué and Jabardo v Spain (App No 10590/83) 6December 1988 [77]; ECtHR,
Telfner v Austria (App No 33501/96) 20 June 2001 [15]; ECtHR, Janosevic v Sweden
(App No 34619/97) 21May 2003 [96 ff]. On the right to be informed of a charge, see art
6 (3) (a) ECHR and, eg, ECtHR, Kamasinski v Austria (App No 9783/82) 19December
1989 [79]; ECtHR, Pélissier and Sassi v France (App No 25444/94) 25March 1999
[52]; ECtHR, Mattoccia v Italy (App No 23969/94) 25 July 2000 [59]; ECtHR, Penev v
Bulgaria (App No 20494/04) 7April 2010 [33; 42]. On the right to prepare the defence,
see art 6 (3) (b) ECHR and, eg, ECtHR, Gregacˇevic´ v Croatia (App No 58331/09)
10October 2012 [51]; ECtHR, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia (App
No 14902/04) 8March 2012 [538 ff]; ECtHR, Huseyn ao v Azerbaijan (App Nos
35485/05, 45553/05, 35680/05 and 36085/05) 26October 2011 [175]. On the right to
defend oneself in person or through legal assistance of one’s own choosing, see art 6 (3)
(c) ECHR and, eg, ECtHR, Imbrioscia v Switzerland (App No 13972/88) 24November
1993 [38]; ECtHR, Öcalan v Turkey (App No 46221/99) 12May 2005 [131–133];
ECtHR, Galstyan v Armenia (App No 26986/03) 15 February 2008 [91]; ECtHR, Salduz
v Turkey (App No 36391/02) 27November 2008 [51]. On the right to free legal aid if
required, see art 6 (3) (c) ECHR. On the right to the attendance and examination of
witnesses, see art 6 (3) (d) ECHR and, eg, ECtHR, Hümmer v Germany (App
No 26171/07) 19October 2012 [38]; ECtHR, Lucà v Italy (App No 33354/96) 27May
2001 [39]; ECtHR, Solakov v the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (App
No 47023/99) 31 January 2002 [57]. On the right to free assistance of an interpreter if the
accused does not understand or speak the language used in court, see art 6 (3) (e) ECHR
and, eg, ECtHR, Kamasinski v Austria (App No 9783/82) 19December 1989 [74];
ECtHR, Lagerblom v Sweden (App No 26891/95) 14April 2003 [62].
1275 Protocol No 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No 11 (Strasbourg, 22November 1984).
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Another regional human rights treaty guaranteeing fair trial rights is the
ACHR. Article 8 (1) ACHR provides for the right to a hearing ‘with due
guarantees’ in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature or in the
determination of rights and obligations of a civil, labour, fiscal or any other
nature. The text thereby already establishes the provision’s broad scope of
application if compared to arts 14 (1) ICCPR and 6 (1) ECHR.1276 The
interpretation of the guarantee is often guided by the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights and, to a lesser extent, the jurisprudence of the UN
Human Rights Committee.1277
Article 8 ACHR is supplemented by art 25 ACHR.1278 While art 8 ACHR
contains fair trial rights, art 25 ACHR guarantees the right of recourse to a
competent court or tribunal, ie judicial protection. The general fair trial rights
of art 8 ACHR, which are not specific to criminal proceedings, include the
right that cases are brought within a reasonable time and the principle of
equality of arms.1279 Criminal fair trial rights include the presumption of
innocence, the right to a free translator or interpreter if required, the freedom
from self-incrimination, the right to be informed of the charge, the right to an
adequate defence, the right to defend oneself or to be assisted by a legal
counsel of one’s own choosing, the right to witness attendance and
examination, the right to review, the principle of ne bis in idem and the
publicity of criminal proceedings.1280 The scope of protection provided for by
1276 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.08;
Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 24.
1277 Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) paras 25.03; 25.28.
1278 ibid para 25.06.
1279 On the right that cases are brought within a reasonable time, see Burgogue-Larsen and de
Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.24 citing, eg, IACtHR, Genie Lacayo
v Nicaragua (Judgment of 29 January 1997) (n 737) [77] and IACtHR, Valle Jaramillo
and others v Colombia (n 1129) [155]. On the principle of equality of arms, see ibid
(n 737) para 25.25 citing IACtHR, Ivcher-Bronstein v Peru (n 1160) [107–110].
1280 On the presumption of innocence, see art 8 (2) ACHR and Burgogue-Larsen and de
Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.35f citing IACtHR, Berenson Mejía v
Peru (n 1038) [160]; IACtHR, Servellón García et al v Honduras (Judgment of
21 September 2006; Series C No 152) (Merits, Reparations and Costs) [96] and
Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 194–196 citing IACtHR, Argüelles et al v Argentina
(n 1150) [130] and IACtHR, J v Peru (n 1238) [228]. On the right to a free translator or
interpreter if required, see art 8 (2) (a) ACHR and Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 196f
(who note that the IACtHR ‘has not directly assessed Article 8(2)(a)’). On the freedom
from self-incrimination, see art 8 (2) (g) and (3) ACHR and Antkowiak and Gonza
(n 737) 206–208. On the right to be informed of the charge, see arts 7 (4) & 8 (2) (b)
ACHR. On the right to an adequate defence, see art 8 (2) (c) ACHR and Burgogue-
Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.38 citing IACtHR,
Cantoral Benavides v Peru (n 1038) [127] and Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 199f
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the ACHR is, thus, similarly broad than that provided for by the ICCPR and the
ECHR.
Also the ACHPR guarantees a broad catalogue of fair trial rights and the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights declared the right to a fair
trial non-derogable.1281 Article 7 (1) ACHPR guarantees the right to have one’s
cause heard which comprises the right to an appeal to a competent national
referring to IACtHR, Barreto Leiva v Venezuela (Judgment of 17November 2009; Series
C No 206) (Merits, Reparations, and Costs); IACtHR, Palamara Iribarne v Chile (n 1209)
and IACtHR, J v Peru (n 1238) [206f]. On the right to defend oneself or to be assisted by
a legal counsel of one’s own choosing, see art 8 (2) (d) ACHR and Burgogue-Larsen and
de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.38 citing IACtHR, Bulacio v
Argentina (Judgment of 18 September 2003; Series C No 100) (Merits, Reparations and
Costs) [130] and Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 200–202 referring to IACtHR, Argüelles
et al v Argentina (n 1150) [175]; IACtHR, Barreto Leiva v Venezuela (Judgment of
17November 2009; Series C No 206) (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) [63]; IACtHR,
Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador (Judgment of 21November 2007; Series
C No 170) (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) [158] and IACtHR, J
v Peru (n 1238) [207]. On the right to witness attendance and examination, see art 8 (2) (f)
ACHR and Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para
25.38 citing IACtHR, Castillo Petruzzi v Peru (Judgment of 30May 1999) (n 1038)
[153] and Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 204–206 citing IACtHR, Berenson Mejía v
Peru (n 1038) [184]; IACtHR, Ricardo Canese v Paraguay (Judgment of 31August
2004; Series No 111) (Merits, Reparations and Costs) [164] and IACtHR, Norín
Catrimán et al v Chile (Judgment of 29May 2014; Series No 279) (Merits, Reparations,
and Costs) [245–249]. On the right to review, see art 8 (2) (h) ACHR and Burgogue-
Larsen and de Torres, ‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.28f citing IACtHR,
Herrera Ulloa v Costa Rica (n 1210) [157–168] and IACtHR, Barreto Leiva v Venezuela
(Judgment of 17November 2009; Series C No 206) (Merits, Reparations, and Costs)
[82–91] and Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 208–210 referring to IACtHR, Norín
Catrimán et al v Chile (Judgment of 29May 2014; Series No 279) (Merits, Reparations,
and Costs) [280] and IACtHR, Mohamed v Argentina (Judgment of 23November 2012;
Case No 255) (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) [92]. On the
principle of ne bis in idem, see art 8 (4) ACHR and Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres,
‘The Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.30 ff citing IACtHR, Loayza Tamayo v Peru
(Judgment of 17 September 1997; Series C No 33) (Merits) [66–77] and IACtHR,
Almonacid Arellano v Chile (Judgment of 26 September 2006; Series C No 154)
(Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) [154] and Antkowiak and
Gonza (n 737) 211–213 referring to IACtHR, J v Peru (n 1238) [262]. On the publicity
of criminal proceedings, see art 8 (5) ACHR and Burgogue-Larsen and de Torres, ‘The
Right to Due Process’ (n 737) para 25.27 citing, eg, IACtHR, Castillo Petruzzi v Peru
(Judgment of 30May 1999) (n 1038) [133f]; IACtHR, Cantoral Benavides v Peru
(n 1038) [141–149]; IACtHR, Palamara Iribarne v Chile (n 1209) [167f]; IACtHR,
Berenson Mejía v Peru (n 1038) [147] and Antkowiak and Gonza (n 737) 213f referring
to IACtHR, J v Peru (n 1238) [217].
1281 AComHPR, Article 19 v Eritrea (n 737) [98f] (the war in Eritrea could, thus, not be used
as a justification for an excessive delay in bringing detainees to trial).
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organ against acts violating one’s fundamental rights as recognised and
guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force, the right to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a competent court or tribunal, the
right to defence, including the right to be defended by a counsel of one’s own
choice and the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court
or tribunal.1282 Article 7 (2) ACHPR contains the prohibition of ex-post facto
laws and individual criminal responsibility.1283 In Good v Botswana, the
Commission recalled that ‘the right to fair trial involves fulfilment of certain
objective criteria, including the right to equal treatment, the right to defence by
a lawyer, especially where this is called for by the interests of Justice, as well as
the obligation on the part of Courts and Tribunals to conform to international
standards in order to guarantee a fair trial to all’.1284 Several fair trial
guarantees, which are not explicitly provided for in the Charter, were later
added by the Commission through its resolutions. These include, ia, the right to
a public hearing, the right to an interpreter, the freedom from self-incrimination,
the principle of ne bis in idem, the right to compensation in cases of
miscarriages of justice or the presumption of innocence.1285 The scope of fair
trial rights under the ACHPR can, thus, be considered to be equally broad than
that provided for under the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR.
As can be inferred from the preceding discussion on fair trial rights
guaranteed by the ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR, the scope of protection
of the different human rights instruments displays great convergence.
1282 On the right to appeal, see Olufemi Amao, ‘Civil and Political Rights in the African
Charter’ in Manisuli Ssenyonjo (ed), The African Regional Human Rights System
(Nijhoff 2012) 29, 39 citing AComHPR, Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria (in
respect of Wahib Akamu, G. Adega et al) (n 1212) [13]; AComHPR, Kenneth Good v
Republic of Botswana (n 1041) [161–173]; AComHPR, Civil Liberties Organisation et
al v Nigeria (n 737) [32f]. On the presumption of innocence, see Amao 40 citing
AComHPR, Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v Cameroon (n 1132)
[18–21]; AComHPR, Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (n 737) [47f]. On the right to
defence, see Amao 40 citing AComHPR, Achuthan and Amnesty International v
Malawi, Com Nos 64/92, 68/92, 78/92 (1995) [10]; AComHPR, Amnesty International
ao v Sudan (n 1041) [64]; AComHPR, Avocats Sans Frontières (on behalf of
Bwampamye) v Burundi, Com No 231/99 (2000) [27]. On the right to be tried within a
reasonable time, see, eg, AComHPR, Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria (in respect
of Wahib Akamu, G. Adega et al) (n 1212) [14]; AComHPR, Alhassan Abubakar v Ghana
(n 1132) [12]; AComHPR, Amnesty International ao v Sudan (n 1041) [68].
1283 On the prohibition of ex-post facto laws, see, eg, AComHPR,Media Rights Agenda a.o. v
Nigeria (n 1041) [59].
1284 AComHPR, Avocats Sans Frontières (on behalf of Bwampamye) v Burundi (n 1282) [26].
1285 Amao (n 1282) 41 citing AComHPR, Resolution on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial
(1992) and AComHPR, Resolution on the Respect and the Strengthening on the
Independence of the Judiciary (1996).
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Additionally, those fundamental principles of a fair trial which are also
guaranteed under international humanitarian law are considered peremptory
international law by the UN Human Rights Committee, thus further enhancing
the normative potential of fair trial rights to provide a legitimising basis for
Council resolutions invoking the need to establish fair judicial systems if the
Council ties them to circumstances that are considered encroachments on fair
trial rights in regional and international (human rights) law.
g. The UN Understanding of a Fair Judicial System
The concept of fairness figures prominently in UN sources that focus on the re-
establishment of rule of law systems in conflict- and post-conflict societies.
They invoke the fair administration of justice, the fairness of judicial process
and proceedings, a fair judiciary and fair courts, fair prosecutions, court
systems and justice systems, fair procedures for the settlement of civil
entitlements and disputes under the law and fair trial standards or emphasise a
need to investigate, adjudicate and resolve cases fairly.1286 Guaranteeing fair
trial standards or fair court systems has also been identified as an element of
UN rule of law assistance in conflict- and post-conflict societies.1287 None of
these sources, however, provide a definition of the concept of fairness and only
rarely identify measures required to guarantee it.1288 It is, thus, unlikely that a
Council notion of fairness with regard to the judiciary and judicial systems
would draw on a potentially existing alternative UN understanding.
h. The Concept of Internationally Agreed Standards
In reaction to the situations in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire, the Council
invoked a need to ensure that the judicial- and justice systems of the concerned
1286 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [2; 64 (b) (e) (i)]; OHCHR, Monitoring Legal Systems
(n 1044) 2, 5f; UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 25f, 40; OHCHR,
Mapping the Justice Sector (n 931) 8; SG Guidance Note UN Rule of Law Assistance
(n 1044) 5; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on Justice Components (n 1049) 8.
1287 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [2; 64 (b) (e)]; UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components
(n 1049) 25f, 40; OHCHR, Mapping the Justice Sector (n 931) 8; SG Guidance Note UN
Rule of Law Assistance (n 1044) 5; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on Justice Components
(n 1049) 8.
1288 OHCHR identified a number of issues that should be monitored when trying to assist
governments in making justice systems overall fairer and more effective and enumerated
‘budgetary and financial allocations, administrative oversight and accountability or
disciplinary mechanisms, judicial appointment processes, human resources policies and
staff allocation and training, law dissemination to justice officials and general
publication, methods for ensuring appropriate interaction between the institutions and
actors involved in justice’. See OHCHR, Monitoring Legal Systems (n 1044) 6.
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countries be consistent with international standards. What the reference to
international standards refers to in the context of UN rule of law assistance can
be construed with reference to UN sources. Several UN sources establish that
UN rule of law assistance should be based on international norms and
standards.1289 The Secretary-General identified the UN Charter, international
human rights-, humanitarian-, criminal- and refugee law as the normative
foundation of the UN’s work in advancing the rule of law and added that ‘[t]his
includes the wealth of United Nations human rights and criminal justice
standards’ which ‘represent universally applicable standards adopted under the
auspices of the United Nations’.1290
Particularly relevant for the present context, the UN Special Rapporteur on
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers has provided a list of international
standards applicable to the judiciary. Among them are, ia, the ICCPR, which –
as illustrated – contains a catalogue of guarantees pertaining to the judicial
branch of government such as the right to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law or the
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.1291 The UNDPKO
Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers further adds the Bangalore Principles
of Judicial Conduct and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors to the
list of international standards pertaining to the judiciary.1292 Another list of
international standards and principles with regard to the integrity and
independence of the judicial profession is found in the UNDPKO Primer for
Justice Components in Multidimensional Peace Operations.1293 The reference
to ‘international standards’ does, thus, refer to a wide array of legal-, non-legal-,
legally binding- and non-binding sources, which establish requirements for the
judicial branch, allowing for broad inferences with regard to the exact
requirements the Council might have in mind when using the phrase.
1289 UNDPKO, Handbook Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (n 899) 94f, 96; SG
Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [9]; UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) 20f,
27, 29, 34; OHCHR, Monitoring Legal Systems (n 1044) 2, 5, 8f; SG Guidance Note
UN Rule of Law Assistance (n 1044) 1f; UNDPKO/DFS, Policy on Justice Components
(n 1049) 3; UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 26.
1290 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [9].
1291 ‹http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Judiciary/Pages/Standards.aspx› accessed 14 July 2017.
With regard to the ICCPR as part of the notion of ‘international standards’, see also SG
Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [n 7].
1292 UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 177.
1293 UNDPKO, Primer for Justice Components (n 1049) [Annex B].
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i. Situations causing Council References to the Concept of an Impartial, Fair
and Transparent Judicial System, consistent with Internationally Agreed
Standards
The situations described in Secretary-General reports preceding the above-
mentioned Council resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire, Afghanistan and Guinea-
Bissau paint a diverse picture of the deficiencies that affected the judiciary in
the three countries.
In Afghanistan the justice sector lacked the required number of skilled staff
and building the capacities of justice-sector staff was urgently required.1294
Permanent justice institutions, including the Supreme Court, experienced
enormous deficits in human- and financial resources as well as in infrastructure.
A functioning judicial system was absent and the justice system generally
lacked sufficiently qualified judges and systematic case auditing- and
tracking.1295 The judiciary was further seriously compromised by
institutionalised corruption, political interferences, inadequate salaries for
justice officials, an insecurity of judges in terms of career progression and
tenure, insufficient security conditions for judges and justice personnel, a lack
of transparent and merit-based processes for appointments and career
advancement and an absence of effective and fair disciplinary- and ethical
oversight mechanisms.1296 The Secretary-General also observed that the failure
1294 UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its
implications for international peace and security: Emergency international assistance for
peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan’ (2004) UN Doc A/
59/581–S/2004/925 [26].
1295 SG Report A/59/581–S/2004/925 (n 1294) [27]; UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and
security: Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of
war-stricken Afghanistan’ (2006) UN Doc A/60/712–S/2006/145 [18; 24; 26]; UNGA-
UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its
implications for peace and security’ (2006) UN Doc A/61/326–S/2006/727 [51; 54];
UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its
implications for international peace and security’ (2007) UN Doc A/62/345–S/2007/555
[37; 45]; UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan
and its implications for international peace and security’ (2008) UN Doc A/62/722–S/
2008/159 [37]; UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in
Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ (2008) UN Doc A/
63/372–S/2008/617 [31]; UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation
in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ (2011) UN Doc
A/66/604–S/2011/772 [38].
1296 SG Report A/60/712–S/2006/145 (n 1295) [24]; SG Report A/61/326–S/2006/727
(n 1295) [10; 54f]; UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in
Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ (2007) UN Doc A/
61/799–S/2007/152 [47]; SG Report A/62/345–S/2007/555 (n 1295) [10; 37; 45]; SG
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to ensure a secure environment for courts and judicial personnel undermined the
overall capacity of the legal system to act impartially and independently and that
the judiciary failed to operate in an independent manner.1297
In Guinea-Bissau, the Secretary-General observed that the capacity of the
country to promote human rights and ensure minimum access to basic social
services, including in national institutions such as the judiciary, remained
weak.1298 Access to justice was undermined by the insufficient and degraded
state infrastructure, an inadequate legislative framework and the lacking
confidence of the population in judicial officials.1299 Justice institutions were
particularly weak, generating a widespread culture of impunity and the
judiciary had limited means to carry out its core functions, especially the
investigation and prosecution of criminal acts committed by people in positions
of power.1300 Judicial authorities were unable to take action with regard to
violence against women and children owing to a lack of material and human
resources and access to justice was jeopardised by absent judges and
prosecutors in many parts of the country.1301 Reflecting these deficits, the
National Programme for Justice Reform (2015–2019) included as one of its
main axes the strengthening of human and material capacities.1302
Report A/62/722–S/2008/159 (n 1295) [24]; SG Report A/63/372–S/2008/617 (n 1295)
[31]; UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and
its implications for international peace and security’ (2010) UN Doc A/64/705–S/
2010/127 [page 17]; SG Report A/66/604–S/2011/772 (n 1295) [38]; UNGA-UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security’ (2013) UN Doc A/67/889–S/2013/350 [19; 27];
UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its
implications for international peace and security’ (2013) UN Doc A/68/609-S/2013/535
[35]; UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and
its implications for international peace and security’ (2015) UN Doc A/69/929-S/
2015/422 [33].
1297 SG Report A/61/326–S/2006/727 (n 1295) [55]; UNGA-UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and
security’ (2009) UN Doc A/63/751–S/2009/135 [60].
1298 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
developments in Guinea-Bissau, including efforts towards the restoration of
constitutional order, and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding
Office in that country’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/262 [45].
1299 SG Report S/2013/262 (n 1298) [45].
1300 SG Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [53].
1301 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated
Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau’ (2015) UN Doc S/2015/626 [20].
1302 SG Report S/2015/626 (n 1301) [47].
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The Secretary-General further reported that the actual independence of the
judiciary from interferences was not guaranteed in Guinea-Bissau as the
politico-military elite had monopolised the state and effectively abolished the
separation of powers and the justice system was considered biased and as
serving the interests of the powerful only.1303 Political patronage often took
precedence over fair competition and recruitment based on merit and owing to
low wages and frequent delays in the payment of salaries, the judiciary had
become highly susceptible to corruption and bribery.1304 A culture of impunity
had been fostered due to interferences in the justice system by the military- and
political elite, threats made against judicial actors, a tendency towards victor’s
justice and little progress in the investigation of and establishment of
accountability for serious human rights violations.1305 To address these judicial
deficits, the Judicial Training Centre conducted trainings for judicial officials on
international principles related to the independence and impartiality of judicial
actors and the National Programme for Justice Reform (2015–2019) comprised
as one of its main axes the independence and transparency of the justice
sector.1306
Regarding the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the Secretary-General reported that
the justice sector had insufficient financial resources and the military justice
system only limited capacity.1307 The judicial system suffered from a backlog
of cases and lacking court infrastructure and equipment.1308 The Secretary-
General further observed that the justice sector lacked institutional
independence and that the resolve and capacity of the judiciary to impartially
and equitably address major crimes remained uneven.1309 The judiciary
suffered from corruption and lacked the ability to ensure accountability for
human rights violations and crimes irrespective of the status or political
1303 SG Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [49; 53].
1304 ibid [49].
1305 SG Report S/2013/262 (n 1298) [46]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United
Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau’ (2014) UN Doc S/2014/333
[16]; SG Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [53]; SG Report S/2015/626 (n 1301) [19].
1306 SG Report S/2015/626 (n 1301) [47].
1307 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/197 [48]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirty-third report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/761 [32].
1308 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirty-second report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire ’ (2013) UN Doc S/2013/377 [10; 32];
SG Report S/2013/761 (n 1307) [74].
1309 SG Report S/2013/197 (n 1307) [48]; SG Report S/2013/377 (n 1308) [10].
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affiliation of suspected perpetrators.1310 Moreover, the Secretary-General
considered it imperative that the government remained committed to ensuring
equitable and independent justice without discrimination and in conformity
with its obligations under international law and relevant human rights
standards, thereby clearly indicating problems with regard to the independence
of the judiciary.1311
j. Analysis
i. Relationship of Council Language to a Trend of Legalisation
The judiciary in Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire was affected by
circumstances which the Council in other resolutions had often addressed with
references to a lack in judicial capacity such as, eg, a backlog of court cases,
insufficiently qualified judicial staff, absent court infrastructure and equipment
and an inability to ensure accountability for crimes and human rights violations.
Instead of referring to a need to strengthen or build judicial capacity in the
countries concerned and using non-technical language, however, the Council
referred to a need to address the fairness, transparency, impartiality and
compliance with internationally agreed standards of the affected judicial
systems. It, thus, made use of legalised language to describe the deficits
affecting the national judiciary in the three countries concerned. This can be
explained, ia, with the circumstance that the factors amounting to an
insufficient judicial capacity certainly affect the ability of the judiciary to
administer justice fairly, transparently, impartially and consistent with
internationally agreed standards. Nonetheless, the Council could have invoked
non-technical concepts such as the capacity of the judicial system to address
these deficits. It did, however, choose to make use of terms and concepts that
resonate with rule of law guarantees whose content enjoys a relatively
1310 SG Report S/2013/377 (n 1308) [9; 47]; SG Report S/2013/761 (n 1307) [32]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2014) UN Doc S/2014/342 [28f; 83];
UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirty-fifth progress report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2014) UN Doc S/2014/892
[36; 41]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirty-sixth progress report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2015) UN Doc S/
2015/320 [16; 44; 50]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirty-seventh progress
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2015)
UN Doc S/2015/940 [25f]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Special report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2016) UN Doc S/
2016/297 [24; 27].
1311 SG Report S/2014/342 (n 1310) [83].
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
278
established meaning in regional and international human rights law. This choice
of language may be interpreted as to support the view that the Council displays a
certain penchant for the invocation of legal concepts when addressing
institutional weaknesses in national judicial systems.
What the Council understands concretely by the separate terms, however, is
not entirely clear. The UNDPKO Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers in UN
Peacekeeping noted a lack of standard UN definitions of terms such as ‘integrity,
professionalism, accountability, impartiality and transparency’, which are
frequently used with regard to justice actors. It further held that these terms are
‘often used to describe challenges to the rule of law (eg lack of accountability)
or the focus of certain programmes (eg developing increased professionalism
among judges)’ and that ‘while these concepts are separate, they are also
interdependent and overlapping’.1312 This assessment seems to apply also to the
way in which the Council invokes such terms. It is impossible to discern the
concrete understanding the Council may be having of the discrete concepts if it
refers to them at the same time to describe the requirements a judiciary or
judicial system should satisfy. The act of identifying which term used in a
resolution is a response to particular judicial deficits described in Secretary-
General reports and thereby construing a tentative understanding of the
Council’s concept of the term, thus, becomes entirely hypothetical.
For example, all three country situations clearly display problems with
regard to the independence of the judiciary, yet the Council did not invoke the
term. With regard to Côte d’Ivoire and Afghanistan, deficits in judicial
independence could of course also be subsumed under the requirement of a fair,
impartial or transparent judicial system. The legal notion of a fair tribunal, eg,
encompasses its independence and impartiality in most above-discussed human
rights treaties. Similarly, the concept of international standards as used by the
Council in reaction to the situations in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire, may
be read to involve human rights as guaranteed in, eg, the ICCPR and thus
encompass the right to an independent tribunal.
Certain circumstances described in Secretary-General reports can also be
read as to relate to the particular terms used in Council resolutions. That the
judiciary in Côte d’Ivoire lacked the ability to address crimes impartially and to
ensure accountability irrespective of the status or political affiliation of alleged
perpetrators, eg, can be considered as the basis for the Council’s call on the
Ivorian government to ensure that the work of the judicial system be ‘impartial’
and ‘fair’. In Afghanistan, reports of judicial corruption, a lack of transparent
and merit-based appointment processes and career advancement and the
1312 UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 173.
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absence of effective and fair disciplinary- and ethical oversight mechanisms
may have been the basis for Council references to a need to establish a ‘fair’ as
well as a ‘transparent’ judicial system. Since the Council used several concepts
to address the judicial deficits in Côte d’Ivoire and Afghanistan, however, it is
impossible to conclusively establish that the invocation of particular terms
relates to specific circumstances described in Secretary-General reports, even
though this seems very likely.
With regard to Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire, the concept of
‘international standards’ may encompass almost all human rights guarantees
pertaining to the judicial system and as such be construed as a reaction to
Secretary-General reports of problems with regard to the independence of the
judiciary or its impartiality. Making use of vague and broad notions such as
‘international standards’, however, does not contribute to the emergence of a
discernable Council understanding of particular legal concepts that may be
subsumed under the generic phrase such as, eg, the independence, impartiality
or fairness of the judiciary. References to ‘international standards’ can thus not
be considered to contribute significantly to a legalisation of Council language
and action as they allow for a great divergence of views as to their concrete
meaning among Council diplomats negotiating the text of a resolution as well
as among implementing actors.
A comparative analysis further shows that often situations on the ground
do not vary significantly with regard to the prevailing judicial deficits but
the Council uses different concepts to identify and address them. Why the
Council chooses to invoke the concept of judicial ‘independence’ or the
concepts of judicial ‘fairness’, ‘transparency’, ‘impartiality’ or ‘compliance
with internationally agreed standards’ is, thus, difficult to discern.
With regard to the two levels of legalisation of Council action, it can thus be
concluded that on a linguistic level Council resolutions on Afghanistan and Côte
d’Ivoire contribute to a trend of legalisation of Council language. They do so, as
they use terms that resonate with rule of law guarantees whose content enjoys a
relatively established meaning in regional and international human rights law.
With regard to the linguistic precision of these references, however, their
contribution to the legalisation of Council language must be qualified lesser than
that of Council references to the independence of the judiciary. References to a
fair, transparent and impartial judicial system may be related to rule of law
guarantees such as fair trial rights, the right to a public hearing and judgment or
the right to an impartial tribunal. The linguistic connection between the arguably
implied rule of law guarantees and the language used by the Council, however, is
less precise than the connection between Council references to the independence
of the judiciary and the rule of law guarantee of an independent tribunal.
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With regard to the second element of legalisation, the level of application,
Council references to the fairness, transparency and impartiality of the judicial
system do not contribute to a trend of legalisation of Council action. It is not
possible to identify – based on a comparative reading of Secretary-General
reports and Council resolutions – which concepts are invoked in response to
which judicial deficits. Whether the Council considers the fairness,
transparency and impartiality of the judicial system affected in a manner that
resonates with the interpretation of related rule of law guarantees by
international or regional human rights bodies can thus not be clearly determined.
References to judicial- or justice systems compliant with international
standards as in Guinea Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire contribute to an only limited
extent – if at all – to a legalisation of Council language as they invoke a broad
and vague concept and do not allow for a clear interpretation as to what the
Council subsumes under the notion of international standards.
In summary it can be said, thus, that Council references to the fairness,
transparency and impartiality of the judicial system contribute to a legalisation
of Council action primarily on a linguistic level. On a level of application such
references may indeed sometimes be related to circumstances reported by the
Secretary-General that are considered encroachments on rule of law guarantees
such as the right to an impartial tribunal or fair trial rights as interpreted by
competent regional and international human rights bodies. Since the Council
invokes several concepts to address these circumstances at the same time,
however, it cannot be conclusively established that specific concepts are used
in reaction to particular circumstances in a way that resembles the
interpretation of the affected rule of law guarantees by regional and
international human rights bodies. References to the compliance of judicial
systems with international standards must generally be considered an only
modest contribution to a legalisation of Council action due to their vague
character.
ii. Contribution of Council Language to Norm Emergence
The preceding analysis also determines the potential of Council references to
the fairness, transparency, impartiality and compliance with international
standards of judicial systems to affect the emergence of the rule of law as an
international norm. Of the norm emergence criteria proposed here, ie precision
of language, consistency of its use and legitimacy of standards related to the rule
of law, such references satisfy primarily the first criterion and the third to a
limited extent. References to fair, transparent and impartial judicial systems
resonate with rule of law guarantees whose content enjoys a relatively
established meaning in regional and international (human rights) law and can
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thus be described as relatively precise. The same, however, cannot be said with
regard to Council references to judicial systems compliant with internationally
agreed standards as they may be related to a wide array of possible sources to
concretise their meaning.
Regarding the consistency of Council reactions, the preceding analysis has
demonstrated that it is difficult to assess the fulfilment of this criterion as the
Council invoked several different concepts at the same time in reaction to
Secretary-General reports of judicial deficits. The act of connecting the
concepts invoked to particular circumstances preceding the issuance of Council
resolutions, thus, remains largely hypothetical. Accordingly, it is almost
impossible to assess whether the Council invoked these concepts consistently
in reaction to clearly discernable and comparable circumstances. The
consistency of Council invocations of the concepts of fair, transparent and
impartial judicial systems can, thus, not really be confirmed even though it
must be conceded that several circumstances affecting the judiciaries in
Afghanistan and Côte d’Ivoire can be related to rule of law guarantees such as
fair trial rights, the right to a public hearing and judgment or the right to an
impartial tribunal. The same must be said with regard to the concept of a
judicial system compliant with international standards to the extent that its
vague character does not allow for conclusive inferences of which guarantees
the Council connects to it, thus making it impossible to determine whether it is
invoked consistently in reaction to comparable circumstances.
The third criterion of norm emergence, the procedural and material
legitimacy of the invoked rule of law standards, may be considered fulfilled to
the extent that Council invocations of a fair, transparent and impartial judicial
system seem to invoke rule of law guarantees that enjoy at least relative
universality as they can be related to rights established in regional and
international human rights law. The invocation of judicial systems compliant
with international standards most certainly fulfils this criterion too as it must be
understood to refer to standards that enjoy near to universal approval in the
international society. To the extent that it cannot be assessed whether the
Council indeed promotes such rule of law guarantees by invoking them in
reaction to circumstances that are considered encroachments upon them,
however, it cannot be concluded that the Council contributes to their
implementation.
It must, thus, be concluded that the criteria for the emergence of the rule of
law as an international norm are only partially fulfilled with regard to Council
invocations of the fairness, transparency, impartiality and compliance with
internationally agreed standards of judicial systems.
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F. Operational Council Language
At various occasions, the Council reverted to a type of language that can be
labelled as operational to the extent that it describes the measures that need to
be undertaken to address judicial deficits rather than on the identification of
particular judicial characteristics and virtues (non-technical language) or
qualities that expressly invoke or resonate with established rule of law
guarantees (legalised language). From the text of most resolutions it can be
discerned that the Council connects operational language pertaining to the
judiciary with the rule of law.1313
1. Council Resolutions using Operational Language
The Council used operational language to address judicial deficits in several
cases when framing binding mandates of UN peace operations.
In Somalia, the Council revised the mandate of the UN Operation in Somalia
II (UNOSOM II) to include assistance in the reorganisation of the judicial
system.1314 Almost twenty years later, UNSOM was mandated to help build the
capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen Somalia’s justice
institutions.1315
In Liberia, the Council established UNMIL to support security reform and to
this end assist the transitional government in developing a strategy to
consolidate judicial institutions.1316
1313 See, eg, UNSC Res 1719 (25October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719 [2 (d)] (requesting
BINUB to consolidate the rule of law, in particular by strengthening the justice system);
UNSC Res 1840 (14October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1840 [17] and UNSC Res 1892
(13October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1892 [15] (counting the implementation of the justice
reform plan as part of MINUSTAH’s mandate to reform rule of law institutions). Many
resolutions use operational language in the same paragraphs, which invoke the rule of
law. See, eg, UNSC Res 1577 (1December 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1577 [preamble,
indent 9]; UNSC Res 1658 (14 February 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1658 [preamble, indent
14]; UNSC Res 1750 (30March 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1750 [preamble, indent 8];
UNSC Res 1943 (13October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1943 [preamble, indent 22]; UNSC
Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996 [3 (c) (i) (iv); 18]; UNSC Res 2103 (22May
2013) UN Doc S/RES/2103 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC Res 2119 (10October 2013)
UN Doc S/RES/2119 [preamble, indent 7].
1314 UNSC Res 897 (4 February 1994) UN Doc S/RES/897 [2 (d)] (emphasis added).
1315 UNSC Res 2102 (2May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2102 [2 (d) (iv)]; UNSC Res 2158
(29May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2158 [1 (d) (iv)] (emphasis added).
1316 UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509 [3 (q)] (emphasis added).
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In Timor-Leste, the Council decided that the mandate of the UN Mission of
Support in East Timor (UNMISET) should involve support for the justice
system of Timor-Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes.1317
The UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was tasked to provide advice and
assistance to the transitional government to complete the reform of the judiciary
and to assist the government and authorities in extending state authority and
utilities throughout the territory, including judicial institutions.1318 The Security
Council later mandated BINUB to support the government in consolidating the
rule of law, particularly by strengthening the justice system.1319
In Haiti, the Council mandated MINUSTAH to provide assistance and
advice to Haitian authorities in monitoring, restructuring, reforming and
strengthening the justice sector.1320 It further requested MINUSTAH to
continue to provide the necessary support with regard to the reform of rule of
law institutions, encouraging Haitian authorities to take full advantage of this
support, notably in implementing the justice reform plan and asked the
Secretary-General to include in his reports a comprehensive assessment of
judiciary sector reform.1321
MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was tasked to support
the efforts of the Congolese authorities to strengthen and reform judicial
institutions, to work with the government for the implementation of any
appropriate recommendations for justice sector reform and to develop and
implement, in consultation with the Congolese authorities and in accordance
with the Congolese strategy for justice reform, a multi-year joint UN justice
support programme in order to develop, ia, the criminal justice chain,
independent criminal justice institutions and processes and the judiciary.1322
In South Sudan, the Council authorised UNMISS to support the government
in justice sector development and in developing a military justice system
complementary to the civil justice system and requested the SRSG and
UNMISS to work and report back to the Council on a plan for UN system
support to specific peacebuilding tasks, especially justice sector support.1323
1317 UNSC Res 1543 (14May 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1543 [3 (i)] (emphasis added).
1318 UNSC Res 1545 (21May 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1545 [5; 6; 7] (emphasis added).
1319 UNSC Res 1719 (25October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719 [2 (d)] (emphasis added).
1320 UNSC Res 1702 (15August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1702 [14] (emphasis added).
1321 UNSC Res 1840 (14October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1840 [17]; UNSC Res 1892
(13October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1892 [15; 26] (emphasis added).
1322 UNSC Res 1925 (28May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1925 [12 (l) (o)]; UNSC Res 2098
(28March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098 [15 (g)]; UNSC Res 2147 (28March 2014) UN
Doc S/RES/2147 [5 (j)]; UNSC Res 2348 (31March 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2348 [35]
(emphasis added).
1323 UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996 [3 (c) (i) (iv); 18] (emphasis added).
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In Côte d’Ivoire, the Council decided that UNOCI should support the
government’s development and implementation of a national justice sector
strategy as well as the development and implementation of a multi-year joint
UN justice support programme in order to develop, ia, the judiciary.1324
Less authoritative with regard to its legal effects and political relevance but
nonetheless informative when analysing whether the Council develops a rule of
law understanding and contributes to its diffusion among UN member states and
the wider international society, the Council reverted to operational language
regarding the situation of the judiciary in various operative, albeit non-binding
paragraphs.
In Somalia, the Council stressed the importance it attached to the
establishment of an operational judiciary system at the regional and district
level.1325 Many years later, it requested the Secretary-General to develop
recommendations on the mandate of a UN Peacekeeping Operation, which
should assist in supporting the effective re-establishment, training and
retention of, ia, the judiciary.1326 A couple of years later, the Council reiterated
the importance of the Somali authorities to assume responsibility for the
establishment of rule of law- and justice services and urged the international
community to continue efforts to support the development of the Somali justice
institutions.1327
In Timor-Leste, it emphasised the need for measures to address short-
comings in the administration of justice, encouraged UNMIT’s sustained
efforts to strengthen the justice system and underlined an ongoing need to
strengthen national capacity in judicial line functions and the importance of a
coordinated approach to justice sector reform as well as a need for sustained
support by the international community in capacity-building and strengthening
of institutions in this sector.1328
In Haiti, the Council supported the recommendations of the Secretary-
General regarding an assessment of the Haitian judiciary, including a more
active role by MINUSTAH.1329
1324 UNSC Res 2000 (27 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2000 [7 (f)] (emphasis added).
1325 UNSC Res 886 (18November 1993) UN Doc S/RES/886 [8] (emphasis added).
1326 UNSC Res 1863 (16 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1863 [6 (e)] (emphasis added).
1327 UNSC Res 2067 (18 September 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2067 [11; 12] (emphasis added).
1328 UNSC Res 1338 (31 January 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1338 [8]; UNSC Res 1745
(22 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1745 [9]; UNSC Res 1867 (26 February 2009) UN
Doc S/RES/1867 [9]; UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1912 [10];
UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1969 [12]; UNSC Res 2037
(23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037 [11] (emphasis added).
1329 UNSC Res 1608 (22 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1608 [2 (d)] (emphasis added).
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In Sierra Leone, the Council called on the government, UNIOSIL and all
other stakeholders to increase their efforts to strengthen the judiciary.1330
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council urged the
international community to consider providing increased technical or other
assistance to reinforce the Congolese justice institutions and MONUSCO to
continue supporting efforts of the Congolese authorities to strengthen their
justice system.1331 It further urged the government to operationalize and
implement a national and comprehensive vision and strategy for the justice
sector, to remain fully committed to protecting the civilian population through
the deployment of, ia, the judiciary, to undertake the necessary judicial reform
to ensure that the DRC effectively addressed impunity and to reinforce state
authority and governance in the eastern DRC to allow for justice sector
reform.1332
In Côte d’Ivoire, the Council called on the government to take the necessary
steps to re-establish and reinforce the judiciary.1333
In Guinea-Bissau, it called on the authorities to actively reform and
strengthen the judicial system.1334
In the Central African Republic, the Council called on the authorities
to strengthen their justice institutions, including, ia, by restoring the
administration of the judiciary and criminal justice system throughout the
country.1335 It further called on the transitional authorities to continue their
efforts to redeploy state administration in the provinces, including through the
effective restoration of the administration of the judiciary and the criminal
justice system and on member states, international and regional organisations to
urgently provide support for the restoration of the judiciary and the criminal
justice system.1336
1330 UNSC Res 1734 (22December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1734 [7]; UNSC Res 1793
(31December 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1793 [7]; UNSC Res 1829 (4August 2008) UN
Doc S/RES/1829 [7]; UNSC Res 1886 (15 September 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1886 [6]
(emphasis added).
1331 UNSC Res 1952 (29November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1952 [15; 16] (emphasis added).
1332 UNSC Res 2053 (27 June 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2053 [8]; UNSC Res 2211 (26March
2015) UN Doc S/RES/2211 [16; 29]; UNSC Res 2277 (30March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/
2277 [2]; UNSC Res 2293 (23 June 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2293 [19]; UNSC Res 2348
(31March 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2348 [21] (emphasis added).
1333 UNSC Res 2000 (27 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2000 [10] (emphasis added).
1334 UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203 [10]; UNSC Res 2267
(26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [14] (emphasis added).
1335 UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [11]; UNSC Res 2301 (26 July
2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [10] (emphasis added).
1336 UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [12; 13]; UNSC Res 2301
(26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [13] (emphasis added).
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In Liberia, the Council urged the effective, transparent and efficient
management by the Government of Liberia of assistance, including from
bilateral and multilateral partners, to support the reform of the justice sector.1337
In its least authoritative form, the Council used operational language in the
preamble of its resolutions.
In Somalia, the Council affirmed the importance of a re-established judicial
system for the restoration of public order.1338 Much later and in reaction to
piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, the Council emphasised the
importance of international support to Somalia’s justice institutions and
welcomed capacity-building efforts in the region to strengthen the Somali
criminal justice system.1339
In Sierra Leone, the Council noted the negative impact of the security
situation on the administration of justice and the pressing need for international
cooperation to assist in strengthening the judicial system of the country.1340
In Timor-Leste, the Council noted that further assistance was required to
ensure the sustained development and strengthening of the justice sector.1341
In Burundi, the Council encouraged the international donor community to
respond to requests from the government to strengthen its national judicial
institutions.1342
In Afghanistan, the Council recognised an urgent need to accelerate justice
sector reform and stressed the importance of further progress by the government
in strengthening judicial institutions.1343
1337 UNSC Res 2333 (23December 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2333 [7] (emphasis added).
1338 UNSC Res 897 (4 February 1994) UN Doc S/RES/897 [preamble, indent 10] (emphasis
added).
1339 UNSC Res 2102 (2May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2102 [preamble, indent 6]; UNSC Res
2125 (18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res 2184
(12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [preamble, indent 15]; UNSC Res 2246
(10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [preamble, indent 16]; UNSC Res 2316
(9November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2316 [preamble, indent 15] (emphasis added).
1340 UNSC Res 1315 (14August 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1315 [preamble, indent 11] (emphasis
added).
1341 UNSC Res 1543 (14May 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1543 [preamble, indent 8] (emphasis
added).
1342 UNSC Res 1577 (1December 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1577 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC
Res 1602 (31May 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1602 [preamble, indent 12] (emphasis added).
1343 UNSC Res 1589 (24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1589 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC Res
1943 (13October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1943 [preamble, indent 22]; UNSC Res 2011
(12October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2011 [preamble, indent 28]; UNSC Res 2069
(9October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2069 [preamble, indent 27]; UNSC Res 2120
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2120 [preamble, indent 28] (emphasis added).
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In Haiti, the Council encouraged MINUSTAH to further explore possibilities
for greater support to reform, modernise and strengthen the judiciary, including
through the provision of targeted technical assistance to rule of law
institutions.1344 It further urged the Haitian government to reform the judiciary,
underlined the need to strengthen the judicial system and noted with concern the
slow progress towards consolidating the rule of law and in this context called on
the government to address the deficiencies in the justice system.1345
In Liberia, the Council identified the reform of the judiciary as a significant
challenge in the consolidation of Liberia’s post-conflict transition.1346 Several
years later, it urged the government to demonstrate substantive progress in the
reform, restructuring and effective functioning of the justice sector to provide
for the protection of all Liberians.1347
With regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council urged the
government to remain fully committed to the implementation of the PSC
Framework and to protecting the civilian population through the deployment of
an accountable Congolese civil administration, in particular the judiciary.1348 It
further urged the government to follow through by undertaking the necessary
judicial reform to ensure that the DRC effectively addressed impunity and to
1344 UNSC Res 1658 (14 February 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1658 [preamble, indent 14]
(emphasis added).
1345 UNSC Res 1702 (15August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1702 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC
Res 1743 (15 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1743 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res
1780 (15October 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1780 [preamble, indent 15]; UNSC Res 1840
(14October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1840 [preamble, indents 17 & 18]; UNSC Res 1892
(13October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1892 [preamble, indent 14]; UNSC Res 1944
(14October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1944 [preamble, indent 17]; UNSC Res 2012
(14October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2012 [preamble, indent 23]; UNSC Res 2070
(12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [preamble, indent 10]; UNSC Res 2119
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2180
(14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2180 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2243
(14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res 2313
(13October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2313 [preamble, indents 15 & 32] (in the same
paragraph, the Council noted ‘the slow progress towards consolidating the rule of law
and calling on Haitian authorities to continue to pursue efforts aimed at strengthening
rule of law institutions and ending impunity’) (emphasis added).
1346 UNSC Res 1750 (30March 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1750 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res
1777 (20 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1777 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res 1836
(29 September 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1836 [preamble, indent 11] (emphasis added).
1347 UNSC Res 2190 (15December 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2190 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC
Res 2239 (17 September 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2239 [preamble, indent 4] (emphasis
added).
1348 UNSC Res 2098 (28March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098 [preamble, indent 24]; UNSC
Res 2147 (28March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147 [preamble, indent 28] (emphasis added).
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take immediate steps to uphold its commitment to the development of a
roadmap for the justice sector.1349
In Guinea-Bissau, the Council stressed that the consolidation of peace and
stability could only result from, ia, reforms in the justice sector and reiterated
the importance of continued support towards the implementation of justice
sector reforms.1350 It also recognised the concrete steps taken by the
government towards peace, security and stability and stressed the need that
such steps be continuously taken by, ia, the tackling of corruption through the
reinforcement of the judicial system.1351
In the Central African Republic, the Council called on international partners
to urgently provide financial contributions to support the restoration of the
judicial chain and on the elected authorities to restore the administration of the
judiciary in order to fight impunity.1352
2. Situations causing Council Uses of Operational Language
The question that arises is, under what circumstances the Council reverts to
operational language as opposed to legalised or non-technical language. Having
identified a set of circumstances that seem to constitute the basis for the use of
legalised or non-technical language in Council resolutions, one can have a
comparative look at the situations triggering the use of operational language to
identify weaknesses in the judiciary or to initiate measures to address such deficits
to determinewhether the Council used such language for discernible reasons.
In Somalia, eg, the main problem affecting the judicial system seemed to
relate to its mere existence or functioning as the Secretary-General reported for
more than twenty years that the Somali judicial system was generally fragile and
judicial institutions largely absent.1353 This resonates with Council resolutions
1349 UNSC Res 2147 (28March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147 [preamble, indents 27 & 29]
(emphasis added).
1350 UNSC Res 2103 (22May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2103 [preamble, indents 4 & 12]; UNSC
Res 2157 (29May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2157 [preamble, indents 5 & 12]; UNSC Res
2186 (25November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2186 [preamble, indents 5 & 15]; UNSC Res
2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203 [preamble, indents 7 & 16]; UNSC Res
2267 (26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [preamble, indents 7 & 18]; UNSC Res
2343 (23 February 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2343 [preamble, indent 9] (emphasis added).
1351 UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC
Res 2267 (26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [preamble, indent 3] (emphasis
added).
1352 UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [preamble, indent 39]; UNSC Res
2262 (27 January 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2262 [preamble, indent 6] (emphasis added).
1353 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Further report of the Secretary-General
submitted in pursuance of paragraph 19 of resolution 814 (1993) and paragraph A 5 of
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on Somalia to the extent that they focused on the ‘re-establishment’ and ‘re-
organisation’ of the judiciary or judicial system or on the strengthening of the
Somali criminal justice system and with resolutions that explicitly emphasised
the limited capacity of the Somali court- and judicial system.1354 This
assessment is also underlined by Secretary-General reports of capacity-building
measures for the Somali justice system such as court reconstruction- and
rehabilitation measures and training for Somali judges and prosecutors,
pointing to problems with regard to court infrastructure and the qualification of
judicial personnel in the country to address piracy-related crimes.1355 These
references indicate that the problems in Somalia did not pertain to the quality
of an already established judiciary but rather to the very creation of a
functioning judicial system.
With regard to the issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia, Somalia’s neighbouring states, which were likewise affected by these
crimes, also seemed to lack judicial capacity. Accordingly, the Secretary-
General reported about international efforts to support the building of judicial
capacity and to enhance the capacity of judiciaries and prosecutorial services of
states in the region.1356 This focus on a lack in regional judicial capacity to
judicially address piracy and armed robbery at sea was also reflected in Council
resolutions which contained manifold references to a need to enhance the
judicial capacity of the states in the region.1357
resolution 865 (1993)’ (1993) UN Doc S/26738 [82]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 4
of resolution 886 (1993)’ (1994) UN Doc S/1994/12 [18]; SG Report S/2014/740 (n 843)
[61].
1354 UNSC Res 886 (18November 1993) UN Doc S/RES/886 [8]; UNSC Res 897
(4 February 1994) UN Doc S/RES/897 [preamble, indent 10; 2 (d)]; UNSC Res 2184
(12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [preamble, indent 15]; UNSC Res 2246
(10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [preamble, indent 16]. For preceding
resolutions, see UNSC Res 1918 (27April 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1918 [preamble,
indent 5; 6]; UNSC Res 1976 (11April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1976 [preamble, indents
11 & 12]; UNSC Res 2184 (12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [4]; UNSC Res
2246 (10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [4]; UNSC Res 2316 (9November
2016) UN Doc S/RES/2316 [4].
1355 SG Report S/2012/643 (n 955) [46; 51; 60]; SG Report S/2013/69 (n 948) [40]; SG Letter
S/2013/239 (n 962) [14]; SG Report S/2013/623 (n 843) [44]; SG Report S/2015/776
(n 843) [16].
1356 SG Report S/2013/623 (n 843) [22; 28; 44]; SG Report S/2014/740 (n 843) [23]; SG
Report S/2016/843 (n 955) [34].
1357 UNSC Res 1846 (2December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 [15]; UNSC Res 1897
(30November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1897 [14]; UNSC Res 1918 (27April 2010) UN
Doc S/RES/1918 [preamble, indents 5 & 6]; UNSC Res 1950 (23November 2010) UN
Doc S/RES/1950 [19]; UNSC Res 1976 (11April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1976
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Council resolutions responding to similar situations in other countries – as
discussed above – had invoked the concept of judicial capacity or the concept
of judicial effectiveness to address comparable weaknesses of the judiciary.
This demonstrates that the Council adopts different approaches when choosing
its language to address judicial deficits.
In Liberia, the Secretary-General noted that the judicial system lacked the
capacity to process cases and reported of measures aimed at strengthening the
capacity of the judiciary.1358 Most courts were not functioning, much of the
infrastructure had been destroyed and the judiciary was severely degraded.1359
The judiciary lacked the necessary infrastructure and essential material
resources such as logistic support, basic office supplies and funding.1360
Unqualified judicial personnel often applied legal rules and procedures in an
inconsistent manner and failed to observe minimum human rights standards.1361
The criminal justice system was facing challenges in bringing cases to trial in a
timely manner and cases were poorly managed.1362 Several years later, the
strengthening of the capacity of the judiciary was still a key national human
[preamble, indents 11 & 12]; UNSC Res 2020 (22November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020
[23]; UNSC Res 2077 (21November 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2077 [27]; UNSC Res 2125
(18November 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2125 [preamble, indent 28; 24]; UNSC Res 2184
(12November 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2184 [preamble, indent 26; 25]; UNSC Res 2246
(10November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2246 [preamble, indent 29; 27]; UNSC Res 2316
(9November 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2316 [preamble, indent 29; 27].
1358 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/151 [33].
1359 SG Report S/2003/875 (n 1056) [24]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Second
Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’
(2004) UN Doc S/2004/229 [30]; SG Report S/2007/151 (n 1358) [33; 40]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/479 [37]; UNSC Report
of the Secretary-General, ‘Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (2008) UN Doc S/2008/553 [40].
1360 SG Report S/2007/151 (n 1358) [33]; SG Report S/2007/479 (n 1359) [40]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (2008) UN Doc S/2008/183 [44]; SG Report S/
2008/553 (n 1359) [35f]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Eighteenth progress
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (2009) UN
Doc S/2009/86 [31].
1361 SG Report S/2007/151 (n 1358) [33; 40]; SG Report S/2007/479 (n 1359) [37; 40]; SG
Report S/2008/183 (n 1360) [41; 44]; SG Report S/2008/553 (n 1359) [35f; 40]; SG
Report S/2009/86 (n 1360) [31]; SG Report S/2015/620 (n 941) [47]; UNHRC, National
Report submitted in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council
Resolution 16/21 (18 February 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/22/LBR/1 [45].
1362 SG Report S/2007/151 (n 1358) [40]; SG Report S/2008/183 (n 1360) [44]; SG Report S/
2008/553 (n 1359) [36]; SG Report S/2009/86 (n 1360) [31]; UNHRC, National Report
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rights priority and a field that required international assistance.1363 Systemic
weaknesses in the criminal justice system, including limited internal oversight,
weak administrative procedures and an outdated legal framework continued to
cause significant delays in the delivery of justice and accountability for human
rights violations and abuses, particularly for sexual and gender-based violence,
was not guaranteed.1364
References to problems with regard to low salaries for judicial personnel,
corruption within the judiciary, political interference with its work, a need to
review the rules of court and the judicial canons and an insufficient legislative
framework for the justice system further pointed to deficits with regard to the
independence of the judiciary and the Secretary-General considered a greater
political commitment by all Liberian institutions and civil society to an
efficient, transparent, accountable and independent judiciary vital for the
government to address victims’ rights and build the trust of the people.1365
Several of the deficits that affected the Liberian judiciary could be qualified
as pertaining to the independence, effectiveness or capacity of the judiciary and
the Council did invoke these concepts in resolutions on other country situations
featuring comparable problems. With regard to Liberia, however, the Council
seemed to react to the reported problems affecting the independence of the
judiciary in just one resolution and only in its preambular part, where it urged
the transitional government to ensure that the establishment of an independent
judiciary be among its highest priorities.1366 In two resolutions issued more
than ten years later, the Council addressed deficits regarding the effectiveness
and capacity of the judiciary when urging the Liberian government to intensify
its efforts to improve the capacity and capability of the justice sector, including
submitted in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council
Resolution 16/21 (n 1361) [40].
1363 UNHRC, National Report submitted in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to
Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21 (n 1361) [66f]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Thirty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Liberia’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/706 [67]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in
Liberia’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/968 [17].
1364 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirty-first progress report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/169 [42]; SG
Report S/2016/706 (n 1363) [28; 73]; SG Report S/2016/968 (n 1363) [17; 26].
1365 SG Report S/2003/875 (n 1056) [24]; SG Report S/2007/151 (n 1358) [33]; SG Report S/
2007/479 (n 1359) [37]; SG Report S/2008/183 (n 1360) [41]; SG Report S/2008/553
(n 1359) [35; 40]; SG Report S/2009/86 (n 1360) [31]; SG Report S/2016/169 (n 1364)
[64]; SG Report S/2016/706 (n 1363) [49; 67]; SG Report S/2016/968 (n 1363) [17; 26;
40; 89].
1366 UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509 [preamble, indent 7].
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the courts.1367 In the majority of its resolutions, however, the Council neither
specified what the ‘reform of the judiciary’ implied concretely, nor did it
explicitly identify the concrete problems affecting the judiciary that needed to
be addressed by judicial reform such as its effectiveness, independence or
capacity.
With regard to Timor-Leste, the Secretary-General noted the limited
capacity of the judicial system. Courts outside Dili were inoperative most of the
time and the judiciary was particularly weak with detrimental effects on the
entire rule of law system.1368 Additionally, the Secretary-General reported of
capacity-strengthening measures undertaken, ia, by UNDP and UNMIT.1369
The concrete problems affecting the judiciary related to delayed decision-
making in courts and a backlog of cases, inadequate security conditions for
courthouses, a lack of accountability for crimes, insufficient infrastructure and
human resources, an absence of qualified judicial personnel, insufficient
disciplinary oversight mechanisms for the judiciary and concerns over growing
corruption.1370 If compared with the language used in other Council resolutions
and rule of law guarantees pertaining to the judiciary, these judicial deficits
could be qualified as affecting the independence, effectiveness or capacity of
the judicial system. Accordingly, Council resolutions reacting to the problems
described in Timor-Leste did not only revert to operational language when
addressing the described judicial deficits. They also used legalised language
when referring to a need to respect the independence of the judiciary or to
enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary system and non-technical language
when highlighting a need to build the capacity of the justice sector.1371 A closer
1367 UNSC Res 2190 (15December 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2190 [4]; UNSC Res 2239
(17 September 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2239 [4].
1368 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission of Support in East Timor’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/333 [25]; SG Report
S/2006/628 (n 937) [81]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the
period from 9August 2006 to 26 January 2007)’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/50 [27; 58]; SG
Report S/2008/26 (n 937) [59]; SG Report S/2009/72 (n 957) [51; 55]; SG Report S/
2010/85 (n 938) [82].
1369 SG Report S/2008/26 (n 937) [37; 59]; SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [74]; SG Report S/
2012/43 (n 938) [42].
1370 SG Report S/2006/628 (n 937) [81; 85]; SG Report S/2007/50 (n 1368) [27]; SG Report
S/2008/26 (n 937) [30; 37]; SG Report S/2010/85 (n 938) [24; 73; 82f]; SG Report S/
2011/32 (n 947) [16; 33]; SG Report S/2012/43 (n 938) [33; 42].
1371 On the independence of the judiciary, see UNSC Res 1745 (22 February 2007) UN Doc
S/RES/1745 [preamble, indent 5]; UNSC Res 1802 (25 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/
1802 [preamble, indent 8]; UNSC Res 1867 (26 February 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1867
[preamble, indent 9]; UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1912
IV. Rule of Law Requirements for National Judiciaries
293
look at resolutions on Timor-Leste, comparing whether the Council issued its
assessments and recommendations in preambular-, non-binding- or binding
paragraphs, suggests that the focus in Timor-Leste was more on judicial
capacity- and effectiveness problems than on issues pertaining to judicial
independence. The use of operational language, thus, derogates less from a
possible trend in legalisation of Council language and action as it would have,
had the judiciary primarily been affected by problems pertaining to its
independence, impartiality or fairness.
In Burundi, the Secretary-General noted the incapacity of the judicial system
to act in a timely and impartial manner and observed that the national judicial
capacity needed to be enhanced in order to be capable of addressing the many
egregious crimes that were continuously committed.1372 He further reported
that the judicial system remained fragile and unable to carry out its function in
a credible and independent manner. Reforms to ensure the judiciary’s
independence and a cadre of qualified judicial workers were critically needed
and significant work remained to be done to ensure an independent and
balanced judicial sector.1373 Secretary-General reports further noted the absence
of the necessary infrastructure such as transport- and communication systems,
insufficient qualified judicial personnel, a backlog of court cases, a need for
adequate funding and a lack of accountability for sexual violence.1374
The situation described by the Secretary-General with regard to Burundi
may be interpreted as to affect the independence, effectiveness and capacity of
[preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1969
[preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2037 (23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037
[preamble, indent 7]. On the effectiveness of the judiciary system, see UNSC Res 1410
(17May 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1410 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 1802
(25 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1802 [8]; UNSC Res 1867 (26 February 2009) UN
Doc S/RES/1867 [11]; UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1912 [11];
UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1969 [13]; UNSC Res 2037
(23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037 [12]. On the capacity of the justice sector, see
UNSC Res 1704 (25August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1704 [4 (f)]; UNSC Res 1802
(25 February 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1802 [7]; UNSC Res 1867 (26 February 2009) UN
Doc S/RES/1867 [9; 10]; UNSC Res 1912 (26 February 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1912
[10]; UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1969 [12]; UNSC Res 2037
(23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037 [11].
1372 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi’
(2004) UN Doc S/2004/210 [28]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Second
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi’ (2004) UN
Doc S/2004/902 [63].
1373 SG Report S/2004/210 (n 1372) [79]; SG Report S/2006/429 (n 1053) [41].
1374 SG Report S/2004/210 (n 1372) [37f]; SG Report S/2004/902 (n 1372) [43]; SG Report S/
2006/429 (n 1053) [41].
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the judiciary. The majority of Council resolutions on Burundi, however, does
not reveal what the ‘reform of the judiciary’ or the ‘strengthening of judicial
institutions’ should imply. A focus on capacity problems may be read into
some resolutions that encourage the international community to respond to
requests from the Burundian government to strengthen its national judicial
institutions and rule of law capacity, but the texts are not conclusive.1375 The
only resolution which clearly identifies the deficiencies affecting the judiciary,
requests BINUB to focus on the consolidation of the rule of law, in particular
by strengthening the justice system, including the independence and capacity
of the judiciary.1376 Here, as it rarely does, the Council explicitly identifies two
focus areas of the activities it mandates to strengthen the justice system, namely
the strengthening of the independence and capacity of the judiciary. Such
specifications by the Council when using operational language are normatively
desirable from the perspective of a legalisation of Council language if judicial
deficits can be described as derogations from rule of law guarantees pertaining
to the judiciary.
In Haiti, the Secretary-General observed that the judicial sector lacked
institutional capacity and resources and that international assistance was
required to enhance the professional capacity of the judiciary.1377 Problems
related to a lack in human and material resources, inadequate case management,
an absence of adequate judicial institutions as judicial buildings had been
damaged or burned down, threats to the safety of judges and judicial personnel,
judges that ceased to report to work due to safety concerns, a general lack in
judicial personnel and a lack of accountability as suspects of the Haitian police
were released without investigation or trial.1378 Even though similar reports on
1375 UNSC Res 1577 (1December 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1577 [preamble, indent 9]; UNSC
Res 1602 (31May 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1602 [preamble, indent 12].
1376 UNSC Res 1719 (25October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1719 [2 (d)].
1377 SG Report S/2004/300 (n 1053) [35]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2006) UN
Doc S/2006/60 [41]. See also, UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2010) UN Doc
S/2010/446 [32]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2013) UN Doc S/
2013/139 [67] and UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2014) UN Doc S/
2014/617 [33]; SG Report S/2016/225 (n 1094) [23]; SG Report S/2016/753 (n 1072)
[25].
1378 SG Report S/2004/300 (n 1053) [35f]; SG Report S/2006/60 (n 1377) [36]; UNSC Report
of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2006) UN Doc S/2006/592 [22]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization
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other country situations were addressed by Council resolutions invoking a need
to enhance the capacity of the judiciary, the Council did not establish in any of
its resolutions on Haiti that justice reform or the monitoring, restructuring,
reforming, modernising and strengthening of the justice sector and the judiciary
were directed at the restoration of its capacity.
The Secretary-General also repeatedly reported that the independence of the
Haitian judiciary had been compromised, ia when observing a generally
excessive dependence of the legal system on the executive branch, which
undermined its credibility.1379 The Ministry of Justice controlled judicial
appointments and job tenure, exercised administrative supervision, determined
the distribution of human resources and material support and took all budgetary
decisions.1380 Additionally, problems were reported with regard to judicial
corruption.1381 Neither statutory- nor constitutional law guaranteed the
independence of the judiciary as it failed to establish the status of judges, the
body that appoints them or the mode of management and discipline of the
judicial corps.1382 Concerns also prevailed regarding the appointment and
dismissal of judges as the interim President ordered the retirement of Supreme
Court judges and immediately nominated their replacements.1383 Judges of the
peace were appointed without following legal requirements and slow progress
in the renewal of the terms of judges remained a serious challenge for the
efficiency of the judiciary.1384 It was further explicitly observed that the
Mission in Haiti’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/439 [40]; SG Report S/2010/446 (n 1377) [32];
SG Report S/2016/225 (n 1094) [33; 38]; SG Report S/2016/753 (n 1072) [25; 27; 31;
Annex, para 11].
1379 SG Report S/2004/300 (n 1053) [35]; SG Report S/2006/60 (n 1377) [37; 43]; SG Report
S/2006/592 (n 1378) [23]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2006) UN Doc
S/2006/1003 [30]; SG Report S/2013/493 (n 1064) [39; 62]; SG Report S/2015/667
(n 1053) [27].
1380 SG Report S/2006/60 (n 1377) [37].
1381 ibid; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/503 [2; 47]; SG
Report S/2010/446 (n 1377) [69]; SG Report S/2016/753 (n 1072) [62].
1382 SG Report S/2006/60 (n 1377) [37]; SG Report S/2006/592 (n 1378) [23]. Later reports,
however, reported progress in this regard with bills being passed on the status of
magistrates, the Superior Council, which oversees their functions, and the school of
magistrates. See, SG Report S/2007/503 (n 1381) [5; 41]; UNSC Report of the
Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization
Mission in Haiti’ (2008) UN Doc S/2008/202 [34]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti’ (2008) UN Doc S/2008/586 [25].
1383 SG Report S/2006/60 (n 1377) [37].
1384 SG Report S/2013/493 (n 1064) [34]; SG Report S/2015/667 (n 1053) [21].
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judiciary lacked actual independence from political interference and that the
vetting of magistrates and the evaluation of judges stagnated due to the lacking
funding of the vetting commission and the pending approval of the evaluation
rules by the Superior Council of the Judiciary.1385
That the described judicial deficits compromise the independence of the
judiciary was sometimes reflected in Council resolutions issued during the
reporting period. The Council, eg, urged the government to ensure that an
independent judiciary be among its highest priorities, albeit only in the
preamble of the concerned resolution and during a time – in 2004 – preceding
the period during which reports of circumstances affecting the independence of
the Haitian judiciary accumulated.1386 For the ensuing years, then, the Council
did not refer to the guarantee of an independent judiciary even though the
Secretary-General often reported about deficiencies in this regard. Only starting
in October 2013, deficits with regard to the independence of the judiciary were
no longer only reflected in Secretary-General reports but also in Council
resolutions as it recognised the steps taken by the Superior Council of the
Judiciary to carry out its mandate and promote the strengthening of judicial
independence and encouraged the Haitian authorities to implement the justice
reform with the aim of ensuring the independence and effectiveness of judicial
institutions.1387 Here again – as in reaction to the situation in Burundi –, one
encounters one of the rare occasions where the Council explicitly identifies the
goal of justice reform with regard to judicial institutions, ie to ensure their
independence and effectiveness. In reaction to most Secretary-General reports
emphasising problems with regard to the independence of the judiciary,
however, the Council only used operational language that focused on a need to
1385 A decree establishing the Conseil superieur du povoir judiciaire was widely criticised for
leaving the door open for continued government interference. See, SG Report S/2006/592
(n 1378) [23]. Several years later, the Secretary-General reported that the Superior
Council of the Judiciary had taken steps to consolidate its authority over the judiciary in
an effort to reduce political interference with judicial affairs. See, SG Report S/2013/493
(n 1064) [34]. Subsequent reports, however, criticised that the slow progress in the
renewal of the terms of judges remained a serious challenge for the efficiency of the
judiciary and highlighted the structural weakness of the system, rooted in the
Constitution and in the law on the status of the judges, which could translate into biased
appointments and inefficient career-management processes. See, SG Report S/2015/667
(n 1053) [21]. See also, SG Report S/2016/753 (n 1072) [27; Annex, para 11].
1386 UNSC Res 1542 (30April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1542 [preamble, indent 4].
1387 UNSC Res 2070 (12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [11]; UNSC Res 2119
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [preamble, indent 9; 14]; UNSC Res 2180
(14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2180 [preamble, indent 11; 16]; UNSC Res 2243
(14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [preamble, indent 13; 20]; UNSC Res 2313
(13October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2313 [22].
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reform, strengthen or restructure the judiciary without identifying the concrete
judicial qualities that should be advanced by such activities.1388 As stated
before, with a view to a possible trend towards the legalisation of Council
action and language, it would be normatively desirable that the Council
identified the institutional guarantees that operational measures should advance.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Secretary-General observed
explicitly that the country required significant international support to build the
capacity of the justice system and recommended that MONUC would support
the government in this regard.1389 He further reported that provincial authorities
lacked effective capacity and that institutions were under-resourced and under-
funded and judicial services weak.1390 The country suffered from a lack of
adequate judicial institutions as those foreseen in the constitution such as the
Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court needed yet to be established
and as civilian justice mechanisms were in a dilapidated state.1391 The civilian
justice system was marked by a lack of material resources to the extent
that it operated on less than 1% of the national budget and was missing a
proper administrative system for finance, personnel, case-tracking, budget,
procurement and asset management.1392 Moreover, the judicial system was
compromised by an absence of judicial personnel with substantially fewer
judges and prosecutors in place than needed and inadequate security
arrangements for magistrates.1393 Additionally, accountability for crimes
1388 UNSC Res 1658 (14 February 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1658 [preamble, indent 14]; UNSC
Res 1702 (15August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1702 [preamble, indent 9; 14]; UNSC Res
1743 (15 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1743 [preamble, indents 9 & 11]; UNSC Res
1780 (15October 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1780 [preamble, indent 15]; UNSC Res 1840
(14October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1840 [preamble, indents 17 & 18; 17]; UNSC Res
1892 (13October 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1892 [preamble, indent 14; 15; 26]; UNSC Res
1944 (14October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1944 [preamble, indent 17; 9]; UNSC Res 2012
(14October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2012 [preamble, indent 23; 8].
1389 SG Report S/2007/156 (n 941) [37; 53]; SG Report S/2008/433 (n 941) [45]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2016) UN
Doc S/2016/833 [49].
1390 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Special Report of the Secretary-General on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region’ (2013) UN Doc S/
2013/119 [19].
1391 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’
(2010) UN Doc S/2010/164 [49]; SG Report S/2013/119 (n 1390) [5].
1392 SG Report S/2010/164 (n 1391) [49]; SG Report S/2013/119 (n 1390) [22].
1393 SG Report S/2010/164 (n 1391) [49]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2012) UN Doc S/2012/355 [39]; SG Report S/
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constituted a problem as justice authorities required UN assistance to investigate
and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, sexual and gender-based as
well as other serious crimes allegedly committed by rebel groups, the FARDC
and the police nationale congolaise.1394
In addition to these judicial deficits of a more capacity-related nature, the
Secretary-General also reported of judicial corruption, frequent interferences in
the justice process by government officials, state institutions that had become co-
opted by private interests and the manipulation of justice, in particular in cases
involving opposition leaders and civil society representatives.1395 The described
deficiencies affecting the national judiciary in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo can clearly be qualified as pertaining to its independence, impartiality,
effectiveness or capacity. The Council, however, invoked none of these concepts
in its resolutions on the situation in the DRC during the concerned reporting
period. To the extent that the Secretary-General reported about problems
pertaining to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, such omissions
derogate from a possible trend towards the legalisation of Council language and
action.
Reporting on the situation in South Sudan, the Secretary-General noted a
weak administration of justice and a lack of capacity in judicial institutions.1396
The government needed support in developing its military justice system and in
building an independent and competent judicial system.1397 Further problems
related to a lack of accountability and arbitrary detentions due to high
2013/119 (n 1390) [22]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’ (2014) UN Doc S/2014/157 [62]; SG Report S/2016/833
(n 1389) [49].
1394 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’
(2015) UN Doc S/2015/172 [52]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation
Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region’ (2016) UN Doc
S/2016/232 [20]; SG Report S/2016/233 (n 853) [44]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-
General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2016) UN Doc S/
2016/579 [21; 39; 42]; SG Report S/2016/833 (n 1389) [48].
1395 SG Report S/2010/164 (n 1391) [49]; SG Report S/2013/119 (n 1390) [19; 22]; SG
Report S/2016/833 (n 1389) [46].
1396 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Special report of the Secretary-General on the
Sudan’ (2011) UN Doc S/2011/314 [32]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General,
‘Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan’ (2011) UN Doc S/2011/678 [60].
1397 SG Report S/2011/314 (n 1396) [32; 41].
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caseloads.1398 The Council resolution responding to these circumstances did not
explicitly identify capacity-building of the judiciary as the goal of operational
measures but came close to it when holding that UNMISS’ mandate should be
implemented with a view to strengthening the capacity of the government and
developing the government’s capacity to establish the rule of law and
strengthen the justice sector.1399 Problems with regard to the independence of
the judicial system as reported by the Secretary-General, however, were not
reflected in the corresponding resolution.
In Côte d’Ivoire, the Secretary-General reported that most of the judicial
infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed and that as a result of the crisis,
the judicial system had practically ceased to function, with the judiciary
collapsing in the south.1400 The majority of the southern courts were partially
damaged or looted and in the north many redeployed judges and prosecutors
had abandoned their posts.1401 The judiciary suffered from insufficient material
and financial resources, inefficient proceedings and inadequate case
management.1402 Additionally, the Secretary-General reported of an absent
independence of the judiciary, a politicisation of its personnel and of judicial
corruption.1403 Even though these problems could have been easily subsumed
under the concepts, the Council did neither identify the impartiality,
independence nor the capacity of the judiciary as goals of the national justice
sector strategy, the multi-year joint UN justice support programme or the re-
establishment and reinforcement of the judiciary.1404 With regard to a trend
towards the legalisation of Council language and action, the use of operational
instead of non-technical language does not constitute a problem. The Council’s
omission of invocations of a need to enhance the impartiality and independence
of the judiciary in reaction to the circumstances prevailing in Côte d’Ivoire,
however, clearly derogates from such a trend.
In Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General over a number of years observed a
generic weakness of the judicial sector, an absence of (qualified) judicial
personnel, inadequate material resources for judicial institutions, precarious
security conditions for judicial personnel, a backlog in court cases and a lack of
1398 SG Report S/2011/314 (n 1396) [32]; SG Report S/2011/678 (n 1396) [62].
1399 UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996 [3 (c) (i)].
1400 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General




1404 UNSC Res 2000 (27 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2000 [7 (f); 10].
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accountability for sexual and gender-based violence.1405 A 2007 report
emphasised a steady progress in promoting the independence of the judiciary,
indicating that problems had existed in this regard.1406 Council resolutions on
the situation in Sierra Leone, however, do not provide a deeper insight as to
what exactly the Council might have understood by its assessment that the
judiciary needed to be strengthened.1407 They neither referred to problems with
regard to judicial independence, effectiveness or capacity nor to any related
guarantee or concept and did, thus, not shed additional light on how the
Council concretely classified the judiciary’s deficiencies.
On Guinea-Bissau the Secretary-General reported that the state was hardly
present outside the capital, state institutions remained weak and the capacity of
Guinea-Bissau to ensure minimum access to basic social services in national
institutions such as, eg, the judiciary, was insufficient.1408 Access to justice
was undermined by an insufficient and degraded state infrastructure and
an inadequate legislative framework.1409 There was a prevailing culture of
impunity as the judiciary was incapable of ensuring accountability for
crimes.1410 Judicial authorities were unable to address violence against women
and children as they lacked sufficient material and human resources and the
judicial system was marked by an absence of judges and prosecutors.1411 The
measures to support the country were described as capacity development
measures such as training in civil- and criminal law for magistrates, judges and
1405 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’ (2000) UN Doc S/2000/751 [11]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Twenty-sixth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’ (2005) UN Doc S/2005/596 [33]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Third report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone’ (2006) UN Doc S/2006/922 [49]; UNSC
Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone’ (2008) UN Doc S/2008/281 [42].
1406 UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/704 [24].
1407 UNSC Res 1315 (14August 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1315 [preamble, indent 11]; UNSC
Res 1734 (22December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1734 [7]; UNSC Res 1793 (31December
2007) UN Doc S/RES/1793 [7]; UNSC Res 1829 (4August 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1829
[7]; UNSC Res 1886 (15 September 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1886 [6].
1408 SG Report S/2013/262 (n 1298) [45]; SG Report S/2014/333 (n 1305) [39]; SG Report S/
2015/37 (n 1053) [49; 53].
1409 SG Report S/2013/262 (n 1298) [45].
1410 ibid [46]; SG Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [53]; SG Report S/2015/626 (n 1301) [19].
1411 SG Report S/2015/626 (n 1301) [20]; UNSC Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Report of
the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United
Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau’ (2016) UN Doc S/2016/141
[27].
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prosecutors and the construction of courts and the National Programme for
Justice Reform was, ia, meant to strengthen human and material capacities.1412
Additionally, the Secretary-General reported that the actual independence
of the judiciary from political interference was not warranted in Guinea-
Bissau, that the judiciary was susceptible to corruption and bribery owing to
low wages and frequent delays in the payment of salaries, that security
measures for judges and prosecutors were inadequate and that judicial actors
were exposed to threats.1413 Reflecting these judicial deficits, training measures
of judicial officials were addressed at strengthening their independence and
impartiality.1414
The problems affecting the judiciary in Guinea-Bissau would have provided
ample ground for an invocation of the need to enhance the independence,
impartiality, effectiveness or capacity of the judiciary. Council resolutions
reacting to Secretary-General reports that included references to problems with
regard to the independence, impartiality, effectiveness or capacity of the
judiciary, however, did not portray the reform of the justice sector as directed at
guaranteeing or restoring any of these rule of law guarantees or judicial virtues.
The Council did, however, mandate UNIOGBIS to provide advice and support
in developing civilian and military justice systems that are compliant with
international standards.1415 Council resolutions may thus be read to react to
Secretary-General reports if one bears in mind that the guarantee of an
independent and impartial tribunal may be subsumed under the notion of
international standards pertaining to the judiciary.1416 As discussed above,
however, the notion of international standards is relatively vague and does,
thus, not provide a precise guideline or contribute significantly to a legalisation
of Council language and action.
In the Central-African Republic, UN support measures aimed at the
establishment of judicial institutions such as the Special Criminal Court, the
deployment of magistrates, judges and prosecutors, the rehabilitation of courts,
the training of judicial personnel, the consolidation of the justice sector’s
governance- and accountability structures and at augmenting local capacity to
process criminal cases.1417 The Secretary-General recommended that the
1412 SG Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [20]; SG Report S/2015/626 (n 1301) [47].
1413 SG Report S/2013/262 (n 1298) [46]; SG Report S/2014/333 (n 1305) [16]; SG Report S/
2015/37 (n 1053) [49; 53]; SG Report S/2016/141 (n 1411) [27].
1414 SG Report S/2015/37 (n 1053) [28; 53].
1415 UNSC Res 2103 (22May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2103 [1 (e)]; UNSC Res 2157 (29May
2014) UN Doc S/RES/2157 [1 (d)]; UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/
2203 [2 (b)]; UNSC Res 2267 (26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267 [2 (b)].
1416 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [n 6f].
1417 SG Report S/2016/305 (n 950) [43f]; SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [24; 39; 47].
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country’s national courts be strengthened and encouraged the appointment of
national magistrates and the provision of financial and technical support to
establish the Special Criminal Court and called upon all actors to ensure
accountability for crimes committed during the unrest of September 2015.1418
The judicial system was further described as incapable of ensuring
accountability for serious crimes and the judiciary suffered from an absence of
judicial personnel with adequate professional training and lacking resources.1419
Observations regarding the absence of relevant legislation guaranteeing the
independence of the judiciary and of threats to magistrates and their families and
the Secretary-General’s call upon national authorities to implement the reforms
necessary to establish an independent judiciary also proved deficiencies with
regard to the independence of the judiciary.1420
The Council did not identify whether the strengthening of justice institutions
or the restoration and administration of the judiciary in the Central African
Republic were directed at guaranteeing judicial independence or any other rule
of law guarantee or at re-establishing the capacity of the judiciary. Both
resolutions which used operational language, however, did also contain
references to a need to build the capacities of the national judicial system and
the resolution following the Secretary-General report that had emphasised
deficits with regard to judicial independence authorised MINUSCA to help
CAR authorities reinforce the independence of the judiciary.1421 The Council,
thus, seemed to react to the input provided by the Secretary-General in its
resolutions, albeit it did not clearly establish whether the operational measures
were directed at restoring the capacity or independence of the judiciary. This,
however, may be legitimately inferred.
On Afghanistan the Secretary-General reported that the justice sector lacked
the required number of skilled staff and that permanent justice institutions were
in need of rehabilitation measures.1422 Several years later, the situation was
marked, ia, by insufficient security conditions for judges and prosecutors as
judicial institutions were subjected to violent attacks, corruption among the
judiciary and prosecutorial services and a limited presence of justice officials at
district levels due to security concerns, poor infrastructure and low salaries.1423
1418 SG Report S/2016/305 (n 950) [44].
1419 SG Report S/2016/565 (n 944) [24].
1420 ibid [24; 63].
1421 UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [33 (a) (i)]; UNSC Res 2301
(26 July 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [35 (a) (i)].
1422 SG Report A/59/581–S/2004/925 (n 1294) [26f].
1423 SG Report A/64/705–S/2010/127 (n 1296) [page 17]; SG Report A/66/604–S/2011/772
(n 1295) [38]; SG Report A/67/889–S/2013/350 (n 1296) [19; 27]; SG Report A/68/609-
S/2013/535 (n 1296) [35].
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The emphasis of judicial deficits in Afghanistan lay, thus, on problems
which could have justified Council resolutions invoking the concept of judicial
independence or references to the effectiveness or capacity of the judicial
system. The Council used operational language only in the preambular parts of
its resolutions on Afghanistan. There, it repeatedly emphasised a need to
accelerate justice reform and the importance of strengthening judicial
institutions, whereas the operative parts of its resolutions focused on the need
to establish a fair and transparent judicial system.1424 It may, thus, be concluded
that the emphasis of Council resolutions lay on building a judicial system
satisfying the standards of fairness and transparency. As already discussed, the
invocation of the concepts of judicial fairness and transparency can be read as a
more or less adequate reaction to the concrete problems affecting the national
judiciary as described by the Secretary-General. In reaction to the situation in
Afghanistan, the Council’s reaction may thus be interpreted to not derogate
from but rather contribute to a possible trend of legalisation of Council action
and language.
3. Analysis
a. Relationship of Council Language to a Trend of Legalisation
A typical characteristic of operational language is its vague and abstract
character. It is often difficult to determine what the Council has in mind exactly
when requiring, eg, that the judicial system or judiciary be reorganised,
strengthened, reformed, assessed, developed or supported. Often also, Council
resolutions identify only abstract goals for which such operational measures
should aim. In Somalia, eg, re-establishing the judicial system was geared
1424 For operational language in the preambular parts of Council resolutions on Afghanistan,
see UNSC Res 1589 (24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1589 [preamble, indent 4]; UNSC
Res 1943 (13October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1943 [preamble, indent 22]; UNSC Res
2011 (12October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2011 [preamble, indent 28]; UNSC Res 2069
(9October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2069 [preamble, indent 27]; UNSC Res 2120
(10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2120 [preamble, indent 28]. For legalised language in
the operative parts of Council resolutions on Afghanistan, see UNSC Res 1536 (26March
2004) UN Doc S/RES/1536 [10]; UNSC Res 1589 (24March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/
1589 [9]; UNSC Res 1662 (23March 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1662 [11]; UNSC Res 1746
(23March 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1746 [13]; UNSC Res 1806 (29March 2008) UN Doc
S/RES/1806 [21]; UNSC Res 1868 (23March 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1868 [23]; UNSC
Res 1917 (22March 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1917 [30]; UNSC Res 1974 (22March
2011) UN Doc S/RES/1974 [31]; UNSC Res 2041 (22March 2012) UN Doc S/RES/
2041 [37]; UNSC Res 2096 (19March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2096 [38]; UNSC Res
2145 (17March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2145 [38]; UNSC Res 2210 (16March 2015) UN
Doc S/RES/2210 [37]; UNSC Res 2274 (15March 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2274 [46].
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towards the restoration of public order.1425 In Haiti, the strengthening of the
judicial system was directed at supporting a more integrated and cohesive
Haitian security sector.1426 MONUSCO in the DRC was mandated to support
efforts of the authorities to strengthen and reform judicial institutions in order
to contribute to stabilisation and peace consolidation.1427 In South Sudan, the
Council identified justice sector support as a peacebuilding task and in Sierra
Leone the strengthening of the judiciary was aimed at promoting good
governance.1428
Only rarely does the Council name concrete goals of the measures it expects
to be undertaken when using operational language. Whereas the abstract goals
couch operational measures in terms of the Council’s general mandate to
maintain international peace and security, the more concrete goals add
some clarity to the question as to what this may entail concretely such as
fighting corruption and guaranteeing access to justice in Guinea-Bissau,
ensuring accountability for crimes in Timor-Leste, Côte d’Ivoire and Somalia,
addressing impunity in the DRC or protecting civilians in Liberia and the
DRC.1429
1425 UNSC Res 886 (18November 1993) UN Doc S/RES/886 [8]; UNSC Res 897
(4 February 1994) UN Doc S/RES/897 [preamble, indent 10] (emphasis added).
1426 UNSC Res 2012 (14October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2012 [preamble, indent 23]; UNSC
Res 2070 (12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [preamble, indent 10]; UNSC Res
2119 (10October 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2119 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2180
(14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2180 [preamble, indent 7]; UNSC Res 2243
(14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [preamble, indent 9] (emphasis added).
1427 UNSC Res 1925 (28May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1925 [12 (l)] (emphasis added).
1428 On South Sudan, see UNSC Res 1996 (8 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996 [18]. On Sierra
Leone, see UNSC Res 1734 (22December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1734 [7]; UNSC Res
1793 (31December 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1793 [7]; UNSC Res 1829 (4August 2008)
UN Doc S/RES/1829 [7]; UNSC Res 1886 (15 September 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1886
[6] (emphasis added).
1429 On Guinea-Bissau, see UNSC Res 2203 (18 February 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2203
[preamble, indent 4; 10]; UNSC Res 2267 (26 February 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2267
[preamble, indent 3; 14]. On Timor-Leste, see UNSC Res 1338 (31 January 2001) UN
Doc S/RES/1338 [8]; UNSC Res 1745 (22 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1745 [9]. On
Côte d’Ivoire see, UNSC Res 2000 (27 July 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2000 [10]. On
Somalia, see UNSC Res 2102 (2May 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2102 [2 (d) (iv)]; UNSC
Res 2158 (29May 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2158 [1 (d) (iv)]. On Liberia, see UNSC Res
2190 (15December 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2190 [preamble, indent 3]; UNSC Res 2239
(17 September 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2239 [preamble, indent 4]. On the DRC, see
UNSC Res 2098 (28March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098 [preamble, indent 24]; UNSC
Res 2147 (28March 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2147 [preamble, indents 27 & 28]; UNSC
Res 2211 (26March 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2211 [16; 29]; UNSC Res 2277 (30March
2016) UN Doc S/RES/2277 [2].
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Another way to ascertain what operational language implies concretely is to
have a look at whether the Council identified concrete measures that need to be
undertaken in the name of such language. Here also, however, the Council
usually paints with a broad brush and omits to explain what precise actions its
operational language shall involve if implemented on the ground. UNOSOM II,
eg, was mandated to assist in the reorganisation of the Somali judicial system
without further directions as to what this reorganisation should involve.1430
UNMIL in Liberia was required to assist the transitional government in
developing a strategy to consolidate judicial institutions without specifying
what consolidation exactly amounts to.1431 In Timor-Leste, the Council referred
to a need to strengthen and support the justice sector but did not elaborate what
this would entail concretely.1432 Also in Burundi, the Council mandated ONUB
to provide advice and assistance to the transitional government to complete the
reform of the judiciary but did not clarify what exactly this judicial reform
should involve.1433
Sometimes, however, the Council goes into more detail and provides an
insight into what measures it expects to be undertaken when using operational
language. In Haiti, eg, reform of the judicial system and of rule of law
institutions involved the provision of experts to serve as professional resources,
the establishment of and ongoing support to the Superior Council of the
Judiciary, nominations for superior judicial institutions, the reorganisation and
standardisation of court registration processes and the management of
cases.1434 Also in the Central African Republic, the Council was relatively
concrete with regard the measures it expected to be undertaken when using
operational language. It, eg, called on authorities to take concrete steps to
strengthen justice institutions and in this regard to swiftly implement the law
1430 UNSC Res 897 (4 February 1994) UN Doc S/RES/897 [2 (d)] (emphasis added).
1431 UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509 [3 (q)] (emphasis added).
1432 UNSC Res 1543 (14May 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1543 [preamble, indent 8; 3 (i)]; UNSC
Res 1745 (22 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1745 [9]; UNSC Res 1912 (26 February
2010) UN Doc S/RES/1912 [10]; UNSC Res 1969 (24 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/
1969 [12]; UNSC Res 2037 (23 February 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2037 [11] (emphasis
added).
1433 UNSC Res 1545 (21May 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1545 [6].
1434 UNSC Res 1702 (15August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1702 [14]; UNSC Res 1840
(14October 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1840 [17]; UNSC Res 1892 (13October 2009) UN
Doc S/RES/1892 [15]; UNSC Res 1944 (14October 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1944 [9];
UNSC Res 2012 (14October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2012 [8]; UNSC Res 2070
(12October 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2070 [11]; UNSC Res 2119 (10October 2013) UN
Doc S/RES/2119 [14]; UNSC Res 2180 (14October 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2180 [16];
UNSC Res 2243 (14October 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2243 [20]; UNSC Res 2313
(13October 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2313 [22] (emphasis added).
Part 3 – The Council Conceptualisation of the Rule of Law
306
establishing the Special Criminal Court, to ensure access to fair and equal
justice for all and to swiftly operationalize the Special Criminal Court.1435
Resolutions that provide concrete input as to the measures the Council expects
to be undertaken when reverting to operational language, however, remain
the exception. Usually, when trying to determine what measures the
Council envisaged when using operational language, one is thus left to the
interpretation of supplementary materials such as Secretary-General reports. If
the Council does not clearly identify the rule of law guarantee that is affected
by judicial deficits and that should be re-established when using operational
measures, a detailed description of the measures it expects to be undertaken
may also contribute to a crystallisation of its rule of law understanding to the
extent that it identifies concretely what it considers necessary to establish or
strengthen a national judiciary.
Regarding a possible trend towards the legalisation of Council language, the
use of operational language must be qualified as a derogation from such a
process if judicial deficits could have also been described and addressed with
reference to rule of law guarantees pertaining to the judiciary. In many
countries with regard to which the Security Council used operational language
to address judicial deficits, the judiciary was affected by problems that related
to its effective functioning or capacity. Secretary-General reports focused on
deficits in the effective functioning of the judiciary or judicial capacity in
countries such as Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South
Sudan. Rarely, however, did Council resolutions pick up on this specific input
and invoked a need to address a lack in judicial effectiveness or capacity. The
Council did so, however, in Timor-Leste where it considered it necessary to
enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary system and to build the capacity of
the justice sector or in Burundi where it requested BINUB to strengthen the
justice system, including the capacity of the judiciary.
If deficits affecting the judiciary or judicial system can only be described in
terms of its lacking capacity, the use of operational language does not
necessarily derogate from a possible trend in legalisation of Council action and
language. It does so only if a lack in judicial capacity could have also been
described as affecting rule of law guarantees such as, eg, the effectiveness of
the judiciary which can be related to the rights of an effective remedy or
expeditious proceedings. It is more problematic with a view to a possible trend
of legalisation of Council action if Secretary-General reports contain explicit
1435 UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [11]; UNSC Res 2301 (26 July
2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [10].
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1435 UNSC Res 2217 (28April 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2217 [11]; UNSC Res 2301 (26 July
2016) UN Doc S/RES/2301 [10].
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references to deficits in judicial independence, impartiality, effectiveness,
fairness or transparency and the Council only uses operational language. In
Sierra Leone, eg, the situation of the judiciary could have easily been
interpreted as to affect its independence and effectiveness. The Secretary-
General even explicitly referred to problems with regard to the independence of
the judiciary. Nonetheless, the Council did neither invoke the concept of judicial
independence nor that of judicial effectiveness. In Liberia too, the judiciary was
plagued by challenges to its independence for several years but the Council
invoked the concept just once and then only in the preambular part of the
concerned resolution. In Burundi, the Secretary-General clearly identified
problems with regard to the impartiality, independence and effectiveness of the
judiciary but the Council invoked a need to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary only once. In Haiti, Secretary-General reports contained abundant
references to problems with regard to the independence of the judiciary but the
Council primarily reverted to operational language. In South Sudan, the
Secretary-General reported that the government needed support in building an
independent and competent judicial system but the Council did not refer to the
principle of judicial independence in its resolutions on the country. Also in the
DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, Secretary-General reports contained references to
deficits in judicial independence and impartiality but the Council did not
invoke these rule of law guarantees.
Of course, there are some counterexamples too, where the Council seemed
to react more directly to Secretary-General reports and reverted to legalised
language to address judicial deficits. In Afghanistan, eg, the Council used
operational language only in the preamble and referred to a need to establish a
fair and transparent judicial system in the operative part of its resolutions.
Secretary-General reports had contained several references to problems that
could be described as affecting the independence of the judiciary. The reference
to a need to establish a fair judicial system can be understood as capturing
problems in this regard. In Timor-Leste too, the Council did not only use
operational language in response to Secretary-General reports of problems with
regard to judicial independence and effectiveness but also referred to a need to
respect the independence of the judiciary – albeit only in the preamble – and to
enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary system. These examples, however,
seem to be the exception rather than the rule.
Regarding a possible trend towards the legalisation of Council action, it may
thus be summarised that the use of operational language certainly does not
contribute to such a process. If the Council uses operational language only in
reaction to situations that could not also be addressed with reference to rule of
law guarantees pertaining to the judiciary, however, it neither derogates from
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such a trend. Only in those cases where Secretary-General reports referred to
judicial deficits which could have also been described with reference to rule of
law guarantees pertaining to the judiciary, the use of operational language by
the Council clearly opposes a trend towards legalisation. As has just been
illustrated, this has often been the case.
b. Contribution of Council Language to Norm Emergence
As a consequence of the preceding analysis, operational Council language does
neither contribute to the emergence of the rule of law as an international norm in
the international society as the Council does not revert to precise language to
identify and address judicial deficits that can be related to the rule of law and
does not connect its language to identifiable standards whose legitimacy within
international society could be scrutinised. The consistency of the Council’s
reactions can neither be assessed as it uses a wide array of different
formulations, which makes it impossible to create meaningful categories based




a. Factors Advancing a Trend towards the Legalisation of Council Action and
Language
A summary of the above-made observations presents a mixed picture with
regard to a possible trend towards the legalisation of Council language. There
are a number of factors that may be interpreted to support the existence of such
a trend. The strongest case can be made with regard to Council references to the
rule of law principle of judicial independence. It is the only use of legalised
language by the Council, where a comparative analysis of preceding Secretary-
General reports allows for the construction of a possible Council understanding
of its content and meaning. Most relevant for a possible trend towards
legalisation, the Council seems to invoke the principle of judicial independence
in reaction to circumstances that are considered encroachments on the guarantee
of an independent tribunal by the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers and several
regional human rights bodies. This suggests a process of legalisation on two
levels. First, on a linguistic level, as the Council uses precise terms that
expressly invoke a rule of law guarantee whose content enjoys a relatively
established meaning in regional and international human rights law, ie the
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guarantee of an independent tribunal. And second, on a level of application, as
the Council seems to invoke the principle in reaction to circumstances that are
considered encroachments on the guarantee of an independent tribunal by
international and regional human rights bodies.
The Council used legalised language also in Afghanistan when mandating
UNAMA to support the establishment of a fair and transparent judicial system
in order to strengthen the rule of law and later using the same language when
addressing Afghan state institutions. Here, in contrast to Council invocations of
the principle of judicial independence, however, an analysis of Secretary-
General reports preceding the relevant Council resolutions does not allow for a
clear interpretation as to what the Council understands concretely by the
concepts of judicial fairness and transparency. When assessing a possible trend
towards the legalisation of Council language, it must be noted that the problems
affecting the Afghan judicial system could have also been described as judicial
capacity deficits. The Council, however, chose to use terms that can be related to
rule of law guarantees pertaining to the judiciary as guaranteed by regional and
international human rights law – ie fair trial rights and the right to a public
hearing and judgment – even if the Council’s concrete understanding of the
terms cannot be discerned. This factor may be qualified as to contribute to a
trend towards the legalisation of Council language. If compared with Council
references to the principle of judicial independence – which seem to suggest
that the Council engages in a trend of legalisation on a level of language and
interpretation –, references to the fairness and transparency of the judicial
system, however, seem to contribute only to the first level.
Also resonating with rule of law guarantees are Council references to the
effectiveness of the judiciary. What exactly the Council understands by the
concept of judicial effectiveness, however, is difficult to discern based on a
comparative analysis of its resolutions with Secretary-General reports. In
Timor-Leste and the Central African Republic, the judicial system was affected
by problems that could have also been described as affecting the capacity or the
independence of the judiciary. In both situations, the Council also used the
two concepts in the same resolutions that invoked the principle of
judicial effectiveness. Accordingly, a clear distinction between the Council’s
understanding of judicial effectiveness and its understanding of the other two
concepts in these two cases is basically impossible. On a level of application,
thus, the Council’s references to judicial effectiveness do not contribute to a
possible trend in legalisation. On a linguistic level, however, Council references
to judicial effectiveness – which may be considered to resonate with rule of law
guarantees such as the right to expeditious hearings or an effective remedy –
further such a trend.
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The vaguest reference – which may still be considered to contribute to a
possible shift towards a legalisation of Council language – was used in
response to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, where the Council mandated
UNIOGBIS to develop civilian and military justice systems that are compliant
with international standards. The contribution of this formulation to a
legalisation of Council language must be qualified as relatively modest to the
extent that the situation in Guinea-Bissau could have also triggered Council
references to the clearly defined rule of law guarantees of an independent or
impartial judiciary. Such precise references would have contributed to a
clarification of what judicial qualities the Council considered affected
concretely in Guinea-Bissau.
The Council also used legalised language when calling on the government
of Côte d’Ivoire to ensure that the work of the Ivorian judicial system be
impartial, transparent and consistent with internationally agreed standards as
such language can be considered to resonate with the right to an impartial
tribunal or the right to a public hearing and judgment. As illustrated above,
however, a comparative analysis of Secretary-General reports preceding
resolutions invoking the concepts of impartiality, transparency and international
standards, does not reveal a discrete understanding of the different terms by the
Council. Accordingly, the use of the terms contributes only to legalisation on a
linguistic level but not on a level of application as it cannot be assessed whether
the Council invoked the concepts in reaction to circumstances that are
considered encroachments on the related rule of law guarantees by regional and
international human rights bodies.
b. Factors Opposing a Trend towards the Legalisation of Council Action and
Language
As discussed in the course of this chapter, there are also a number of factors that
speak against a trend towards the legalisation of Council language and action.
First, it must be noted that the Council regularly did not refer to the principle
of judicial independence or other established rule of law guarantees even
though the Secretary-General clearly reported about problems affecting these
guarantees.
Second, the use of non-technical terms such as judicial capacity and judicial
authority or the use of operational language neither contribute to a legalisation
of Council language. Particularly not in those cases, where Secretary-General
reports described circumstances that affected, eg, the independence of the
judiciary, its impartiality or another judicial quality that could be identified
with reference to established rule of law guarantees.
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Several situations in response to which the Council referred to the authority
of the judiciary or used operational language, could have also justified
invocations of concrete rule of law guarantees based on the input provided by
the Secretary-General. Only in situations to which the Council reacted by
invoking a need to strengthen judicial capacity, the national judiciaries were
indeed primarily affected by capacity-related deficits and the use of non-
technical language did not contravene a possible trend towards the legalisation
of Council language.
Regarding the two levels of legalisation discussed above, non-technical and
operational language does not contribute to the crystallisation of a rule of law
understanding of the Council. Such language does not invoke or resonate with
rule of law guarantees as established in regional and international human rights
law and its use can thus not be related to their interpretation by competent
regional and international human rights bodies. Further, the use of non-
technical and operational language sometimes even derogates from a trend
towards the legalisation of Council language if used in reaction to situations
that could have been addressed with reference to particular rule of law
guarantees pertaining to the judiciary. Consequently, the use of non-technical
and operational language does also not contribute to the dissemination of a
Council rule of law understanding in the international society as it does not
contribute to a meaningful process of ideation that could result in the
emergence of the rule of law as an international norm that redefines state
identities and interests.
On an operational level, however, it might not matter much whether the
Council uses language that resonates with established rule of law guarantees or
whether it reverts to non-technical or operational language. Implementing actors
such as UNDPKO, UNDPA or OHCHR may engage in very similar
programming or measures regardless of the concrete language used by the
Council as the UN bureaucracy also reverts to internal standards or guidance
notes to flesh out its programmes based on Council mandates.1436 Secretary-
General reports sometimes explicitly mention measures undertaken to, eg,
enhance judicial independence even though the Council did not refer to the
1436 See, eg, the various OHCHR rule-of-law tools for post-conflict states issued between
2006 and 2015 on archives, amnesties, national consultations on transitional justice, the
monitoring of legal systems, truth commissions, the mapping of justice sectors,
prosecution initiatives, vetting, reparations programmes, maximising the legacy of
hybrid courts. ‹http://www.ohchr.org/EN/PublicationsResources/Pages/Methodological
Materials3.aspx› accessed 14 July 2017. Or, eg, UNDPKO, Handbook Multidimensional
Peacekeeping Operations (n 899); SG Guidance Note UN Rule of Law Assistance
(n 1044); UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440).
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guarantee. In Côte d’Ivoire, eg, the Secretary-General reported that UNOCI’s
rule of law unit met with the local judiciary to develop measures to strengthen
the independence of the judiciary and to address problems of corruption.1437
The related Council resolution, however, only mandated UNOCI to assist the
government in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary.1438 In the DRC, the
Secretary-General reported that MONUC facilitated efforts to conduct an
inventory of human and material resources in courts in order to increase the
capacity and independence of the judiciary, including through the recruitment
and deployment of magistrates.1439 MONUC’s mandate during this time,
however, was only geared towards advising the government in strengthening
the capacity of the judicial system.1440 In this sense, the instructions of the
UNDPKO Handbook for Judicial Affairs Officers for peacekeeping missions
supporting the judiciary, eg, explicitly focus on the promotion of the
independence of the judiciary and provide several concrete instructions how to
achieve and maintain judicial independence.1441
From this perspective, non-technical or operational language also forms part
of the rule of law work of the Council to the extent that it initiates reform of
national judiciaries on the ground. As such, it aspires to contribute to the
strengthening of the national rule of law. It, thus, needs to be counted as part of
the Council’s rule of law dissemination work even though it does not contribute
to the evolution of a Council rule of law understanding, which could affect the
emergence of a global concept of the rule of law in the international society by
means of Council resolutions.
1437 SG Report S/2005/398 (n 995) [40].
1438 UNSC Res 1609 (24 June 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1609 [2 (x)].
1439 SG Report S/2008/433 (n 941) [45].
1440 UNSC Res 1756 (15May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1756 [2 (q)]; UNSC Res 1856
(22December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1856 [4 (g)].
1441 UNDPKO, Handbook Judicial Affairs Officers (n 440) 58 (the Handbook observes that
peacekeeping missions that provide assistance to the judiciary may be called on to
highlight any improper pressure on judges, prosecutors and courts; advise on the
appointment and selection of judges, judicial tenure and judicial discipline; monitor the
judicial process, including observing trials; collect, analyse and disseminate criminal
justice data; strengthen court administration and case management; develop ongoing
training programmes (both on- and off-the-job training); mentor and advise judges,
prosecutors and lawyers; improve the quality of justice and access to justice through
reform of criminal law, policy and practice and provide personnel for positions where
local capacity is lacking).
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c. Contribution of Council Language to the Emergence of the Rule of Law as
an International Norm
Closely related to the question whether a legalisation of Council language and
action can be observed and whether the Council has developed an
understanding of the rule of law or certain of its sub-guarantees, is the question
whether the Council may contribute to the evolution of a global understanding
of the rule of law and its emergence as an international norm.
The Council may contribute to such a global understanding based on its
authority to issue binding decisions against UN member states that reform their
rule of law systems and thus change their internal governance structure and
thereby possibly also their rule of law understanding. According to a social-
constructivist approach, the Council may further affect the emergence of the
rule of law as an international norm independently of the use of its enforcement
powers by way of initiating and contributing to a process of ideation on the
principle’s meaning within the international society. A social-constructivist
analysis considers international organisations and their organs as independent
agents, who can provide organisational platforms for the creation and diffusion
of common meanings and ideas and thus contribute to the emergence of norms
that redefine state identities and interests.
It has been proposed that the Council can figure as a norm entrepreneur and
contribute to the emergence of the rule of law as an international norm under
particular circumstances. Accordingly, it is considered most likely that the
Council contributes to the emergence of a global understanding of the rule of
law if it uses precise language in connection with the rule of law, if it invokes
this language consistently in reaction to similar circumstances and if the
standards it relates to the rule of law are perceived legitimate in the international
society. This proposition assumes that vague and inconsistent references to the
rule of law or its sub-guarantees are unlikely to initiate a potent and contoured
process of ideation in the international society as regards the meaning of the
rule of law. It further assumes that borrowing rule of law guarantees from
regional and international human rights law with regard to the language used
and the circumstances of their invocation, vests them with procedural
legitimacy as they constitute standards in whose elaboration a large number
of affected states were involved or to which they subsequently acceded.
Borrowing the language and interpretation of rule of law guarantees from
regional and international human rights law further contributes to their
substantive legitimacy as they come closest to universal standards.
The requirements proposed for the Council to contribute to the emergence of
a global rule of law understanding are satisfied to a large extent in those cases in
which Council language and action with regard to certain rule of law sub-
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guarantees can be described as legalised. The norm emergence requirement of
precision of language can be considered satisfied in those cases in which the
Council uses terms that expressly invoke or resonate with rule of law
guarantees whose content enjoys a relatively established meaning in regional
and international human rights law. The norm emergence requirement of
consistent invocation can be considered satisfied if the Council invokes
particular rule of law guarantees in reaction to circumstances that are
considered encroachments upon these guarantees by regional and international
human rights bodies. Borrowing rule of law language and the conditions of its
invocation from regional and international human rights law further satisfies
the norm emergence requirement of procedural and substantive legitimacy.
To the extent that the criteria of norm emergence largely coincide with the
criteria of legalisation of Council language and action, the Council is most likely to
affect the evolution of a global understanding of the rule of law guarantee of judicial
independence. To a certain extent, the criteria were also fulfilled with regard to
Council invocations of an effective, fair, transparent and impartial judicial system
with regard to the criterion of precision of language as these concepts resonate
with rule of law guarantees whose content enjoys a relatively established meaning
in regional and international human rights law. As has been illustrated above,
however, the consistency of Council invocations of such concepts cannot be
assessed adequately as the Council did not clearly connect them to particular
judicial deficits as reported by the Secretary-General. Their procedural and
substantive legitimacy can be affirmed to the extent that they invoke more or less
universally recognised human rights guarantees. As it cannot be determined
whether the Council invokes such concepts in reaction to circumstances that are
considered encroachments upon the relatable human rights guarantees, however, it
cannot be concluded that it actually implements such standards.
The requirements of norm emergence proposed here are, thus, best fulfilled
by Council invocations of the concept of the independence of the judiciary.
2. Quantitative Analysis
If one takes the position that the use of language by international organisations can
shape and disseminate ideas in international society or reflect such processes, a
quantitative analysis seems to be a necessary corollary to a qualitative analysis as it
must be assumed that often and repeatedly expressed ideas aremore influential than
ideas that are only rarely invoked. The present thesis, thus, presents the quantitative
results based on the resolutions it has examined.1442
1442 While the thesis has tried to work with all relevant resolutions that were issued on the
respective subjects, the selection of resolutions and Council paragraphs has relied on the
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The Council referred to the principle of judicial independence in a total of
35 resolutions, 38 paragraphs and in reaction to 12 country situations.1443 11 of
the 37 paragraphs invoking the term were of a binding nature, 14 non-binding
but in the operative part of the concerned resolutions and 13 in the preambular
part. These numbers are remarkable if compared to the use of non-technical
terms in Council resolutions. For example, the Council invoked the concept of
judicial authority in only five resolutions and only in reaction to the situation in
Côte d’Ivoire. All references, however, were of a binding nature. The concept of
judicial capacity was referred to in 26 Council resolutions and 43 paragraphs,
reacting to only five country situations.1444 Eight of the 26 paragraphs were
binding, 16 non-binding but in the operative part of the said resolutions and 11
in the preambular part.
Only the use of operational language may compare with the frequency and
legal effects of references to the principle of judicial independence. In 70
resolutions, 102 paragraphs and with regard to 13 country situations did the
Council use operational language to address judicial deficits.1445 19 of the said
paragraphs were of a binding character, 32 non-binding but included in the
operative part of the concerned resolutions and 51 in the preambular part.
In comparison, of course, this clearly shows that the Council most
frequently used operational language in its resolutions, which does not
contribute to the legalisation of Council language and action. However, half of
the uses of operational language occurred in the preambular part of resolutions
and only 19 in binding paragraphs.
If looking at a wider trend towards the legalisation of Council language, one
also needs to illustrate the use of the other concepts referred to by the Council
that are qualified here as legalised language. The Council, eg, invoked the need
for judicial institutions compliant with international standards in six resolutions,
six binding paragraphs and in reaction to one country situation, ie Guinea-
Bissau. It used the reference to an impartial, transparent and fair judicial
results of the online UN Official Document System’s full-text search programme as well
as on a qualitative reading of Council resolutions containing explicit references to the rule
of law. A certain degree of inaccuracy is thus possible and the presented figures must be
understood as plausible approximations that are as accurate as possible.
1443 Guinea-Bissau, Sudan & South Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Eastern Chad,
Libya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Haiti, Liberia and
Timor-Leste.
1444 Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Liberia and
Somalia.
1445 Somalia, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Burundi, Haiti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South
Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic,
Afghanistan and Liberia.
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system, consistent with internationally agreed standards in 18 resolutions and 18
paragraphs, two of which were binding and 16 non-binding but in the operative
part of the concerned resolutions and in reaction to two country situations. The
concept of an effective judiciary was invoked in 16 resolutions (including one
thematic resolution) and 16 paragraphs, six of which were binding, five non-
binding but included in the operative part of the said resolutions and five in the
preambular parts.
If one compares the total of all paragraphs using legalised language with the
total of paragraphs using non-technical and operational language, the result is
the following: The Council used legalised language in 25 binding paragraphs,
35 non-binding but operative paragraphs and 17 preambular paragraphs. Non-
technical language was used in 13 binding, 20 non-binding but operative and
15 preambular paragraphs. As already stated, operational language was used
in 19 binding, 32 non-binding but operative and 51 preambular paragraphs.
Overall, the use of non-technical and operational language with regard to the
judiciary, thus, prevails but the numbers also illustrate a clear Council
commitment to the use of legalised language based on a simple quantitative
assessment and to the extent that such language was often included in binding
or non-binding but operative paragraphs.
An overall assessment, thus, reveals several factors speaking against a trend
towards the legalisation of Council language and action while a non-negligible
number of observations can also be invoked to support such a trend. From a
normative perspective, it seems desirable that the Council follows and
substantiates this trend if its observations, recommendations and decisions can
be framed with reference to established rule of law guarantees as contained in
regional and international (human rights) law. This would underline a Council
commitment to the Secretary-General’s observation that the UN Charter,
international human rights-, humanitarian-, criminal- and refugee law form the
normative foundation of UN work in advancing the rule of law.1446 To the
extent that these norms and standards are universally applicable, basing
Council decisions, recommendations and observations on them provides the
latter with a high degree of legitimacy not least because it respects the principle
of state sovereignty.1447 If the Council issues measures with regard to rule of law
guarantees pertaining to the judiciary which are guaranteed in international or
regional (human rights) law, its action is thus also legitimised by the fact that it
invokes guarantees to whose legal bindingness the affected states already
expressed their consent.
1446 SG Report S/2004/616 (n 439) [9].
1447 art 2 (1) UN.
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Additionally, Council decisions, recommendations and observations regard-
ing national judiciaries may also contribute to the enforcement of human rights
if they aim at initiating or supporting the implementation of human rights
obligations of the concerned states. Of all possible rule of law areas in which
the Council may be active, reforming national judiciaries may further be
considered particularly relevant for the protection of human rights if one
assumes a connection ‘between the weakening of safeguards for the judiciary
and lawyers and the gravity and frequency of violations of human rights’.1448
1448 UNComHR, Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the




Part 4 – Evaluation
The present thesis responds to the phenomenon that the UN Security Council
has prominently invoked the rule of law in its resolutions for more than two
decades. Legal scholarship has taken note of the Council’s engagement with
the rule of law and addressed the question as to whether the Council has
developed an understanding of the principle’s content and meaning. The overall
conclusion has been that the Council’s rule of law understanding is inconclusive
and legal scholars largely left it at identifying the various contexts in which the
Council invoked the principle. No study, however, has yet attempted to provide
a detailed analysis of the language used by the Council in connection with the
rule of law or a comparative examination of the circumstances that have
triggered the Council’s use of particular rule of law vocabulary. Such an
analysis, however, is indispensable to determine whether the Council has
developed or develops an understanding of the rule of law or its sub-guarantees
and whether its rule of law language may affect the emergence of a global
understanding of the rule of law in the international society.
The present thesis has thus inquired whether references to the rule of law in
Council documents may indicate an already existing consensus on the
principle’s content among the wider UN membership and thus basically the
majority of states. An analysis of the UN organ’s composition and the concrete
chances of non-permanent members and non-Council members to affect its
deliberations and the content of its decisions, however, does not suggest that
references to the rule of law in Council documents reflect an already existing
international consensus as to the meaning of the rule of law. Since the Council
is hardly representative enough for a convincing claim that concepts used in its
documents reflect an international consensus, the thesis then focused on the
question whether Council resolutions reflect the Council’s understanding of the
meaning of the rule of law, ie of its function and content. As the scope of the
thesis did not allow for a comprehensive analysis of the Council’s engagement
with the rule of law, it focused on an analysis of the circumstances and purposes
that have triggered rule of law references in Council resolutions and on a
particular sub-set of the Council’s rule of law vocabulary, ie rule of law
requirements for national judiciaries.
The thesis claims the existence of indicators of a possible trend towards the
crystallisation of a Council rule of law understanding and describes this trend as
a legalisation of Council language and action. Legalised Council language uses
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terms that resonate with or expressly invoke a rule of law guarantee whose
content enjoys a relatively established meaning in regional and international
(human rights) law. The Council’s actions are described as legalised if the
Council invokes such rule of law guarantees in reaction to circumstances that
are considered encroachments upon them in the jurisprudence of regional or
international human rights bodies. The legalisation of Council language and
action can be observed with regard to the rule of law guarantee of judicial
independence. Council language referring to the principle of an independent
judiciary expressly invokes the human rights guarantee of an independent
tribunal as guaranteed in the ICCPR and various regional human rights treaties.
Additionally, the Council has invoked the rule of law principle in reaction to
circumstances that are considered encroachments upon the guarantee of an
independent tribunal by the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers and by various
regional human rights bodies. With regard to the rule of law guarantee of an
independent tribunal, a legalisation of Council language and action can thus be
confirmed.
A legalisation of Council language can further be observed with regard to
resolutions that invoke a need to enhance, strengthen or ensure the
effectiveness of the judiciary or judicial institutions. The language used by the
Council can be considered to resonate with the human rights to expeditious
proceedings and an effective remedy. The Council’s invocation of the concept,
however, cannot be considered to contribute to a trend of legalisation on a level
of application as a comparative reading of Secretary-General reports and
Council resolutions does not result in a clear determination of the Council’s
understanding of the concept of judicial effectiveness. It is thus impossible
to determine whether the Council invoked the concept in reaction to
circumstances that are considered encroachments upon the rights to expeditious
hearings and an effective remedy by regional and international human rights
bodies.
The same applies more or less to Council references to the impartiality,
fairness, transparency and compliance with internationally agreed standards of
judicial systems. Here again, a legalisation of Council language can be
observed to the extent that such references can be related to the right to an
impartial tribunal, fair trial rights or the right to a public hearing and judgment.
As the Council has always invoked these terms collectively, however, it is
impossible to discern its discrete understanding of the different concepts. It can
thus only be assumed which terms the Council uses in response to which
particular judicial deficits as reported by the Secretary-General. Accordingly,
the construction of a tentative Council understanding of the concepts used
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becomes rather hypothetical and it is impossible to conclusively assess whether
the Council invoked these concepts in reaction to circumstances that are
considered encroachments upon relatable rule of law guarantees in the
jurisprudence of regional or international human rights bodies.
Overall, the thesis thus concludes that there is evidence of a legalisation
of Council language and action which contributes to a crystallisation of the
Council’s rule of law understanding but that this trend is not sufficiently
entrenched at the present time to amount to a clear tendency of legalisation of
Council language and action in the context of the rule of law.
The thesis further assessed whether Council language on rule of law
requirements for national judiciaries fulfils certain criteria that may affect
the emergence of the rule of law as an international norm that redefines state
identities and interests. The requirements proposed for the Council to affect the
emergence of a global understanding of the content of the rule of law or its sub-
guarantees included the precision of its language, the consistency of its reactions
and the legitimacy of the standards it relates to the rule of law. To the extent that
the criteria of norm emergence largely coincide with the criteria of legalisation
of Council language and action, it was proposed that the Council is most likely
to affect the evolution of a global understanding of the rule of law guarantee of
judicial independence.
Whether a process of legalisation and norm emergence can be observed with
regard to other rule of law guarantees as found in Council documents such as,
eg, the right to due process or the principle of separation of powers, merits
future research that analyses the situations in reaction to which the Council
invoked these rule of law guarantees and an examination of the question
whether it responded to circumstances that are considered encroachments upon
these guarantees in regional or international (human rights) law.1449
A critical reading of the Council’s engagement with the rule of law may
submit that it is a symptom of an only thin or even crumbling consensus within
the Council regarding its role in the promotion of human rights.1450 If the
Council’s rule of law agenda would indeed develop at the cost of its human
rights agenda and not only serve its disguise, then the criticism may be levelled
1449 Such a comparative analysis will be easier with regard to rule of law guarantees that are
protected by clearly identifiable human rights guarantees and be more challenging
regarding rule of law guarantees that are only partially protected by regional or
international human rights law or only as an aggregate of various different guarantees.
1450 Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law (n 3) 14 (‘Incorporating the rule of law into its
vocabulary has allowed for the Council to promote the protection of human rights without
labelling its actions as such, thus avoiding tensions and criticism by those who view the
link between international peace and security and human rights as tenuous.’).
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that the rule of law constitutes ‘a convenient substitute for human rights’ to the
extent that it is less transformative with regard to social change and more
amenable to the introduction of instrumental goals and purposes by promoting
actors.1451 Against this argument, however, it must be advanced that the
institutionalisation of the rule of law may precisely serve the promotion of
human rights to the extent that human rights require a functioning institutional
framework for their enforcement.1452 Further, as has been illustrated, several
human rights guarantees coincide with sub-elements of the rule of law.
Another strand of criticism relates to the argument that the rule of law serves
powerful states sitting on the Council as a tool to engage in the imposition of
domestic institutions in an attempt to dominate states of strategic interest.1453
This assessment may be substantiated by the fact that the Council has
developed its rule of law understanding primarily externally with regard to
other states but did not attribute it equal importance internally with regard to its
own actions as exemplified in the fields of targeted sanctions or its decision-
making procedures.1454 Regardless of the possible motives behind the Council’s
engagement with the rule of law, it is obviously desirable from a normative
perspective that the Council considers itself bound by rule of law principles
if it aspires to figure as a norm entrepreneur in international society regarding
the function and content of the rule of law.1455 This normative position is
also underpinned by the familiar ‘real-political’ argument that the Council’s
effectiveness hinges on its legitimacy.1456
1451 Rajagopal (n 13) 1359 (‘Unlike human rights, the rule of law does not promise the
achievement of any substantive social, political, or cultural goal. It is much more empty
of content and capable of being interpreted in many diverse, sometimes contradictory,
ways.’). For a discussion of the evolution of the status of human rights in Council
resolutions in the context of UN peace operations see, eg, Månsson (n 11) 79-107.
1452 Woodward (n 707) 54 f.
1453 John Owen, ‘The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions’ (2002) 56 IO 375 (who
claims that ‘forcible promotion [of domestic institutions] is most likely when great
powers (1) need to expand their power; and (2) find that, by imposing on smaller states
those institutions most likely to keep their ideological confreres in power, they can bring
those states under their influence.›); Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (n 18) 39
(who finds that ‘rather than being a universal institution that expresses the shared
interests and goals of states, the international rule of law provides political resources
with which states and other actors legitimize and delegitimize contending policies’). The
same claim was traditionally advanced against the promotion of human rights. See, eg,
Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 203 f.
1454 Farrall, United Nations Sanctions (n 16) 22; Elgebeily (n 16).
1455 For a similar argument with regard to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, see
Altwicker and Wieczorek (n 413) 115–133.
1456 See, eg, Bianchi (n 462) 881–919; Frederking (n 7) 39; Christine Gray, ‘The Security
Council and the Rule of Law: An Overview’ (2009) 103 ASIL Proceedings 245, 247;
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that the rule of law constitutes ‘a convenient substitute for human rights’ to the
extent that it is less transformative with regard to social change and more
amenable to the introduction of instrumental goals and purposes by promoting
actors.1451 Against this argument, however, it must be advanced that the
institutionalisation of the rule of law may precisely serve the promotion of
human rights to the extent that human rights require a functioning institutional
framework for their enforcement.1452 Further, as has been illustrated, several
human rights guarantees coincide with sub-elements of the rule of law.
Another strand of criticism relates to the argument that the rule of law serves
powerful states sitting on the Council as a tool to engage in the imposition of
domestic institutions in an attempt to dominate states of strategic interest.1453
This assessment may be substantiated by the fact that the Council has
developed its rule of law understanding primarily externally with regard to
other states but did not attribute it equal importance internally with regard to its
own actions as exemplified in the fields of targeted sanctions or its decision-
making procedures.1454 Regardless of the possible motives behind the Council’s
engagement with the rule of law, it is obviously desirable from a normative
perspective that the Council considers itself bound by rule of law principles
if it aspires to figure as a norm entrepreneur in international society regarding
the function and content of the rule of law.1455 This normative position is
also underpinned by the familiar ‘real-political’ argument that the Council’s
effectiveness hinges on its legitimacy.1456
1451 Rajagopal (n 13) 1359 (‘Unlike human rights, the rule of law does not promise the
achievement of any substantive social, political, or cultural goal. It is much more empty
of content and capable of being interpreted in many diverse, sometimes contradictory,
ways.’). For a discussion of the evolution of the status of human rights in Council
resolutions in the context of UN peace operations see, eg, Månsson (n 11) 79-107.
1452 Woodward (n 707) 54 f.
1453 John Owen, ‘The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions’ (2002) 56 IO 375 (who
claims that ‘forcible promotion [of domestic institutions] is most likely when great
powers (1) need to expand their power; and (2) find that, by imposing on smaller states
those institutions most likely to keep their ideological confreres in power, they can bring
those states under their influence.›); Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (n 18) 39
(who finds that ‘rather than being a universal institution that expresses the shared
interests and goals of states, the international rule of law provides political resources
with which states and other actors legitimize and delegitimize contending policies’). The
same claim was traditionally advanced against the promotion of human rights. See, eg,
Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 203 f.
1454 Farrall, United Nations Sanctions (n 16) 22; Elgebeily (n 16).
1455 For a similar argument with regard to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, see
Altwicker and Wieczorek (n 413) 115–133.
1456 See, eg, Bianchi (n 462) 881–919; Frederking (n 7) 39; Christine Gray, ‘The Security
Council and the Rule of Law: An Overview’ (2009) 103 ASIL Proceedings 245, 247;
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It may well be that the Council’s engagement with the rule of law serves
concealed policy interests given that ‘in public settings impartial arguments and
appeals to collective interest fare better than self-serving arguments’.1457 The rule
of law may well figure as such an impartial argument and provide a convenient
entry point for powerful Council members to advance their geopolitical goals in
foreign states. A social-constructivist account that emphasises the relevance of
norms for the explanation of state behaviour does not preclude such a reading.
Finnemore and Sikkink invoke the concept of ‘strategic social construction’ to
describe how instrumental rationality and norm relevance may coincide.1458
They propose that norm entrepreneurs ‘are making detailed means-ends
calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize
involve changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the
normative commitments of the norm entrepreneur’.
However, so-called impartial arguments that are used to advance hidden
strategic goals still carry the potential ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’ and
accordingly may ‘lead to concessions to the general interest and more equitable
outcomes’.1459 The Council’s strategic engagement with the rule of law may
thus still cater more to the interests of the wider international society as any of
its actions explicitly undertaken in the interest of some Council members only.
Further, even if the Council employs the rule of law strategically to disguise its
true policy interests, this does not speak against the assumption that its – maybe
strategic – use could contribute to the emergence of a global understanding of
the rule of law and that this might be a normatively desirable international
development if it indeed stabilises fragile states and contributes to the
guarantee of higher living standards for individuals inhabiting such states. In
any case, Council references to rule of law guarantees enjoy an enhanced
procedural and substantive legitimacy if informed by regional and international
human rights law with regard to states but also the individuals living in them –
even if undertaken for strategic reasons. Regardless of the possible motivation
of the Council when invoking the rule of law, it is thus normatively desirable
that it bases its rule of law understanding on existing regional or international
(human rights) law to compensate for the lack of inclusion of affected states in
Asada (n 669) 332; Clemens Feinäugle, ‘Theoretical Approaches to the Rule of Law and
Its Application to the United Nations’ in Clemens Feinäugle (ed), The Rule of Law and its
Application to the United Nations (Nomos 2016) 29, 43.
1457 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 454 (referring to Jon Elster, ‘The
Strategic Uses of Argument’ in Kenneth Arrow and others (eds), Barriers to Conflict
Resolution (Norton 1995) 236–257).
1458 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 24) 910.
1459 Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’ (n 24) 454 (again invoking Elster (n 1457)).
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the elaboration of the applied rule of law standards and to ensure that they come
as close as possible to representing universal values.1460 Additionally, such an
approach would be in line with the United Nations purpose to promote and
encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms according to art
1 (3) and art 55 (c) UN Charter.
1460 For a related proposal, see Hestermeyer (n 410) 131–147.
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Beginning in the 1990s, the concept of the rule of law has been increasingly invoked
in UN Security Council resolutions. The Security Council applies the principle of
the rule of law as an instrument to fulfil its core mandate of restoring and maintaining
international peace and security. Taking account of the heterogeneous composition
of the Council and its far-reaching competences, this monograph examines whether
the UN body develops its own understanding of the rule of law, a principle strongly
anchored in national constitutional law, or whether the invocation of the principle in
its resolutions points to an emerging global understanding. For the examination of
the function and partial guarantees of the rule of law in Security Council resolutions,
the monograph undertakes a comparative study of all resolutions that explicitly
mention the principle of the rule of law and thus analyses the phenomenon compre-
hensively. The monograph addresses the central question which role the United 
Nations and the UN Security Council can play in upholding the rule of law nationally
and internationally.
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